LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:
This case involves an action brought by the President of the National Maritime Union, on behalf of all members of that union, against United States officials responsible for the shipment of American military cargo. Appellant seeks enforcement of the Cargo Preference Act. This statute, passed in 1904, and reenacted in the codification law of [124]*124August 10, 1956, provides as follows, see 10 U.S.C. § 2631 (1964):
Only vessels of the United States or belonging to the United States may be used in the transportation by sea of supplies bought for the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. However, if the President finds that the freight charged by those vessels is excessive or otherwise unreasonable, contracts for transportation may be made as otherwise provided by law. * * *
It is undisputed that the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) has used foreign flag ships to transport American military cargo to Vietnam. The Government replies that foreign vessels were not used while operating American bottoms were available. It also defends the action on various legal grounds.
After receiving depositions and affidavits the District Court granted summary judgment for appellees. We agree that appellant Curran has standing, in behalf of the members of the National Maritime Union (NMU), to bring this action. However, we reject appellant’s several contentions on the merits. Accordingly we affirm.
I. STANDING
The Government argues that neither the NMU nor its members have standing to complain in court of a violation of the Cargo Preference Act.
Plainly the NMU, representing the interests of its members, is . aggrieved in fact by the allegedly unlawful action of the Secretary of Defense. A requirement that the Secretary use American flag vessels will expand employment opportunities for the members of the NMU, who man those vessels.1
Aggrievement in fact presents the kind of concrete, adversary interest underlying the recent decisions rejecting objections to standing, especially in the constitutional sphere.2 It establishes “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination” of difficult and far-reaching questions. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). It is also significant in determining the existence of standing to seek a mandate for enforcement of a statutory provision, though we agree with the Government that is not decisive.3 Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act4 makes cross-reference to the legislative trend of enacting statutes that provide standing to persons aggrieved in fact. E. g., FCC v. Sanders Bros., 309 UvS. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L.Ed. 869 (1940). Under the liberal approach developed by the Supreme Court, a person’s ability to vindicate his statutory rights permits an action attacking broad regulation claimed inconsistent with the statute, even though complainant is not now or imminently engaged in or proposing activities interdicted by the regulation, provided his ability to undertake cogent planning of his present or future operations is in[125]*125hibited. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 200, 76 S.Ct. 763, 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1956). The Legislature’s additional provision, that any person suffering legal wrong because of agency action is entitled to judicial review, confirms and strengthens the doctrine whereby courts have found standing on the basis of a legally protected interest. The statute’s expansion of judicial review intermeshes with and reenforces a judicial trend liberalizing standing through discernment of a protected interest. The general line of development is underscored by the observation of Justice Harlan in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967):
[A] survey of our cases shows that judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress. * * * Early cases in which this type of judicial review was entertained, e. g. Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co., 305 U.S. 177, 59 S.Ct. 160, 83 L.Ed. 111; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 64 S.Ct. 559, 88 L.Ed. 733, have been reinforced by the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, which embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one “suffering legal wrong because of agency action or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,” 5 U.S.C. § 702, so long as no statute precludes such relief or the action is not one committed by law to agency discretion, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). The Administrative Procedure Act provides specifically not only for review of “Agency action made reviewable by statute” but also for review of “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The legislative material elucidating that seminal act manifests a congressional intention that it cover a broad spectrum of administrative actions and this Court has echoed that theme by noting that the Administrative Procedure Act’s “generous review provisions” must be given a “hospitable” interpretation. * * * Again in Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 82 S.Ct. 787, 7 L.Ed.2d 809, supra, at 379-380, 82 S.Ct. at 794, the Court held that only upon a showing of “clear and convincing evidence” of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review. See also Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 336-359 (1965). [Footnote omitted.]
The area where the judicial liberalization of standing has made least headway relates to actions by one competitor complaining of another’s lack of authority. In this context the courts have been reluctant to find standing “because of the policy encouraging free and open competition — a policy that favors competition in the market place, not in the courts.” 5 Yet even here there have been decisions upholding standing in a competitor upon “an indication of Congressional intent, explicit or implicit, in the relevant substantive acts to grant protection to the competitive interest * * 6
In the recent case of Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 651, 19 L.Ed.2d 787 (1968), the Court upheld the standing of a private utility to challenge the legality of TYA’s activities in expanding its area of sales. The Court restated the general rule “that the economic injury which results from lawful competition cannot, in and of itself, confer standing on the injured business to question the legality of any aspect of its competitor’s operations.” But the Court stressed that another rule, established at least since the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 44 S.Ct. 317, 68 L.Ed. 667 (1924), made it plain that even a competitor had standing to complain of non-observance of a statutory provision that reflected “a legislative purpose to [126]*126protect a competitive interest.” (390 U. S. at 6, 88 S.Ct. at 654.)
