OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
WHITE, Judge.
Appellant was tried and convicted before a jury in Panola County for the offense of [407]*407aggravated assault under V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 22.02 and the jury assessed appellant’s punishment at 8 years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections.
Appellant raised four grounds of error on appeal. Among them he claimed that the assistant district attorney interjected reversible error into the trial by commenting, in his final argument to the jury, on the appellant’s failure to testify during the punishment phase of the trial.
In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals in Texarkana affirmed appellant’s conviction. The court ruled that the assistant district attorney’s remarks did not constitute reversible error. The court below overruled the remaining grounds of error. Appellant’s motion for rehearing was subsequently overruled.
In his petition for discretionary review, appellant presents to us as ground of review the contention that the trial court erred by not finding the assistant district attorney’s remarks to be a comment on the appellant’s failure to testify. We agree with the court below and overrule appellant’s ground of review.
At the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, appellant testified that he had acted in self-defense, and gave his version of the events that led to his arrest. At the punishment phase of his trial he offered no testimony. During jury argument at this phase of the trial, the assistant district attorney remarked “The defendant hasn’t indicated any remorse.” Counsel for the defense objected to the remark as being a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify and thus an improper jury argument in contravention of both the state and federal constitutions. U.S. Const., Amend. V; Tex. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. The trial court sustained his objection and instructed the jury to disregard. The trial court denied appellant’s request for a mistrial.
Article 38.08, V.A.C.C.P., prohibits comment on an accused’s right to remain silent and his failure to testify. Both the state and federal constitutions have established this right. See U.S. Const., Amend. V, Tex. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. The right of an accused party to be free from the fear of compelled self-incrimination and to remain silent is a vital protection which our society provides a citizen accused of a criminal offense. This personal right cannot in any way be abridged and any claim made by the appellant that this right has been denied him cannot be lightly dismissed. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). It has often been said that the prohibition against commenting on a defendant’s silence at trial is mandatory, see Art. 38.08, Y.A.C.C.P., and thus rarely cured by instruction. Bird v. State, 527 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Overton v. State, 470 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). The appellant cites the case of Owen v. State, 656 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) to further support this argument.
In order for the argument of the state’s attorney to violate this right, the language used must be looked at from the standpoint of the jury. The implication that counsel’s argument referred to the accused’s failure to testify must be clear. It is not sufficient that the language might be construed as an implied or indirect allusion thereto. Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 367 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Overton v. State, supra 470 S.W.2d at 655; Roller v. State, 518 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
This Court discussed this theory in Bird v. State, supra 527 S.W.2d at 894. This Court held:
“The test employed is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the accused’s failure to testify. See McDaniel v. State, supra; Roller v. State, supra; Chapman v. State, 504 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). In applying this test, the facts and circumstances of each case must be analyzed to determine whether the language used was of such character.”
[408]*408The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed this issue also. That court held in Davis v. United States, 357 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. — 1966):
“It is important to observe that the rule does not prohibit all comment on testimony or evidence which stands un-contradicted, and the right to make such statements is well established....”
“ ‘The facts and circumstances of each case must be carefully analyzed to determine “whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” ’ ”
In light of the above authority, we find that no error occurred, and if there was an error, it was harmless in nature.
The entire statement in question in this case reads as follows:
“ 1... the defendant hasn’t indicated any remorse, [here the defendant’s attorney objected to the remark. His objection was sustained. The court then instructed the jury ‘that any argument of counsel is not evidence in this case. It is not to be considered as evidence and you are to disregard the statement made by counsel for the state in regards to showing of remorse.’ Counsel for the defense then asked for a mistrial which was overruled.] Ladies and Gentlemen, the Charge would show you can consider all of the evidence that you have heard before in the guilt innocence phase as well as this phase. The defendant was on the stand. He said, he admitted that he went out there. Dorothy Jones was shot. He admitted that he blamed her for him not having the farm. He told you that he would do anything to get that farm back. He said he would kill for it under the right situation.’ ”
The statement was intended to reflect upon what the appellant had testified about at the guilt or innocence portion of the trial. As such we cannot find that the language was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify at punishment. The appellant urges us to accept Owen v. State, supra, as controlling authority in this case. While the similarities appellant alludes to are well taken, there is an important distinction between Owen and the instant case. In Owen there was no question that the prosecutor’s remarks were manifestly intended to be a comment on the accused’s failure to testify. In the punishment phase of the Owen case, the prosecutor said:
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OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
WHITE, Judge.
Appellant was tried and convicted before a jury in Panola County for the offense of [407]*407aggravated assault under V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 22.02 and the jury assessed appellant’s punishment at 8 years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections.
Appellant raised four grounds of error on appeal. Among them he claimed that the assistant district attorney interjected reversible error into the trial by commenting, in his final argument to the jury, on the appellant’s failure to testify during the punishment phase of the trial.
In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals in Texarkana affirmed appellant’s conviction. The court ruled that the assistant district attorney’s remarks did not constitute reversible error. The court below overruled the remaining grounds of error. Appellant’s motion for rehearing was subsequently overruled.
In his petition for discretionary review, appellant presents to us as ground of review the contention that the trial court erred by not finding the assistant district attorney’s remarks to be a comment on the appellant’s failure to testify. We agree with the court below and overrule appellant’s ground of review.
At the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, appellant testified that he had acted in self-defense, and gave his version of the events that led to his arrest. At the punishment phase of his trial he offered no testimony. During jury argument at this phase of the trial, the assistant district attorney remarked “The defendant hasn’t indicated any remorse.” Counsel for the defense objected to the remark as being a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify and thus an improper jury argument in contravention of both the state and federal constitutions. U.S. Const., Amend. V; Tex. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. The trial court sustained his objection and instructed the jury to disregard. The trial court denied appellant’s request for a mistrial.
