OPINION
BRANDT, Bankruptcy Judge.
Appellant Suzanne Jorgenson filed two (almost) identical personal injury claims in the chapter 112 case of State Line Casino (“State Line”), a general partnership.3 She listed an attorney’s name and office address in the space on each proof of claim form calling for the name and address to which notice should be sent, and included her own handwritten address beside her signature on the bottom of the form. Debtor filed an objection to her claims, which it mailed to the attorney’s office. Jorgenson did not respond, and the bankruptcy court sustained the objection, disallowing the claim.
Several months later, after learning that her claims had been disallowed, Jorgenson moved to vacate the order disallowing the claim, arguing that it was void for inadequate service. The bankruptcy court denied the motion and Jorgenson timely appealed.
We AFFIRM.
I. FACTS
Jorgenson alleges that, on 12 December 2001, she was injured on State Line’s premises when an escalator caught her purse and pulled her backwards, causing her to fall and strike her head. This occurred approximately one month before debtor’s chapter 11 petition. No debt to Jorgenson was scheduled.
Some time after the incident, Jorgenson retained attorney Marc McLachlan in connection with her state law claims. She timely filed two almost identical proofs of claim, each on Official Form B10, prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to Rule 9009, and [706]*706each asserted a general unsecured claim in the amount of $1,000,000. Appearing in the box for “Name & address where notices should be sent” of each form is:
Mark C. McLachlan, Esq.
480 E. 400 S., Suite 200
S.L.C., UT 84111
(801) 521-0123
Jorgenson signed in the signature box at the bottom of each form; handwritten after her signature is “@ 426 N. 150 E., Lindon, Utah 84042.” No documentation was attached in support of either claim, nor is any proof of service of either claim in the record provided to us.4
The parties do not dispute that, other than the proofs of claim, debtor received no other communication from Jorgenson or from counsel; McLachlan never requested to be added to the special notice list pursuant to Rule 2002(i), nor filed a notice of appearance, nor participated in the bankruptcy ease. No personal injury action was filed before the proceedings in question.
In its Fourth Set of Objections to Claims (the “Objection”), debtor objected to both of Jorgenson’s claims and several others. The Objection provided in part:
Claim Nos. 208 and 215 filed by Suzanne Jorgenson (the “Jorgenson Claims”) ... assert identical unsecured nonpriority claims based on personal injury/wrongful death in the amount of $1 Million. Each of the Jorgenson Claims attach insufficient proof of any monies owed by the Debtors as neither attaches any supporting documentation at all. After a thorough review of the Debtors’ books and records, the Debtors have determined that they have no records reflecting any basis for either of the Jorgenson Claims. Accordingly, the Debtors request that the Court disallow Claims Nos. 208 and 215 in their entirety-
The proof of service indicates that debtor mailed the Objection to Jorgenson care of McLachlan’s law office in Salt Lake City.
Jorgenson filed no response to the Objection, and on 29 April 2003, the bankruptcy court entered an order sustaining the Objection, disallowing both claims:
The Debtors’ objections to Claims No. 208 and 215, general unsecured claims in the amount of $1 million each asserted by Suzanne Jorgenson against State Line Casino, are sustained. Claims No. 208 and 215 are hereby disallowed in their entirety.
McLachlan apparently first learned that Jorgenson’s claims had been disallowed on 20 October 2003, on being served notice of debtor’s motion to dismiss the case. An exhibit to the motion valued Jorgenson’s claim at “$0.00.”
Shortly thereafter, Jorgenson (with new counsel) moved to vacate the order disallowing the claims, arguing that the order is void. In McLachlan’s affidavit, the only evidence in support, he stated:
1. I am an attorney for claimant Suzanne F. Jorgenson and represent her with regard to injuries sustained from a fall on an escalator located in the State-line Hotel on or about December 12, 2001. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah.
2. In connection with this claim, I caused to be filed a Proof of Claim, which was received and filed in this honorable court on April 11, 2002.
