IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Joseph Lee Young, FILED Appellant-Defendant Oct 04 2024, 9:03 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court v. Court of Appeals and Tax Court
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
October 4, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CR-2544 Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court The Honorable Douglas B. Cummins, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 41D03-2303-F2-16
Opinion by Judge May Judges Brown and Foley concur.
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 1 of 27 [1] Joseph Lee Young appeals following his convictions of Level 2 felony dealing
methamphetamine in an amount of ten grams or more 1 and Level 6 felony
unlawful possession of a syringe 2 and his adjudication as a habitual offender. 3
Young presents four issues for our review, which we revise, restate, and reorder
as:
1. Whether the warrantless search of Young’s vehicle, which included
looking inside a loose door panel, violated Young’s rights under:
1.1. the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; or
1.2. Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution;
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that the
State established an adequate chain of custody to support admission of
the items law enforcement collected during the search of Young’s
vehicle;
3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Young’s
convictions; and
1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(e) (2017). 2 Ind. Code § 16-42-19-18 (2015). 3 Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (2017).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 2 of 27 4. Whether Young’s aggregate thirty-five-year sentence is inappropriate
in light of the nature of his offenses and his character.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History 4
[2] On March 8, 2023, Franklin Police Department (“FPD”) officers conducted
long-range surveillance of Young because there was an outstanding warrant for
Young’s arrest. The officers observed Young sitting in the front seat of a
Chevrolet Trailblazer while it was parked on the street outside of Young’s
residence, and after Young sat in the car for about an hour, Detective Kody
Martin of the FPD parked his patrol vehicle behind the Trailblazer, ordered
Young out of the vehicle, and handcuffed Young. Detective Martin conducted
a pat down search of Young and found approximately half a gram of a
substance later determined to be methamphetamine and a substance Detective
Martin believed was marijuana.
[3] Multiple other law enforcement officers arrived at the scene including
Lieutenant Christopher Tennell of the FPD and Detective Andrew Eggebrecht,
a K-9 officer with the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office. Detective Eggebrecht
4 We heard oral argument in this case on Constitution Day, September 17, 2024, at the University of Evansville. We commend counsel for their advocacy and thank University of Evansville President Christopher Pietruszkiewicz as well as the university’s faculty, staff, and students for their warm reception and hospitality.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 3 of 27 used his police dog to perform a free air sniff around the Trailblazer. The police
dog gave a positive indication near the rear passenger-side door of the vehicle,
so Detective Eggebrecht and Detective Martin searched the vehicle, while
Lieutenant Tennell stood with Young. Detective Eggebrecht searched the area
near the rear passenger-side door and found a “marijuana-branded tray that had
residue on it.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 234.) There were tools and wires scattered
throughout the vehicle and the center console had been disassembled. As the
officers were searching near the driver’s door, Lieutenant Tennell noticed that
Young’s behavior changed. Young had been ignoring the search, but Young
became more attentive at that point. Detective Eggebrecht found “a magnetic
box” near the vehicle’s instrument cluster “stuck on the side of it where there
was an air vent that was missing.” (Id. at 234-35.) The officers found red
baggies, marijuana cigarettes, and a pipe inside the magnetic box.
[4] The officers continued searching the vehicle and Detective Martin noticed the
plastic interior door panel of the driver’s door moved away from the door and
was “super loose.” (Ex. 1 at 24:04-:06.) Detective Eggebrecht noticed “there
was a plastic clip that was holding the bottom of that door panel in rather than
the normal number of clips that hold it all the way around the perimeter.” (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 236.) Detective Martin pulled the loose plastic panel away from the
door and a bag containing approximately nineteen grams of methamphetamine,
small baggies with methamphetamine inside them, a scale, a latex band,
syringes, and numerous unused plastic baggies fell out. The officers then used
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 4 of 27 their fingers to unscrew the door panel, but they did not find any additional
evidence secreted behind the door panel.
[5] Detective Martin sorted the evidence at the scene and placed it into plastic bags.
He then transported the evidence to FPD headquarters. Detective Martin gave
the evidence to FPD Detective Jess Harris. Detective Harris tagged each bag of
evidence with the case number and an item number, initialed and dated each
bag, and placed the bags into an evidence locker used for temporary storage.
The evidence technician was the only person who could retrieve the bags from
the evidence locker.
[6] On March 14, 2023, the State charged Young with Level 2 felony dealing in
methamphetamine and Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe.