Article 38.08, V.A.C.C.P., prohibits comment on an accused’s right to remain silent and his failure to testify. Both the state and federal constitutions have established this right. See U.S. Const., Amend. V, Tex. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. The right of an accused party to be free from the fear of compelled self-incrimination and to remain silent is a vital protection which our society provides a citizen accused of a criminal offense. This personal right cannot in any way be abridged and any claim made by the appellant that this right has been denied him cannot be lightly dismissed. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). It has often been said that the prohibition against commenting on a defendant’s silence at trial is mandatory, see Art. 38.08, Y.A.C.C.P., and thus rarely cured by instruction. Bird v. State, 527 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Overton v. State, 470 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). The appellant cites the case of Owen v. State, 656 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) to further support this argument.
In order for the argument of the state’s attorney to violate this right, the language used must be looked at from the standpoint of the jury. The implication that counsel’s argument referred to the accused’s failure to testify must be clear. It is not sufficient that the language might be construed as an implied or indirect allusion thereto. Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 367 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Overton v. State, supra 470 S.W.2d at 655; Roller v. State, 518 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
This Court discussed this theory in Bird v. State, supra 527 S.W.2d at 894. This Court held:
“The test employed is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the accused’s failure to testify. See McDaniel v. State, supra; Roller v. State, supra; Chapman v. State, 504 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). In applying this test, the facts and circumstances of each case must be analyzed to determine whether the language used was of such character.”
[408]*408The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed this issue also. That court held in Davis v. United States, 357 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. — 1966):
“It is important to observe that the rule does not prohibit all comment on testimony or evidence which stands un-contradicted, and the right to make such statements is well established....”
“ ‘The facts and circumstances of each case must be carefully analyzed to determine “whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” ’ ”
In light of the above authority, we find that no error occurred, and if there was an error, it was harmless in nature.
The entire statement in question in this case reads as follows:
“ 1... the defendant hasn’t indicated any remorse, [here the defendant’s attorney objected to the remark. His objection was sustained. The court then instructed the jury ‘that any argument of counsel is not evidence in this case. It is not to be considered as evidence and you are to disregard the statement made by counsel for the state in regards to showing of remorse.’ Counsel for the defense then asked for a mistrial which was overruled.] Ladies and Gentlemen, the Charge would show you can consider all of the evidence that you have heard before in the guilt innocence phase as well as this phase. The defendant was on the stand. He said, he admitted that he went out there. Dorothy Jones was shot. He admitted that he blamed her for him not having the farm. He told you that he would do anything to get that farm back. He said he would kill for it under the right situation.’ ”
The statement was intended to reflect upon what the appellant had testified about at the guilt or innocence portion of the trial. As such we cannot find that the language was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify at punishment. The appellant urges us to accept Owen v. State, supra, as controlling authority in this case. While the similarities appellant alludes to are well taken, there is an important distinction between Owen and the instant case. In Owen there was no question that the prosecutor’s remarks were manifestly intended to be a comment on the accused’s failure to testify. In the punishment phase of the Owen case, the prosecutor said:
“ ‘He [deceased] was a living breathing human being that is not here today to tell us how he feels about what happened because of Lewis Owen [appellant]. Now, in the Defendant’s testimony you heard the Defense rest, they did not present any testimony to you, but in the testimony you heard this morning, I submit to you and by your verdict, you have said that he lied to you. He lied to you about that self-defense theory. He had the opportunity to come up here and say to you that he was sorry. I submit to you — ’ ”
After a sustained objection the prosecutor continued in this vein, saying:
“... I would submit to you that the first step in rehabilitating somebody, the first step in granting somebody probation is for him to at least say that he is sorry for what happened.”
There is no question the jury “would naturally and necessarily take this to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” These factors are simply not present in the instant case. Here the prosecution’s comments are simply not of the same uncompromising and unequivocal nature. The intent shown by the state’s attorney in Owen was manifest and subject to no redeeming action. The jury could naturally and necessarily interpret the remarks in Owen only as being made in reference to the accused’s failure to take the stand.
Furthermore, the appellant made a timely objection and an instruction to disregard the comment was given to the jury. Unlike the Owen case, supra, this was not a case where the prosecution made continu[409]*409ous and repeated impermissible remarks which were not subject to cure through proper and timely instruction. In this case the remark was made and objected to, and subsequently a jury instruction was given to disregard the comment. The prosecutor resumed his argument commenting only about statements made previously by the appellant at the guilt or innocence stage of the trial.
As in Johnson v. State, 583 S.W.2d 399, 408 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), we do not believe that the argument was such that the jury would or could not follow the instruction of the trial judge. This Court stated in Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Cr.App.1967):
“... even if the argument did constitute a comment on appellant’s failure to testify in violation of his federal constitutional rights, we conclude the same is harmless error, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that it might [not] have contributed to appellant’s conviction.... ”
We find this reasoning to be applicable to this case. This conclusion is supported by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20, 87 S.Ct. 824, 826, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 708 (1967). In that case the Court held that even when an error has, as alleged here, constitutional implications, that it may still be harmless in nature and require no reversal.
We conclude that the argument viewed in its entirety can most reasonably be interpreted as a comment not on the appellant’s failure to testify during punishment, but upon his testimony in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. We further hold that if an error was made that it was harmless error, subsequently and effectively cured by the trial judge’s instruction to the jury.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
TOM G. DAVIS, MILLER and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur in the result.