José Navarro Martinez v. ICE Field Office Director

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: March 2, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00032
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 JOSE NAVARRO MARTINEZ, CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00032-JNW 8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 9 PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS v. 10 ICE FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, 11 Respondent. 12 13

14 1. INTRODUCTION 15 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner José Navarro Martinez’s 16 petition for writ of habeas corpus. Dkt. No. 3. Having reviewed the petition, the 17 return, Dkt. No. 6, the traverse, Dkt. No. 10, and the relevant record, the Court 18 GRANTS the petition IN PART. 19 2. BACKGROUND 20 Petitioner José Navarro Martinez is a 32-year-old Cuban national. Dkt. No. 21 8-1; Dkt. No. 10 at 2. On July 6, 2022, he was apprehended by Border Patrol near 22 Eagle Pass, Texas, attempting to enter the United States. Dkt. No. 8-1. The 23 following day, he was paroled into the United States due to detention capacity and 1 was eventually released from custody with instructions to report to the U.S. 2 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Enforcement and Removal

3 Operations (“ERO”) for enrollment into the Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) 4 program. Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 6; Dkt. No 8-2. Upon reporting to ERO, Petitioner was 5 “removed from the ATD program as he was no longer required to participate. Dkt. 6 No. 7 ¶ 7. About a year after his parole, Petitioner filed an application for relief 7 from removal with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 8. 8 On April 30, 2024, Petitioner was arrested in Miami, Florida, on state

9 criminal charges that remaining pending. Dkt. No. 8-5 at 3; Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 9. ERO 10 issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration 11 and Nationality Act, Dkt. No. 8-3. ICE then issued a warrant for his arrest, Dkt. No. 12 8-4, and took Petitioner into custody on May 7, 2024. Dkt. No. 8-5. 13 While in custody, Petitioner allegedly (1) appeared in immigration court and 14 conceded the charge of removability, and (2) filed an asylum application and an 15 application to register permanent residence with the Executive Office for

16 Immigration Review (“EOIR”). Dkt. No. 7 ¶¶ 13, 14. 17 On March 6, 2025—ten months after being taken into ICE custody—both 18 Petitioner and his removal proceedings were transferred from Florida to the 19 Northwest ICE Processing Center (“NWIPC”) in Tacoma, Washington. Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 20 15. On November 3, 2025, a Tacoma Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his 21 applications for asylum and adjustment of status, and ordered that he be removed

22 to Cuba. Dkt. No. 8-6. Petitioner timely appealed the IJ’s order to the Board of 23 1 Immigration Appeals (BIA), where it remains pending. Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 17. As of the 2 date of Respondent’s return, no briefing schedule had been issued by the BIA. Id.

3 3. DISCUSSION 4 3.1 Legal standard. 5 Because Petitioner proceeds without counsel, the Court construes his filings 6 liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). To succeed on his habeas 7 petition, Petitioner must show he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or 8 laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. “The essence of habeas 9 corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and … 10 the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser 11 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction 12 includes challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 13 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 14 3.2 Petitioner is not entitled to release under Zadvydas. 15 Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention entitles him to release under 16 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court 17 held that the INA does not authorize “indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention” of 18 noncitizens subject to final orders of removal. 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001). Applying 19 the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Court concluded that, “once removal is 20 no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by 21 statute.” Id. at 699. The “presumptively reasonable” period for detention following a 22 removal order is six months. Id. at 701. 23 1 But Zadvydas only “when [a noncitizen] has been found to be unlawfully 2 present in the United States and a final order of removal has been entered. . .” 533

3 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s removal order is currently on appeal 4 before the BIA and therefore not considered final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B) (an 5 order of deportation “shall become final” upon a determination by the BIA affirming 6 the order); see also Ocampo v. Holder, 629 F.3d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 2010); Harris v. 7 Herrey, No. CIV.A. 13-4365 KM, 2013 WL 3884191, at *1 (D.N.J. July 26, 2013) 8 (“Because [petitioner’s] appeal is still pending before the BIA, his order of removal

9 is not final.”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for release under Zadvydas is 10 DENIED. 11 3.3 Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing under Banda. 12

13 Respondent asserts that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Dkt. 14 No. 6 at 2. While detention is mandated under Section 1225(b), the courts have 15 “grappled … with whether the various immigration detention statutes may 16 authorize indefinite or prolonged detention of detainees and, if so, may do so 17 without providing a bond hearing.” Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th 18 Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). 19 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has settled on a test for 20 assessing the constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention. Banda v. 21 McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1116 (W.D. Wash. 2019). Consequently, “[d]istrict 22 courts have grappled with how to address due process challenges to prolonged 23 1 mandatory detention[.]” Id. And “[n]early all district courts that have considered the 2 issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings,

3 without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due process.” Id. 4 (quotation modified). 5 In assessing the constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention, the 6 court in Banda declined to apply the test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 7 (1976), because the test does “not resolve the more fundamental issue of whether 8 any procedure—such as a bond hearing—must be provided.” Banda, 385 F. Supp.

