OPINION
TEAGUE, Judge.
Appellant appeals his conviction for the felony offense of burglary of a building. His punishment was assessed by a jury at 18 years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections, together with a $10,-000 fine.1
This Court is confronted at the outset with a question of first impression:
Is it reversible error for the trial court, over objection, to refuse to charge the jury, at the punishment stage of the trial, on the defendant’s failure to testify, when the trial court so charged the jury at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial?
Appellant did not testify at either stage of his trial. The trial court instructed the jury at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial on appellant’s failure to testify but refused, over timely objection, to charge in like fashion at the punishment stage. We reverse for reasons hereinafter stated.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently ruled in Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 55 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978), that the giving of an instruction on the failure of the accused to testify, over objection, at the guilt-innocence stage of a trial did not violate any provision of the Constitution of the United States. It was pointed out, however: “Each State is, of course, free to forbid its trial judges from giving the instruction as a matter of state law,” but it was held that the fifth and fourteenth amendments bar only adverse comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, not a favorable limiting instruction.
Even more recently, in Carter v. Kentucky, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a defendant has a right to a requested instruction on failure to testify under the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination of the fifth amendment, as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial
Though instructive and informative, the above decisions of the Supreme Court do not answer our question due to the fact [236] that Texas is unique: under our system of criminal jurisprudence in felony and also in misdemeanor cases, where punishment may include assessment of jail time, and the plea is not guilty, we have a bifurcated trial system, i. e., if there is a jury trial and if the jury finds the accused guilty, and if, prior to the voir dire examination of the jury, the defendant has filed an election for the jury to assess punishment, then there may be a separate hearing before the same jury on the issue of punishment. See Art. 37.07, V.A.T.C.C.P., hereinafter cited as C.C.P. Here, appellant timely elected, as was his right under the law, to have the jury assess his punishment should he be found guilty.2
The importance of giving proper instructions to a jury by a trial court should never be questioned, especially when one considers the very obvious purpose the charge serves:
The very purpose of a jury charge is to flag the jurors’ attention to concepts that must not be misunderstood ... Lakeside, supra, at 435 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1095.
In resolving the question before us, we first acknowledge that both Constitutions under which we live provide that an accused in a criminal prosecution shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.
The Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution, provides that an accused in a criminal prosecution shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. Such amendment has now become applicable to the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653; Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106.
The Texas Constitution, Article I, Sec. 10, contains a similar provision. See also Article 1.05, V.A.C.C.P. Brumfield v. State, [Tex.Cr.App.] 445 S.W.2d 732, 734 (1969).
These Constitutional provisions are as broad as the mischief against which they seek to guard. The proposition that a criminal defendant cannot be compelled to take the witness stand at the guilt-innocence stage and give evidence against himself is so well understood that it requires no citation of authority to support it. It is, of course, a waivable right if done knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. A corollary to the above is the fact that any defendant in a criminal action shall be permitted to testify in his own behalf. But, again, the failure of an accused to testify at his trial, at the guilt-innocence stage, shall not be taken as a circumstance against him, nor shall it be alluded to or commented on by counsel in the cause. See Art. 38.08, C.C.P.
We observe that, as at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial, if the defendant exercises his right to testify at the punishment hearing, he is subject to the same rules governing examination and cross-examination as any other witness. He may be contradicted, impeached, discredited, attacked, sustained, bolstered up, made to give evidence against himself, cross-examined as to new matter, and treated in every respect as any other witness testifying, except where there are overriding constitutional or statutory prohibitions. See Brumfield, supra, see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) and Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 (1969).