The reference to “a legislative purpose” is not a requirement that this be the principal purpose of the legislature. This is also the analysis of the Chicago Junction Case presented by Professor Jaffe,7 whose approach, it will be noted, was cited with approval by Justice Harlan in Abbott Laboraories.
A number of precedents have been cited to us. The Government relies especially on Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 273, 225 F.2d 924, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884, 76 S.Ct. 137, 100 L.Ed. 780 (1955), and other igre-Hardin precedents of this court denying standing.8
In Hardin the Supreme Court limited the significance of our McKay decision. Our view, that the “long established doctrine” concerning actions by competitors meant that an explicit statutory provision was necessary to confer standing on a competitor, was held wholly inapplicable to actions by competitors to enforce statutory requirements concerned with protecting competitive interests. See 390 U.S. at 7, 88 S.Ct. 651.
The post -Hardin opinions have appeared for the most part in cases involving competitors protesting broadened activities of national banks. While the results are by no means uniform, there seems to be a trend toward recognition of standing accompanied by avowals of difficulty.9
There is little to be gained from examination of the precedents in detail. Obviously no simple touchstone can be provided for determination of standing questions. Each case turns on the nature of the parties, the grievances and the statutory provisions involved. However, it is clear that with the approach charted in Abbott Laboratories, a person aggrieved in fact may properly invoke not only the letter of the Administrative Procedure Act and its “generous” review provisions, but a broad conception that Congress is “hospitable” to the maintenance of complaints against officials charged with disregarding its substantive mandate. And it does appear that in the absence of a contrary indication the courts will entertain even an action brought by an aggrieved competitor if there can fairly be attributed to Congress, expressly or impliedly, a purpose of protecting competitive interests like those of complainants.
In the light of these doctrines 7and criteria we conclude that American sailors have standing to complain that \the executive officials have illegally /and arbitrarily disregarded the statutory / mandate to use American ships on mili- ; tary cargo. That conclusion is sup- \ ported by the nature of the substantive statutory provisions and issues involved, land the protections contemplated by Congress.
We turn now to the statutes that we consider reflect sufficient concern for American crews and protection against [127]*127foreign competition to avoid dismissal of their action for lack of standing. The legislative history of the 1904 Cargo Preference Act reveals a purpose to use preference on Government freightage in order to promote vitality and emergency availability of American ships and crews and to offset the disadvantage incurred in meeting foreign competition.10 Crews on American ships were not confined in 1904 to American seamen as a matter of law, but that did not negative the prospect that American seamen would benefit from the law. In any event, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 did contain a legal requirement assuring use of American crews.11 Both the Cargo Preference Law and the Merchant Marine Act are interrelated parts of a wide-ranging statutory scheme to foster American shipping. It is appropriate to refer to both of them in considering whether Congress intended that seamen aggrieved by illegal official action be left without legal protection. The protection intended for American crews was certainly not diminished, if anything it was strengthened, by the reenactment of the cargo preference legislation in 1956.
Our determination does not signify that the issues tendered are necessarily appropriate for judicial scrutiny. Indeed, as will appear in Part III of this opinion, we conclude that certain questions raised by appellants relate to matters that have been committed by Congress to the discretion of the officials involved without being subject to judicial reexamination. But our conclusion on standing does serve to avoid dismissal of the action because of the nature of the parties and to bring us to the merits of the case.
II. THE MERITS ON ISSUES NOT INVOLVING THE RESERVE FLEET
On the merits we reinstate for the court en banc, and attach in the Appendix to this opinion, Parts II A, B, C, and D of the opinion written by Judge Wright for the panel, an opinion which was issued on December 27, 1968. In brief summary we hold in these rulings: A. The Cargo Preference Act, which prohibits the use of foreign vessels to transport American military cargo, is subject to an implied exception that for[128]*128eign ships may be used when American ships are not available.
B. This implied exception does not require a finding by the President himself rather than by other officials in the Executive Department.
C. The record shows no genuine factual dispute relating to appellant’s contention that MSTS has in fact shipped military cargo in foreign ships when operating American vessels were available for use.
