FPL Group, Inc. v. Commissioner

116 T.C. No. 7, 116 T.C. 73, 2001 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 7
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedFebruary 1, 2001
DocketNo. 5271-96
StatusPublished
Cited by257 cases

This text of 116 T.C. No. 7 (FPL Group, Inc. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
FPL Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. 7, 116 T.C. 73, 2001 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 7 (tax 2001).

Opinion

OPINION

RUWE, Judge:

This matter is before the Court on respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 121.1 The sole issue presented is whether petitioner is barred by the so-called “one claim” rule of section 6427(i)(l) from obtaining a credit under section 34 for amounts of Federal excise taxes paid on fuels.

Background

FPL Group, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida with its principal office located in Juno Beach, Florida. FPL Group, Inc. & Subsidiaries (petitioner) filed consolidated Federal income tax returns for the years 1988 through 1992. Petitioner attached to each return a Form 4136, Computation of Credit for Federal Tax on Fuels. Form 4136 is used to claim credit for Federal excise tax paid on fuels sold or used during the period of the claim. On its Federal income tax returns for those years, petitioner claimed credits for Federal taxes on fuels as follows:

Year Credit
1988 . $279,732
1989 . 233,053
1990 . 275,303
1991 . 391,516
1992 . 332,568

In its second amended petition, petitioner alleged that respondent erred in failing to allow additional fuel tax credits for vehicles which are not “highway use” vehicles in the following amounts:

Year Credit
1988 . $135,194
1989 . 136,840
1990 . 143,340
1991 . 202,096
1992 . 215,649

These amounts are in addition to the amounts claimed as credits on petitioner’s original Federal income tax returns for those years.

Discussion

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. See Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 294, 295 (1993); Shiosaki v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 861, 862 (1974). Rule 121(a) provides that either party may move for summary judgment upon all or any part of the legal issues in controversy. Full or partial summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. See Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). Respondent, as the moving party, bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32, 36 (1993); Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the factual materials and the inferences drawn from them must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Bond v. Commissioner, supra at 36; Naftel v. Commissioner, supra at 529. In the instant case, there is no genuine issue as to any of the material facts that we have set forth in the background section of this opinion.

II. Sections 6427 and 34

Respondent argues that petitioner is making a second claim under section 6427 and that the so-called one claim rule contained in section 6427(i)(l) acts as a bar to petitioner’s claim for credit. Petitioner argues that its claim for credit is being made under section 34 and that the “one claim” rule in section 6427(f)(1) has no application.

A. Section 6427

Section 6427 provides a mechanism whereby a purchaser of fuel can obtain payment from the Secretary of taxes previously imposed on fuel which was not used for taxable purposes by the purchaser. See sec. 6427(a),2 (l).3 Subsections (a) and (1) of section 6427 specifically pertain to nontaxable uses of diesel fuel previously taxed under sections 40414 and 4091.5

Limitations on filing a claim for payment under section 6427 are addressed in section 6427(f). The general rule of limitation for payment of claims filed under section 6427 is that not more than one claim may be filed by any person with respect to fuel used during the taxable year. Section 6427(i) provides:

SEC. 6427(i). Time for Filing Claims; Period Covered.—
(1) General rule. — Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), not more than one claim may be filed under subsection (a), (b), (d), [e in 1988 and 1989], (g), (h), (1), or (q) [(p) in 1988] by any person with respect to fuel used * * * during his taxable year; * * * [6]

Section 6427(i) does not refer to any claims filed under subsection (k). Section 6427(k) makes the following reference to an income tax credit in lieu of payment:

SEC. 6427(k). Income Tax Credit in Lieu of Payment.—
% 5}5 # * # # *
(3) Allowance of credit against income tax.—
For allowances of credit against the income tax imposed by subtitle A for fuel used or resold by the purchaser, see section 34.

B. Section 34

Section 34 allows a credit against income tax imposed under subtitle A for the taxable year equal to the sum of the amounts payable to the taxpayer under section 6427. See sec. 34(a)(3).7 However, credit is not allowed under section 34(a) for an amount payable under section 6427 if a claim for such an amount is timely filed and is “payable” under that section.8 Sec. 34(b).

C. Analysis

The Court of Federal Claims has recently held that the “one claim” rule under section 6427(i) does not bar timely claims for tax credit under section 34. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. & Subs. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 298 (2000). We agree with the Court of Federal Claims and its reasoning.

Section 34(a)(3) provides: “There shall be allowed as a credit * * * an amount equal to the sum of the amounts payable to the taxpayer * * * under section 6427”. The text of section 34 does not suggest that the credit it affords is limited by any of the procedural provisions of section 6427. Rather, the reference to section 6427 contained in section 34 appears merely to be a convenient measure of the amount of the credit to be afforded. Section 6427(k) does not purport to control or limit the rights afforded petitioner under section 34.

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Bluebook (online)
116 T.C. No. 7, 116 T.C. 73, 2001 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fpl-group-inc-v-commissioner-tax-2001.