Joseph Anthony Reyna v. Nissan North America, Inc.

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 JOSEPH ANTHONY REYNA, Case No. 26-cv-00472-SVK

5 Plaintiff, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 6 v. FORMA PAUPERIS

7 NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., SCREENING ORDER PURSUANT TO 8 Defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

9 ORDER ON: (1) MOTION FOR EARLY CASE MANAGEMENT 10 CONFERENCE; (2) MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING 11 COMMUNICATION; (3) MOTION TO 12 CLARIFY SCOPE OF CLAIMS; (4) MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; 13 AND (5) MOTION TO CONFIRM PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE 14 Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 15

16 Plaintiff Joseph Anthony Reyna, appearing pro se, filed a civil complaint (the 17 “Complaint”) and two applications for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) seeking 18 permission to proceed without paying ordinary court costs. Dkt. 1, 2, 4. The Complaint is not 19 entirely clear about the events giving rise to this lawsuit, but it appears that: (1) Plaintiff 20 experienced an alleged mechanical defect with his Nissan Rogue automobile, which prompted him 21 to contact Defendant Nissan North America; (2) Plaintiff requested that all communications with 22 Defendant occur in writing due to Plaintiff’s “disability-related access needs and the necessity of 23 accurate recordkeeping”; but (3) Defendant continued to contact Plaintiff my telephone and 24 voicemail on various issues, “including calls associated with arbitration handling. See Dkt. 1 at 25 2-5. This order is the Court’s initial screening review for civil actions filed IFP, pursuant to 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons stated below, the Court (1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to 27 1 therefore ORDERS Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint by May 4, 2026. The Court also 2 DENIES the following motions filed by Plaintiff WITHOUT PREJUDICE to his ability to seek such relief, if warranted, if he files a First Amended Complaint that addresses the deficiencies 3 identified in this order: motion for an early case management conference (attached to Dkt. 1); 4 motion for protective order regarding communication (Dkt. 5); motion to clarify scope of claims 5 (Dkt. 6); motion to confirm preservation of evidence (Dkt. 8); and motion for judicial notice 6 (Dkt. 9). 7 I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 8 If the Court is satisfied that an applicant cannot pay the requisite filing fees, the Court may 9 grant an IFP application. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After evaluating Plaintiff’s IFP applications 10 (Dkt. 2, 4), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets the financial eligibility requirement of 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(a)(1) and therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP applications. Service of the Complaint will 12 be suspended pending further order of the Court following resolution of the pleading issues 13 discussed below. 14 II. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2) 15 A. Legal Standard 16 District courts must screen civil actions filed in forma pauperis to ensure that the complaint 17 states a claim, is not frivolous and does not seek monetary relief against a defendant who is 18 immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 112–27 (9th 19 Cir. 2000) (en banc). A “frivolous” complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 20 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). The Ninth Circuit has noted that 21 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Barren v. 22 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Both Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) require 23 a district court to dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 24 The plaintiff’s “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 25 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 26 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27 8(a) provides that a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the grounds for the 1 court’s jurisdiction” and a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 2 entitled to relief.” Although a plaintiff “does not need detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff 3 must still provide enough “[f]actual allegations . . . to raise a right to relief above the speculative 4 level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. That “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 5 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. (citation omitted). 6 Pursuant to a section 1915 review, “[d]ismissal is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff 7 cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to relief.” Watison v. 8 Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In its review, the Court liberally 9 construes pro se pleadings. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). 10 B. Analysis 11 1. Subject matter jurisdiction 12 The Complaint invokes federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the basis 13 that this action arises under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Dkt. 1 at 3. 14 Federal question jurisdiction exists when the case arises under the Constitution or laws of the 15 United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the 16 Complaint fails to state a valid claim for relief under the ADA or any other authority that would 17 give rise to federal question jurisdiction. As also discussed below, Court will give Plaintiff leave 18 to amend the Complaint. 19 2. Claims for Relief 20 The Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief compelling Defendant to communicate 21 with Plaintiff only in writing and to preserve records relevant to Plaintiff’s anticipated automotive 22 defect claim. Dkt. 1 at 7-9. Plaintiff “does not seek adjudication of the underlying mechanical defect 23 at this stage.” Dkt. 1 at 2; see also id. (“Plaintiff has deliberately limited this filing to procedural 24 access and preservation issues …”); id. at 6 (Plaintiff seeks “court intervention solely to obtain 25 accessible information and confirmation of preservation obligations”). 