Jones v. Woodrow

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: April 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-1313
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-1313 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 10, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court JIMMY JONES,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 24-1313 v. (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-00545-CMA-SBP) (D. Colo.) TRACEY WOODROW, individually, and in her official capacity as Evidence Technician for Archuleta County Sheriff’s Office; MARSHALL CURRIER, individually and in his official capacity as tow truck operator for J.R. Towing; J.R. TOWING INC.; BRIAN REIS, individually and in his official capacity as Sergeant Deputy for Archuleta County Sheriff’s Office; CHRIS VAN WAGENEN, individually and in his official capacity as Patrol Deputy for Archuleta County Sheriff’s Office; RICHARD VALDEZ, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Archuleta County, Colorado; EDWARD WILLIAMS, individually and in his official capacity as Commander of Archuleta County Detention Facility; COUNTY OF ARCHULETA,

Defendants - Appellees.

and

UNKNOWN DOES 1-6, individually and in their official capacities as employees for Archuleta County Sheriff’s Office/Detention Facility; UNKNOWN DOE 7, individually and in his/her official Appellate Case: 24-1313 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2025 Page: 2

capacity as Evidence Technician for Archuleta County Sheriff's Office,

Defendants. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Jimmy Jones, appearing pro se,1 appeals from the district court’s entry of final

judgment in favor of defendants on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims stemming from a

traffic stop, his ensuing arrest, and the impoundment and sale of his truck.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

On the afternoon of March 7, 2021, two Archuleta County Sheriff’s Office

(ACSO) deputies, Brian Reis and Chris Van Wagenen, observed Mr. Jones driving an

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Mr. Jones proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his pleadings, but do not act as his advocate. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).

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unregistered truck eastbound on U.S. Route 160 through the town of Pagosa Springs,

Colorado. The deputies stopped Mr. Jones and asked for his “papers.” R. vol. I

at 30. Mr. Jones refused to produce any identification, proof of ownership, or

insurance documentation. Mr. Jones, by his own admission, did not believe he was

obligated to register the truck with the State of Colorado or to produce his

identification or registration to the deputies.

The deputies issued a citation to Mr. Jones for failing to display proper

registration on his vehicle and operating the vehicle with expired insurance.

Mr. Jones refused to sign the citation. He was arrested and transported to jail.

Mr. Jones remained in jail until the afternoon of March 9, 2021, when he appeared

before a judge and was released from custody.

After taking Mr. Jones into custody, the deputies decided to impound the

truck. The deputies contacted J.R. Towing, which sent employee Marshall Currier to

the scene in a tow truck. The deputies signed a Vehicle Impoundment Record stating

that Mr. Jones’s truck was being impounded for “No Registration (expired)” and “No

Insurance.” R. vol. I at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Currier towed the

impounded truck to J.R. Towing’s private lot. The following day, an unknown

ACSO employee, Unknown Doe 7, entered a “Towed Vehicle Summary” into the

ACSO computer system indicating that Mr. Jones’s vehicle was “ABANDONED.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Following the impoundment, Tracey Woodrow, an ACSO evidence technician,

completed a national title search for the truck and determined the truck’s last

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registered owner was Tennessee resident Dustin Carter. On March 15, 2021,

Ms. Woodrow sent written notice of the impoundment to Mr. Carter. Mr. Carter

contacted ACSO and J.R. Towing and disclaimed any interest in the truck. The truck

was sold to an unnamed individual in April 2021.

B. Procedural History

In March 2022, Mr. Jones filed a pro se complaint asserting claims for relief

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Archuleta County, multiple named and unnamed

ACSO officials, J.R. Towing, and Mr. Currier.

The district court, in response to motions to dismiss, dismissed all of the

claims except for a Fifth Amendment takings claim asserted against J.R. Towing,

Mr. Currier, Ms. Woodrow, and Unknown Doe 7. The court later dismissed

Unknown Doe 7 due to Mr. Jones’s failure to identify or prosecute a claim against

this defendant. Finally, the court entered summary judgment in favor of

Ms. Woodrow, J.R. Towing, and Mr. Currier on the takings claim.