Evidence Technician Mark Riley removed the bagged evidence from the
evidence locker on March 16, 2023, processed the evidence, and then stored the
evidence in the FPD’s secure property room. On June 16, 2023, the State filed
an information alleging Young qualified for a habitual offender sentence
enhancement.
[7] On July 20, 2023, Young moved to suppress the narcotics and syringes found
inside his vehicle alleging the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional. The
trial court held a hearing on Young’s motion on July 21, 2023. During the
hearing, Young explained he was not seeking to suppress evidence of the drugs
found on his person or in the magnetic black box found near the instrument
cluster. He clarified that he was only seeking to suppress the evidence found
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 5 of 27 inside the door panel. Young argued that taking apart the door was an
“invasive search” that required a warrant. (Id. at 43.)
[8] On July 24, 2023, the trial court issued an order denying Young’s motion to
suppress. The trial court ruled that a warrant was unnecessary because of the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court noted that the
vehicle was in a public place and was operational. In addition, the police had
already arrested Young and were preparing to take him to jail. The trial court
also ruled that removal of the loose door panel did not exceed the scope of a
lawful warrantless search: “Having found the rolling tray where [the police dog]
indicated and the partially hidden metal box containing additional narcotics,
noticing that the door panel was only secured by a single screw gave rise to the
officer’s suspicion that additional illegal substances may be hidden in that
compartment[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 61.)
[9] The trial court held Young’s jury trial from August 8, 2023, to August 10, 2023.
During Detective Martin’s testimony, Young objected to admission of the
portion of Detective Martin’s bodycam footage that showed him pulling on the
loose interior door panel on the basis that that portion of the search was
unconstitutional, but the trial court overruled Young’s objection. Young
further objected on the same basis when the State sought to admit the evidence
discovered inside the loose door panel, and the trial court overruled each of
Young’s objections. Dakota Altepeter testified he sold the Trailblazer at issue
to Young in January 2023, he cleaned out the vehicle before attempting to sell
it, the door panel was not loose at that time, and there were no illegal drugs in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 6 of 27 the vehicle when he sold it. In addition, the State entered into evidence several
recordings of phone calls Young had made while incarcerated in the Johnson
County Jail. During these phone calls, Young stated officers “found all my
shit,” “they got me with an ounce almost . . . yeah they got me,” and that he
knew he “did this[.]” (Ex. 19 at 1:27-29; Ex. 20 at 1:23-30; Ex. 22 at 00:33-36).
The jury found Young guilty of both Level 2 felony dealing in
methamphetamine and Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe. After
the jury read its verdict, Young pled guilty to the habitual offender sentence
[10] On September 25, 2023, the trial court held Young’s sentencing hearing. The
trial court found Young’s criminal history and Young’s commission of these
offenses while on bond to be aggravating circumstances. The trial court noted
Young seemed remorseful but stated “I can’t give you any credit for being
remorseful at this point because it’s one thing to be remorseful before your
sentence and another thing to sit there and go I’m lookin’ at 50 years and now
I’m really remorseful.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 152.) The trial court also observed that
Young twice had been ordered to receive drug treatment but continued to abuse
drugs. The trial court found as a mitigating factor that Young pled guilty in two
other cases and that Young pled guilty to the habitual offender enhancement in
the instant case. For Young’s Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine
conviction, the trial court sentenced Young to twenty-five years and enhanced
that sentence by ten years because of the habitual offender finding. The trial
court also sentenced Young to a term of one year for his Level 6 felony
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 7 of 27 unlawful possession of a syringe conviction. The trial court ordered Young to
serve the sentences concurrently for an aggregate term of thirty-five years. The
trial court also recommended that Young participate in the Recovery While
Incarcerated program and stated “I’m gonna give you a chance to modify at
some point.” (Id. at 154.)
Discussion and Decision 1. Vehicle Search [11] Young contends the officers’ search of his vehicle violated his rights under both
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution5 and Article 1,
section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.6 He asserts “the police’s action in
dismantling Young’s vehicle and conducting a warrantless search of it was
unreasonable.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) While Young filed a motion to suppress
challenging the constitutionality of the vehicle search prior to trial, which the
5 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
6 Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 8 of 27 trial court denied, he subsequently proceeded to trial and renewed his objection
to the constitutionality of the search at trial. Therefore, Young’s “appeal is best
framed as challenging the admission of evidence at trial.” Clark v. State, 994
N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013).
[12] We generally review a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence
at trial for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 260. An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court’s decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Id.
