BOWNES, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellee Jorge Hiram Collazo Rivera filed a civil rights suit in district court alleging that defendants-appellants Cosme Hernandez Silva and Jaime Torres Gaztambide violated the first and fourteenth amendments when they dismissed plaintiff from his government position. The district court granted plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, ordering that Collazo Rivera be reinstated. We reverse the grant of the preliminary injunction.
I. BACKGROUND
In June 1981 Collazo Rivera was appointed Utuado District Regional Director of the Rural Housing Administration (RHA), an agency of the Puerto Rico Department of Housing. In January 1985 the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), having won [259]*259the gubernatorial election, supplanted the Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP), of which plaintiff was a member, as the party in control of the Commonwealth Administration.1 On February 19, 1985, Hernandez Silva, Director of the RHA, transferred Jaime Barcelo, a PPD member, to take over plaintiffs functions as Regional Director, and on March 19, 1985, Hernandez Silva and Torres Gaztambide, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and a PPD member, notified plaintiff in writing that he had been replaced and his services would no longer be required.
Plaintiff brought suit in district court alleging that the firing violated his constitutional rights, and asking for damages and an injunction ordering his reinstatement as Regional Director with back pay. The district court held that the requirements for a preliminary injunction had been met; it ordered reinstatement and enjoined defendants from altering plaintiff’s employment status on the basis of political affiliation pending a hearing and a determination on the request for a permanent injunction.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We need not decide at this stage of the proceedings whether, as defendants urge, we must make an independent examination of the whole record under Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). This is not an appeal from a judgment on the merits. We are deciding only whether it was proper to issue a preliminary injunction. The appropriate standard for such review is abuse of discretion. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 239 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc); see also De Choudens v. Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, 801 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1986) (en banc); National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 823 (1st Cir.1979). We have described this standard as follows:
The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is a matter for the discretion of the district court and is reversible, of course, only for an abuse of discretion. It is also well-settled, however, that the application of an improper legal standard in determining the likelihood of success on the merits is never within the district court’s discretion. Similarly, misapplication of the law to particular facts is an abuse of discretion. In either of these circumstances, the denial of the preliminary injunction should be reversed and the injunction entered if necessary to protect the rights of the parties.
Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir.1981) (citations omitted) (quoting Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 776 (7th Cir.1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986)). We note also that because we are reviewing a preliminary injunction, “our ‘conclusions’ and ‘holdings’ as to the merits of the issue presented are to be understood as statements as to probable outcomes.” Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 239.
III. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
In this circuit there are four criteria that must be satisfied for a plaintiff to be entitled to a preliminary injunction:
The Court must find: (1) that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) that such injury outweighs any harm which granting injunctive relief would inflict on the defendant; (3) that plaintiff has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that the public interest will not be adversely affected by the grant of the injunction.
Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d at 1009 (quoting Women’s Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F.Supp. 542, 544 (D.Me.1979)). The district court held that all four criteria were met and granted plaintiff’s request [260]*260for a preliminary injunction. We hold that plaintiff has not established the third criterion — a likelihood of success on the merits — because we find that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the Regional Director position and, therefore, it was permissible for the Administration to dismiss Collazo Rivera. If the court abused its discretion in making its decision on any criterion, we must reverse. See Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 239. Thus, we have no cause to address the other criteria.
In our en banc opinion in Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide2 this court analyzed Supreme Court precedent, particularly Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), and surveyed lower court interpretations of the law governing politically motivated discharges, to formulate a two-step inquiry for determining when a position is exempt from the prohibitions on firing someone for partisan political reasons. Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 239-242. We noted that party loyalty is a permissible basis for selecting officials to fill certain positions on which the Administration relies for facilitating its programs and policies. Id. at 242. The first step in determining whether a particular position plays such a role is to ask if it “relates to ‘partisan political interests.... [or] concerns.’ That is, does the position involve government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation? Otherwise stated, do party goals or programs affect the direction, pace, or quality of governance?” Id. at 242 (citation omitted) (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 519, 100 S.Ct. at 1295).
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BOWNES, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellee Jorge Hiram Collazo Rivera filed a civil rights suit in district court alleging that defendants-appellants Cosme Hernandez Silva and Jaime Torres Gaztambide violated the first and fourteenth amendments when they dismissed plaintiff from his government position. The district court granted plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, ordering that Collazo Rivera be reinstated. We reverse the grant of the preliminary injunction.
I. BACKGROUND
In June 1981 Collazo Rivera was appointed Utuado District Regional Director of the Rural Housing Administration (RHA), an agency of the Puerto Rico Department of Housing. In January 1985 the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), having won [259]*259the gubernatorial election, supplanted the Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP), of which plaintiff was a member, as the party in control of the Commonwealth Administration.1 On February 19, 1985, Hernandez Silva, Director of the RHA, transferred Jaime Barcelo, a PPD member, to take over plaintiffs functions as Regional Director, and on March 19, 1985, Hernandez Silva and Torres Gaztambide, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and a PPD member, notified plaintiff in writing that he had been replaced and his services would no longer be required.
