1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 CV 19-5041-RSWL-PLA ORDER AND FINDINGS OF FACT 13 Plaintiff, & LAW 14 v. 15 UNITED STATES, Complaint Filed: June 10, 2019 16 Trial Date: May 25-26, 2021 Defendant. 17 18 19 Plaintiff Jose Madrigal (“Plaintiff”) initiated 20 this Action against Defendant United States 21 (“Defendant”) for injuries arising out of a collision 22 (the “Collision”) between Plaintiff’s vehicle and a 23 United States Postal Service mail delivery truck. On 24 May 25 and May 26, 2021, the Court conducted a bench 25 trial.1 Having considered the evidence, the parties’ 26 1 On April 27, 2021, the Court ordered [69] the parties to 27 submit declarations in lieu of oral live testimony for purposes 28 of direct examination. 1 objections to the evidence, the credibility of the trial
2 witnesses, and both parties’ arguments at trial, the
3 Court issues the following findings of fact and 4 conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 5 Procedure 52(a). 7 The intersection of Baltic Avenue and Dominguez 8 Street lies in Carson, California. Ex. 3, at 4; Ex. 9 115-7. Baltic Street is a residential roadway that runs 10 north and south. Ex. 3, at 4; Ex. 115-7. Dominguez 11 Street is a business roadway that runs east and west. 12 Ex. 3, at 2. The intersection of Baltic and Dominguez 13 has no traffic lights. Ex. 3, at 4; Ex. 115-7; Ex. 52, 14 at 27:2-6. 15 On June 16, 2017, United States Postal Service 16 (“USPS”) employee Asia Crowfield was driving a USPS mail 17 truck on an unfamiliar route. Ex. 51, at 38:1-10. Ms. 18 Crowfield was traveling northbound on Baltic Avenue, 19 approaching the intersection of Baltic Avenue and 20 Dominguez Street. Ex. 3, at 5; Ex. 115-9. At the same 21 time, Plaintiff was driving his twelve-wheel semi-truck 22 eastbound on Dominguez Street. ¶¶ 5-6. Ms. Crowfield 23 attempted to make an unprotected left turn from Baltic 24 Avenue into the westbound lane of Dominguez Street. Ex. 25 49 ¶ 5. Although Plaintiff saw Ms. Crowfield’s mail 26 truck pull out from Baltic Avenue, he was unable to stop 27 his truck. Id. Ms. Crowfield’s vehicle struck the 28 passenger side of Plaintiff’s truck. Id. ¶ 6; Ex. 3, at 1 5-6; Ex. 115-9, 115-11. Plaintiff’s feet hit the floor
2 of the truck, and his head hit the driver’s side door
3 frame. Ex. 49 ¶ 6. 4 In precipitating the Collision, Ms. Crowfield 5 violated California Vehicle Code § 21801(a), which reads 6 as follows: 7 [t]he driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left or to complete a U-turn upon a highway 8 . . . shall yield the right-of-way to all 9 vehicles approaching from the opposite direction which are close enough to constitute 10 a hazard at any time during the turning 11 movement, and shall continue to yield the right-of-way to the approaching vehicles until 12 the left turn or U-turn can be made with 13 reasonable safety. 14 Ms. Crowfield was the sole cause of the Collision. Ex. 15 3, at 2, 6; Ex. 52, at 30:5-9; Ex. 115-3, 115-11. 16 Plaintiff has undergone significant medical 17 treatment in relation to resultant injuries to his 18 lumbar spine, including emergency room services, 19 magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scans, physical 20 therapy sessions, epidural steroid injections, physician 21 consultations, and a transforaminal lumbar interbody 22 fusion (“TLIF”). Ex. 45 ¶¶ 8-15; Ex. 46 ¶¶ 11-15. In 23 the future, Plaintiff is likely to require additional 24 care in the form of medical consultations, medications, 25 and interventional pain management. Ex. 46 ¶ 25; Ex. 26 158 ¶¶ 36, 38. 27 Plaintiff works as a truck driver five days per 28 1 week for approximately ten to twelve hours per day. Day
2 2 Tr. 17:17-25; Ex. 49 ¶ 12. He is reasonably expected