The district court denied Mr. Jones’s motion for leave to file an amended

complaint and entered final judgment in the case.

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Jones raises six issues on appeal. We find no merit to any of them and

affirm.

A. Unreasonable search and seizure claim

Mr. Jones first challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claim that

Deputies Reis and Van Wegenen conducted an unreasonable search and seizure of his

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vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amendment. “We review de novo a dismissal for

failure to state a claim.” Griffith v. El Paso Cnty., Colo., 129 F.4th 790, 806

(10th Cir. 2025). “When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we accept a

complaint’s well-pleaded allegations as true, viewing all reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party, and liberally construe the pleadings.” Id. at 806–07

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Jones argues the deputies were not entitled to stop him for failing to

display proper registration on his truck because the truck did not qualify as a “motor

vehicle” under Colorado state law. Aplt. Br. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).

He argues that “instead of using [the truck] primarily for travel,” he “commonly and

generally use[d] it to transport persons and property.” Id. He contends the district

court erred in concluding otherwise and should have allowed the issue “to be

determined by a jury.” Id. at 9.

We reject this argument. Colorado law defines the term “motor vehicle” to

mean, in relevant part, “any self-propelled vehicle that is designed primarily for

travel on the public highway and that is generally and commonly used to transport

persons and property over the public highways . . . .” Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 42-1-102(58)(a). Mr. Jones’s truck, a 2002 Ford F250, clearly fell within the plain

language of this definition because it was “designed primarily for travel on the public

highway” and is of the type that “is generally and commonly used to transport

persons and property over the public highways.” See generally Haney v. City Court

In and For City of Empire, 779 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Colo. 1989) (holding that

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Colorado’s definition of “motor vehicle” includes motorized vehicles driven by

private individuals for their personal use).

B. The impoundment of Mr. Jones’s truck

In his second issue on appeal, Mr. Jones argues “[t]he district court erred in

concluding . . . the impoundment and seizure” of his truck “from a lawful parking

spot in the absence of a warrant was not a Fourth Amendment violation.” Aplt. Br.

at 9. He argues “the facts establish that before” his truck “was seized and

impounded,” he “was not under arrest,” his truck “was not hazardous or disabled, was

not parked illegally, and was not obstructing traffic on public roads.” Id.

This argument lacks merit. Deputies Reis and Van Wegenen arrested

Mr. Jones before his truck was seized and impounded. The deputies had to decide

what to do with the truck, which, by Mr. Jones’s own admission, was parked along a

public highway. See United States v. Woodard, 5 F.4th 1148, 1150 (10th Cir. 2021)

(“When the driver is arrested, the police must decide what to do with the car.”). As

the magistrate judge and district court noted, there was no allegation, let alone

evidence, “that there was someone else (such as a passenger) who was available to

drive the [truck] and remove it from the [public] road” where it was parked. R. vol. I

at 156. We therefore agree with the district court that the complaint “fail[ed] to

adequately allege any reasonable alternatives to impoundment or that the decision to

impound was unreasonable.” Id.

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C. Denial of leave to amend complaint

Mr. Jones argues in his third issue that the district court erred in denying his

motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Generally speaking, we “apply the

abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a denial of leave to amend.” Adams v.

C3 Pipeline Constr. Inc., 30 F.4th 943, 972 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted). To the extent, however, “the district court denies leave to amend

based on futility, our review for abuse of discretion includes de novo review of the

legal basis for the finding of futility.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Mr. Jones moved, over defendants’ objections, to file a first amended

complaint nearly two years after he filed his original complaint and long after the

district court granted the public official defendants’ motions to dismiss. In his

motion, Mr. Jones alleged he was seeking to: (a) remove Unknown Does 1–7 and the

County as defendants; (b) add ACSO as a defendant because “it was responsible for

the unlawful sale of [his truck] and the failure to properly train its agents and

employees”; (c) remove several of his original claims and replace them with revised

claims; and (d) add several new counts, including two claims for malicious

prosecution, a claim for failure to provide him with due process of law before selling

his truck, and three conspiracy claims. R. vol. II at 64.