D. The finding that American flag ships are not available is not to be negatived by treating ships subject to requisition by the United States under 46 U.S.C. § 1242(a) (1964) as “available” within the meaning of the exception to the Cargo Preference Act.
III. STATUS OF RESERVE FLEET VESSELS
Appellant argues that the Government-owned transport ships within the national defense reserve fleet are “available American ships,” which must be used for military cargo pursuant to the Cargo Preference Act, before resort is had to foreign vessels.
The reserve fleet legislation, enacted as part of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, now provides, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1744(a) (1964): “* * * Unless otherwise provided for by law, all vessels placed in [national defense] reserve shall be preserved and maintained by the [Secretary of Commerce] for the purpose of national defense. A vessel placed in such reserve shall in no case be used for any purpose whatsoever except that any such vessel may be used for account of any agency or department of the United States during any period in which vessels may be requisitioned under [46 U.S.C. 1242] * * We have been in such a period since December 16, 1950, the date of President Truman’s proclamation of national emergency.
The case .involves the interplay of two statutes — -the cargo preference legislation and the reserve fleet legislation. It is axiomatic that they should be construed so as to harmonize, and to the maximum extent effectuate, respective underlying policies. For this court to require laid-up ships to be reactivated in order to satisfy cargo preference provisions would negate the Congressional purpose of maintaining a reserve fleet as an emergency stockpile, and would turn a flexible asset into a millstone for those who must coordinate transportation of today’s military cargoes with long-range defense requirements.
In our view the, cargo preference__]egis-lation does not contain a mandate that oyerrides ..the. judgment. cdLthe-executive d§MÍÍI?lS3^.KheüierJq.,_^aw.. on _ the mothball vessels mairitained_for use_in emergencies.
There being no overriding mandate, either of another statute, or the Constitution, we hold that the legislation providing for a reserve fleet available for use in emergencies authorizes a span of executive actions — pertaining to the fleet’s establishment, expansion, curtailment, maintenance and use — that are “committed to agency discretion” within the meaning of § 10(a) (2) of the Administrative Procedure Act,12 and are not subject to judicial surveillance and correction for error in the exercise of discretion.
Our conclusion does not set aside the general rule that official administrative action is reviewable in courts when a person claims injury from an act taken by a government official in excess of his powers.
While that is sound doctrine, recognized by decisions13 and approved by scholars,14 it is not a universal precept but only a general widespread rule, a rule subject to exceptions. These exeep-[129]*129tions do not violate, they rather define, the rule of reviewability.
That the matter before us for consideration lies in the special zones of the exceptions, rather than the ordinary area of judicial reviewability, is established by several cardinal aspects of the issues. The case involves decisions relating to the conduct of national defense; the President has a key role; the national interest contemplates and requires flexibility in management of defense resources;' and the particular issues call for determinations that lie outside sound judicial domain in terms of aptitude, facilities, and responsibility.
The legislative history reenforces this view of the nature of the reserve fleet law and executive actions contemplated under the law.15 The significance of the features mentioned above is highlighted by court decisions to which we turn.
In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948), the Court held, without dissent, that Presidential determination on applications for authority to engage in overseas and foreign air transport are not subject to judicial review. See 333 U.S. at 108, 111, 68 S.Ct. at 434, 436:
That aerial navigation routes and bases should be prudently correlated with facilities and plans for our own national defenses and raise new problems in conduct of foreign relations, is a fact of common knowledge. * * * The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports neither are nor ought to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
The President’s action in determining whether a person deserves appointment to a military commission, or any other position of-trust and honor, is likewise not subject to judicial scrutiny. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953). So also is a decision over assignment to military service. Ibid.