3 to earn $29,627.75 annually, or $569.76 per week.2 Ex. 4 24. As a result of the Collision, Plaintiff missed 5 twelve weeks of work, including four weeks after the 6 Collision and eight weeks following his TLIF. Ex. 49 ¶ 7 18. However, the Collision has not had a material 8 effect on Plaintiff’s ability to perform his job, and no 9 physician has placed any work-related restriction on 10 him. Day 2 Tr. 18:19-19:3. 11 Plaintiff’s injuries have hindered his ability to 12 engage in certain hobbies, including hiking with family 13 and traveling. Ex. 14; Ex. 49 ¶¶ 22, 36. Accustomed to 14 life as the family breadwinner, Plaintiff feels more 15 like a burden after the Collision. Ex. 49 ¶ 35. 17 Plaintiff asserts a single claim for negligence 18 against Defendant by way of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 19 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In California,3 the elements of 20 negligence are duty, breach of duty, causation, and 21 damages. Carrera v. Maurice J. Sopp & Son, 177 Cal. 22 App. 4th 366, 377 (2009) (citations omitted). 23
24 2 The $29,627.75 figure is an average of Plaintiff’s annual income as a truck driver from the years 2011 to 2019, excluding 25 2014, for which no tax returns were provided. 26 3 Because the Collision occurred in California, California law applies to Plaintiff’s claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) 27 (creating governmental liability “in accordance with the law of 28 the place where the act or omission occurred”). 1 A. Liability
2 Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine, under
3 which the “violation of a statute gives rise to a 4 presumption of negligence in the absence of 5 justification or excuse.” Ramirez v. Nelson, 44 Cal. 6 4th 908, 918 (2008). To establish negligence per se, a 7 plaintiff must establish: “(1) the defendant violated a 8 statute, ordinance, or regulation; (2) the violation 9 proximately caused the injury; (3) the injury resulted 10 from an occurrence that the enactment was designed to 11 prevent; and (4) the plaintiff fits within the class of 12 persons for whose protection the enactment was adopted.” 13 Coppola v. Smith, 935 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1017 (E.D. Cal. 14 2013) (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 669). 15 Because Ms. Crowfield violated California Vehicle 16 Code § 21801(a) and thereby caused Plaintiff’s injuries, 17 she was presumptively negligent. Moreover, because Ms. 18 Crowfield was acting within the scope of her employment 19 during that time, the Court imputes Ms. Crowfield’s 20 presumptive negligence to Defendant. 21 Finally, a defendant may rebut the presumption of 22 negligence by showing that the person violating the 23 statute “did what might reasonably be expected of a 24 person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar 25 circumstances, who desired to comply with the law.” 26 Cal. Evid. Code § 669(b)(1). Defendant adduced no such 27 evidence. Defendant is thus liable for damages 28 proximately caused by Ms. Crowfield’s negligence. 1 B. Damages
2 1. Medical Care
3 Plaintiff is entitled to recover for reasonably 4 necessary medical care attributable to the Collision. 5 Hanif v. Housing Authority, 200 Cal. App. 3d 635, 640 6 (1988). Here, based on the testimony of Plaintiff’s 7 medical experts Dr. Devin Binder and Dr. Fardad Mobin, 8 the ultimate severity of Plaintiff’s condition would not 9 have emerged without the Collision. Ex. 45 ¶ 25; Ex. 46 10 ¶¶ 16-19. Plaintiff had some degeneration prior to the 11 Collision, but the Collision exacerbated his spinal 12 condition and rendered those degenerative problems 13 symptomatic. Ex. 46 ¶¶ 18-19.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 CV 19-5041-RSWL-PLA ORDER AND FINDINGS OF FACT 13 Plaintiff, & LAW 14 v. 15 UNITED STATES, Complaint Filed: June 10, 2019 16 Trial Date: May 25-26, 2021 Defendant. 17 18 19 Plaintiff Jose Madrigal (“Plaintiff”) initiated 20 this Action against Defendant United States 21 (“Defendant”) for injuries arising out of a collision 22 (the “Collision”) between Plaintiff’s vehicle and a 23 United States Postal Service mail delivery truck. On 24 May 25 and May 26, 2021, the Court conducted a bench 25 trial.1 Having considered the evidence, the parties’ 26 1 On April 27, 2021, the Court ordered [69] the parties to 27 submit declarations in lieu of oral live testimony for purposes 28 of direct examination. 1 objections to the evidence, the credibility of the trial