9 3d at 1106–07. Instead, the court conducted a case-specific analysis considering the 10 following factors: 11 (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal 12 proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the 13 removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. Id. at 1117 (quoting Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858–59 (D. Minn. 14 2019)). Courts in this district have now adopted the “Banda test” to assess when 15 detention violates due process. See, e.g., Toktosunov v. Wamsley, No. 2:25-cv-1724- 16 TL, 2025 WL 3492858, at *4–7 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2025); Belqasim v. Hermosillo, 17 No. 2:25-cv-1282-LK, 2025 WL 3466971, at *7–10 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2025), report 18 and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3170929 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2025); 19 Maliwa v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-0788-TMC, 2025 WL 2256711, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. 20 Aug. 7, 2025); Hong v. Mayorkas, No. 2:20-cv-1784-LK, 2022 WL 1078627, at *4–5 21 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2022). Respondents acknowledge that courts in this District 22 analyze this issue using the Banda multi-factor test, Dkt. 6 at 6–7, and the Court 23 1 will likewise apply it here to determine whether Respondents have met their 2 burden of proving that Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing is

3 justified. 4 3.3.1 Length of detention. 5 “[T]he most important factor” under the Banda test is the length of detention. 6 Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. The “context” of a petitioner's circumstances is 7 crucial to keep in mind, particularly that “[t]he detention that is being examined 8 here is the detention of a human being who has never been found to pose a danger 9 to the community or to be likely to flee if released.” Jamal A., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 10 859. “The longer mandatory detention continues ... the harder it is to justify.” 11 Murillo-Chavez v. Garland, No. 2:22-cv-0303-LK, 2022 WL 16555994, at *5 (W.D. 12 Wash. Aug. 30, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 16553176 13 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2022). 14 Petitioner has been detained since May 7, 2024—over twenty months as of 15 the date of this order. Courts in this district have found that similar or shorter 16 spans of detention favor the detainee. See Murillo-Chavez v. Garland, No. 2:22-cv- 17 0303-LK, 2022 WL 16555994, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2022), report and 18 recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 16553176 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2022) (collecting 19 cases). This “most important” factor undoubtedly favors Petitioner. 20 3.3.2 Likely duration of future detention. 21 The second factor requires consideration of “how long the detention is likely 22 to continue absent judicial intervention; in other words, the ‘anticipated duration of 23 1 all removal proceedings—including administrative and judicial appeals.’ ” Banda, 2 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (quoting Jamal A., 358 F. Supp. at 859). In Banda, the

3 Court noted that if the BIA were to affirm the petitioner’s removal order, the 4 petitioner could then seek review in the Ninth Circuit, which might “take up to two 5 years or longer.” 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (citation omitted). That prospect favored 6 granting the petitioner a bond hearing. Id.; see also Hong, 2022 WL 1078627, at *7 7 (noting that appeals in the Ninth Circuit typically pend for twelve to twenty months 8 before argument and then an additional three months to a year before decision, and

9 finding the factor favors petitioner). 10 As discussed above, Petitioner has appealed his removal order to the BIA, 11 where the appeal remains pending. Respondents argues that the anticipated length 12 of future detention is speculative, Dkt. No. 6 at 7, but the lack of a briefing schedule 13 and the realistic prospect of further appellate proceedings point toward continued 14 and significant detention absent judicial intervention. The second factor weighs in 15 favor of petitioner.