3. In December 2003,1 learned that on February 24, 2003, the debtor, Stateline Casino, formally objected to Mrs. Jor-genson’s Proof of Claim. The certificate of service shows that a copy of this [707]*707Objection was supposedly mailed to me at my business address, printed above. I have since had the opportunity to review this pleading and herein state that prior to December 2003, I have never received a copy of this Objection. I have reviewed my files and have likewise been unable to locate the copy that was purportedly sent to my attention.
4. Further I never received a copy of any Order that was apparently entered by the Court on April 29, 2003, sustaining the Debtor’s subject objection. I have not located a copy of this Order after having conducted a diligent search of my files.
5. Having litigated personal injury matters in the State of Utah for 30 years, I value this claim as being worth in the range of $500,000 to $1,000,000.
Debtor responded, arguing that Jorgen-son had appointed McLachlan as her counsel of record, and that McLaehlan’s bare affidavit is insufficient to rebut the mailbox presumption because the Objection had never been returned as undeliverable. Debtor did not contend that it had served Jorgenson herself at any address. Debtor also argued that relief should be denied for equitable reasons, as the estate had later entered into a settlement agreement with creditors and would be irreparably prejudiced by Jorgenson’s delay. Finally, it argued that Jorgenson’s claim was not meritorious and lacked supporting documentation.
After hearing, the bankruptcy court denied the motion, finding:
Even if I had to reach the agency theory, which I don’t think I do, the proof of claim indicates who Ms. Jorgenson wanted served;
And it has the lawyer’s name, it . has her name care of the lawyer’s address. That’s it[.]
This is an objection to a claim;
And I do find that it is analogous to a civil action or an adversary proceeding;
The proof of claim sometimes can substitute as a complaint;
And we do that sometimes pursuant to local rule or even Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3007, where the parties don’t want to go through the expense ... of an adversary about the claim. They allow the claim to stand as here it is. And then the objection is like the answer;
And ... some of the cases that made that analogy. And I think that’s a good analogy....
Transcript, 2 March 2004, at 8:24 — 10:5.
Interpreting Rule 7004(b), the bankruptcy court further observed:
And if you’re trying to tell me that you can appoint somebody to accept notice and that doesn’t vest that person with the authority to accept service, frankly, I can’t accept that.
Id. at 27:24 — 28:2.
Jorgenson timely appealed.
A sale of substantially all debtor’s assets closed in December 2002, and debtor moved for approval of a compromise and settlement with other creditors. Under the terms of the approved settlement, $90,000 was reserved for payment in full of all allowed unsecured creditors’ claims. On 14 October 2003 the bankruptcy court granted debtor’s motion. Later, based on the underlying settlement, debtor moved to dismiss certain debtors, including State Line Casino, which triggered the proceedings resulting in the order on review.
Since this appeal was taken, the order approving the settlement was appealed to this panel; we reversed and remanded. In re State Line Hotel, Inc., BAP No. NV-03-1523-MoHMa (9th Cir. BAP June 9, [708]*7082004). Review of the docket reflects that a plan has been confirmed and debtor’s motion for final decree is now pending.
Since taking her appeal, Jorgenson moved for relief from stay to allow her to prosecute her personal injury claim in state court. The bankruptcy court granted her motion, limiting any recovery to insurance proceeds.
II.JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction via 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and § 157(b)(1) and (2)(B), and we do under 28 U.S.C. § 158(c).
III.ISSUES
A. Was notice of the Objection properly given?
B. Did that notice satisfy due process?
C. Was the motion to vacate the order denying Jorgenson’s claim properly denied?
IV.STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. If service is defective, the judgment is void, and we review de novo “[wjhether a default judgment was void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction” over a defendant in an adversary proceeding. In re Cossio, 163 B.R. 150, 154 (9th Cir. BAP 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 70 (9th Cir.1995) (table). We review factual findings respecting service for clear error. Id.
B. Whether a particular procedure comports with basic requirements of due process is a question of law which we review de novo. In re Garner, 246 B.R. 617, 619 (9th Cir. BAP 2000).