2 witnesses, and both parties’ arguments at trial, the
3 Court issues the following findings of fact and 4 conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 5 Procedure 52(a). 7 The intersection of Baltic Avenue and Dominguez 8 Street lies in Carson, California. Ex. 3, at 4; Ex. 9 115-7. Baltic Street is a residential roadway that runs 10 north and south. Ex. 3, at 4; Ex. 115-7. Dominguez 11 Street is a business roadway that runs east and west. 12 Ex. 3, at 2. The intersection of Baltic and Dominguez 13 has no traffic lights. Ex. 3, at 4; Ex. 115-7; Ex. 52, 14 at 27:2-6. 15 On June 16, 2017, United States Postal Service 16 (“USPS”) employee Asia Crowfield was driving a USPS mail 17 truck on an unfamiliar route. Ex. 51, at 38:1-10. Ms. 18 Crowfield was traveling northbound on Baltic Avenue, 19 approaching the intersection of Baltic Avenue and 20 Dominguez Street. Ex. 3, at 5; Ex. 115-9. At the same 21 time, Plaintiff was driving his twelve-wheel semi-truck 22 eastbound on Dominguez Street. ¶¶ 5-6. Ms. Crowfield 23 attempted to make an unprotected left turn from Baltic 24 Avenue into the westbound lane of Dominguez Street. Ex. 25 49 ¶ 5. Although Plaintiff saw Ms. Crowfield’s mail 26 truck pull out from Baltic Avenue, he was unable to stop 27 his truck. Id. Ms. Crowfield’s vehicle struck the 28 passenger side of Plaintiff’s truck. Id. ¶ 6; Ex. 3, at 1 5-6; Ex. 115-9, 115-11. Plaintiff’s feet hit the floor
2 of the truck, and his head hit the driver’s side door
3 frame. Ex. 49 ¶ 6. 4 In precipitating the Collision, Ms. Crowfield 5 violated California Vehicle Code § 21801(a), which reads 6 as follows: 7 [t]he driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left or to complete a U-turn upon a highway 8 . . . shall yield the right-of-way to all 9 vehicles approaching from the opposite direction which are close enough to constitute 10 a hazard at any time during the turning 11 movement, and shall continue to yield the right-of-way to the approaching vehicles until 12 the left turn or U-turn can be made with 13 reasonable safety. 14 Ms. Crowfield was the sole cause of the Collision. Ex. 15 3, at 2, 6; Ex. 52, at 30:5-9; Ex. 115-3, 115-11. 16 Plaintiff has undergone significant medical 17 treatment in relation to resultant injuries to his 18 lumbar spine, including emergency room services, 19 magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scans, physical 20 therapy sessions, epidural steroid injections, physician 21 consultations, and a transforaminal lumbar interbody 22 fusion (“TLIF”). Ex. 45 ¶¶ 8-15; Ex. 46 ¶¶ 11-15. In 23 the future, Plaintiff is likely to require additional 24 care in the form of medical consultations, medications, 25 and interventional pain management. Ex. 46 ¶ 25; Ex. 26 158 ¶¶ 36, 38. 27 Plaintiff works as a truck driver five days per 28 1 week for approximately ten to twelve hours per day. Day
2 2 Tr. 17:17-25; Ex. 49 ¶ 12. He is reasonably expected
