Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Insurance

130 N.W. 177, 151 Iowa 73
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedMarch 11, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by40 cases

This text of 130 N.W. 177 (Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Insurance, 130 N.W. 177, 151 Iowa 73 (iowa 1911).

Opinion

Deemer, J.

Defendant issued two policies of insurance upon live stock promising indemnity against loss or damage by tornadoes, cyclones, or windstorms; one policy was issued to plaintiff and the other to Matt Fox, and they are alike in terms and conditions. After the loss upon [75]*75which this action is in part bottomed, Fox assigned his claim to plaintiff and the action is upon both policies. Each policy contained this provision: “I further agree to be governed by the articles of incorporation and rules, now in force or hereafter made by said association, and to pay all assessments made on me by the association in accordance with its rules.” And on the back of each was the following by-law: “Nor shall it be liable for damage to live stock by the blowing or toppling over of hay or straw stacks, or by snow or hail.” After the issuance ■ of the policies defendant amended this by-law so as to make it read, as follows: “Nor shall it be liable for damages to live stock ... by blowing of snow or hail.”

Plaintiff claims that both he and Fox suffered a loss on live stock by reason of a tornado or windstorm occurring on January 29, 30, and 31 of the year 1909, and that the total damage amounted to $817, for which amount he asked judgment. Defendant denied that the loss was due to a tornado, pleaded that the loss, if any, was wholly outside of the terms of the contract and that the cattle died of causes not insured against by defendant. A jury was waived and the cause was tried to the court upon the issues thus presented. The trial court made a finding of facts from which we extract the following:

The policy is an ordinary tornado, windstorm, cyclone, Iowa policy, and purports to protect the assured against loss occasioned by windstorms, tornadoes, and cyclones. Now, the definition of a windstorm is very broad, and, as counsel has suggested, sometimes includes all of the others. There is an exception contained in the bylaws to the effect, as I recall it, that the policy does not cover loss by snow or hail, and by an amendment it is made to say by the blowing of snow or hail. Now, the storm which occasioned the loss in this case was a severe one, and it seems to me clearly comes within the definition of a windstorm, and I think that the primary cause of the loss was the windstorm and I find such to be the fact as [76]*76shown by the evidence. It seems to me that it would be incumbent upon the defendant to show this exception exempted the company from loss and they have not done that. At most, all that we can say in reference to the matter of the snow is that if it had not been for the blowing of snow, perhaps the loss would not have occurred and these cattle might not have perished. I am sure I do not know what the fact is in reference to that. It seems to me that, as I say, it was incumbent upon the defendant to show that the exception applied. They have failed to do it. I think the burden of proof was upon the defendant to show that. If a tornado policy or a windstorm policy did not afford protection from this sort of storm — a windstorm in winter, it seems to me that you might just about as well put a clause in the policy saying that it should not be operative during the winter months. It is very difficult for me to conceive of a wind in this locality in winter which is likely to occur when there would not be more or less snow in the air, blowing snow, and if this clause, in the absence of any evidence except the fact that there was drifting and blowing snow, was to constitute an absolute defense to the company and excuse them from liability, then you might as well make a clean cut of it and say that the policy should not be operative during the winter months. I presume that it is possible that there might be a windstorm or tornado in the winter without very much blowing snow, but in practical operation it does not exist, in this locality. Now, I have treated this question as though this amendment to the by-laws was operative, and I do not consider it necessary for me to absolutely pass on that question, but for the purposes of this determination I have treated it as though it was in fact in full force and effect as to this policy issued before the by-laws were claimed to have been adopted. I rather incline to the view that this by-law would be effective, and hence consider it in that way, but I do not find especially on that point.

Based thereon a judgment was rendered for plaintiff for the amount claimed. The appeal is from these findings and the judgment so rendered.

[77]*77*’ insurance: live stock indemnity: evidence. [76]*76Eliminating for the present the amendment to the by[77]*77law it is apparent that defendant promised .indemnity against loss or damage on live stock by tornado, cyclone, or windstorm, but specifically provided that it should not be liable for damage by snow . . 1 . . or hail.. It is not claimed that the injury to the cattle was the result of a cyclone, but it is insisted that they were injured and perished as a result of a tornado or a windstorm, and not by snovy or hail. The term “tornado” has a well understood meaning. It has been defined as follows: “The words ‘tornado’ and ‘hurricane’ are synonymous, and mean a violent storm, distinguished by the vehemence of the wind and its sudden changes. A hurricane is a very high wind, so that an allegation in an answer denying that the loss was caused by a tornado or hurricane, but stating that it was caused by a very high wind, admits that it was caused by a tornado or hurricane.” Queen Ins. Co. v. Hudnut Co., 8 Ind. App. 22 (35 N. E. 397). And in Spensley v. Ins. Co., 54 Wis. 433 (11 N. W. 894), the court said: “A ‘tornado’ is defined by Webster as a violent gust of wind, or a tempest distinguished by a whirling, progressive motion, usually accompanied by thunder, lighting, and torrents of rain, and commonly of short duration and small breadth; a hurricane. Other dictionaries give substantially the same definition, and that it is generally accompanied by thunder and lightning and rain or hail, and appears to have an electric origin, so that whether a loss was caused by a tornado or the lightning accompanying it is a matter for the jury.”

The word “windstorm” is a simple one and is defined by Webster to be: “A storm characterized by high wind with little or no precipitation.” As used in the policies in suit it should be construed as something more than an ordinary gust of wind, no matter how prolonged; and it takes its meaning measurably at least from the other words with which it- is associated, to wit, tornado and [78]*78cyclone. However, it need not have either the cyclonic or the twirling or whirling features which usually accompany tornadoes or cyclones, but it must be more than an ordinary current of air no matter how long continued. In other words, it must assume the aspect of a storm, i. e., an outburst of tumultuous force. Now, the trial court was justified in finding that the storm which caused the damage to the live stock or which directly and approximately contributed thereto was one of the worst of what are known familiarly in the Mississippi valley as “blizzards.” This term has found its way into the dictionary and it is defined by Webster to be: “A violent blow. A dry, intensely cold, violent storm, with high wind and fine driving snow, such as those which originate on the Eastern slope of the Canadian Rocky Mountains.”

We here quote some of the testimony with reference to the character of the storm:

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Bluebook (online)
130 N.W. 177, 151 Iowa 73, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jordan-v-iowa-mutual-tornado-insurance-iowa-1911.