C. We review the denial of a motion under FRCP 60(b), applicable via Rule 9024, for abuse of discretion. In re Van Meter, 175 B.R. 64, 67 (9th Cir. BAP 1994); In re Hammer, 940 F.2d 524, 525 (9th Cir.1991). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we must have a definite and firm conviction that the bankruptcy court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion that it reached before reversal is proper. In re Black, 222 B.R. 896, 899 (9th Cir. BAP 1998).
Further:
A trial court will necessarily abuse its discretion by failing to set aside a void judgment. Although the language of Rule 60(b)(4) appears to allow the court discretion, there is no discretion to refuse vacating a judgment if it is void. When it is found that there has been defective service of process, the judgment is void: A person is not bound by a judgment in litigation to which he or she has not been made a party by service of process. The factual circumstances surrounding service of process are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013. Whether the default judgment was void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over [claimant]' under the circumstances is reviewed de novo.
Cossio, 163 B.R. at 154 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
And we may affirm on any basis fairly supported by the record. In re Fraschilla, 235 B.R. 449, 459 (9th Cir. BAP 1999), aff'd, 242 F.3d 381 (9th Cir.2000) (table).
Y. DISCUSSION
Jorgenson conceded at argument that she could not rebut the mailbox presumption; 5 accordingly, our analysis is [709]*709predicated on the factual premise that Mc-Laehlan received the Objection. Further, as noted in the dissent, she waived any argument regarding the form of the Objection; we do not address that possible issue.
Jorgenson’s motion to vacate invoked FRCP 60(b)(4), applicable in bankruptcy proceedings via Rule 9024. It provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: ...
(4) the judgment is void;....
Jorgenson argues that she was not represented, and had to be served as an individual “at her dwelling house or where she regularly conducts business.” Opening Brief, at 3. Rule 3008 and § 502(j) provide express authority to seek reconsideration of a disallowed claim for cause, but were not raised, and we do not address them.
Generally, a trial court may deny a motion to vacate a default judgment if the plaintiff (here, State Line) would be prejudiced should the judgment be set aside, and if the defendant (here, Jorgenson, the claimant) has no meritorious defense (here, her claim), or if her culpable conduct led to the default. Hammer, 940 F.2d at 525-526.
The bankruptcy court opined that there was not a shred of evidence that Jorgen-son’s claim was meritorious:
... nobody has ever bothered to submit to me, the form of an affidavit or declaration, medical records, bills, lost wages. I don’t even know her age;
If I’m going to set aside a final order I should be aware that there’s a meritorious defense. And I’m not satisfied in that regard. And more than adequate opportunity has been provided to do that....
Transcript, 2 March 2004, at 39:15-18 and 40:7-10.
But, as noted by Professor Moore, the showing of a meritorious claim is not necessary for relief from a void judgment:
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that when a judgment is void because of a lack of proper service on the defendant, it is a denial of due process to require a showing of a meritorious defense as a precondition to relief from that void judgment. The case in which the United States Supreme Court made its statement involved procedures for relief from default judgments that applied in the state courts of Texas, but there is no question that the Court’s constitutional holding also applies to Rule 60(b)(4) motions in federal court.
James Wm. Moore et al., 12 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 60.44[5][b] (3d ed.2004) (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84-86, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988)). See also 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civ.2d § 2862 (1995).
We need not reach this question if the order is void for insufficient service or lack of due process, see Cossio, 163 B.R. at 154, which we now address:
[710]*710A. Was notice of the Objection properly given?
Rule 3007, which governs the procedure for objections to claims, provides:
An objection to the allowance of a claim shall be in writing and filed. A copy of the objection with notice of hearing thereon shall be mailed or otherwise delivered to the claimant, the debtor or debtor in possession and the trustee at least 30 days prior to the hearing. If an objection to a claim is joined with a demand for relief of a kind specified in Rule 7001, it becomes an adversary proceeding.
(emphasis added).