3 to earn $29,627.75 annually, or $569.76 per week.2 Ex. 4 24. As a result of the Collision, Plaintiff missed 5 twelve weeks of work, including four weeks after the 6 Collision and eight weeks following his TLIF. Ex. 49 ¶ 7 18. However, the Collision has not had a material 8 effect on Plaintiff’s ability to perform his job, and no 9 physician has placed any work-related restriction on 10 him. Day 2 Tr. 18:19-19:3. 11 Plaintiff’s injuries have hindered his ability to 12 engage in certain hobbies, including hiking with family 13 and traveling. Ex. 14; Ex. 49 ¶¶ 22, 36. Accustomed to 14 life as the family breadwinner, Plaintiff feels more 15 like a burden after the Collision. Ex. 49 ¶ 35. 17 Plaintiff asserts a single claim for negligence 18 against Defendant by way of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 19 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In California,3 the elements of 20 negligence are duty, breach of duty, causation, and 21 damages. Carrera v. Maurice J. Sopp & Son, 177 Cal. 22 App. 4th 366, 377 (2009) (citations omitted). 23
24 2 The $29,627.75 figure is an average of Plaintiff’s annual income as a truck driver from the years 2011 to 2019, excluding 25 2014, for which no tax returns were provided. 26 3 Because the Collision occurred in California, California law applies to Plaintiff’s claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) 27 (creating governmental liability “in accordance with the law of 28 the place where the act or omission occurred”). 1 A. Liability
2 Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine, under
3 which the “violation of a statute gives rise to a 4 presumption of negligence in the absence of 5 justification or excuse.” Ramirez v. Nelson, 44 Cal. 6 4th 908, 918 (2008). To establish negligence per se, a 7 plaintiff must establish: “(1) the defendant violated a 8 statute, ordinance, or regulation; (2) the violation 9 proximately caused the injury; (3) the injury resulted 10 from an occurrence that the enactment was designed to 11 prevent; and (4) the plaintiff fits within the class of 12 persons for whose protection the enactment was adopted.” 13 Coppola v. Smith, 935 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1017 (E.D. Cal. 14 2013) (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 669). 15 Because Ms. Crowfield violated California Vehicle 16 Code § 21801(a) and thereby caused Plaintiff’s injuries, 17 she was presumptively negligent. Moreover, because Ms. 18 Crowfield was acting within the scope of her employment 19 during that time, the Court imputes Ms. Crowfield’s 20 presumptive negligence to Defendant. 21 Finally, a defendant may rebut the presumption of 22 negligence by showing that the person violating the 23 statute “did what might reasonably be expected of a 24 person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar 25 circumstances, who desired to comply with the law.” 26 Cal. Evid. Code § 669(b)(1). Defendant adduced no such 27 evidence. Defendant is thus liable for damages 28 proximately caused by Ms. Crowfield’s negligence. 1 B. Damages
2 1. Medical Care
3 Plaintiff is entitled to recover for reasonably 4 necessary medical care attributable to the Collision. 5 Hanif v. Housing Authority, 200 Cal. App. 3d 635, 640 6 (1988). Here, based on the testimony of Plaintiff’s 7 medical experts Dr. Devin Binder and Dr. Fardad Mobin, 8 the ultimate severity of Plaintiff’s condition would not 9 have emerged without the Collision. Ex. 45 ¶ 25; Ex. 46 10 ¶¶ 16-19. Plaintiff had some degeneration prior to the 11 Collision, but the Collision exacerbated his spinal 12 condition and rendered those degenerative problems 13 symptomatic. Ex. 46 ¶¶ 18-19. This aligns with 14 Plaintiff’s credible testimony that he did not have any 15 back pain prior to the Collision but experienced an 16 onset of back pain soon after its occurrence. Ex. 49 ¶ 17 24. As a result, the following medical care was 18 attributable4 to the Collision:
19 4 Defendant argued, and Defendant’s medical experts posited, 20 that Plaintiff’s condition was unrelated to the Collision. Def. United States of Am.’s Closing Arg. 7:19-22, ECF No. 133; see 21 generally Exs. 145-146. Specifically, Dr. Raymond Hah and Dr. Isaac Yang testified that the August 12, 2017 MRI revealed an 22 absence of trauma to the surrounding bone which, in turn, signified an unlikelihood of trauma to the spinal discs. Ex. 157 23 ¶ 28; Ex. 158 ¶¶ 20-21. The doctors suggested that Plaintiff 24 merely exhibited mild degenerative symptoms typical for a person of his age and occupation. Ex. 157 ¶ 28; Ex. 158 ¶ 10. 25 While Defendant’s medical experts opined that injury to the 26 bone typifies disc herniation resulting from trauma, they did not rule out the possibility that disc herniation resulting from 27 trauma could materialize absent trauma to the bone. See Day 1 Tr. 110:18; Day 2 Tr. 76:18-22. In fact, when confronted with 28 the question of causation on cross-examination, Dr. Hah and Dr. 1 - Emergency room services
2 - MRI scans
3 - Physical therapy sessions 4 - Epidural steroid injections 5 - Consultations with Dr. Binder 6 - TLIF surgery 7 Furthermore, Plaintiff’s medical care was 8 reasonably necessary.5 The conservative treatment— 9 namely, the medical consultations, physical therapy, and 10 epidural injections—was a reasonable measure in an 11 attempt to alleviate Plaintiff’s pain. Day 1 Tr. 12 104:12-22, 131:11-18. Moreover, contrary to Defendant’s 13 position, a TLIF was a reasonably necessary surgery for 14 Dr. Binder to perform given the MRI scans, the 15 ineffectiveness of conservative treatment, and 16 Plaintiff’s symptomatology. Ex. 45 ¶¶ 8-13; Ex. 46 ¶ 17 15. 18 2. Plaintiff’s Compensation for Medical Care 19 With respect to Plaintiff’s monetary recovery for 20 medical services, the amount recoverable is “the lesser 21 of (1) the amount paid or incurred for past medical 22
23 Yang displayed notable incertitude about the causal connection between the Collision and Plaintiff’s degenerative pathology. 24 Day 1 Tr. 110:18-111:1, 111:6-18, 120:12-13, 130:13-2. 25 5 Although the parties stipulated to the admission of certain medical records—specifically, those pertaining to 26 Plaintiff’s visits with Dr. Shi and Dr. Chen—none of Plaintiff’s witnesses testified about these visits. The Court cannot 27 ascertain whether the services rendered were reasonably necessary 28 or attributable to the Collision. 1 expenses and (2) the reasonable value of the services.”
2 Corenbaum v. Lampkin, 215 Cal. App. 4th 1308, 1325-26
3 (2013). The reasonable value is the fair market value,6 4 or the amount that the provider “normally receives from 5 the relevant community for the services it provides.” 6 Bermudez v. Ciolek, 237 Cal. App. 4th 1311, 1334 (2015). 7 While billed amounts are relevant in the reasonableness 8 inquiry, they are alone insufficient.7 See id. at 1338 9 (stating that “the amount incurred by an uninsured 10 medical patient is not sufficient evidence on its own to 11 prove the reasonable amount of medical damages”). 12 The reasonable value of Plaintiff’s medical 13 treatment attributable to the Collision is as follows: 14 - Emergency room services - $425.00 15 - MRI scans – $2,750.00 16 - Physical therapy sessions – $8,704.40 17 - Epidural steroid injections – $4,000.00 18 - Consultations with Dr. Binder – $11,000.00 19 - TLIF and associated costs – $39,500.00
20 6 As the California Supreme Court noted in Howell, “pricing 21 of medical services is highly complex and depends, to a significant extent, on the identity of the payer. In effect, 22 there appears to be not one market for medical services but several . . . .” Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 23 Cal. 4th 541, 562 (2011). 24 7 The determination of fair market value “will usually turn on a wide-ranging inquiry” involving additional evidence and 25 expert testimony. Bermudez, 237 Cal. App. 4th at 1330-31; see also Pebley v. Santa Clara Organics, LLC, 22 Cal. App. 5th 1266, 26 1275 (2018) (remarking that “the uninsured plaintiff also must present additional evidence, generally in the form of expert 27 opinion testimony, to establish that the amount billed is a 28 reasonable value for the service rendered”). 1 These values derive from a dissection of the
2 respective analyses for each parties’ experts.
