Jose A. Jimenez v. Warden

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedFebruary 13, 2020
Docket8:19-cv-01321
StatusUnknown

This text of Jose A. Jimenez v. Warden (Jose A. Jimenez v. Warden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jose A. Jimenez v. Warden, (C.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 Case No. SA CV 19-1321 CJC (MRW) 13 JOSE JIMENEZ, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 14 Petitioner, WITH PREJUDICE 15 v. 16 STEPHEN PFEIFFER, Warden, 17 Respondent. 18

19 The Court grants the California Attorney General’s motion to dismiss 20 this untimely habeas corpus action. 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 21 * * * 22 1. Petitioner was convicted of multiple counts of attempted 23 murder and gang-related offenses in the early 2000s. His conviction 24 became final when the state supreme court denied review in mid-2004. He 25 is currently serving a life term in prison. 26 2. In 2019, Petitioner filed this habeas action in federal court. 27 (Docket # 1.) The petition contained (a) a challenge to the sufficiency of the 28 1 evidence at his original trial, and (b) a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 2 (Docket # 8-1 at 2.) 3 3. Magistrate Judge Wilner issued a screening order. (Docket 4 # 4.) The order noted several facial problems with the petition, notably 5 untimeliness under AEDPA and a lack of exhaustion of the claims. The 6 Court directed Petitioner to file a supplemental statement regarding these 7 defects. 8 4. Petitioner did so. (Docket # 5.) Even though Petitioner’s 9 supplemental statement did not fully address Judge Wilner’s concerns, the 10 Court ordered the Attorney General to respond to the petition. (Docket 11 # 6.) 12 5. The Attorney General subsequently moved to dismiss the 13 action as untimely. (Docket # 8.) In response to the motion, Petitioner 14 made a cursory argument that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the 15 statute of limitations based on his low educational/reading level, and 16 delays in obtaining his legal files over the years.1 (Docket # 14.) 17 * * * 18 6. If it “appears from the application that the applicant or person 19 detained is not entitled” to habeas relief, a court may dismiss a habeas 20 action without ordering service on the responding party or by summary 21 proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see also Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 22 2254 Cases in United States District Courts (petition may be summarily 23 dismissed if petitioner plainly not entitled to relief); Local Civil Rule 72-3.2 24 (magistrate judge may submit proposed order for summary dismissal to 25 district judge “if it plainly appears from the face of the petition [ ] that the 26 petitioner is not entitled to relief”). 27 1 Judge Wilner twice informed Petitioner of his obligation to present 28 evidence regarding his claim for equitable tolling. (Docket # 4, 10.) 1 7. Under AEDPA, state prisoners have a one-year period within 2 which they must seek federal habeas review of their habeas claims. 3 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The AEDPA limitations period is generally 4 triggered when state court appellate review becomes final, or under other 5 specific conditions set forth in the statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A-D); Lee 6 v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2011). 7 8. AEDPA’s statutory limitations period may be tolled for 8 statutory or equitable reasons “in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 9 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). To establish equitable tolling, prisoners must 10 prove that: (1) they have been pursuing their rights diligently; and (2) some 11 extraordinary circumstances caused the delay. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 12 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). 13 9. Equitable tolling requires prisoners to clear “a very high bar, 14 and is reserved for rare cases.” Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th 15 Cir. 2014). A prisoner’s poor educational background or lack of literacy is 16 not enough on its own to establish extraordinary circumstances. Hughes v. 17 Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986); Baker v. CDC, 18 484 F. App’x 130, 131 (9th Cir. 2012) (proof of “limited reading and writing 19 abilities does not establish a mental condition that would amount to 20 extraordinary circumstances” for equitable tolling). Moreover, a prisoner 21 must prove that his lack of access to his trial record – which may be a 22 typical circumstance for incarcerated inmates – was the cause of his delay 23 in seeking habeas relief. Bryant v. Ariz. Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 24 (9th Cir. 2007). 25 * * * 26 10. Petitioner failed to meet this rigorous standard. He filed this 27 action a decade and a half after his conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. 28 1 § 2244. Petitioner concedes that his petition is untimely under federal law. 2 (Docket # 14 at 1 (“I Petitioner fully understand now that I was late on 3 filing my federal petition [due] to the fact that I was given a time 4 limitation.”).) 5 11. Petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to 15 years of equitable 6 tolling is unsupported and unconvincing. His opposition to the dismissal 7 motion consisted of a single page of a prison disciplinary report from 2006. 8 (Docket # 14 at 3.) This excerpt shows that Petitioner had a low reading 9 level. But Petitioner admitted (without any documentation) that he was 10 able to improve his educational ability over time. (Id. At 1-2.) More 11 directly, though, he failed to explain how his reading and writing abilities 12 many years ago prevented him from taking other steps (contacting private 13 lawyers, other inmates, etc.) to pursue habeas relief reasonably diligently 14 following his conviction. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Baker, 484 F. App’x at 131. 15 12. Similarly, Petitioner offered no evidentiary support for his 16 bare claim that an unidentified amount of time he spent in segregated 17 housing in 2005 without his legal file (Docket # 14 at 2) explained the 18 overall delay in filing this habeas action. Bryant, 499 F.3d at 1061. 19 Petitioner’s meager submission has not convincingly approached the 20 “high bar” necessary to establish a claim to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 21 time limits. Yeh, 751 F.3d at 1077. 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / /

25 26 27 28 1 Therefore, the present action is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice 2 | as untimely.? 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 Ko Lo s—— / 6 | Dated: February 13, 2020 7 HON. CORMAC J. CAR'NEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 Presented by: 10 11 [ _ 12 HON. MICHAEL R. WILNER 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2 The Court notes, but need not take up, the Attorney General’s additional contention that one of Petitioner’s claims was never presented to the 27 | state supreme court and is unexhausted. Given the passage of time, there is little likelihood that Petitioner could ever obtain timely collateral review of the claim 28 | in state court.

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Related

Porter v. Ollison
620 F.3d 952 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Lee v. Lampert
653 F.3d 929 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Baker v. California Department of Corrections
484 F. App'x 130 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General
499 F.3d 1056 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Yow Yeh v. Matthew Martel
751 F.3d 1075 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Holland v. Florida
177 L. Ed. 2d 130 (Supreme Court, 2010)

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Jose A. Jimenez v. Warden, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jose-a-jimenez-v-warden-cacd-2020.