1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOSE ELIAS MORALES AGUIRRE, Case No. 22-cv-06909-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 57 10 AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CORPORATION, INC., 11 Defendant. 12 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. Dkt. No. 57 (“Mot.”); 14 Dkt. No. 65 (“Opp.”); Dkt. No. 69 (“Reply”); Dkt. No. 78 (“Sur-Reply”).1 The Court held a 15 hearing on the motion, Dkt. No. 81 (“Tr.”), and now DENIES it. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 Plaintiff Jose Elias Morales Aguirre owned a Honda Partial Zero Emissions Vehicle 18 (“PZEV”), which began malfunctioning two years after purchase at a mileage of 127,530 miles. 19 Dkt. No. 35 (“SAC”) ¶¶ 58–59. Technicians at a Honda repair facility determined that the head 20 gasket was blown, and Plaintiff paid a total of $3,267 for the necessary diagnosis and repairs. See 21 id. ¶¶ 60–63.2 22 After Plaintiff paid for the repairs, he retained counsel, who sent a letter to Defendant 23 American Honda Motor Corporation, Inc. (“AHM”) requesting that it cover the repairs under the 24 California Emissions Warranty because the head gasket is an emissions-related part. Id. ¶ 64. 25 1 The Court allowed Defendant to file a sur-reply to address evidentiary objections and Plaintiff’s 26 revised class definition. Dkt. No. 77.
27 2 The head gasket “sits between the cylinder head and the block” in an internal combustion engine, 1 California Health and Safety Code § 43200 authorizes the California Air Resources Board 2 (“CARB”) to promulgate regulations for vehicle emissions, including the “California Emissions 3 Warranty.” See id. ¶ 11. That warranty consists of two relevant parts: the Defects Warranty, 13 4 C.C.R. § 2037, and the Performance Warranty, 13 C.C.R. § 2038. See id. ¶¶ 22, 27. These 5 warranties extend coverage to fifteen years or 150,000 miles for certain PZEVs. 13 C.C.R. 6 § 1962.1(c)(2)(D); SAC ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that the head gasket qualifies as an emissions- 7 related part that should be covered by these extended warranties. SAC ¶¶ 79–82. But Defendant 8 allegedly refused Plaintiff’s request to reimburse him under these provisions, stating that “the head 9 gasket is not a component that is covered by the Emissions Warranty.” See id. ¶ 64. 10 Now, Plaintiff brings this putative class action against Defendant on behalf of a multistate 11 and California class of PZEV owners and lessees. Id. ¶ 143. He argues that Defendant violated 12 California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. (the “UCL”), by failing to identify the 13 head gasket as an emissions-related part. SAC ¶¶ 126, 150–71. He seeks injunctive and 14 declaratory relief, as well as “reimbursement or restitution for out-of-pocket expenses, including 15 diagnostic fees for amounts wrongfully paid by Plaintiff and members of the Classes relating to 16 head gasket repairs that should have been covered.” Id. ¶¶ 144–45. 17 Judge Breyer previously granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss 18 in July 2023. Most notably, Judge Breyer (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for prospective 19 injunctive relief, but granted leave to amend in light of counsel’s representation that Plaintiff could 20 allege that another “head gasket malfunction is likely or certainly impending”; and (2) found 21 Plaintiff had adequately pleaded that he lacked an adequate remedy at law such that the Court had 22 equitable jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 33 (“MTD Order”) at 17, 20.3 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides that a district court may certify a class only 25 if: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are 26 questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative 27 1 parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will 2 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(a). That is, the class 3 must satisfy the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 4 representation to maintain a class action. See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 5 588 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. 6 Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651 (9th Cir. 2022). 7 If the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met, a court also must find that the plaintiff 8 “satisf[ies] through evidentiary proof” one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Comcast Corp. 9 v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013). Rule 23(b)(3) applies where there is both “predominance” 10 and “superiority,” meaning “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over 11 any questions affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other 12 available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 13 23(b)(3). To determine whether a putative class action satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), 14 courts consider: 15 (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 16 prosecution or defense of separate actions;
