Matthes v. Imperial Accident Ass'n

81 N.W. 484, 110 Iowa 222
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJanuary 18, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 81 N.W. 484 (Matthes v. Imperial Accident Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matthes v. Imperial Accident Ass'n, 81 N.W. 484, 110 Iowa 222 (iowa 1900).

Opinion

Waterman, J.

1 2 Plaintiff was injured while attempting to get some pigeons from the cupola of a bam. lie was in a rope sling that moved by means of a truck upon the track of a hay carrier some thirty feet above the barn flo'or. As he was moving himself along, something about the truck broke, and he fell to the floor, sustaining injuries which resulted in his total disability for a period of one year, and which will cripple him for life. The articles of incorporation, which the policy recites are a part of the contract, contained a provision that the policy should not cover disability “when caused directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by * * * voluntary or unnecessary exposure, to danger or obvious risk. * * *” It is insisted that plaintiff at the time of his fall was voluntarily and unnece-sarily exposing himself to obvious danger. T'hh facts are that plaintiff was a house painter, and was insured as such. He was accustomed to working at great heights. II© had worked .in a rope sling on a church spire eighty feet above the ground; had painted another spire one hundred, and twenty feet high. II© had used this particular apparatus before. On the occasion of his accident he examined it carefully and thought it was safe. We do not think he had reason to apprehend danger. The height that he was above the floor had nothing whatever to do with the accident. The danger was not, as to him, obvious. Was it unnecessary exposure ? We think not, for the evidence shows that he was attempting to get the pigeons to serve as [225]*225food for himself and family. See Casualty Co. v. Sittig, 181 Ill. Sup. 111 (54 N. E. Rep. 903).

3 II. . The accident happened on. Sunday. Another provision of the articles of incorporation relieves the company from liability if the disability was incurred “while violating the law.” It is insisted that when plaintiff fell he was violating section 4072, Code 1873, which prohibits labor on Sunday except in, cases of necessity or for charity. We have to say on this branch of the-ease that it does not appear but that plaintiff wanted the pigeons for a. Sunday meal, and, if so, such necessary domestic avocation as getting and preparing them would not fall within the class of labor that is prohibited by this section. The burden was on defendant to prove a violation of this condition. Sutherland v. Insurance Co. 87 Iowa, 505. We may further suggest on this question that the violation of law mentioned in the policy is evidently intended to comprehend acts that will avoid the risk if done at any time. They must be in the nature of contributing causes, and not mere conditions of the accident. In this case the risk would have included plaintiff’s acts if done on a secular day. Therefore we can see no reason why it should not cover them when done on Sunday. See Schmid v. Humphrey, 48 Iowa, 652; Gross v. Miller, 93 Iowa, 72 (26 L. R. A. 605).

4 III. The policy, on its face, provides for the payment of a weekly indemnity of $15 for a period not exceeding fifty-two weeks. We have seen that plaintiff suffered' a total disability, which continued for the entire time provided for. Therefore he is apparently entitled to recover the sum of seven hundred and eighty dollars. But it is asserted that defendant has no funds on hand_, or means with which to pay this loss, save and except from an assessment on the members of plaintiff’s class; that by the terms of the contract it is provided that,' if defendant had no sur-' plus fund on hand, plaintiff is to accept the amount of an [226]*226assessment levied upon the members of his class, in full settlement of all claims under his policy. It is further averred' that plaintiff was a member of class A, and that an assessment on the members of that class produced the sum of thirty-five dollars and forty-four cents, which is the extent of defendant’s liability, if it is to be held at all. Defendant claims to have been organized under chapter 1, title 0, Code-1873, and chapter 65, Acts Twenty-first General Assembly, as a mutual benefit or assessment company. But we find that it charged a fixed and level premium, and had no power to make assessments of any kind to- pay losses. If there is-a question, as suggested by appellee, whether an association which charges a level premium, as in this case, is entitled To the benefits of the act of the general assembly to- which we have referred, we do not feel called upon to- pass on it. Assuming the- defendant association to be properly organized, Us claimed, we shall proceed to a consideration, of its attain dealing with plaintiff. We are not concerned with the matter of wha.t defendant might have done under its articles of incorporation, but only with what it in fact did. The policy is for three thousand dollars in the event of death, with a weekly 'indemnity in. case of total disability of fifteen dollars per week for a limited period. This promise is made-without qualification in the first instance, hut towards the-close of the policy we find this provision : “That, in case the reserve or surplus fund is exhausted when the policy becomes' a claim, the amount to he paid shall he dependent upon the-amount collected from an assessment made to meet such claim.” But it will be seen further on that nowhere is the association given any power or authority to- make an assessment for the purpose of paying losses. This should he borne in mind, for we are- now endeavoring to ascei’tain what knowledge the policy-holder might have gained of his rights, had he instituted an investigation at the time he became a member. The prevision for payments by members is as-follows: “For the purpose of defraying the expenses of [227]*227the association, and providing the funds to pay the benefits and losses by death, there shall be paid by each member, either in cash or by note, the following sums: Section 1. As membership fees: For certificate or policy Al, $3.00; for certificate or policy A. or Al Lim., $2.00; for certificate or policy AA, or A Lim., $1.50. Sec. 2. Each holder of a certificate or policy shall, within 30 days after the same has been issued, pay to the See., at the home office of the association,- an advance assessment, and additional assessments thereafter as the terms of said certificate or policy shall require, or as may bo required by these articles. For these purposes, as herein set forth, the members of this association, shall pay to the association the following sums as an advance assessment: Members or holders of certificate or policy A A, $1.50; members or holders of certificate or policy A, $2.25; members or holders of certificate or policy Al, $3.00; members or holders of certificate or policy A Lim., $2.00; members or holders of certificate or policy Al Lim., $3.00. Hoc. 3. Each member shall be required to pay annually, in addition to the- membership fee, the following sums, to wit: $6 annually on certificate or policy AA; $9.00 annually on certificate or policy A.” The first two sums mentioned are to be paid but once, and by new members. Thereafter, so far as plaintiff’s contract is concerned, only the level premium could be demanded. There is nothing to show that other contracts were different from this. We now turn to No. 13 of the articles of incorporation, section 1, of which reads as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
81 N.W. 484, 110 Iowa 222, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matthes-v-imperial-accident-assn-iowa-1900.