Is putting an attorney’s name and address in the box for designation of the notice recipient and notice address on the proof of claim form, without more, an appointment for service of an objection to that claim? State Line argues that it is authorization for service under Rule 7004(b)(8), which provides:
... it is also sufficient if a copy of the summons and complaint is mailed to an agent of such defendant authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process ....
Service of process and notice are distinct under the bankruptcy rules, as observed in In re Association of Volleyball Professionals, 256 B.R. 313, 320 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2000):
In contrast [to notice under Rule 2002(g)], when a bankruptcy proceeding, such as an objection to a proof of claim ..., directly affects the individual rights of a specific party, the initiating motion or objection must be served on the affected party in the same manner as a summons and complaint are served pursuant to Rule 7004.
(citation omitted). The bankruptcy court there required service of a claim objection on a non-responding presumed corporation by publication.
Debtor argues Jorgenson initiated the contested matter by filing the proof of claim, so the Objection is akin to an answer, which may properly be served on counsel, citing FRCP 5, applicable via Rule 7005, and In re Lomas Financial Corp., 212 B.R. 46, 55 (Bankr.D.Del.1997).
We disagree, as a claim is deemed allowed if not objected to. § 502(a). Rather, it is the objection which initiates a contested matter, governed by Rule 9014. See In re Levoy, 182 B.R. 827, 834 (9th Cir. BAP 1995); and Garner, 246 B.R. at 623. Rule 9014 provides:
(a) Motion. In a contested matter not otherwise governed by these rules, relief shall be requested by motion, and reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing shall be afforded the party against whom relief is sought....
(b) Service. The motion shall be served in the manner provided for service of a summons and complaint by Rule 7004. Any paper served after the motion shall be served in the manner provided by [FRCP 5(b)],
A number of other courts have concluded that an objection to a proof of claim is properly served on a corporation (under Rule 7004(b)(3)) if served on the person named on the proof of claim at the address given for notice. In re Ms. Interpret, 222 B.R. 409, 415 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1998); In re Rushton, 285 B.R. 76, 81 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2002) (following Ms. Interpret ); In re Village Craftsman, Inc., 160 B.R. 740, 745 (Bankr.D.N.J.1993). In Ms. Interpret, the proof of claim specified that notice should be sent to claimant “c/d” a particular law firm, and the court held that that was sufficient to designate the law firm as agent for service of process:
[711]*711[I]t is evident that a party may not sign a proof of claim and then assert that it did not want notices sent to the address contained within the proof of claim. Who better than the creditor know what address it wishes used? Had [the creditor] desired some other address for service of process in the case, it had only to insert it into the proof of claim. Accordingly, I hold that [the creditor] expressly authorized [law firm] as its agent for service of process in the bankruptcy case.
222 B.R. at 415 (citations omitted). The parties have not cited, nor have we found, any authority from within this Circuit apart from In re Association of Volleyball Professionals, 256 B.R. 313 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2000) which follows these cases, nor any so holding on an individual’s claim.
Elaborating, the Ms. Interpret court also found implied authority, in the alternative:
But even if I err in this conclusion [that in the name and address box on the proof of claim was the appointment of an agent], the record plainly establishes that [the law firm] was implicitly appointed as [creditor’s] agent for service of process.
If the purported agent’s activities in the forum are substantial and involve the significant exercise of independent judgment and discretion, service on the agent is valid even in the absence of express authorization to accept process.
Id. at 415-16 (citations omitted). And the Ninth Circuit recently decided In re Focus Media, Inc., 387 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir.2004) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1674, 161 L.Ed.2d 482 (2005):
[I]n an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court, a lawyer can be deemed to be the client’s implied agent to receive service of process [under Rule 7004(b)(8) ] when the lawyer repeatedly represented that client in the underlying bankruptcy case, and where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates the intent of the client to convey such authority.
There, the defendant’s attorney had been “extensively involved in the underlying bankruptcy proceeding and on several occasions participated on [the defendant’s] behalf.” Id. at 1084.