17 (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; 18 (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of 19 the claims in the particular forum; and
20 (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 21 22 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). Plaintiff, as the party seeking certification, “must 23 affirmatively demonstrate” his compliance with Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence. See 24 White v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Serv. Co., 104 F.4th 1182, 1192 (9th Cir. 2024) (quotation 25 omitted). To do so, Plaintiff “must actually prove—not simply plead—that [his] proposed class 26 satisfies each requirement of Rule 23, including (if applicable) the predominance requirement of 27 Rule 23(b)(3).” Id. (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Defendant raises several challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction, Opp. at 15–26, which the 3 Court addresses first. The Court then considers the predominance requirement for Plaintiff’s 4 damages class. 5 A. Exhaustion 6 Defendant argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not exhaust his 7 administrative remedies under 13 C.C.R. § 2041, and the issue is not ripe for judicial 8 determination. Opp. at 16. The basic rule of exhaustion “is that where an administrative remedy 9 is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy 10 exhausted before the courts will act.” Campbell v. Regents of Univ. of California, 35 Cal. 4th 311, 11 321 (2005) (quotation omitted). Defendant concedes that the “Warranty Regulations are silent as 12 to whether exhaustion is required,” but argues that an exhaustion requirement applies under 13 California state precedent. Id. 14 The regulations state that “[a] vehicle or engine owner may request that the Executive 15 Officer4 mediate a warranty claim.” 13 C.C.R. § 2041(b). “Upon examination of the facts 16 submitted by the parties concerned, the Executive Officer . . . may find that a warranted part, or a 17 vehicle’s nonconformity with any California statutorily authorized motor vehicle emissions 18 inspection and maintenance program, is eligible for warranty coverage pursuant to this article. If 19 such a finding is made, the Executive Officer shall issue a Finding of Warrantable Condition.” Id. 20 § 2041(b)(2). “This section is intended to provide a mechanism for mediating unresolved 21 emissions warranty disputes between vehicle or engine owners and manufacturers or their agents.” 22 Id. § 2041(a). 23 The Court finds that exhaustion is not required here because the administrative remedy is 24 “unavailable or inadequate.” Ramos v. Cnty. of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 691 (1971) (quotation 25 omitted). First, Plaintiff is no longer “[a] vehicle or engine owner,” so it is not clear that he can 26 still use this regulatory mechanism. 13 C.C.R. § 2041(b); Reply at 12 (stating Plaintiff sold his car 27 1 in 2022). Second, the regulation states that the Executive Officer may find that “a warranted part 2 . . . is eligible for warranty coverage pursuant to this article.” 13 C.C.R. § 2041(b)(2) (emphasis 3 added). This does not appear to give the Executive Officer authority to determine that an 4 unwarranted part should have been listed as warranted in the first place. The Court cannot identify 5 any cases that suggest Plaintiff could use this regulatory mechanism to achieve anything like the 6 remedy he seeks here. 7 In addition, “[i]f the remedies do not provide class-wide relief, then no plaintiff need 8 exhaust them before suing.” Tarkington v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 172 Cal. App. 9 4th 1494, 1510 (2009); Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of L.A., 42 Cal. App. 5th 918, 931– 10 32 (2019) (same). Here, Defendant has not introduced any evidence that “appeals from individual 11 [car owners] had the power to affect an entire class of [owners],” Tarkington, 172 Cal. App. 4th at 12 1510, and the regulation’s language suggests the Findings of Warrantable Condition apply only to 13 individual owners and vehicles, see 13 C.C.R. § 2041(a), (b)(3). Contrast Lopez v. Civ. Serv. 14 Com., 232 Cal. App. 3d 307, 313 (1991) (requiring exhaustion where “records of the Commission 15 . . . confirm that the Commission regularly hears appeals from individual employees on matters 16 which affect the entire class to which they belong”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff 17 was not required to exhaust any potential remedies under 13 C.C.R. § 2041 before bringing his 18 claims here. 19 B. Standing 20 Standing “is a jurisdictional element that must be satisfied prior to class certification.” Lee 21 v. State of Or., 107 F.3d 1382, 1390 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Mar. 21, 1997), as amended 22 (Apr. 16, 1997) (quotation omitted). “On a motion for class certification, this means a plaintiff 23 must show standing through evidentiary proof.” Rivera v. Invitation Homes, Inc., No. 18-CV- 24 03158-JSW, 2022 WL 504161, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2022). 