The magistrate judge recommended denying Mr. Jones’s motion for two

reasons: (1) Mr. Jones was “impermissibly seek[ing] to bring back claims [the district

court] dismissed with prejudice”; and (2) the proposed amended complaint, which

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was over 100 pages in length, “violate[d] the pleading requirements of Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 8” because it was “verbose, unduly complex and indirect, and in

large measure, unintelligible.” Id. at 506–07. The district court, however, ultimately

denied Mr. Jones’s motion to amend as moot after it granted summary judgment in

favor of J.R. Towing, Mr. Currier, and Ms. Woodrow and effectively disposed of all

the claims asserted in Mr. Jones’s original complaint.

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Mr. Jones’s motion to amend. When the district court ruled on the motion, it had

disposed of all the claims alleged in Mr. Jones’s original complaint and intended to

enter final judgment. See Mtn. Home Flight Serv., Inc. v. Baxter Cnty., Ark.,

758 F.3d 1038, 1046 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding district court did not abuse

discretion when it denied motion for leave to amend complaint after it intended to

dismiss the entire action). Because an amended complaint supersedes and renders

void the original complaint, allowing Mr. Jones to file his proposed amended

complaint would have effectively undermined the district court’s prior dispositive

rulings and its intent to dismiss the entire action. See Tufaro v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of

Regents of Univ. of Okla., 107 F.4th 1121, 1137 (10th Cir. 2024) (noting that an

amended complaint supersedes a prior complaint and renders it of no legal effect).

Moreover, we agree with the magistrate judge that Mr. Jones’s proposed amendment

was both (1) futile, because it effectively sought, in part, to resuscitate claims that the

district court previously dismissed, and (2) violative of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8.

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D. Procedural due process claim

In his fourth issue, Mr. Jones challenges the district court’s dismissal of the

procedural due process claim he asserted against J.R. Towing and Mr. Currier. As

previously noted, “[w]e review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim.”

Griffith, 129 F.4th at 806.

The district court concluded Mr. Jones’s “unabashed admission that he

purposefully neglected to register his truck under his name prove[d] fatal to his

procedural due process claim” against J.R. Towing and Mr. Currier. R. vol. II at 500.

The court noted that “Colorado law clearly states that a vehicle owner’s failure to

register his vehicle is a waiver of his right to notice of the vehicle’s abandonment and

sale.” Id. It concluded that because Mr. Jones knowingly failed to register his truck,

he “was not entitled to notice via certified mail” and “was not deprived of any due

process.” Id. The court concluded that, “[h]aving ignored the available procedures,

Mr. Jones [wa]s in no position to argue that said procedures were unlawfully

withheld from him.” Id. at 500–01 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We agree with the district court. The statute it cited, Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 42-4-2108(1)(b), plainly states that “[f]ailure to register a vehicle . . . is deemed a

waiver of the owner’s right to be notified” under the rules that govern the removal,

storage, and disposal of motor vehicles that are abandoned on private property.

Because Mr. Jones knowingly chose not to register his truck, he was not entitled to

the procedures that otherwise apply under Colorado law when a properly registered

vehicle is impounded.

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E. Striking of Rule 72 objections

In his fifth issue, Mr. Jones argues the district court “erred in striking” two of

his “Rule 72 objections.” Aplt. Br. at 12. Both concerned recommendations by the

magistrate judge regarding Mr. Jones’s motion for leave to file an amended

complaint. Mr. Jones submitted them within the time period normally allowed for

objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation, but after the district court had

entered final judgment. The district court thus ordered the two Rule 72 objections

stricken. We discern no abuse of discretion. The district court had disposed of all of

the claims when it received Mr. Jones’s objections. The court already had considered

and properly rejected Mr. Jones’s motion to amend his complaint.

F. As-applied constitutional challenge

In his sixth and final issue, Mr. Jones argues the district court erred in

“ignoring [his] as applied constitutional challenge, where [he] argued the

Defendants/Appellees misapplied the registration provision of the motor vehicle code

to private property used solely for the purposes of public vehicular travel.” Id.

at 12-13. We reject this argument because it is essentially the same one that

Mr. Jones makes in his first issue on appeal—that his truck did not qualify as a

“motor vehicle” under Colorado state law.

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III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge