UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHARLES L. JONES,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 -1223 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles L. Jones, a security guard assigned to the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
office in Rockville, Maryland, alleges that his car was damaged when he drove over a
malfunctioning “security wedge” in the parking garage. Mr. Jones brought this suit alleging that
the FDA was negligent in maintaining the garage and thus responsible for the damage caused to
his vehicle. The FDA now moves to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, the Court concludes that venue in this District is
improper and thus transfers this case to the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland.
BACKGROUND
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and
attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
Mr. Jones is a resident of Maryland. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1. In May 2023, he was
employed by a third-party contractor as a security guard at the FDA’s office in Rockville,
Maryland. Compl. Ex. 1 at 27, ECF No. 1-1. On May 9, 2023, Mr. Jones drove over a “security
wedge” as he was exiting the parking lot and heard a noise followed by a dragging sound. Compl. at 4; Compl. Ex. 1 at 28. When Mr. Jones got out of his car, he discovered that his “under carriage
was ripped and hanging” and that pieces of it were “wedged in the barrier and hanging underneath
the driver[] side door.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 28. He also noticed that the “security wedge” he had hit
was “propped up due to rus[t] and misc[ellaneous] elements.” Compl. at 4.
Shortly after the accident, Mr. Jones submitted a claim to the FDA. Compl. at 5. He then
spent roughly nine months corresponding with the FDA about his claim and providing additional
documentation and repair cost estimates. Id. Eventually, Mr. Jones became unsatisfied with the
FDA’s failure to resolve his claim and so he filed this lawsuit pro se on April 25, 2024. Compl. at
1, 4. He seeks $76,928.64 in damages for “repair costs, car payment, car insurance, lost wages,
rent differential, and utility differential” for the months of May 2023 to April 2024 during which
his car was inoperable. Id. at 4.
On March 3, 2025, the FDA moved to dismiss the case under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 10. The motion is fully briefed
and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF No. 12; Reply, ECF No. 17.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(3), a court may dismiss a case for improper venue. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(3). “[T]he plaintiff usually bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper.” Varma v.
Gutierrez, 421 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113 (D.D.C. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). “In considering a
Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations regarding venue
as true, draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor, and resolves
any factual conflicts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Darby v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 231 F. Supp. 2d 274,
276 (D.D.C. 2002). For a pro se plaintiff, the court holds the factual allegations contained in the
complaint “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Sparrow v.
2 United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (quotation marks omitted)).
When venue is improper, a court may dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(3) or “if it be in
the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s case is disfavored. See James v.
Verizon Servs. Corp., 639 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that “[c]ourts generally favor
transfer over dismissal” and that “[t]his is especially true” for pro se plaintiffs). And the decision
whether to dismiss or transfer is committed to the “sound discretion of the district court.” Davis v.
Am. Soc’y of Civ. Eng’rs, 290 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (D.D.C. 2003) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
The FDA argues that Mr. Jones’ claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3),
and 12(b)(6). The Court agrees that this District is an improper venue for Mr. Jones’ lawsuit and
finds that transfer to the District of Maryland is appropriate. 1
A. Improper Venue
While Mr. Jones does not identify the specific statute he is relying on, the Court construes
his claim as one under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq., which
provides a statutory cause of action where a plaintiff “seeks monetary damages against a federal
defendant for common law torts.” Wilson v. Obama, 770 F. Supp. 2d 188, 191 (D.D.C. 2011). The
“[p]roper venue for an FTCA claim is ‘the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein
1 Because transfer is appropriate, the Court declines to address the Defendant’s arguments for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). See Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D.D.C. 2009) (a district court may resolve a “venue issue before addressing whether subject matter jurisdiction exists”) (collecting cases); see also Bourdon v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 235 F. Supp. 3d 298, 301 (D.D.C. 2017) (when transfer is appropriate, the court need not “reach the merits” of other arguments for dismissal).
3 the act or omission complained of occurred.’” Id. at 192 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b)). See also
Sanchez ex rel. Rivera-Sanchez v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2009) (the judicial
district where an act occurs is where “sufficient activities giving rise to the plaintiff’s cause of
action took place”) (cleaned up). And courts in this circuit are careful “to guard against the danger”
of a plaintiff manufacturing venue in the District of Columbia by bringing suits against government
officials “that properly should be pursued elsewhere.” Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHARLES L. JONES,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 -1223 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles L. Jones, a security guard assigned to the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
office in Rockville, Maryland, alleges that his car was damaged when he drove over a
malfunctioning “security wedge” in the parking garage. Mr. Jones brought this suit alleging that
the FDA was negligent in maintaining the garage and thus responsible for the damage caused to
his vehicle. The FDA now moves to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, the Court concludes that venue in this District is
improper and thus transfers this case to the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland.
BACKGROUND
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and
attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
Mr. Jones is a resident of Maryland. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1. In May 2023, he was
employed by a third-party contractor as a security guard at the FDA’s office in Rockville,
Maryland. Compl. Ex. 1 at 27, ECF No. 1-1. On May 9, 2023, Mr. Jones drove over a “security
wedge” as he was exiting the parking lot and heard a noise followed by a dragging sound. Compl. at 4; Compl. Ex. 1 at 28. When Mr. Jones got out of his car, he discovered that his “under carriage
was ripped and hanging” and that pieces of it were “wedged in the barrier and hanging underneath
the driver[] side door.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 28. He also noticed that the “security wedge” he had hit
was “propped up due to rus[t] and misc[ellaneous] elements.” Compl. at 4.
Shortly after the accident, Mr. Jones submitted a claim to the FDA. Compl. at 5. He then
spent roughly nine months corresponding with the FDA about his claim and providing additional
documentation and repair cost estimates. Id. Eventually, Mr. Jones became unsatisfied with the
FDA’s failure to resolve his claim and so he filed this lawsuit pro se on April 25, 2024. Compl. at
1, 4. He seeks $76,928.64 in damages for “repair costs, car payment, car insurance, lost wages,
rent differential, and utility differential” for the months of May 2023 to April 2024 during which
his car was inoperable. Id. at 4.
On March 3, 2025, the FDA moved to dismiss the case under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 10. The motion is fully briefed
and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF No. 12; Reply, ECF No. 17.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(3), a court may dismiss a case for improper venue. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(3). “[T]he plaintiff usually bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper.” Varma v.
Gutierrez, 421 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113 (D.D.C. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). “In considering a
Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations regarding venue
as true, draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor, and resolves
any factual conflicts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Darby v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 231 F. Supp. 2d 274,
276 (D.D.C. 2002). For a pro se plaintiff, the court holds the factual allegations contained in the
complaint “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Sparrow v.
2 United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (quotation marks omitted)).
When venue is improper, a court may dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(3) or “if it be in
the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s case is disfavored. See James v.
Verizon Servs. Corp., 639 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that “[c]ourts generally favor
transfer over dismissal” and that “[t]his is especially true” for pro se plaintiffs). And the decision
whether to dismiss or transfer is committed to the “sound discretion of the district court.” Davis v.
Am. Soc’y of Civ. Eng’rs, 290 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (D.D.C. 2003) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
The FDA argues that Mr. Jones’ claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3),
and 12(b)(6). The Court agrees that this District is an improper venue for Mr. Jones’ lawsuit and
finds that transfer to the District of Maryland is appropriate. 1
A. Improper Venue
While Mr. Jones does not identify the specific statute he is relying on, the Court construes
his claim as one under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq., which
provides a statutory cause of action where a plaintiff “seeks monetary damages against a federal
defendant for common law torts.” Wilson v. Obama, 770 F. Supp. 2d 188, 191 (D.D.C. 2011). The
“[p]roper venue for an FTCA claim is ‘the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein
1 Because transfer is appropriate, the Court declines to address the Defendant’s arguments for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). See Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D.D.C. 2009) (a district court may resolve a “venue issue before addressing whether subject matter jurisdiction exists”) (collecting cases); see also Bourdon v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 235 F. Supp. 3d 298, 301 (D.D.C. 2017) (when transfer is appropriate, the court need not “reach the merits” of other arguments for dismissal).
3 the act or omission complained of occurred.’” Id. at 192 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b)). See also
Sanchez ex rel. Rivera-Sanchez v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2009) (the judicial
district where an act occurs is where “sufficient activities giving rise to the plaintiff’s cause of
action took place”) (cleaned up). And courts in this circuit are careful “to guard against the danger”
of a plaintiff manufacturing venue in the District of Columbia by bringing suits against government
officials “that properly should be pursued elsewhere.” Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 256
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
Here, Mr. Jones alleges that he resides in Maryland, that his car was damaged in Maryland,
and that the parking garage in question is in Maryland. Compl. Ex. 1 at 27. Accordingly, venue is
not proper in this District, as it is not “the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein
the act or omission complained of occurred.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b).
Mr. Jones argues that venue is proper under the FTCA in “the judicial district where the
defendant resides.” Opp’n at 1 (emphasis added). Not so. Venue lies in “the judicial district where
the plaintiff resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (emphasis added). The two cases Mr. Jones cites do not
alter this conclusion. Opp’n at 2. Poku v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation involved a claim
brought under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, and so
it did not involve application of the FTCA’s venue provision. 752 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C.
2010). And in Sanchez-Mercedes v. Bureau of Prisons, the court found—as the Court finds here—
that the District of Columbia was an improper venue for an FTCA claim brought by a nonresident
pro se plaintiff alleging tortious conduct that occurred outside the District. 453 F. Supp. 3d 404,
417 (D.D.C. 2020).
4 B. Transfer
“Where venue is improper, the district court ‘shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.’”
Dastmalchian v. Dep’t of Just., 71 F. Supp. 3d 173, 177 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a)). Generally, “[t]ransfer is the preferred option.” Id. This is especially true where pro se
litigants are involved. See James v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 639 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2009)
(“Courts generally favor transfer over dismissal . . . especially . . . when the plaintiff [is] pro se.”).
Here, the Court declines to dismiss and finds it is in the interest of justice to instead transfer
this case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Maryland is where
Mr. Jones resides and where his accident in the FDA parking lot occurred. Compl. Ex. 1 at 27.
Litigating this case in the District of Maryland is thus likely to be more convenient for the parties
and witnesses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). And transfer would not prejudice the Defendant. Sinclair
v. Kleindienst, 711 F.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court transfers this case to the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland. A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge
Date: September 23, 2025