Jorge Segura Martinez v. ICE Field Office Director, et al.

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 10 JORGE SEGURA MARTINEZ, CASE NO. C26-1027JLR 11 Petitioner, ORDER v. 12 ICE FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, et 13 al., 14 Respondents. 15

16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 Before the court is Petitioner Jorge Segura Martinez’s petition for writ of habeas 18 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet. (Dkt. # 3); Traverse (Dkt. # 9).) The Government1 19 1 The Federal Respondent is the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Field 20 Office Director (referenced herein as the “Government”). The proper respondent, however, for a § 2241 petition is “the person who has custody over” the petitioner. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2243) (internal quotation marks omitted); 21 Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2024) (reversing grant of federal habeas relief where the immigration detainee’s direct custodian was not named as respondent). Because 22 Petitioner represents that he is currently detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center, the 1 opposes the petition. (Return (Dkt. # 6).) The court has considered the petition, the 2 parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law. Being

3 fully advised, the court GRANTS the petition in part. 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States at an unknown 6 location, on an unknown date, and without being admitted or paroled. (Soraghan Decl. 7 (Dkt. # 7) ¶ 3.) On three occasions in June 2002, United States Border Patrol (“USBP”) 8 encountered Petitioner at or near Douglas, Arizona, and offered him voluntary return to

9 Mexico. (Id. ¶¶ 4-6 (representing that on June 26, 2002; June 28, 2002; and June 29, 10 2002, USBP encountered Petitioner and offered him voluntary return).) On December 11 20, 2025, ICE officers encountered Petitioner at a vehicle stop in Everett, Washington; 12 determined that he was a noncitizen present in the United States without being admitted 13 or paroled; and detained him. (Id. ¶ 7.) The Government issued Petitioner a Notice to

14 Appear; placed him in removal proceedings in the Tacoma, Washington, Immigration 15 Court; and transported him to the Northwest ICE Processing Center, where he has since 16 remained. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 12; see also Wong Decl. (Dkt. # 8), ¶ 2, Ex. 2 (Notice to Appear).) 17 On March 16, 2026, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) held a merits hearing for Petitioner, 18 denied his requested relief, and ordered him removed to Mexico. (Soraghan Decl. ¶ 8;

19 Wong Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 3 (IJ Order).) On April 13, 2026, Petitioner appealed the IJ’s 20

21 proper respondent for this action is the individual in charge of that facility. Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to name Bruce Scott, Warden of the Northwest ICE Processing Center, as a 22 Respondent in this action. 1 decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and that appeal remains pending. 2 (Soraghan Decl. ¶ 11.) On April 3, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition

3 under 8 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking his immediate release from federal custody or, in the 4 alternative, a bond hearing. (See generally Pet.) The petition is now fully briefed and 5 ripe for the court’s consideration. 6 III. ANALYSIS 7 Habeas petitioners must provide by preponderance of the evidence that they are 8 “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”

9 8 U.S.C. § 2241(c); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). 10 Petitioner asserts that his detention is unlawful because the Government has held 11 him in custody since December 20, 2025, following the entry of a final order of removal; 12 the Government has not provided a constitutionally adequate bond hearing; and his 13 continued detention does not comport with due process requirement. (See generally

14 Traverse.) The Government asserts that the court should deny Petitioner habeas relief 15 because he is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); due 16 process does not require a court-ordered bond hearing; and he failed to exhaust his 17 administrative remedies regarding his bond hearing. (See generally Pet.) The court 18 considers each argument in turn.

19 A. Petitioner is Entitled to a Bond Hearing Under Banda. 20 Petitioner first asserts that his continued detention is unlawful because the 21 Government has held him in federal custody since December 20, 2025, without any 22 meaningful determination justifying his continued detention. (Traverse at 7.) “Courts in 1 this circuit have an obligation to give a liberal construction to the filings of pro se 2 litigants, especially when they are civil rights claims by [incarcerated persons].”

3 Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The court 4 liberally construes Petitioner’s claim as one arguing that his detention has become so 5 unreasonably prolonged that the Constitution requires a bond hearing. The Government, 6 in pertinent part, contends that Petitioner is not entitled to release because he is “subject 7 to mandatory detention while his removal proceedings remain pending.” (Return at 4 8 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).) The Government further argues that, even if the court

9 were to apply the Banda test, Petitioner’s continued detention under § 1225(b) does not 10 violate due process. (Return at 5 (citing Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 11 1111-12 (W.D. Wash. 2019)).) 12 The Government considers Petitioner to be subject to detention under § 1225. (Id. 13 at 4-5.) Petitioner does not provide an argument as to which section of the Immigration

14 Nationality Act (“INA”) governs his detention, and he does not appear to challenge the 15 statutory basis for his detention. (See generally Pet.; Traverse.) Rather, the substance of 16 Petitioner’s claim is that his detention has become constitutionally prolonged. (See 17 generally Traverse.) The court therefore assumes Petitioner is subject to § 1225 without 18 considering the merits of the Government’s argument and considers his prolonged

19 detention claim under that framework. 20 “Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has settled on a test for 21 assessing the constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention” under § 1225. 22 Toktosunov v. Wamsley, No. C25-1724TL, 2025 WL 3492858, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1 5, 2025). Courts in this district have adopted the Banda test to assess when such 2 detention violates due process. See, e.g., Hong v. Mayorkas, C20-01784LK, 2022 WL

3 1078627, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2022) (citing Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1106)). 4 Under Banda, a court evaluates the following factors: 5 (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal 6 proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the Government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal 7 proceedings will result in a final order of removal.