Implied agency is not seriously argued in the case before us, as there were no “substantial activities or significant exercise of independent judgment and discretion” to support an implied agency theory. At most, McLaehlan’s office prepared and filed two proofs of claim. McLachlan neither negotiated for Jorgenson, nor communicated with the court or counsel on her behalf, nor filed anything which identifies Jorgenson as his client.
But we need not go so far to decide this appeal. The cases finding either an express or an implied appointment of the counsel named in the appropriate box on the claim form as an agent for service of process are predicated on an implicit assumption that Rule 7004 service is required. We disagree: Rule 9014(b) requires service of any motion required by Rule 9014(a) to meet Rule 7004’s requirements, and Rule 9014(a) applies only to contested matters “not otherwise governed by these rules.” As noted in In re Hejl, 85 B.R. 399, 400 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1988), a claim objection is otherwise governed: Rule 3007 calls for its initiation by mailing (or otherwise delivering) a copy of the objection with a notice of hearing to the claimant. See also In re Metro Transp. Co., 117 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr.E.D.Penn.1990) (holding that since a motion to determine claim priority is “otherwise gov[712]*712erned” by Rules 3007 and 7001(2), Rule 9014 is inapplicable).
Contra the dissent, we do not think Rule 9014 nevertheless required the Objection to be served in accordance with Rule 7004. Subparagraph (b) of that rule, rigorously parsed, only pertains to “[t]he motion,” unambiguously referring back to subpara-graph (a). This was even clearer before the 2002 revision broke the unitary Rule 9014 into subparagraphs, without changing the wording of what is now (a) and (b), insofar as it pertains to this appeal (that is, the language respecting service of any required motion). Advisory Comm. Note (2002).
If a motion is not required under sub-paragraph (a) because the contested matter is “otherwise governed by these rules,” and the other provision does not require a motion, as with respect to claims objections, Rule 9014(b) does not require Rule 7004 service. Rule 9014(b) does not mention objections.
Official Form B10, promulgated by the same authority as the Rules, and used here, calls for the claimant to specify to whom and where that notice should go. Jorgenson specified McLachlan at his office address. Although attorneys and agents often sign proofs of claim, Jorgenson signed the forms herself. The record does not disclose why she also wrote in her address, but that is of no moment. She had, a few inches above, expressly directed that notice be sent to her attorney, and the mailing of notice is all Rule 3007 requires. It follows that mailing the Objection as she directed was sufficient under the Rules, and the resulting order was not void.
Parenthetically, this outcome is consistent with Focus Media, wherein the Ninth Circuit noted:
The critical inquiry in evaluating an attorney’s authority to receive process is, of course, whether the client acted in a manner that expressly or impliedly indicated the grant of such authority.
Focus Media, 387 F.3d at 1083, quoting Olympus Corp. v. Dealer Sales & Serv., Inc., 107 F.R.D. 300, 305 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (emphasis added).
Further, after finding that the attorney had appeared extensively on the client’s behalf in the underlying bankruptcy case, the court noted that an agent’s authority to act cannot be determined solely on the agent’s actions but, rather, “authority must be established by an act of the principal.” In this regard, the court found “most important” the fact that the client’s own declaration “manifests the requisite evidence of authority conveyed by the principal.” Id. at 1084. Although the pertinent rule here allows for mailed notice, rather than requiring service of process, Jorgenson explicitly directed where and to whom it should go, in contrast to impliedly authorizing her lawyer to accept it.
Although we reach a result contrary to Volleyball Professionals and we differ from the bankruptcy courts in the other claims objection cases discussed above, none of those courts (apart from Hejl) were, apparently, presented with an argument from the structure of Rules 3007 and 9014, on which our conclusion rests. Nor were we, but we are not confined to the arguments of the parties on legal issues, In re Pizza of Hawaii 761 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir.1985), and may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Fraschilla, 235 B.R. at 459.