25 i. Injunctive/Declaratory Relief 26 Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to represent all class members, including 27 current owners and lessees. Opp. at 21–26. In reply, Plaintiff modifies his class definitions so that 1 vehicles.” Dkt. No. 70 ¶ 15. In doing so, Plaintiff has written himself out of these classes, as it is 2 undisputed that he sold his vehicle in 2022, and he does not claim to have purchased another. 3 Reply at 12; see Betts v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 659 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981) 4 (noting “the fundamental requirement that the representative plaintiff must be a member of the 5 class he represents”).5 6 In addition, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue prospective injunctive relief. To pursue 7 injunctive relief, a plaintiff must plead a “threat of injury [that is] actual and imminent, not 8 conjectural or hypothetical.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 9 2018) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff does not currently own a Honda vehicle that could be 10 impacted by Defendant’s warranties, but he claims that he “would again purchase another AHM 11 vehicle, if the alleged unlawful practices are corrected through the relief sought,” and “absent the 12 requested injunctive relief, he will not know whether it makes sense to spend money on another 13 AHM vehicle on account of its noncompliance with the Emissions Warranty.” Mot. at 23. He 14 claims he is “unable to rely on AHM’s compliance with the requirements of the Emissions 15 Warranty.” Id. at 24. 16 As Judge Breyer already observed when originally dismissing the injunctive relief claim, 17 Plaintiff “will be able to rely on AHM’s application for certification by CARB to determine 18 whether AHM covers the head gasket under the California Emissions Warranty.” MTD Order at 19 19. Davidson found standing for prospective injunctive relief in a false advertising case where a 20 consumer wanted to purchase a product again, but would either be “unable to rely on the product’s 21 advertising or labeling in the future” or “may reasonably, but incorrectly, assume the product was 22 improved.” 889 F.3d at 969–70. Prospective injunctive relief remedied the problem created 23 where “[k]nowledge that the advertisement or label was false in the past does not equate to 24 knowledge that it will remain false in the future.” Id. at 769. In contrast, Plaintiff will be able to 25
26 5 While “[d]istrict courts have broad discretion to modify class definitions,” Nevarez v. Forty Niners Football Co., LLC, 326 F.R.D. 562, 575 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quotation omitted); Fed. R. Civ. 27 Proc. 23(c)(1)(C), the Court will not attempt to reconcile Plaintiff’s proposed class definitions 1 see if Defendant lists allegedly emissions-related parts like the head gasket as warranted parts in 2 the future, see SAC ¶ 55, and the issue was never that Defendant listed a part as warranted but 3 then refused to honor the warranty.6 To the extent Plaintiff’s theory is that he wishes to buy a car 4 but cannot because he may one day have a head gasket failure during the warranty period that he 5 would not be reimbursed for, this “relies on [too] highly attenuated [a] chain of possibilities.” 6 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013).7 Thus, the Court DENIES the motion 7 with respect to the 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4) classes.8 8 ii. Restitution 9 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to seek retrospective restitution. Opp. at 10 18. Plaintiff claims he has standing “because he lost money when he paid out of pocket as a result 11 of AHM’s failure to identify the head gasket as a warranted part.” Reply at 15. Standing requires 12 a plaintiff to have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 13 conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 14 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). The parties do not 15 seriously dispute that out-of-pocket repairs constitute an injury in fact or that an order of 16 restitution by this Court can redress that harm. Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiff must 17 “submit evidence establishing that, if the head gasket were a warranted part, his replacement 18 would have been covered under warranty” to establish causation. Opp. at 18. 19 On one hand, the Court agrees with Defendant that “failure of a warranted part does not 20
21 6 If Plaintiff is claiming that he can’t trust Defendant’s warranty compliance after it lists the head gasket as a warranted part, then a court order requiring it to list the part will not remedy Plaintiff’s 22 injury, either.