These Supreme Court rulings are not dispositive by themselves of the matter before us. But they point up the relevant considerations. Perhaps closer in terms of particular issues, though not [130]*130identical, are circuit court rulings. Our own court has noted, in dictum:
It is — and must — be true that the Executive should be accorded wide and normally unassailable discretion with respect to the conduct of the national defense and the prosecution of national objectives through military means. The power of the armed services to make their dispositions of men and materiel, and to take measures for the safeguarding of each does not admit of fragmentation. (Emphasis added.) 16
In United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 929, 89 S.Ct. 1195, 22 L.Ed.2d 460 (March 24, 1969), the court, through Judge Friendly, held that it must decline to review the military’s refusal to grant a hardship exemption to a ready reservist ordered to report for active duty. See pp. 374-375:
The very purpose of a “ready reserve” is that the reserve shall be ready. Under the regulations, delay or exemption from active duty in hardship cases is authorized but not required. The hardship must be “extreme,” and while the regulations wisely give more specific content to this criterion, a good deal is necessarily left to the judgment of the commanding officer. In contrast to the' yea or nay character of entitlement to the conscientious objection exemption, administration of the hardship exemption necessarily involves a balancing of the individual’s claims against the nation’s needs, and the balance may differ from time to time and from place to place in a manner beyond the competence of a court to decide. While no one could reasonably assert that the country would perish if Schonbrun did not serve with his company, delay in the call-up of a reservist, even during the period necessary for judicial consideraion of his claim to discretionary exemption, inevitably means either a gap in the unit or the call of another reservist who otherwise might not have been reached.
While every case must turn on its own issues,17 we think this analysis of people “reserves” is a meaningful parallel for the issue of vessel “reserves” before us. Before turning to more detailed consideration of reserve fleet legislation involved in the case before us, we think it appropriate to identify certain strands of doctrine that are not involved in our ['decision. We expressly note that our jj ¡decision does not involve personal rights \and liberties,18 does not involve constitu[131]*131tional claims, and does not involve a right expressly granted by statute that qualifies what would otherwise be non-reviewable discretion.19
Furthermore, our decision does not contradict the principle that even where an official action is of a type which generally involves the exercise of discretion the court has power to inquire into a claim of abuse of discretion, or use of proeedurally unfair and unauthorized techniques, inflicting injury on private citizens.20 The point of our decision is that there is a narrow band of matters that are wholly committed to official discretion, and that the inappropriateness or even mischief involved in appraising a claim of error or of abuse of discretion, and testing it in an evidentiary hearing, leads to the conclusion that there has been withdrawn from the judicial ambit any consideration of whether the official action is “arbitrary” 01 constitutes an abuse of discretion.
This case does not remotely involve, and there is no claim seeking, the kind of exception that may justify judicial review in certain instances even as to matters generally committed to the final judgment of an official. These exceptional instances relate to a case where there has been not merely a contention of error or abuse of discretion, but also facts adduced in support of a claim of the kind of bad faith, fraud, or conscious wrongdoing which in effect undercuts the assumption that the personnel involved have been genuinely acting as government officials.21
The soundness of our conclusion that the decisions whether, when, and how to add to or detract from the reserve fleet in time of emergency, are committed to official discretion is established by the fact that these decisions are inextricably intertwined with and permeated by assumptions and conclusions of national defense strategy.22
[132]*132In time of stress and emergency our officials need freedom to act. Congress gave the Executive such freedom in relation to the reserve fleet. The statute empowering officials to call upon the reserve fleet during a declared national emergency does not mean that they are obligated to draw upon this resource in every declared emergency. Yet the position adopted by appellant points to this result.
Even the determination of how long it will take to put a laid-up vessel into service for carriage of military cargo is not a mere mechanical computation. At the very least there will be questions of judgment as to the level of efficiency and reliability that is to be sought when reserve vessels are reactivated for emergency use.
The administration of commercial cargo preference provisions23 involves questions of “judgment requiring close analysis and nice choices.” 24 The issues of judgment take on a heightened dimension when such issues as deliverability and range of tolerable delay relate to supplies necessary for the military effort.
The range of executive judgments involved are likely to involve estimates as to when, where, and how much cargo will have to be moved in the future — not only military but also foreign aid cargoes. The decisions also require a judgment of the feasibility of providing sustained employment for a reactivated vessel.25
This court cannot sit in judgment to review a determination which involves appraisals like those outlined. The manifest difficulties cannot be obviated by construing the statute as requiring only that the authorities “consider” the feasibility of employing the reserve fleet ships for transporting military cargoes. There is no satisfactory exit once the judiciary crosses the threshold and enters the domain of these matters. Unless our determinations are to be merely preca-tory, a decision that Military Sea Transportation Service or the Department of Defense must “consider” using mothballed ships necessarily invites future litigation concerning first the fact of such consideration vel non, and then whether the consideration has sufficient rationality to escape condemnation as an empty formality.
