Jones v. Comm'r

2009 T.C. Memo. 3, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 2
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJanuary 5, 2009
DocketNo. 19290-07L
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2009 T.C. Memo. 3 (Jones v. Comm'r) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Comm'r, 2009 T.C. Memo. 3, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 2 (tax 2009).

Opinion

A. J. JONES, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Jones v. Comm'r
No. 19290-07L
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 2009-3; 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 2;
January 5, 2009, Filed
*2
Frederick J. O'Laughlin, for petitioner.
G. Chad Barton, for respondent.
Morrison, Richard T.

RICHARD T. MORRISON

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

MORRISON, Judge: This "collection due process" ("CDP") case is before the Court on respondent's amended motion for summary judgment to uphold his Appeals officer's determination to sustain a notice of intent to levy (the "levy") on petitioner's assets for her 2002 income tax liability.

Petitioner alleged in her petition that respondent had erred by sustaining the levy and, specifically, by sustaining the levy after allegedly finding that it was more intrusive than necessary. Respondent moved for summary judgment on the grounds that his Appeals officer had properly based his determination on petitioner's repeated failures to file tax returns, provide requested information, and propose collection alternatives; and that the Appeals officer actually determined that the levy was not more intrusive than necessary but simply made a misstatement in his notice of determination.

Petitioner did not respond to the motion with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. (The record before the Court did enable us to consider her claim *3 that the Appeals officer determined the levy to be more intrusive than necessary.) Instead, she conceded that she is statutorily prohibited from challenging her underlying tax liability but argued that we should review respondent's determination of that tax liability. We find that petitioner has conceded this argument by failing to properly raise it in her petition. We also find, in any case, that the argument is a circuitous, still prohibited, challenge to her underlying tax liability, and that petitioner has failed to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial with respect to the liability. Upon examination of the notice of determination, we find that the Appeals officer did not determine that the levy was more intrusive than necessary but simply made a misstatement. Finally, we refuse to further consider petitioner's argument that respondent erred by sustaining the levy because it is too broad to give respondent and the Court notice of any particular issue for decision.

Therefore, we will grant respondent's motion.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Petitioner failed to timely file an income tax return for 2002. Respondent prepared on her behalf, with respect to her 2002 income tax, *4 a "substitute for return." 1 Respondent issued, and petitioner apparently received, a notice of deficiency for her 2002 income tax in or around October 2005. 2*5 Petitioner failed to file a Tax Court petition to challenge the notice of deficiency (and did not otherwise dispute the notice of deficiency). Respondent then assessed the deficiency. Respondent sent petitioner an IRS Notice CP 90, Final Notice, Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, for her unpaid 2002 income tax on August 21, 2006. Petitioner duly requested a CDP hearing to contest the levy. She explained in this request that "Taxpayer disagrees with the final notice of intent to levy because a levy would cause a great hardship to Taxpayer. Taxpayer does not have the ability to pay the entire tax liability owned [owed] because both taxpayers [sic] are disabled." 3*6

Respondent's Appeals officer conducted the CDP hearing through a series of communications with petitioner which included, but were not limited to, a "face-to-face" (in-person) meeting with her counsel. On October 23, 2006, respondent sent petitioner and her counsel copies of a letter which acknowledged petitioner's request for a CDP hearing, explained that he had not received her 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax returns, and asked her to submit them by October 31, 2006. On December 6, 2006, respondent sent them copies of a letter which scheduled a conference call as part of petitioner's CDP hearing, explained the factors he would have to consider in the hearing, and requested that she provide a completed Collection Information Statement (a form statement of her finances), income tax returns for 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2005, 4 and any other federal tax returns required to be filed, since he would need the foregoing materials to consider alternatives to the levy. On December 20, 2006, petitioner's counsel requested a "face-to-face" (in-person) meeting. On *7 May 1, 2007, respondent sent petitioner and her counsel copies of a letter which scheduled a conference call for June 5, 2007, requested her Collection Information Statement and 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 tax returns, and stated in underlined text: "Your POA ["power of attorney," i.e., counsel] requested a face-to-face conference to discuss the potential levy action. Unless you become compliant and can present a serious plan of action to pay, I do not believe a face-to-face meeting would be productive. CDP should not be used as a forum to delay collection."

During the June 5, 2007 call, petitioner's counsel said that petitioner, in the Appeals officer's account, was "basically destitute and would provide proof thereof," requested that a face-to-face meeting be scheduled for June 20, 2007, and said that petitioner would provide all delinquent tax returns and an updated financial statement. At the June 20, 2007 *8

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Bluebook (online)
2009 T.C. Memo. 3, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 2, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-commr-tax-2009.