23 7 Plaintiff also suggests that he faces a “continuing and ongoing” harm because “he is breathing polluted and unhealthy air as a result of Defendant’s violation of the emissions laws and by not 24 covering the [head gasket] under warranty.” Mot. at 24–25. Besides being too speculative and attenuated, this theory is not particularized and would give anyone standing to bring this action. 25
8 It’s worth noting that a significant reason why Judge Breyer granted Plaintiff leave to amend his 26 claim for injunctive relief is because Plaintiff’s counsel represented that Plaintiff’s mileage was still below 150,000 miles in 2023, so Plaintiff could “plausibly allege that a head gasket 27 malfunction [was] likely or certainly impending.” MTD Order at 20. Plaintiff’s own briefing 1 mean warranty coverage is automatic” under 13 C.C.R. §§ 2037(b) and 2038(b). Id. The Defects 2 Warranty states, for example, that “[t]he manufacturer of each motor vehicle or motor vehicle 3 engine shall warrant . . . that the vehicle or engine is: . . . [f]ree from defects in materials and 4 workmanship which cause the failure of a warranted part to be identical in all material respects to 5 the part as described in the vehicle or engine manufacturer’s application for certification, including 6 any defect in materials or workmanship which would cause the vehicle’s on-board diagnostic 7 malfunction indicator light to illuminate.” 13 C.C.R. § 2037(b)(2).9 The Performance Warranty 8 states that “[t]he manufacturer of each passenger car . . . shall warrant . . . that the vehicle or 9 engine . . . [w]ill, for a period of [fifteen years or 150,000 miles], whichever first occurs, pass an 10 inspection established under section 44012 of the Health and Safety Code.” Id. § 2038(b); id. 11 § 1962.1(c)(2)(D).10 Both provisions also exclude repair or replacement of any warranted part 12 when “the vehicle or engine manufacturer demonstrates that the vehicle or engine has been 13 abused, neglected, or improperly maintained, and that such abuse, neglect, or improper 14 maintenance was the direct cause of the need for the repair or replacement of the part.” Id. 15 § 2037(i); see also id. § 2038(d)(1). In other words, while both regulations require that Defendant 16 must provide coverage for warranted parts in some circumstances,11 the actual warranty coverage 17 has limits. 18 On the other hand, Defendant overstates the causation requirement. For Article III 19 causation, the injury must be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not 20 the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Bennett v. Spear, 21 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997). While the “line of causation between the defendant’s action and the 22 9 It also requires that a vehicle or engine is “[d]esigned, built and equipped so as to conform with 23 all applicable regulations adopted by the Air Resources Board,” but the parties don’t discuss this provision. 13 C.C.R. § 2037(b)(1). 24
10 This allegedly requires that the vehicle will pass a smog test. SAC ¶ 27. 25
11 When these conditions are met, “[r]epair or replacement of any warranted part under the 26 warranty provisions of this article shall be performed at no charge to the vehicle or engine owner at a warranty station,” and “[t]he manufacturer shall reimburse the owner for his or her expenses 27 including diagnostic charges for such emergency repair or replacement.” See, e.g., 13 C.C.R. 1 plaintiff’s harm must be more than attenuated,” standing does not “require the defendant’s action 2 to be the sole source of injury.” Wash. Env’t Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 3 2013) (quotation omitted). “[T]he causal connection put forward for standing purposes cannot be 4 too speculative, or rely on conjecture about the behavior of other parties, but need not be so 5 airtight at this stage of litigation as to demonstrate that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits.” 6 Ocean Advocs. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 860 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation 7 omitted). There is “no requirement that the defendant’s conduct comprise the last link in the 8 chain.” Mendia v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). 9 Plaintiff has met this standard. Plaintiff has introduced evidence showing that he sent a 10 letter to Defendant asking it to reimburse his costs. Dkt. No. 69-14 at 6. Defendant refused, 11 stating that, “[b]ased on the current information available, we determined and confirmed that the 12 head gasket is not a component that is covered by the Emissions Warranty.” Dkt. No. 69-15 at 2; 13 see also SAC ¶ 64. This evidence plausibly suggests that Defendant’s allegedly unlawful choice 14 not to list the head gasket as an emissions-related part was a but-for cause of Plaintiff’s injury.12 15 The Court does not need to conclude that Plaintiff certainly would have been reimbursed if the 16 head gasket had been listed. See Barnum Timber Co. v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir.2011) 17 (holding that a plaintiff “need not eliminate any other contributing causes to establish . . . 18 standing”); Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 540 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding plaintiff did “not 19 need to prove at this stage that [defendant’s conduct was] the sole source of her injury” (quotation 20 omitted)).13 21 22 12 Plaintiff also argues that “Dublin Honda apparently denied coverage solely because the head 23 gasket was not covered under the Warranty and not for any other reason.” Reply at 10. Plaintiff has not identified any evidence that supports this assertion about Dublin Honda’s actions. See 24 Dkt. No. 57-7 (Dublin repair records).
25 13 The Court does not address Defendant’s other standing-related arguments, including whether Plaintiff has standing to represent lessees or can bring a UCL claim on behalf of class members in 26 other states. Opp. at 21–26. These are “question[s] of class certification—i.e., whether the named plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs—not [questions] of 27 standing.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court defers these 1 iii. Equitable Jurisdiction 2 Defendant argues that the “existence of [an] administrative remedy (among other available 3 legal remedies), establishes that [Plaintiff] has an adequate legal remedy, which precludes 4 pursuing equitable claims.” Opp. at 17; see also id. at 31 (discussing this in the context of 5 adequacy, and mentioning Cal. Civ. Code § 1794 as one possible remedy). “In order to entertain a 6 request for equitable relief, a district court must have equitable jurisdiction, which can only exist 7 under federal common law if the plaintiff has no adequate legal remedy.” Guzman v. Polaris 8 Indus., 49 F.4th 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff alleges several explanations for why 9 equitable relief is necessary, SAC ¶¶ 92–113, and Judge Breyer previously credited several of 10 these when denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of equitable jurisdiction, MTD Order 11 at 17. Most of these allegations explain why injunctive relief, as opposed to restitution, is 12 necessary, and the Court is skeptical that it ultimately will have equitable jurisdiction over a 13 restitution claim premised on compensating out-of-pocket repair costs. But the parties barely 14 address this argument, so the Court will not rule on it for now.14 If Defendant seeks to challenge 15 the Court’s equitable jurisdiction again, it should more fully explain (1) what the adequate legal 16 remedy is; and (2) what the standard for establishing equitable jurisdiction is at the class 17 certification stage, if relevant. 18 C. Predominance 19 While Plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to establish individual standing, he has 20 not adequately demonstrated that common issues predominate over individual issues. The 21 predominance inquiry “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 22 adjudication by representation.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) 23 (quotation omitted). When “one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the 24 class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) 25 even though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some 26
27 14 Plaintiff explains why he might be an adequate representative even if he chose not to pursue a 1 affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual class members.” Id. (quotation omitted). The 2 Supreme Court has defined an individual question as “one where members of a proposed class will 3 need to present evidence that varies from member to member, while a common question is one 4 where the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the 5 issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.” Id. (quotation omitted). This “inquiry asks 6 whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important 7 than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues.” Id. (quotation omitted). 8 The Supreme Court has made clear that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement is 9 “even more demanding” than the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a). See Comcast Corp. v. 10 Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013). In short, “Rule 23(a)(2) asks whether there are issues common 11 to the class,” and “Rule 23(b)(3) asks whether these common questions predominate.” Abdullah v. 12 U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). 13 There are undoubtedly common and substantial questions here, such as whether Defendant 14 was legally required to list the head gasket as an emissions-related part. However, that does not 15 end the inquiry, because “Rule 23 also requires a district court to determine whether 16 individualized inquiries into [a] standing issue would predominate over common questions.” 17 Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 668 n.12 (9th Cir. 18 2022). Plaintiff introduced evidence that Defendant told him it would not warrant his head gasket 19 because it was not a warranted part, but he has not offered or discussed any class-wide evidence 20 capable of establishing this same fact for other members of the class. Put another way, Plaintiff 21 hasn’t explained at all what class-wide proof would be capable of addressing Defendant’s conduct 22 or the potential chain of causation.15 Instead, Plaintiff asks the Court to infer that class members’ 23 15 Plaintiff comes closest through deposition testimony from CARB’s Branch Chief stating that 24 Defendant told him “Honda looks at the head [gasket] as hardware. And Honda has the interpretation that hardware is or was or should be excluded from the California Emissions 25 Warranty based on past practices.” Dkt. No. 57-4 at 4 (discussed in Mot. at 11). That noncommittal statement about