Plaintiff brought suit in district court alleging that the firing violated his constitutional rights, and asking for damages and an injunction ordering his reinstatement as Regional Director with back pay. The district court held that the requirements for a preliminary injunction had been met; it ordered reinstatement and enjoined defendants from altering plaintiff’s employment status on the basis of political affiliation pending a hearing and a determination on the request for a permanent injunction.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We need not decide at this stage of the proceedings whether, as defendants urge, we must make an independent examination of the whole record under Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). This is not an appeal from a judgment on the merits. We are deciding only whether it was proper to issue a preliminary injunction. The appropriate standard for such review is abuse of discretion. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 239 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc); see also De Choudens v. Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, 801 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1986) (en banc); National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 823 (1st Cir.1979). We have described this standard as follows:
The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is a matter for the discretion of the district court and is reversible, of course, only for an abuse of discretion. It is also well-settled, however, that the application of an improper legal standard in determining the likelihood of success on the merits is never within the district court’s discretion. Similarly, misapplication of the law to particular facts is an abuse of discretion. In either of these circumstances, the denial of the preliminary injunction should be reversed and the injunction entered if necessary to protect the rights of the parties.
Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir.1981) (citations omitted) (quoting Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 776 (7th Cir.1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986)). We note also that because we are reviewing a preliminary injunction, “our ‘conclusions’ and ‘holdings’ as to the merits of the issue presented are to be understood as statements as to probable outcomes.” Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 239.
III. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
In this circuit there are four criteria that must be satisfied for a plaintiff to be entitled to a preliminary injunction:
The Court must find: (1) that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) that such injury outweighs any harm which granting injunctive relief would inflict on the defendant; (3) that plaintiff has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that the public interest will not be adversely affected by the grant of the injunction.
Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d at 1009 (quoting Women’s Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F.Supp. 542, 544 (D.Me.1979)). The district court held that all four criteria were met and granted plaintiff’s request [260]*260for a preliminary injunction. We hold that plaintiff has not established the third criterion — a likelihood of success on the merits — because we find that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the Regional Director position and, therefore, it was permissible for the Administration to dismiss Collazo Rivera. If the court abused its discretion in making its decision on any criterion, we must reverse. See Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 239. Thus, we have no cause to address the other criteria.
In our en banc opinion in Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide2 this court analyzed Supreme Court precedent, particularly Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), and surveyed lower court interpretations of the law governing politically motivated discharges, to formulate a two-step inquiry for determining when a position is exempt from the prohibitions on firing someone for partisan political reasons. Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 239-242. We noted that party loyalty is a permissible basis for selecting officials to fill certain positions on which the Administration relies for facilitating its programs and policies. Id. at 242. The first step in determining whether a particular position plays such a role is to ask if it “relates to ‘partisan political interests.... [or] concerns.’ That is, does the position involve government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation? Otherwise stated, do party goals or programs affect the direction, pace, or quality of governance?” Id. at 242 (citation omitted) (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 519, 100 S.Ct. at 1295). The second step is to “examine the particular responsibilities of the position to determine whether it resembles a policymaker, a privy to confidential information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally appropriate requirement.” Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242. Our function is “to weigh all relevant factors and make a common sense judgment in light of the fundamental purpose to be served.” Id.
The district court held that “[o]ther than defendants’ reliance on the fact that plaintiff’s position is one of trust and confidence and the citing of some cases which the Court finds inapposite, there is no evidence the post entailed a degree of policy-making sufficient for political affiliation to qualify as an appropriate requirement.” It found that there were “no responsibilities that may be even remotely considered of a policy-making nature.” Our analysis of the Regional Director’s functions in the light of the teaching of Jimenez Fuentes leads us to the opposite conclusion.
A. Relationship to Partisan Political Concerns
Our first inquiry is whether the Regional Director position relates to partisan political concerns. In Jimenez Fuentes, we held that the Regional Director of the Puerto Rico Urban Development and Housing Corporation was such a position. 807 F.2d at 243-244. The Urban Development and Housing Corporation is a subgroup of the Department of Housing, responsible for providing housing in urban areas. The RHA is also a subgroup of the Department of Housing, responsible for administering housing programs in rural areas. The Regional Director implements RHA programs of significant economic and geopolitical impact. For instance, the RHA has the responsibility of distributing land to certain agricultural laborers (the agregados). See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 28, §§ 521, 555 (1985). It administers programs to encourage family farm ownership and to distribute lots and construction materials to low-income families. Id. §§ 521, 711.
The RHA, therefore, administers important agrarian reform programs that impact on the fabric of Puerto Rico’s rural life. The governing political party’s ideological orientation on social and economic issues could affect the approach taken in carrying [261]*261out these programs. The position, therefore, is essentially similar to one involving “the provision of housing to low and middle income city residents[, which] is a vital political issue, at least as important to partisan program goals as the provision of water discussed in Tomczak [v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.1985)].” Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 243. In other words, it is a position in an agency rendering economic and social services of broad impact involving “government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation[.]” Id. at 242. An official with regional authority to implement rural social and economic reforms could, because of political disagreement with the Administration over fundamental issues, hinder the accomplishment of the elected Administration’s goals. We hold, therefore, that the RHA Regional Director position is substantially related to partisan political concerns.