“When, however, admissibility turns on questions of constitutionality relating
to the search and seizure of that evidence, our review is de novo.” Jacobs v.
State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 849 (Ind. 2017).
1.1 Fourth Amendment [13] Young asserts the officers “exceeded the bounds” of the Fourth Amendment
“by dismantling the door panel.” (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) The Fourth
Amendment protects citizens from search or seizure absent a warrant supported
by probable cause unless a well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement
applies. Tigner v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1064, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “The
State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement
applies for evidence obtained during a warrantless search to be admissible at
trial.” Id. One such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile
exception, which our Indiana Supreme Court discussed in State v. Hobbs:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 9 of 27 The ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement allows police to search a vehicle without obtaining a warrant if they have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle. This doctrine is grounded in two notions: 1) a vehicle is readily moved and therefore the evidence may disappear while a warrant is being obtained, and 2) citizens have lower expectations of privacy in their vehicles than in their homes. One reason for this diminished expectation of privacy in a car and its contents is that cars travel along public highways and are subject to pervasive government regulation.
933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ind. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
[14] A search pursuant to the automobile exception “is not defined by the nature of
the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the
object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe
that it may be found.” U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). The scope of a
search pursuant to the automobile exception “is no broader and no narrower
than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable cause
justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every
part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”
Id. at 825. This includes the contents of closed containers inside the vehicle.
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580-81 (1991). “When there is probable
cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers . . . to
examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable
cause for each one.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 10 of 27 [15] Young argues the officers at the scene “should not have dismantled the door
panel of the vehicle without a search warrant,” (Appellant’s Br. at 15), and he
likens his case to Bell v. State, 818 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), reh’g denied,
trans. denied. In Bell, the police conducted a traffic stop of Bell’s vehicle because
Bell’s passenger had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Id. at 482. The
officers handcuffed Bell and his passenger and placed them in separate police
cruisers. Id. at 483. The officers then searched Bell’s vehicle. Id. During the
search, the officers “dismantled” Bell’s glove compartment “enabling the
officers to look behind the glove box and into the chassis of the vehicle.” Id.
The officers found a bag of cocaine inside the vehicle’s chassis. Id.
[16] Bell filed a motion to suppress arguing that the search of his car was
unconstitutional, and the trial court denied Bell’s motion. Id. at 483-84. The
State argued on appeal that the warrantless search of Bell’s vehicle fell within
the Fourth Amendment’s search incident to arrest exception because it followed
the arrest of Bell’s passenger. Id. at 484-85. We held the search was
unconstitutional because it went beyond “the opening and searching of the
closed glove box, consoles, receptacles, luggage, boxes and bags found within
the vehicle’s passenger compartment,” the officers “dismantled the glove box to
view behind it into the vehicle’s chassis.” Id. at 485.
[17] However, Bell is readily distinguishable from the instant case. Whereas the
officers in Bell exceeded the scope of a lawful warrantless search incident to
arrest by searching beyond the immediate area where Bell’s passenger was
seated, id. at 485, the officers who searched Young’s vehicle did not exceed the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 11 of 27 scope of a lawful search pursuant to the automobile exception. “Where there is
probable cause to search a vehicle, a search is not unreasonable if it is based on
facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not
been obtained.” Meister v. State, 933 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ind. 2010). “Probable
cause to issue a search warrant exists where the facts and circumstances would
lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search would uncover
evidence of a crime.” Id.
[18] Before Detective Martin pulled on the loose door panel, the police had found
drugs on Young’s person, a police dog had alerted to the presence of drugs
inside Young’s vehicle, the officers had found a marijuana-branded rolling tray
near the rear passenger-side door, and the officers had also found a magnetic
box containing narcotics and paraphernalia secreted inside a dismantled air
vent near the vehicle’s instrument cluster. Moreover, prior to police arriving,
the vehicle’s center console had been disassembled, and there were wires and
tools scattered over the two front seats of the vehicle. Thus, a reasonably
prudent person could conclude additional drugs could be hidden behind a loose
door panel. Because probable cause existed to justify looking behind the door
panel, Detective Martin’s act of pulling on the loose door panel did not violate
Young’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. 7 See, e.g., Cheatham v. State, 819
7 Young also asserts on appeal that the search did not fall within the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and that “[a]s for any alleged probable cause established by the canine, the search was unreasonable because the purpose of the stop was complete prior to the dog sniff.” (Appellant’s Br. at 18.) However, Young did not raise these arguments before the trial court, and therefore,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 12 of 27 N.E.2d 71, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding probable cause existed to justify
search of defendant’s car pursuant to the automobile exception when officers
observed rolling papers in plain view and smelled the odor of marijuana, and a
police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle).