Even restricted review requires probing the surface and going beyond mere conclusory affidavits setting forth the department’s reasons. Any other ap[133]*133proach belies the notion that these matters before us are not in fact necessarily committed to agency discretion. Settled doctrine does not permit us to accept at face value administrative determinations without at least surveying a record.26
We do not deal with officials who are operating under discernible statutory standards, or a mandate to develop standards to assure even-handed justice. They are rather likely to be called on to make and revise judgments freely, perhaps to draw heavily on information from sources abroad or in the domain of the military in making global guesstimates. Not all operations of government are subject to judicial review, even though they may have a profound effect on our lives.27
To avoid misunderstanding we note that the decision whether and how to let vessels out of the reserve fleet may well be influenced by. a desire to use these ships, and American crews, in carrying American military supplies, and the awareness that when taken out of the reserve fleet they have a certain guaranty of employment arising out of the cargo preference legislation.
Í, But there is no legislative mandate that is judicially enforceable which requires use of the mothball fleet to be given due consideration as a condition of use of foreign flag vessels. When, as, and if, executive officials reactivate reserve vessels into operating condition, they become fully “available” for the purpose of cargo preference legislation. Until then, they are part of a stockpile held for emergencies but not now in operation, and they are outside the category of available vessels that a court may mandate the executive officials to consider before shipping military supplies in foreign bottoms.
Affirmed.
APPENDIX
Excerpt from Judge Wright’s opinion issued December 27, 1968, sub mm. Cur-ran v. Clifford et al.
II
Coming then to the merits on the appeal from summary judgment, we must determine whether “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and whether appellees are “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), Fed. R.Civ.P.
A. At the outset, we reject appellant’s contention that the 1956 Act absolutely prohibits the use of foreign vessels to transport American military cargo. Where American ships are unavailable, we cannot suppose Congress to have intended that military supplies, perhaps urgently needed, must sit upon the docks despite the availability of foreign vessels to carry them. It would be absurd to derive such a result from a statute designed to further the national security through the development of a healthy merchant marine.
Thus an implied exception must be read into the 1956 Act: when American ships are not available, foreign ships may be used. This has indeed been the consistent administrative interpretation of the Act for over 60 years, dating from an Attorney General’s opinion issued in [134]*13419079 to the policy guidelines used by the Defense Department today.10 That interpretation is here approved.
B. Appellant urges that any implied exception to the literal command of the statute must be read, like the explicit statutory exception for “excessive or otherwise unreasonable” rates charged by American shippers, to require a presidential finding before it is invoked. This contention too must be rejected. Congress in 1904 doubtless feared that low-level administrators might evade the Act’s command by manipulation of the vague standard of “excessive or otherwise unreasonable.” In the absence of an administrative agency suited to the purpose, it interposed the President as the interpreter of this standard.
The determination of the availability of American shipping, unlike the determination of the “reasonableness” of American shippers’ rates, does not leave too much leeway for evasion or abuse. Further, the determination is primarily technical and logistic, rather than political or legal, and hence of a type more likely to be entrusted to line officials.
Moreover, rates set by conference (in the case of scheduled liners) remain reasonably stable over time. Their reasonableness can thus suitably be assessed at the top Executive level without too much burden on the office of the President. On the other hand, the availability of American shipping for the transport of military cargo fluctuates from day to day. Particularly as the determination of such availability is primarily a simple matter of fact, we cannot suppose that Congress meant it to be entrusted to the President.
C. Appellant’s third contention is that MSTS has shipped military cargo in foreign ships when operating American vessels were in fact available for use. If this were true, it would indeed raise serious questions under the 1956 Act. A genuine factual dispute about this contention would serve to defeat summary judgment. However, we find no such dispute.
Appellant’s case on this point conjoins an attack upon the procedures used to solicit American shipping with allegations of two instances in which available American ships were ignored in favor of foreign flag vessels. There is no dispute of fact concerning the procedures. The MSTS sends out requests for proposals to a large pool of brokers, agents and owners of United States- flag ships. If insufficient shipping to meet current military needs is offered, MSTS sends a further request for proposals from United States or foreign flag ships. MSTS pays the market rate current at the time of charter for American shipping, and when such shipping is not forthcoming, pays the lower market rate for foreign charters.
Appellant attacks this procedure as insufficiently diligent to satisfy the terms and policy of the 1956 Act. In appel[135]*135lant’s view the procedure fails to reveal all the American shipping which is in fact available. Appellant argues that American owners of both American flag and foreign flag of convenience vessels withhold the former from the Government in order to allow charter of the latter, for which the costs are lower, and the profits perhaps higher.