16 3.3.3 The conditions of detention. 17 Next, the Court considers the conditions of detention. “The more that the 18 conditions under which the noncitizen is being held resemble penal confinement, 19 the stronger his argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing.” Banda, 385 F. 20 Supp. 3d at 1119 (citation omitted). Courts have recognized that the conditions at 21 NWIPC are “similar ... to those in many prisons and jails.” See Jennings v. 22 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 329 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Amhirra v. Warden, 23 1 No. 2:25-cv-1376-TL, 2025 WL 3718994, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2025); 2 Toktosunov, 2025 WL 3492858, at *5; Rahman, 2025 WL 1920341, at *4 (citing

3 cases). The Court finds the third Banda factor favors Petitioner. 4 3.3.4 Delays in removal proceedings by Petitioner and Respondents. 5 The fourth and fifth factors consider the nature and extent of any delays in 6 the removal proceedings caused by Petitioner and the Government, respectively. 7 “Petitioner is entitled to raise legitimate defenses to removal ... and such challenges 8 to his removal cannot undermine his claim that detention has become 9 unreasonable.” Martinez v. Clark, No. 2:18-cv-1669-RAJ, 2019 WL 5968089, at *10 10 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 11 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019). Courts, however, should be “sensitive to the possibility 12 that dilatory tactics by the removable [noncitizen] may serve not only to put off the 13 final day of deportation, but also to compel a determination that the [noncitizen] 14 must be released because of the length of his incarceration.” Id. 15 With respect to the Government, “If immigration officials have caused delay, 16 it weighs in favor of finding continued detention unreasonable .... Continued 17 detention will also appear more unreasonable when the delay in the proceedings 18 was caused by the immigration court or other non-ICE government officials.” Sajous 19 v. Decker, No. 18-2447, 2018 WL 2357266, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018). 20 Here, there is no indication in any of the filings before the Court that either 21 Petitioner or Respondents caused any delays in the proceedings. Thus, the Court 22 finds that fourth factor favors Petitioner, while the fifth factor favors Respondents. 23 1 3.3.5 Likelihood of final order of removal. Under the sixth factor, the Court considers the likelihood that the removal 2 proceedings will result in a final order of removal. Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 3 (citation omitted). Here, Respondents argue that Petitioner has “conceded his 4 charge of removability” and thus the factor should weigh in their favor. However, 5 this concession is not apparent from the record before the Court and is based solely 6 on the Reed declaration. Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 13. There is no record of Petitioner’s July 15, 7 2024, appearance in immigration court where he is alleged to have “conceded the 8 charge of removability.” Accordingly, the finds the sixth Banda factor to be neutral. 9 10 3.3.6 Weighing the factors. 11 In sum, four of the six Banda factors, including the critical first factor, weigh 12 in favor of granting Petitioner a bond hearing. Only one of the factors weigh in favor 13 of Respondents. And only one factor is neutral. Since four of the Banda factors 14 clearly favor Petitioner, the Court concludes that the Banda test, on balance, favors 15 Petitioner, and that his “continued mandatory detention under § 1225(b) has 16 become unreasonable and that due process requires the Government to provide him 17 with a bond hearing.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120. 18 3.3.7 Appropriate relief. 19 Having found that Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonable, the Court 20 concludes that the proper remedy in this instance is a bond hearing that comports 21 with the requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) 22 (clarifying that “the government should be held to a clear and convincing evidence 23 1 standard of proof” in a bond hearing). The Court therefore GRANTS the petition as 2 it relates to an individualized bond hearing.

3 3.4 Third-country removal. 4 Petitioner finally requests that the Court prohibit Respondents from 5 removing him to a third country, i.e., a country other than Cuba, without first 6 providing him with notice or opportunity to respond. Dkt. No. 10 at 1. However, 7 Respondents claim that should Petitioner be removed, he will be removed to Cuba. 8 Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 18. While the Court shares Petitioner’s skepticism as to that claim, it is 9 not apparent that his deportation to a third country is imminent or even 10 threatened. Therefore, the Court DENIES the petition as it relates to third-country 11 removal. 12 4. CONCLUSION 13 Accordingly, the Court finds and orders the following: 14 1. The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED IN PART. Dkt. 15 No. 1. 16 2. Petitioner’s prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without a bond 17 hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 18 3. Within FOURTEEN (14) days of this order, Respondents must provide 19 Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing that complies with the 20 requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). In the 21 event that bond is granted, Respondent is ORDERED to immediately 22 release Petitioner. 23 1 4. If the individualized bond hearing is not conducted within fourteen days of 2 this order, Petitioner MUST be released immediately under appropriate

3 conditions of supervised release. 4 5. Petitioner and Respondents MUST file a status report on the status of 5 Petitioner’s bond hearing no later than FIFTEEN (15) days from this 6 order. The status report MUST detail if and when the bond hearing 7 occurred, if bond was granted or denied and, if denied, the reasons for that 8 denial.

9 6. The Petition is DENIED in all other respects. 10 11 Dated this 2nd day of March, 2026. 12 A Jamal N. Whitehead 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23