Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedMarch 24, 2020
Docket5:18-cv-00493
StatusUnknown

This text of Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security (Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, (M.D. Fla. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OCALA DIVISION

BILLIE CHERYL JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:18-cv-493-Oc-MCR

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant. /

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an administrative decision denying her applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), and supplemental security income (“SSI”). Plaintiff filed her applications for DIB and SSI on August 27, 2014, alleging a disability onset date of July 15, 2010, which were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 15.) On March 4, 2017, Plaintiff amended her alleged disability onset date to March 22, 2013. (Id.) On April 18, 2017, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Rhonda S. Greenberg at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (Tr. 61-78.) On August 30, 2017, ALJ R. Dirk Selland held a supplemental hearing at which Plaintiff was again represented by counsel. (Tr.

1 The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 18.) 36-59.) On October 3, 2017, ALJ Selland found Plaintiff not disabled from July 15, 20102 through the date of the decision.3 (Tr. 15-28.) Plaintiff is appealing the Commissioner’s final decision that she was not disabled during the relevant time

period. Plaintiff has exhausted her available administrative remedies and the case is properly before the Court. (Tr. 1-3.) The Court has reviewed the record, the briefs, and the applicable law. For the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED. I. Standard

The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence

2 The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s claim based on her alleged disability date of July 15, 2010 even though Plaintiff had amended her alleged disability onset date to March 22, 2013. (Tr. 15-16.)

3 Plaintiff had to establish disability on or before December 31, 2014, her date last insured, in order to be entitled to a period of disability and DIB. (Tr. 16.) preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into

account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual findings). II. Discussion

Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards to the opinion of Doyle Phillips, Jr., M.D., Plaintiff’s treating physician. (Doc. 20 at 9.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards to the opinion of Colleen D. Character, Ph.D., a State agency psychological consultant. (Id. at 12.)

Defendant counters that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to assign moderate weight to the opinions of Dr. Phillips and Dr. Character. (Doc. 21 at 5.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff on the first issue and, therefore, does not address the second issue. A. Standard for Evaluating Opinion Evidence

The ALJ is required to consider all the evidence in the record when making a disability determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(3), 416.920(a)(3). With regard to medical opinion evidence, “the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). Substantial weight must be given to a treating physician’s opinion unless there is good cause to do otherwise. See Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).

“‘[G]ood cause’ exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004). When a treating physician’s opinion does not warrant controlling weight, the ALJ

must nevertheless weigh the medical opinion based on: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) the medical evidence supporting the opinion, (4) consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a whole, (5) specialization in the medical issues at issue, and (6) any other factors that tend

to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). “However, the ALJ is not required to explicitly address each of those factors. Rather, the ALJ must provide ‘good cause’ for rejecting a treating physician’s medical opinions.” Lawton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 431 F. App’x 830, 833 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Although a treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to more weight than a consulting physician’s opinion, see Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 518 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2), “[t]he opinions of state agency physicians” can outweigh the contrary opinion of a treating physician if “that opinion has been properly discounted,” Cooper v. Astrue, 2008 WL 649244, *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2008). Further, “the ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.”

Wainwright v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2007 WL 708971, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2007) (per curiam); see also Sryock v.

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