26 The Complaint purports to state four claims for relief: (1) Violation of ADA Title III – 27 Failure to Provide Effective Communication; (2) ADA Retaliation/Interference; (3) Declaratory 1 this material states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 2 a. Count 1: Violation of ADA Title III – Failure to Provide Effective Communication 3 Count I of the complaint for violation of ADA Title III cites 42 U.S.C. § 12182 and 4 28 C.F.R. § 36.303. Dkt. 1 at 6. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 prevents discrimination against the disabled 5 in places of public accommodation: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 6 disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 7 or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or 8 leases to) or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). “Discrimination” 9 under the ADA encompasses the denial of the opportunity, by the disabled, to participate in 10 programs or services, and providing the disabled with separate, but unequal, goods or services. See 11 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i-iii). To ensure that the disabled have full and equal enjoyment of 12 the goods and services of places of public accommodation, the ADA requires “reasonable 13 modification” of “policies, practices, and procedures,” the provision of auxiliary aids to ensure 14 effective communication with the disabled, and the removal of architectural and communications 15 barriers. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii-iv); see also Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 16 F. Supp. 2d 946, 951 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The regulation cited in the Complaint, 28 C.F.R. § 36.303, 17 identifies “auxiliary aids and services” that a public accommodation must provide under certain 18 circumstances, including “appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure 19 effective communication with individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c). 20 The Complaint does not allege the elements of a claim for violation of the ADA. Specifically, 21 the Complaint does not contain facts showing that (1) Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the 22 ADA, (2) Defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a “place of public 23 accommodation,” or (3) Plaintiff was discriminated against within the meaning of the ADA. See 24 Gomez v. Gates Estates, Inc., No. C 21-7147-WHA, 2022 WL 458465, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 25 2022). For similar reasons, the Complaint does not contain facts showing that Plaintiff is entitled to 26 auxiliary aids or services under 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 that Defendant has failed to provide. 27 //// b. Count 2: Violation of ADA Title III – Failure to Provide 1 Effective Communication 2 Count II of the complaint for ADA retaliation/interference cites 42 U.S.C. § 12203. Dkt. 1 3 at 7. Under the ADA, “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such 4 individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). 5 “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he 6 engaged in protected activity; (2) suffered an adverse ... action; and (3) there was a causal link 7 between the two. Pardi v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also West v. PBC Mgmt. 9 LLC, 754 F. Supp. 3d 914, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2024). 10 Although the Complaint states that Plaintiff made requests for accommodation, it does not 11 identify any adverse action taken against him or facts showing a causal link between Plaintiff’s 12 protected activity and the action taken against Plaintiff. 13 c. Count 3: Declaratory Relief 14 Count III of the complaint seeks declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Dkt. 1 at 7. 15 Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendant must: (1) “honor written-only 16 communication requests”; (2) “refrain from non-written contact absent express written consent”; 17 and (3) “preserve relevant records upon notice of dispute.” Id. at 8. For reasons similar to those 18 discussed above in connection with Plaintiff’s ADA claims, Plaintiff has not pleaded facts 19 showing that he is entitled to declaratory relief requiring Defendant to communicate with him only 20 in writing. Similarly, Plaintiff has not pleaded facts showing that he is entitled to an evidence 21 preservation order. This issue is discussed in more detail in section VII below. 22 d. Count 4: Injunctive and Equitable Relief 23 Count IV of the complaint is not a substantive cause of action but instead contains a list of 24 relief Plaintiff seeks. For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has not pleaded facts showing a 25 plausible case that he is entitled to such relief. 26 3. Screening order conclusion 27 As discussed, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief. The Court 1 First Amended Complaint by May 4, 2026 2 III. MOTION FOR EARLY CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 3 Attached to Plaintiff’s complaint is a motion for early case management conference. 4 Dkt. 1 at PDF pp. 16-19. The motion is DENIED. The Court also VACATES the Initial Case 5 Management Conference currently scheduled for April 14, 2026. The Court will not set an Initial 6 Case Management Conference until Plaintiff files a legally viable complaint, Defendant is served, 7 and Defendant either appears or the time for it to do so following service has run. 8 IV. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING COMMUNICATION 9 Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a court order requiring that all communications related to this 10 action occur in writing, absent express written consent. Dkt. 5. To the extent Plaintiff’s motion is a 11 request that the Court communicate with him in writing, issuance of a protective order is not 12 necessary. The Court generally issues orders and communicates with Parties in writing. If in the 13 future the Court sets a hearing in this case, Plaintiff can request accommodation at that time. To the 14 extent Plaintiff seeks an order requiring Defendant to communicate with him in writing, for the 15 reasons discussed in section II.B.2. above Plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to such an order at 16 this time. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for protective order is DENIED. This denial is WITHOUT 17 PREJUDICE to seek such an order in this case if warranted by future circumstances. 18 V. MOTION TO CLARIFY SCOPE OF CLAIMS 19 Plaintiff has filed a “motion to clarify scope of claims and relief.” Dkt. 6. Plaintiff seeks “an 20 order clarifying the scope of this action”—specifically, clarification that he is seeking relief, including 21 declaratory injunctive relief and relief under the ADA, and “does not assert claims for damages, 22 product defect, warrant liability, or arbitration enforcement in this action.” Id. Plaintiff’s motion to 23 clarify scope of claims is DENIED. If further clarification of Plaintiff’s claims is necessary, Plaintiff 24 himself may clarify the scope of his claims in the forthcoming First Amended Complaint. 25 VI. MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 26 Plaintiff has filed a motion for judicial notice, asking the Court to take judicial notice 27 pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 concerning his communications with Defendant and the 1 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff’s ability to request judicial notice, if 2 appropriate, in connection with future proceedings in this case. 3 VII. MOTION FOR PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE 4 Plaintiff has filed a “motion to confirm preservation of evidence.” Dkt. 8. The motion cites no 5 legal authority for a pre-complaint evidentiary order. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27 6 authorizes courts to order preservation of evidence prior to the filing of a complaint in limited 7 circumstances. See Reyna v. Credit Karma, LLC, N.D. Cal. Case No. 26-cv-00190-JST, at Dkt. 6 p. 2. 8 “Under Rule 27, a petitioner seeking preservation of evidence must show, among other things, ‘that 9 the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a United States court but cannot presently 10 bring it or cause it to be brought’ and ‘the facts that the petitioner wants to establish by the proposed 11 [evidence] and the reasons to perpetuate it.’” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1) and Martin v. 12 Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 56 (9th Cir. 1961)). “Courts have held that the requirements of 13 Rule 27(a) have been met where an individual seeking discovery . . . presents evidence that there 14 is a ‘significant risk’ that the evidence will be lost if it is not perpetuated.” Reyna, Dkt. 6 at p. 3 15 (citing Tennison v. Henry, 203 F.R.D. 435, 440 (N.D. Cal. 2001) and Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for 16 N. Dist. of California, 144 F.3d 618, 622 (9th Cir. 1998)). 17 Plaintiff cannot invoke Rule 27 because he has not shown why he is unable to bring his 18 complaint at this time. He has also not shown why he needs the evidence he seeks, how it would 19 support his claims, or why he believes that the evidence will be lost unless a preservation order 20 issues. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for preservation of evidence is DENIED WITHOUT 21 PREJUDICE. 22 VIII. CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons discussed above, the Court ORDERS as follows: 24 1. Even measured by the liberal standards accorded pro se litigants, Plaintiff’s complaint 25 fails to state a cause of action for violation of federal law that would establish a basis 26 for federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), 27 12(b)(6). When dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, the Ninth Circuit has ] amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 2 be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. The Court grants 3 Plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND to attempt to address the deficiencies identified in this 4 order. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is due by May 4, 2026. If Plaintiff does 5 not file a First Amended Complaint by the deadline, then the Court will issue an order 6 reassigning the case to a District Judge with a recommendation that the case be 7 dismissed. 8 2. The following motions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE: Plaintiff's motion 9 for an early case management conference (attached to Dkt. 1); motion for protective 10 order regarding communication (Dkt. 5); motion to clarify scope of claims (Dkt. 6); motion to confirm preservation of evidence (Dkt. 8); and motion for judicial notice

2 (Dkt. 9). 3. Plaintiff MAY NOT file any additional motions prior to filing a First Amended = ° Complaint. 4 4. The Initial Case Management Conference currently scheduled for April 14, 2026 is 5 VACATED, to be reset by the Court after Plaintiff files a legally viable complaint. The Court informs Plaintiff that the Federal Pro Se Program at the San Jose Courthouse = provides free information and limited-scope legal advice to pro se litigants in federal civil cases. 8 The Federal Pro Se Program is available by appointment and on a drop-in basis. The Federal Pro " Se Program is available at Room 2070 in the United States Courthouse in San Jose (Monday to Thursday 9:00 a.m.—4:00 p.m.) or by calling (408) 297-1480. In addition, the Court offers a pro se handbook free of charge; a copy may be downloaded from https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se- handbook/ or obtained from the Clerk’s Office. °° SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: April 2, 2026 Sess va 26 SUSAN VAN KEULEN United States Magistrate Judge 28