Nor does Levoy require otherwise: our opinion there reasons from the unexamined premise that Rule 7004 service is required. The implications of “not otherwise governed” in Rule 9014(a) (then Rule 9014) are not considered; the Rule is not quoted. In fairness, it appears the question was not raised. But we are not con[713]*713strained by stare decisis from now examining the premise:
Of course, not every statement of law in every opinion is binding on later panels. Where it is clear that a statement is made casually and without analysis, where the statement is uttered in passing without due consideration of the alternatives, or where it is merely a prelude to another legal issue that commands the panel’s full attention, it may be appropriate to re-visit the issue in a later case. However, any such reconsideration should be done cautiously and rarely-only where the later panel is convinced that the earlier panel did not make a deliberate decision to adopt the rule of law it announced. Where, on the other hand, it is clear that a majority of the panel has focused on the legal issue presented by the case before it and made a deliberate decision to resolve the issue, that ruling becomes the law of the circuit and can only be overturned by an en banc court or by the Supreme Court.
U.S. v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915-916 (9th Cir.2001) (Kozinski, J.) (footnote omitted). See, to the same effect, Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 2003).
Levoy holds, 182 B.R. at 834, that Rule 9014 applies to objections to claims. We do not disagree with that statement, but, as set out above, conclude that Rule 9014 defers to Rule 3007 on the subject of claims objections: it calls for an objection, not a motion, and authorizes notice, rather than requiring service. It is Levoy’s next offhand statement which comes within the principle explicated in the quote from Johnson: that claims objections must be served as Rule 7004 provides. It is almost an assumption, not entitled to precedential weight, Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir.2001); there is no discussion of the notice language of Rule 3007, which is not quoted, nor any supporting analysis respecting notice or service. We do not see a focus on the notice/service question, nor a deliberate decision to resolve the issue, in dramatic contrast to the treatment given to Rule 7004’s requirements, obviously the main focus of the Levoy panel’s energies. We take no issue with Le-voy’s analysis of Rule 7004, just to its applicability here.
B. Due Process
Although Jorgenson argued failure to comply with the Rules, rather than denial of due process, we observe that it requires that notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). And “[i]f the notice requirement of the due process clause is not satisfied, the order is void.” In re Ex-Cel Concrete Co., 178 B.R. 198, 203 (9th Cir. BAP 1995); likewise, In re Loloee, 241 B.R. 655, 661 (9th Cir. BAP 1999) and In re Villar, 317 B.R. 88, 94 (9th Cir. BAP 2004).
We do not see how notice given as Jor-genson specified fails these requirements.
C. Meritorious defense?
Because the Objection was properly served and there was no violation of due process, the normal requirements for setting aside a judgment (to which, by operation of Rule 9014, the order sustaining it was analogous) govern. As we noted at the beginning of our analysis, a court may properly decline to vacate when no meritorious defense (here, claim) is shown. The bankruptcy court found that was the case here. Jorgenson has not challenged that finding, and we see nothing in the [714]*714record indicating she made any showing whatsoever respecting the merits of her claim. Accordingly, the Objection was properly sustained, and the motion to vacate properly denied.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy estates receive hundreds of claims, as here, and thousands or hundreds of thousands in very large cases, from across the nation and beyond. The result here is neither harsh nor unfair: the designation of a recipient for notice is uniquely in the claimant’s control, and debtors, trustees, and other creditors cannot reasonably be required to expend the effort and incur the expense of finding claimants who may be out of state or anywhere in the world. Following the claimant’s explicit direction on the claim form comports with the Rules and due process, promotes economy (in most instances, other creditors bear the expense of claims objections), and efficiency for parties and courts alike.
The serendipitous inclusion of Jorgen-son’s address on her claim form does not support a contrary ruling — neither debtor nor anyone else should have to second-guess her express designation.
As State Line noticed Jorgenson of its Objection to her claim as she had directed, its service complied with the Rules and satisfied due process. And as she has not shown a meritorious basis for her claim, the bankruptcy court properly denied her motion to vacate the order disallowing it. AFFIRMED.