However, it is further observed that if the defendant chooses to testify at the punishment stage of the trial, but not at the guilt-innocence stage, Walker v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 555 S.W.2d 454 (1977); and Stratman v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 436 S.W.2d 144 (1969), he may waive, for appellate purposes, evidentiary objections made during the guilt-innocence stage of the trial. This may include the right to complain on appeal of an in or out-of-court identification, the sufficiency of the evidence, and an illegal search and seizure. See Downey v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 505 S.W.2d 907 (1974); Sims v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 502 S.W.2d 730 (1973); [237] Palmer v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 475 S.W.2d 797 (1972); Boothe v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 474 S.W.2d 219 (1972); and Richardson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 458 S.W.2d 665 (1970).
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OPINION
TEAGUE, Judge.
Appellant appeals his conviction for the felony offense of burglary of a building. His punishment was assessed by a jury at 18 years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections, together with a $10,-000 fine.1
This Court is confronted at the outset with a question of first impression:
Is it reversible error for the trial court, over objection, to refuse to charge the jury, at the punishment stage of the trial, on the defendant’s failure to testify, when the trial court so charged the jury at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial?
Appellant did not testify at either stage of his trial. The trial court instructed the jury at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial on appellant’s failure to testify but refused, over timely objection, to charge in like fashion at the punishment stage. We reverse for reasons hereinafter stated.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently ruled in Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 55 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978), that the giving of an instruction on the failure of the accused to testify, over objection, at the guilt-innocence stage of a trial did not violate any provision of the Constitution of the United States. It was pointed out, however: “Each State is, of course, free to forbid its trial judges from giving the instruction as a matter of state law,” but it was held that the fifth and fourteenth amendments bar only adverse comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, not a favorable limiting instruction.
Even more recently, in Carter v. Kentucky, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a defendant has a right to a requested instruction on failure to testify under the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination of the fifth amendment, as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial
Though instructive and informative, the above decisions of the Supreme Court do not answer our question due to the fact [236] that Texas is unique: under our system of criminal jurisprudence in felony and also in misdemeanor cases, where punishment may include assessment of jail time, and the plea is not guilty, we have a bifurcated trial system, i. e., if there is a jury trial and if the jury finds the accused guilty, and if, prior to the voir dire examination of the jury, the defendant has filed an election for the jury to assess punishment, then there may be a separate hearing before the same jury on the issue of punishment. See Art. 37.07, V.A.T.C.C.P., hereinafter cited as C.C.P. Here, appellant timely elected, as was his right under the law, to have the jury assess his punishment should he be found guilty.2
The importance of giving proper instructions to a jury by a trial court should never be questioned, especially when one considers the very obvious purpose the charge serves:
The very purpose of a jury charge is to flag the jurors’ attention to concepts that must not be misunderstood ... Lakeside, supra, at 435 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1095.
In resolving the question before us, we first acknowledge that both Constitutions under which we live provide that an accused in a criminal prosecution shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.
The Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution, provides that an accused in a criminal prosecution shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. Such amendment has now become applicable to the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653; Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106.
The Texas Constitution, Article I, Sec. 10, contains a similar provision. See also Article 1.05, V.A.C.C.P. Brumfield v. State, [Tex.Cr.App.] 445 S.W.2d 732, 734 (1969).
These Constitutional provisions are as broad as the mischief against which they seek to guard. The proposition that a criminal defendant cannot be compelled to take the witness stand at the guilt-innocence stage and give evidence against himself is so well understood that it requires no citation of authority to support it. It is, of course, a waivable right if done knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. A corollary to the above is the fact that any defendant in a criminal action shall be permitted to testify in his own behalf. But, again, the failure of an accused to testify at his trial, at the guilt-innocence stage, shall not be taken as a circumstance against him, nor shall it be alluded to or commented on by counsel in the cause. See Art. 38.08, C.C.P.
We observe that, as at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial, if the defendant exercises his right to testify at the punishment hearing, he is subject to the same rules governing examination and cross-examination as any other witness. He may be contradicted, impeached, discredited, attacked, sustained, bolstered up, made to give evidence against himself, cross-examined as to new matter, and treated in every respect as any other witness testifying, except where there are overriding constitutional or statutory prohibitions. See Brumfield, supra, see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) and Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 (1969).
However, it is further observed that if the defendant chooses to testify at the punishment stage of the trial, but not at the guilt-innocence stage, Walker v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 555 S.W.2d 454 (1977); and Stratman v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 436 S.W.2d 144 (1969), he may waive, for appellate purposes, evidentiary objections made during the guilt-innocence stage of the trial. This may include the right to complain on appeal of an in or out-of-court identification, the sufficiency of the evidence, and an illegal search and seizure. See Downey v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 505 S.W.2d 907 (1974); Sims v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 502 S.W.2d 730 (1973); [237] Palmer v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 475 S.W.2d 797 (1972); Boothe v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 474 S.W.2d 219 (1972); and Richardson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 458 S.W.2d 665 (1970).
We therefore move to the punishment phase of the trial where the defendant is not entitled, because he was found guilty, to many of the precautionary instructions usually given at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, i. e., he is no longer presumed innocent, by the verdict of the jury the State has satisfied its burden to prove the defendant guilty, there is no longer a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, and the indictment or information is no longer relevant except where it contains enhancement allegations. See Art. 36.01, C.C.P.
However, the right of self-incrimination does not end with the jury finding the defendant guilty for, as Presiding Judge Onion said in Brumfield, supra:
The mere finding of guilt does not terminate the privilege against self-incrimination. ... the privilege ceases only when liability to punishment no longer exists. We cannot agree that the legislature by providing a bifurcated trial system intended to make the decision of an accused as to taking the witness stand on the issue of guilt a more onerous one than it was under the former Code, (emphasis added) Id. at 741.
Nor does the fact that a verdict of guilty has been returned by a jury diminish the importance of giving additional proper instructions to the same jury at the punishment stage of the trial. In fact, the legislature has mandated, see Art. 37.07, Sec. 2(b), C.C.P., that “the court shall give such additional written instructions as may be necessary” at the punishment stage of the trial.3
The dissent’s argument that the trial court's instruction, given at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial, carried over to the punishment phase of the trial, thus eliminating the need for an identical instruction at that stage of the trial, at first blush seems reasonable, but a short analysis of the proposition shows it to be fallacious. The trial court, by giving the jury pattern jury instructions at the punishment stage, which were in part identical to those given at the guilt-innocence stage, showed a recognition of the evanescent qualities of the human [238] mind. Otherwise, if the elementary pattern instructions given at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial were so permanently embedded in the minds of the jurors, common sense dictates there would have been no need to give the jury those instructions again. It would also be disingenuous to say that a jury composed of 12 reasonably intelligent persons were sufficiently attentive during the guilt-innocence stage of the trial to be capable of carrying over to the punishment phase the instruction on the failure of the defendant to testify, but were incapable of doing the same with the most rudimentary of the pattern jury instructions given.4
The above holding is really not anything new as what we announce today is merely to apply to the punishment stage of the trial, inversely, the many suggestions we have made in the past, see Rogers v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 486 S.W.2d 786 (1972); Handley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 480 S.W.2d 738 (1972); and Hill v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 466 S.W.2d 791 (1971), regarding the guilt-innocence stage of the trial.
We now return to the question presented, and answer it in the affirmative. We hold that where a request is made to the trial court to add to its charge at the punishment stage of the trial an instruction on the failure of the defendant to testify, or an objection is made to the omission of such charge, it is reversible error if the trial court fails to honor that request or objection because we find that “members of the jury, unless instructed otherwise, may well draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence,” at the punishment phase of the trial, just as they could from the defendant’s silence at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial. “No judge can prevent jurors from speculating about why a defendant stands mute ..., but a judge can, and must, if requested to do so, use the unique jury instruction to reduce that speculation to a minimum.” See Carter, supra, - U.S. at pages-,-, 101 S.Ct. at 1113.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
ROBERTS, ODOM and DALLY, JJ., concur.