3 Plaintiff, on the one hand, adduced evidence of the full 4 amount of his outstanding medical bills. These amounts 5 are minimally probative in determining the reasonable 6 value of medical services, as they represent the 7 unilateral assignment of value by Plaintiff’s respective 8 providers. This concern is especially glaring for 9 services rendered by Dr. Binder, who was retained on a 10 lien. 11 On the other hand, Defendant proffered the expert 12 testimony of Lindsay Knutson, who opined on the fair 13 market value of Plaintiff’s medical care. In reaching 14 her conclusions, Ms. Knutson applied a multiplier to 15 data extracted from the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule 16 Database, a comprehensive source of information on fees 17 for medical services. Ex. 159 ¶¶ 35-38. Application of 18 the multiplier to the cost of the service, which was 19 identified by the pertinent Current Procedural 20 Terminology code, yielded the “reasonable value” of the 21 respective service. Id. 22 The Court finds Ms. Knutson’s methodology to be 23 more probative of the reasonable value of medical 24 services but nevertheless problematic. While her 25 methodology more nearly pinpoints the reasonable value, 26 it concerns a singular “fair market value.” The Court 27 is not convinced that the relevant market for 28 Plaintiff’s treatment is precisely aligned with the 1 market identified in Ms. Knutson’s methodology. That
2 is, Ms. Knutson’s methodology encompasses those rates
3 negotiated by payers who may have more bargaining power 4 than Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court does not adopt 5 Ms. Knutson’s conclusions but accords reasonable values 6 for Plaintiff’s medical services more closely tied to 7 figures proffered by Ms. Knutson. 8 With respect to future medical care, Plaintiff is 9 entitled to recover the reasonable value of reasonably 10 necessary medical care that he is reasonably certain to 11 need in the future as a result of the Collision. Cuevas 12 v. Contra Costa County, 11 Cal. App. 5th 163, 183 13 (2017); see also CACI 3903A. As stated in the factual 14 findings, Plaintiff is likely to require future care, 15 including medical consultations, medications, and 16 interventional pain management. Application of the same 17 principles used to calculate the reasonable value of 18 Plaintiff’s past medical services yields recovery for 19 future medical expenses of $10,800.00. See Ex. 159 ¶ 20 47. 21 3. Lost Wages 22 A plaintiff may recover for lost wages, but such 23 damages must not be speculative. Cantu v. United 24 States, No. CV 14-00219 MMM (JCGx), 2015 WL 4720580, at 25 *32 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015) (citing Engle v. Oroville, 26 238 Cal. App. 2d 266, 273 (1965)). 27 Here, Plaintiff missed twelve weeks of work due to 28 the Collision. Because Plaintiff earns $569.76 per week 1 as a truck driver, Plaintiff is entitled to recover
2 $6,837.12 in lost wages.8 In addition, the record
3 reflects a minor diminution in Plaintiff’s work-life 4 expectancy. Given his significant medical treatment, 5 persistent back problems, and need for future treatment, 6 it is more likely than not that Plaintiff’s work-life 7 expectancy is reduced by two years. With expected 8 annual earnings of $29,627.75, Plaintiff is entitled to 9 recover $59,255.50 in future wages. 10 The Court does not adopt the figure of 4.2 years 11 suggested by Plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Vega, because of 12 Plaintiff’s current medical status and ongoing 13 vocational incentives. That is, no physician has placed 14 a work-related restriction on Plaintiff, and he 15 maintains potent incentives to work. Day 1 Tr. 78:15- 16 80:4; Day 2 Tr. 18:19-19:3; Ex. 160 ¶ 42. 17 4. Noneconomic Damages 18 In California, “[f]or harm to body, feelings or 19 reputation, compensatory damages reasonably proportioned 20 to the intensity and duration of the harm can be awarded 21 without proof of amount other than evidence of the 22 nature of the harm.” Duarte v. Zachariah, 22 Cal. App. 23
24 8 Plaintiff’s vocational economic analyst, Enrique Vega, testified that Plaintiff should recover an additional 26.9% of 25 his earnings to account for fringe benefits. Ex. 47 ¶ 16. While 26.9% of earnings may represent the national average in fringe 26 benefits, there is no evidence that this figure applies in Plaintiff’s case. Moreover, fringe benefits are reflected in 27 Plaintiff’s tax returns as an offset to his earnings. Day 1 Tr. 28 82:14-18; see generally Ex. 24. 1 4th 1652, 1664-65 (1994) (quoting Restatement (Second)
2 of Torts § 912 (1979)). Plaintiff’s noneconomic harm is
3 meager but nevertheless existent. Plaintiff adduced 4 minimal evidence of pain and suffering, and the 5 testimony of Maria Garcia, Plaintiff’s partner, was 6 minimally probative on that point. He has, however, 7 been rendered somewhat burdensome to his family and has 8 lost the ability to hike or travel as he did before the 9 Collision. Plaintiff has suffered noneconomic harm in 10 the amount of $40,000.00. 12 The Court awards Judgment for Plaintiff and against 13 Defendant in the amount of $183,272.02, plus costs. 15 16 DATED: August 13, 2021 _____/_s/_ R_o_na_ld_ S_._W_. L_e_w_____________ HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW 17 Senior U.S. District Judge 18
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