1.2 Article 1, section 11 [19] Young also argues the search was unreasonable under Article 1, section 11 of
the Indiana Constitution. While the text of Article 1, section 11 is nearly
identical to the text of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, “we evaluate a search under our state constitution based on the
reasonableness of the conduct of the law enforcement officers under the
circumstances, rather than on the expectation of privacy that is commonly
associated with analysis under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jones, 191
N.E.3d 878, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.
We evaluate whether a search is unconstitutional under the Indiana
Constitution by balancing three factors: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or
he is precluded from raising them for the first time on appeal. See Finnegan v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1186, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“A party may not raise an argument or objection on appeal that was not raised before the trial court.”). Waiver notwithstanding, a warrantless search is constitutional if it fits into one exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016) (“the State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the State proved the search fell within the automobile exception, the State did not also need to prove the search fell within the search incident to arrest exception. In addition, when the dog sniff occurred, the vehicle was parked on a public street, and the police had already arrested Young because of the outstanding warrant. The dog sniff did not prolong Young’s detention, and officers are permitted to walk dogs past vehicles parked in public because a dog sniff is not a protected search. See Danh v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1055, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“A dog sniff sweep of a vehicle is not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 13 of 27 knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method
of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the
extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind.
2005).
[20] Young argues the warrantless search of his vehicle is similar to the search our
Indiana Supreme Court held violated the Indiana Constitution in Brown v. State,
653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995). In Brown, an individual robbed a drug store in
Indianapolis, and a witness reported seeing the getaway car. Id. at 78-79. The
next day, officers found a vehicle matching the witness’s description of the
getaway car parked outside of Brown’s house. Id. at 79. The officers
“impounded and ‘inventory-searched’” the vehicle and found several pieces of
incriminating evidence. Id. Brown argued the search was unconstitutional, the
trial court overruled his objection, and this court affirmed the trial court. Id.
However, our Indiana Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 80. The Court held that
the search was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution and the officers
should have obtained a warrant before conducting the search. Id. The Court
noted the car was parked in a residential neighborhood and was surrounded by
police cars. Id. For that reason, it was unlikely the car would have been
moved while the officers sought a warrant, and there was neither a shortage of
time nor an emergency that would have made seeking a warrant impractical.
Id. While Brown did not explicitly evaluate the search of Brown’s vehicle in
light of the Litchfield factors, our Supreme Court clarified in Hardin v. State that
the search of Brown’s vehicle was unconstitutional because of “low police
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 14 of 27 suspicion or concern and a lack of law-enforcement needs (Litchfield factors one
and three)[.]” 148 N.E.3d 932, 945 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied 141 S. Ct. 2468
(2021).
[21] In contrast, in Hobbs, our Indiana Supreme Court held the Litchfield factors
supported finding the search of Hobbs’s vehicle was reasonable. 933 N.E.2d at
1287. The police arrested Hobbs on an outstanding warrant when Hobbs was
inside the Pizza Hut restaurant where he worked. Id. at 1284. When Hobbs
refused to consent to a police search of his vehicle, the police summoned a K-9
officer to the scene. Id. The police dog alerted, and the police then searched
Hobbs’s vehicle. Id. The officers found marijuana and paraphernalia inside the
car. Id. Hobbs challenged the search, but our Indiana Supreme Court held the
search did not violate the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 1287. The Court
explained police had a high degree of suspicion or concern that a violation of
law occurred when the police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in Hobb’s
vehicle. Id. In addition, the Court noted the search of Hobb’s vehicle did not
disrupt his normal activities because he was already under arrest on an
outstanding warrant at the time of the search, and the Court explained “the
same considerations underlying the federal automobile exception support
permitting the officers to secure the evidence without delay.” Id. The Court
distinguished the search of Hobbs’s vehicle from the search in Brown because
“although the car [in Brown] appeared to be the one used in the robbery, there
was no probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of a crime, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 15 of 27 there was no certainty that detaining the car would not inconvenience its
owner.” Id.