Defendant’s view on warranting this part is not the same as class- 26 wide proof that it denied coverage for class members because the head gasket was not listed as a warranted part. 27 1 out-of-pocket payments are fairly traceable to Defendant’s conduct solely from statutory language 2 that suggests that Defendant would have sometimes needed to reimburse repairs had the head 3 gasket been a warranted part. 4 It is Plaintiff’s burden to “prove—not simply plead—that their proposed class satisfies 5 each requirement of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.” Small v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of 6 N. Am., 122 F.4th 1182, 1197 (9th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted); see also Black Lives Matter L.A. 7 v. City of L.A., 113 F.4th 1249, 1258 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that “plaintiffs cannot plead their way 8 to class certification through just allegations and assertions”). Without some minimum class-wide 9 proof capable of addressing the causal chain, a purported class action would devolve into 10 thousands of individual inquiries as to whether the alleged injuries were fairly traceable to the 11 purported misconduct Plaintiff alleges (failure to list the part) as opposed to another cause (for 12 example, disqualifying conduct by individual car owners).16 Given the sparse record here, the 13 Court is not “satisfied, after a rigorous analysis,” that the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been met. 14 Olean, 31 F.4th at 664 (quotation omitted). 15 Plaintiff may be able to overcome this burden. For example, Plaintiff could explain how 16 he will use class-wide proof to show that engines with a head gasket failure would necessarily fail 17 a smog test and qualify for warranty coverage under 13 C.C.R. § 2038(b).17 Plaintiff may also 18 specifically excluded basic mechanical components for emissions defect warranty coverage.” Dkt. 19 No. 57-3 at 10. But that testimony does not explain if a head gasket is considered a basic mechanical part. 20
16 Plaintiff argues that exclusion from warranty coverage relates only to the amount of damages 21 and “would be part of the post-certification claims process.” See Reply at 8. But Plaintiff proposes employing a claims process to do more than just crunch numbers: he wants to use it to 22 elide inherently individualized questions of standing.
23 Plaintiff also cites to Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2015), which held that “a court need not make individual determinations regarding entitlement to 24 restitution,” which “is available on a class[-]wide basis once the class representative makes the threshold showing of liability under the UCL.” Id. at 986. The lower court had been concerned 25 about how to “exclude from Plaintiffs’ proposed class the many advertisers who have no legal claim to restitution because they derived direct economic benefits from” unlawfully placed ads. 26 Id. at 984. The Court is not suggesting that predominance is defeated because some class members may not be entitled to any restitution. Instead, the Court is concerned by the lack of any 27 proffered class-wide evidence supporting Plaintiff’s causal theory for anyone other than himself. ] have policy documents or deposition testimony showing that Defendant always declined head 2 || gasket repairs because the head gasket was not an emissions-related part. But under Rule 23, it is 3 Plaintiff's burden, not the Court’s obligation, to explain how Article III standing is susceptible to 4 || class-wide proof and back up that theory with evidence. Plaintiff has not met that burden here.'® 5 || IV. CONCLUSION 6 The Court DENIES the motion for class certification. Dkt. No. 57. 7 The Court further SETS a case management conference in this case on March 31, 2026, at 8 || 2:00 p.m. The hearing will be held by Public Zoom Webinar. All counsel, members of the public, 9 || and media may access the webinar information at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/hsg. All 10 || attorneys and pro se litigants appearing for the case management conference are required to join at 11 least 15 minutes before the hearing to check in with the courtroom deputy and test internet, video, « 12 || and audio capabilities. The Court DIRECTS the parties to meet and confer and file a joint case
13 management statement by March 24, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: 3/4/2026
17 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 supporting that claim in his motion for class certification. 26 '8 Plaintiff also asks the Court to certify a 23(c)(4) class for the restitution claims. While “predominance [is] not required for certifying a class under Rule 23(c)(4),” the Court will not 97 || certify a restitution-based 23(c)(4) class at this time given the Court’s remaining concerns that “numerous individualized issues affecting determinations of liability [will] make Rule 23(c)(4) 28 certification inefficient.” Reitman v. Champion Petfoods USA, Inc., 830 F. App’x 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2020) (unpublished case which the Court relies on only for its persuasive value).