B. The Responsibilities of the Regional Director
Our second inquiry is into the particular responsibilities of the Regional Director to determine whether they entail policymaking, access to confidential information, communications, or similar functions for which party loyalty is an appropriate requirement. Our focus in this analysis is on the Regional Director’s inherent powers, not the duties actually performed. The purpose of “this approach seems to be twofold: first, to resolve the issue entirely in one proceeding, thereby relieving the courts of the burden of having to reexamine a certain position every time a new administration changes the mix of responsibilities bestowed upon the officeholder; and, second, to provide certainty to litigants.” De Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187, 1192 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 641 (7th Cir.1985)).
The job classification provided to the court lists the following duties of the RHA Regional Director:
1. Administering RHA activities at district level;
2. Attending meetings at the RHA central office to implement the land distribution program;
3. Orienting the officers and the community on the pertinent statutes and regulations;
4. Supervising and evaluating field work;
5. Filling out, investigating, and referring applications for parcels not awarded, left vacant, or obtained because of certain changes in ownership and configuration;
6. Organizing personnel training;
7. Coordinating RHA activities with municipal administrations;
8. Directing the investigation and verification of candidate lists for parcel distribution;
9. Handling complaints and making referrals to mayors, legislators, and community commissions;
10. Coordinating deed signing for the property granted in the district;
11. Coordinating and supervising surveying activity;
12. Evaluating work performance and submitting recommendations on personnel matters to the central office;
13. Serving as liaison between the RHA central office and other district-level agencies;
14. Drafting reports;
15. Offering recommendations for the improvement of RHA services to the executive director;
16. Representing the RHA in disputes concerning pertinent statutes, regulations, and rules;
17. Carrying out other assigned duties; and
18. Participating in a direct or delegated manner in the enactment of program rules and regulations, including “the enactment, modification and interpretation of [program] functions or in the direct coun[262]*262seling of the [RHA] head influencing the public policy.”3
These duties include implementing RHA programs, coordinating RHA activities with senior officials and other agencies and officials, and evaluating RHA policy and making recommendations for changes to it. They are very similar to the Regional Director’s duties for which we found party loyalty to be an appropriate requirement in Jimenez Fuentes. See Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d 244-245. Plaintiff argues, however, that the RHA Regional Director in fact has no discretion in performing the assigned functions. He directs our attention to the Norms and Procedures Handbook for the RHA, which contains detailed guidelines for the implementation of the parcel distribution program. The use of a detailed guidebook does not necessarily mean, however, that the position does not involve duties for which political affiliation is an appropriate requirement. Even if the procedures for carrying out the program are strictly circumscribed, there is still opportunity for affecting rural social and economic policies. As we said in Jimenez Fuentes, unless a regional director supports the agency’s policies, the agency head “ ‘might face a situation where the hostile efforts or foot-dragging actions of any one of the [regional directors] could singlehandedly thwart the Administration’s goals in that particular [region].’ ” 803 F.2d at 10 (quoting Brunton v. United States, 518 F.Supp. 223, 239 (S.D.Ohio 1981). “[P]olicy implementation is just as important as policymaking.” Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 530, 100 S.Ct. at 1301 (Powell, J., dissenting), quoted in Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 246. The Regional Director’s duties offer considerable opportunity either to effectuate or to hinder the implementation of RHA programs and policies.
In Jimenez Fuentes, we found support for our conclusion that the Urban Development and Housing Corporation Regional Director was a position for which party loyalty was an appropriate requirement in the legislative classification of the position as one of “trust and confidence.” 807 F.2d at 246-247. The RHA Regional Director is similarly classified. See L.P.R.A. tit. 3, § 1350 (1978). According to the statute, “[c]onfidential employees are those who intervene or collaborate substantially in the formulation of the public policy, who advise directly or render direct services to the head of the agency, such as ... [Regional directors of agencies.” Id. The district court did not find this classification significant in the context of its determination that there was no other evidence that the Regional Director had responsibilities of a policymaking nature. Although this legislative classification is not determinative in our examination of the Regional Director’s responsibilities, the decision to include the individual in this position as one of the few “confidential employees” indicates that the position was viewed as entailing sensitive responsibilities. As we said in Jimenez Fuentes, “[w]ithin the agency at least, [plaintiff was] considered to be at the policymaking end of the spectrum.” 807 F.2d at 247. We hold, therefore, that “party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance” of the Regional Director position. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. at 1294.
In light of the similarity between the RHA Regional Director’s duties and those of the Urban Development and Housing Corporation Regional Director, the same conclusion is warranted in this case as in Jimenez Fuentes.
The grant of the preliminary injunction is reversed. Remanded.
[263]*263Costs awarded to appellants.