[22] With respect to the search of Young’s vehicle, the police had a high degree of
suspicion or concern that a violation of law occurred when a police dog alerted
to the presence of drugs in Young’s vehicle, and that concern only heightened
as the police found drugs and drug paraphernalia inside the vehicle. Like
Hobbs, Young was already under arrest on an outstanding warrant at the time
of the search of his vehicle, and therefore, the search constituted a minimal
disruption of his normal activities. In addition, the police have a significant
need to intervene and remove illicit drugs because “distributing or possessing
even small amounts of drugs threatens society.” State v. Timbs, 169 N.E.3d 361,
373 (Ind. 2021). Therefore, the warrantless search of Young’s vehicle was not
unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution. See, e.g., McKinney v. State, 212
N.E.3d 697, 707-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding search of defendant’s vehicle
was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances when dog alerted to the
presence of drugs in vehicle, defendant’s vehicle was already set to be
impounded at the time of the search, and law enforcement need to find
evidence of drug activity was high), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 16 of 27 2. Chain of Custody [23] Young also asserts the trial court erred in admitting the evidence Detective
Martin collected at the scene 8 because the State did not sufficiently prove the
chain of custody for that evidence. Our standard of review regarding chain-of-
custody claims is well-settled:
An adequate foundation establishing a continuous chain of custody is established if the State accounts for the evidence at each stage from its acquisition, to its testing, and to its introduction at trial. Under the chain of custody doctrine, an adequate foundation is laid when the continuous whereabouts of an exhibit is shown from the time it came into the possession of the police.
To establish a proper chain of custody, the State must give reasonable assurances that the evidence remained in an undisturbed condition. However, the State need not establish a perfect chain of custody, and once the State strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence, any gaps go to the weight of the evidence and not to admissibility. Moreover, there is a presumption of regularity in the handling of evidence by officers, and there is a presumption that officers exercise due care in handling their duties. To mount a successful challenge to the chain of custody, one must present evidence that does more than raise a mere possibility that the evidence may have been tampered with.
8 Specifically, Young challenged Exhibit 4 (scale), Exhibit 5 (syringes), Exhibit 6 (latex band), Exhibit 7 (black magnetic boxes), Exhibit 8 (baggies), Exhibit 9 (methamphetamine found in the door panel), Exhibit 10 (methamphetamine found in Young’s pocket), and Exhibit 11 (baggies found in Young’s pocket).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 17 of 27 Espinoza v. State, 859 N.E.2d 375, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
[24] In K.W. v. State, we discussed the varying foundational requirements the State
must prove to establish an adequate chain of custody for fungible and
nonfungible items:
“For fungible items such as blood and drugs, an adequate foundation is laid when the whereabouts of an exhibit is shown from the time it came into the possession of the police.” Mateo v. State, 981 N.E.2d 59, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. For fungible items, the State lays a proper foundation when “a witness is able to identify the item, . . . the item is relevant to the disposition of the case[,] . . . [and the State] provid[es] a reasonable assurance that the evidence was undisturbed as it passed from the custody of one person to the next.” Id. at 66-67. “If the State presents evidence that strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times, that is sufficient.” Id. at 67. In contrast, for “nonfungible items like guns and vehicles, the State need only show that the item is what it is purported to be and that it is in a substantially unchanged state” from when it was initially collected by police. Id.
216 N.E.3d 505, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (all quotation marks, citations, and
brackets in original), trans. denied.
[25] Young notes that, although the police arrested him on March 8, 2023, the first
entry on the chain of custody form Young received on the eve of trial was dated
March 16, 2023. Young relies on Graham v. State, 255 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. 1970),
to argue that the State’s proof of the chain of custody was insufficient. In
Graham, our Indiana Supreme Court held that an unexplained six-day break in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 18 of 27 the chain of custody “precluded a finding that the white powder substance
allegedly received by a ‘buyer’ from appellant was in fact the same white
powder found to contain heroin in the police laboratory.” Id. at 653.
[26] However, unlike Graham, there is not an unexplained absence in Young’s case.