In support of its claim that privately-owned American ships are left idle while foreign ships transport our military cargoes, appellant has introduced by affidavit two instances. In both of these instances, MSTS, receiving no timely offers of American shipping, chartered foreign ships to carry cargo to Vietnam. The crews of the two Greek ships involved both refused to proceed. In both instances, American ships then were used to carry the stranded cargo.
In our view, the undisputed facts of these two incidents do not lend support to the conelusory allegation in appellant’s affidavit that foreign ships were used while “United States flag vessels were available at rates which were reasonable and not excessive.” Appellant has shown only that after chartering of foreign vessels, and their failure to perform on the charter, American ships were found. Given the day-to-day fluctuations in the availability of shipping, this goes no way toward showing that American ships were idle when the MSTS request for proposals was circulated or when the charter was made.
Nor do the MSTS procedures by themselves give rise to any inference that available operating American vessels are left idle while foreign ships are employed. When hiring vessels in the ordinary course of business, the Government can do little more than make known to the shipping industry its needs and its willingness to pay the market price. Indeed, the Commander of MSTS held meetings with American shipowners, and exhorted them by telephone, in a further effort to elicit American shipping.
Apart from the exercise of its powers to requisition private ships and break out part of the Government reserve fleet —powers which we discuss below — it is difficult to see what more MSTS could have done to obtain American sea transport for its military cargo even if it had been shown that American ships lay idle and unoffered. Accordingly, we find no issue of material fact concerning the availability of operating American vessels, and hence the District Court was justified in granting summary judgment as to this issue.11
D. Appellant next argues that ships subject to requisition by the United States under 46 U.S.C. § 1242(a) (1964) are “available” within the meaning of the 1956 Act.12 Such ships fall into two classes, which must be treated separately.
First are American-owned American flag ships. Appellant urges that such ships are idle and available while foreign ships transport American military cargo, and that the Government must override the shipowners’ unwillingness to offer them on the market, and must requisition them so that American seamen may transport American cargo.
[136]*136As we found in rejecting appellant’s claim challenging the MSTS procedures for hiring vessels, he has made no factual showing that privately-owned American ships were idle when the Government hired foreign vessels. Yet the 1956 Act can be violated only when the Government uses foreign ships, thereby leaving American ships and the American seamen who would man them idle. In the absence of a showing of the availability of idle American operating vessels, the question of the Government’s duty to requisition such vessels is not ripe for decision in this case.
The second class of ships which appellant would have appellees requisition includes American-owned ships flying foreign flags of convenience, and foreign flag ships which are subject to “effective American control.”13 These ships are indeed subject to American requisition. Such requisition, however, would not necessarily benefit appellant and the American seamen whom he represents. The statute allows the United States to requisition ships by purchase or by charter. Requisition by purchase would of course bring the ships under the American flag, and hence under the statute requiring the use of American crews.
However, where requisition is undertaken to overcome temporary shortages it is much more likely to be by charter. If it were by time charter (with the owner manning and victualling the vessel) the foreign flag might well be retained; hence no benefit would accrue to appellant. If it were by bareboat charter (with the chartering party manning and victualling) we have the opinion of the Maritime Administrator that either flag could be flown.14
To satisfy appellant’s claim on this issue, we would have to require the Executive at least to consider seriously the requisition of foreign flag vessels before it chartered any such vessels on the market. Yet the decision to requisition, impinging as it does upon the sovereignty of another nation, is a political decision involving complex questions of foreign relations.
Further, to fulfill the American seaman preference policy through requisition, the Government would not only have to take foreign flag ships, but to take them under only some of the forms available. A very clear congressional mandate would be required before courts could order the Executive to contemplate such a series of discretionary and political actions.
Such a mandate is lacking here. The 1956 Act requires that American military cargo be transported in American ships. We have limited its command to “American ships, where available.” The traditional criterion of the nationality of a ship is the flag it flies. By this criterion, both privately-owned American flag ships and the vessels of the reserve fleet are American. Foreign flag ships, whether owned by Americans or subject to “effective American control,” are not.
Where clear congressional intent or even compelling reasons of policy indicate, we might “pierce the flag veil” and find such ships to be “American” for certain purposes. Here there is no such clear intent and no such compulsion of policy. Hence we hold that foreign flag ships subject to American requisition are not “American” ships for purposes of the 1956 Act.