8 Id. The Banda court further clarified that, at such hearings, the burden of proof rests 9 with the Government, which must satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard. 10 Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1107. In so concluding the Banda court relied on the Ninth 11 Circuit’s analysis in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011) and 12 determined that when at stake is freedom from prolonged detention, the Government has 13 this burden—regardless of the stage of proceedings. Id. 14 Here, (1) the Government has detained Petitioner for nearly six months (Soraghan 15 Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12); Petitioner’s future lengthy detention is likely as his appeal remains 16 pending (Id. ¶ 11); Petitioner is imprisoned; (4) the Government concedes that Petitioner 17 has not intentionally delayed removal proceedings (Return at 8); (5) Petitioner does not 18 identify any delays occasioned by the Government (see generally Traverse); and (6) there 19 is already a final order of removal (see generally IJ Order). All factors either weigh in 20 Petitioner’s favor or are neutral. Dovlatov v. Hernandez, C26-0826JNW, 2026 WL 21 1030454, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 16, 2026) (finding petitioner’s detention had become 22 1 unconstitutionally prolonged with four factors favoring petitioner and two factors 2 neutral); Kumar v. Hermosillo, C26-0389JNW, 2026 WL 523276, at *4 (W.D. Wash.

3 Feb. 25, 2026) (same). Thus, the court finds that Petitioner’s detention has become 4 unreasonable, “and that due process requires the Government to provide him with a bond 5 hearing.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120; see Toktosunov, 2025 WL 3492858, at *6. 6 Furthermore, this bond hearing must comply with the procedural requirements set forth in 7 Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). 8 B. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Immediate Release.

9 Petitioner also asserts that, under the Due Process Clause, the court must order his 10 immediate release. (See, e.g., Traverse at 7.) Petitioner, however, is mistaken. 11 In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court stated that, pursuant to § 1231(a), 12 “[w]hen [a noncitizen] has been found to be unlawfully present in the United States and a 13 final order of removal has been entered, the Government ordinarily secures the

14 [noncitizen’s] removal during a subsequent 90-day statutory ‘removal period,’ during 15 which time the [noncitizen] normally is held in custody.” 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). 16 During the 90-day removal period, the Government “shall detain” the noncitizen. 17 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Following the conclusion of the 90-day removal period, the 18 Government may continue to detain certain noncitizens. Id. § 1231(a)(6). A noncitizen

19 ordered removed who is inadmissible, removable, or “who has been determined by the 20 Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of 21 removal, may be detained beyond the removal period[.]” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 22 1 (citation omitted). The “presumptively reasonable” period for detention following a 2 removal order is six months. Id. at 701.

3 Here, the IJ entered a final order of removal on March 16, 2026. (See generally IJ 4 Order.) Thus, because fewer than six months have elapsed since entry of the final order 5 of removal, the Government’s detention of Petitioner is presumptively reasonable. 6 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Accordingly, the court declines to order his immediate 7 release without prejudice to him refiling a new habeas action seeking immediate release 8 under Zadvydas as circumstances warrant.

9 C. Petitioner Need Not Exhaust His Administrative Remedies. 10 Finally, the Government asserts that the court should decline to consider 11 Petitioner’s habeas petition seeking a bond hearing without first exhausting his 12 administrative remedies. (Return at 9-10.) This argument, however, is without merit. 13 The exhaustion requirement for habeas claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is

14 prudential, rather than jurisdictional. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 15 2017) (citation omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, courts may require prudential exhaustion 16 when: 17 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement 18 would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own 19 mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.

20 Id. (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). In the Ninth Circuit, 21 “[w]hen a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily 22 should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the 1 petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 2 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). A court, however, may waive the

3 prudential exhaustion requirement if “administrative remedies are inadequate or not 4 efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable 5 injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d 6 at 988 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). 7 Here, the court determines that exhaustion is excused due to risk of irreparable 8 injury to Petitioner. In so concluding, the court adopts the reasoning of the Honorable

9 Tiffany M. Cartwright in Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025) 10 who held that a petitioner subject to potentially seven months of detention while awaiting 11 appeal “suffers potentially irreparable harm every day that he remains in custody without 12 a hearing, which could ultimately result in his release from detention.” Rodriguez, 779 F. 13 3d at 1254 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, this court

14 “follows the vast majority of other cases which have waived exhaustion based on 15 irreparable injury when an individual has been detained for months without a bond 16 hearing, and where several additional months may pass before the BIA renders a decision 17 on a pending appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the 18 court declines to deny Petitioner a bond hearing on this ground.

19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 Accordingly, the court ORDERS as follows: 21 (1) Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED in part (Dkt. 22 # 3); 1 (2) Within 14 days of the date of this order, the Government shall provide 2 Petitioner an individualized bond hearing that complies with the requirements

3 of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011); 4 (3) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel 5 of record and to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address. 6 7 Dated this 2 9th day of May, 2026. 8 A 9 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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