Detective Martin testified that he took possession of the items at the scene,
bagged them, and personally transported them to FPD headquarters. Narcotics
Detective Harris testified that he received the items from Detective Martin,
packaged and sealed the items, placed an evidence tag with an incident number
and date on each item, and placed the evidence in a secure drop box. Evidence
Technician Riley testified he removed the evidence from the secure drop box on
March 16, 2023. He processed the items, including starting a chain of custody
form, and placed the items in storage in the secure property room. Thus, officer
testimony established the whereabouts of the bagged evidence between March
8, 2023, and March 16, 2023, and we hold the State laid an adequate
foundation regarding chain of custody to support admission of the bagged
evidence at trial. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)
(holding State met burden of establishing chain of custody of fungible DNA
samples through officer testimony), trans. denied.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence [27] Young contends the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his
convictions of dealing in methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a
syringe. When faced with challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we apply a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 19 of 27 “well settled” standard of review that leaves determination of the weight of the
evidence and credibility of the witnesses to the fact-finder. Teising v. State, 226
N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). “We consider only the evidence most favorable to
the trial court’s ruling and will affirm a defendant’s conviction unless ‘no
reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind.
2000)).
[28] A person who knowingly or intentionally possesses, with intent to deliver, at
least ten grams of methamphetamine commits Level 2 felony dealing in
methamphetamine. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1. Likewise, a person who possesses
with the intent to commit a drug offense a hypodermic syringe or needle or an
instrument adapted for the use of a controlled substance or legend drug by
injection in a human being commits Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a
syringe. Ind. Code § 16-42-19-18. “We have long recognized that a conviction
for possession of contraband may be founded upon actual or constructive
possession.” Griffin v. State, 945 N.E.2d 781, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “Actual
possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over an item.
Constructive possession occurs when a person has (1) the capability to maintain
dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion
and control over it.” Eckrich v. State, 73 N.E.3d 744, 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
[29] “In cases where the accused has exclusive possession of the premises on which
contraband is found, an inference is permitted that he or she knew of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 20 of 27 presence of contraband and was capable of controlling it.” Griffin, 945 N.E.2d
at 784. “A trier of fact may likewise infer that a defendant had the intent to
maintain dominion and control over contraband from the defendant’s
possessory interest in the premises, even when that possessory interest is not
exclusive.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). However, in the
case of non-exclusive possession of the premises on which the contraband is
found, the State must support the inference that the defendant intended to
exercise dominion and control over the contraband “with additional
circumstances pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of the presence and the
nature of the item.” Id. at 174-75. Such additional circumstances include:
(1) a defendant’s incriminating statements; (2) a defendant’s attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the item’s proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendant’s plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.
Id. at 175. In addition, other factors beyond the six listed above may support a
finding that the defendant had constructive possession of contraband. Canfield
v. State, 128 N.E.3d 563, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.
[30] Young argues that while “he had been in the proximate area where the drugs
and paraphernalia were found inside the door panel of the SUV, there was no
evidence he knew of their existence.” (Appellant’s Br. at 12.) Young notes that
Altepeter testified that someone had lived in the vehicle before it was
abandoned in the tow yard. Young contends that “[a]lthough Altepeter stated
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 21 of 27 that he did not observe any issues with the doors and that nothing was loose, he
acknowledged that he had not taken the panel off, did not know what was
there, and he didn’t know if the previous owner put something in there.” (Id.)
[31] However, we agree with the State that “several circumstances allowed the jury
to find that [Young] had the intent and capability to maintain dominion and
control over the items” found behind the driver’s door panel. (Appellee’s Br. at
14.) Young was the only person in the vehicle when the police arrested him,
and he had been sitting in the driver’s seat for at least an hour before the police
arrested him. Further, Young does not challenge the drugs and paraphernalia
police found on his person and in a magnetic box concealed in a missing air
vent near the vehicle’s instrument cluster, and the items found in the door panel
are of the same character as those items. Young also appeared to be actively
disassembling the center console of the vehicle at the time of his arrest,
presumably because he was trying to create additional places in the vehicle to
hide contraband. While the vehicle was still registered to Altepeter at the time
of Young’s arrest, Altepeter testified he had not transferred title to Young at
that point because Young had not yet paid the full purchase price to Altepeter
[32] Young also made incriminating statements in his phone calls to friends and
family from the jail. For example, Young’s statement “they got me with an
ounce almost . . . yeah they got me,” (Ex. 20 at 1:23-30), implicitly
acknowledges his possession of the large amount of methamphetamine found
behind the door panel because the total weight of methamphetamine found in
Young’s possession only approaches an ounce if that amount is included in the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 22 of 27 calculation. Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude Young constructively
possessed the methamphetamine and syringes found in the door panel, and
consequently, we hold the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain
Young’s convictions. See, e.g., Parks v. State, 113 N.E.3d 269, 274 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2018) (holding the State presented sufficient evidence defendant
constructively possessed gun and drugs found in the backseat of his car given
the defendant’s proximity to the items, his incriminating statements, the strong
odor of marijuana, and the presence of items suggestive of manufacturing or
dealing).
4. Inappropriate Sentence [33] Last, Young asserts his aggregate sentence of thirty-five years is inappropriate
given the nature of his offenses and his character. Pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the
trial court’s decision, [we] find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our determination
“turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime,
the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a
given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
Our review is deferential to the trial court’s decision, and our goal is to determine whether the appellant’s sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating his sentence [is] inappropriate.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 23 of 27 George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations
omitted), trans. denied. Our review is “holistic” and takes into consideration
“the whole picture before us.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024).
Appellants need not prove their sentence is inappropriate for both their
character and offense, but “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates
against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify
relief.” Id.
[34] “Our analysis of the nature of the offense requires us to look at the nature,
extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d
656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). As our Indiana Supreme Court has explained,
“compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense
(such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality)” may lead to a
downward revision of the defendant’s sentence. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d
111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[35] “When considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory
sentence for the crime.” McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App.
2020). A Level 2 felony is punishable by imprisonment “for a fixed term of
between ten (10) and thirty (30) years, with the advisory sentence being
seventeen and one-half (17 ½) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. Here, Young’s
twenty-five-year sentence for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine was
above the advisory term for that level of offense, but it was below the maximum
sentence. That sentence was subject to an enhancement of between six and
twenty years because the trial court adjudicated him to be a habitual offender,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 24 of 27 Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1) (2017), but the trial court only enhanced his
sentence by ten years. In addition, the trial court imposed the advisory sentence
for Young’s Level 6 felony illegal possession of a syringe conviction. See Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-7 (Level 6 felony punishable by imprisonment “for a fixed term
of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 ½) years, with the advisory
sentence being one (1) year.”).
[36] Young argues the nature of his offenses merits a lesser sentence because he
“acknowledged ownership of the drugs on his person” and “[n]o one was
injured regarding these offenses.” (Appellant’s Br. at 23-24.) We disagree.
Young possessed twenty-two grams of methamphetamine, which is over twice
the amount required for his offense, and he possessed other paraphernalia and
items consistent with drug dealing. He also made significant efforts to hide his
criminal activity from police by concealing his contraband in the voids of his
vehicle. Young moreover committed these crimes while released on bond. All
these facts render the nature of Young’s offenses worse than the “typical”
versions of each offense. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 182 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2022) (holding nature of defendant’s offense was more egregious than a
typical version of that offense because of the large amount of
methamphetamine defendant sold). Thus, we cannot say Young’s sentence is
inappropriate for his offenses.
[37] With respect to an offender’s character, one relevant fact is the defendant’s
criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
Young’s criminal history is significant. He has two prior felony convictions and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 25 of 27 ten misdemeanor convictions, and Young’s history also includes violations of
his terms of probation. While Young has a long history of substance abuse and
expressed a desire at his sentencing to receive treatment, his history shows
continued abuse of substances even after receiving treatment. Young contends
he is employable because he has a GED and various work-related certifications.
He also stated at sentencing that he worked as a cook while incarcerated in jail.
However, Young’s employment history does not merit a lesser sentence. See
Jones, 218 N.E.3d at 16 (“Lastly, Jones claims that his gainful employment is
evidence of his positive character. We have held before that most people are
employed such that this consideration does not warrant a lesser sentence.”).
Therefore, we hold Young’s sentence also is not inappropriate for his character.
See, e.g., Murray, 182 N.E.3d at 279 (defendant’s twenty-five-year sentence was
not inappropriate given his character, particularly his prior criminal history and
repeated failures to abide by his terms of probation).
Conclusion [38] The search of Young’s vehicle, which included pulling on the loose door panel
attached to Young’s front driver’s side door, was permissible pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception, and the search was also
reasonable under the Indiana Constitution. Moreover, the testimony of
Detective Martin, Detective Harris, and Evidence Technician Riley laid an
adequate foundation regarding the chain of custody of the items Detective
Martin collected for those items to be admissible at trial. In addition, the State
presented sufficient evidence to prove Young constructively possessed the drugs
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 26 of 27 and paraphernalia found in the vehicle’s door panel. Finally, Young’s
aggregate thirty-five-year sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of
his offenses and his character. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
[39] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Foley, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Carlos I. Carrillo Carrillo Law LLC Greenwood, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 27 of 27