Jones v. City of Comanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: November 24, 2025
• Docket: 25-6016
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-6016 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/24/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 24, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court CLAYTON PHILLIP JONES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-6016 (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-01111-J) CITY OF COMANCHE, OKLAHOMA; (W.D. Okla.) OKLAHOMA MUNICIPAL ASSURANCE GROUP (OMAG),

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before HARTZ, EID, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Clayton Jones sued the City of Comanche (“the City”) and the Oklahoma

Municipal Assurance Group (“OMAG”), asserting federal law claims under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law claims under the Oklahoma

Constitution and statutes. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-6016 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/24/2025 Page: 2

claim. Jones now appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

we affirm.

I. Background

Jones filed his complaint in state court in October 2024, alleging violations of

his state and federal constitutional rights after his car was impounded. The claims

were based on an incident in March 2024, when Comanche Police Officer Timothy

McClinsey impounded Jones’s car based on an expired registration. While

McClinsey was acting as an officer for the city, he had not signed and filed an oath of

office, as required under Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 36.1. 1 Jones argued that McClinsey

accordingly lacked the authority to impound Jones’s car, and McClinsey therefore

violated Jones’s state and federal constitutional rights by acting without proper

authority. He further argued that the impoundment was unconstitutional because

Jones’s car was a private, non-commercial vehicle, which did not fall under the

federal definition of the term “motor vehicle.” Jones also filed an insurance claim

with OMAG related to the incident, who Jones alleged acted in bad faith in denying

the claim.

The defendants removed the action to the district court and then filed a motion

to dismiss under Fed. R. 12(b)(1) and (6). Jones responded in opposition to the

1 The statute requires officers employed in Oklahoma to “first take and subscribe to the loyalty oath or affirmation required by this act and file the same as hereinafter set forth.” Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 36.1 (footnote omitted).

2 Appellate Case: 25-6016 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/24/2025 Page: 3

motion to dismiss, and the defendants filed a reply. Jones then filed a “sur-reply”

and moved for summary judgment. The defendants moved to strike the “sur-reply”.

The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It found that any

amendment to Jones’s claims against the City would be futile and dismissed those

claims with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It dismissed the claim against

OMAG without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The

court denied Jones’s motion for summary judgment and the defendants’ motion to

strike as moot.

The district court explained its dismissal as follows. First, it determined that

Jones failed to state a claim for relief against the City because the de facto officer

doctrine applied to McClinsey’s actions, barring Jones’s claims. The district court

also found that Jones’s allegations that he did not have to submit to Oklahoma

registration requirements based on the definition of the term “motor vehicle” failed,

as a constitutional right to travel does not exempt individuals from state licensing and

registration requirements. Second, the court determined that Jones failed to state a

claim for relief against OMAG because OMAG was immune from Jones’s bad faith

claims under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (“OGTCA”).

Jones timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

We review dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) de novo.

Davis ex rel. Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1294 (10th Cir. 2003). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complainant must allege facts that, if true, state a claim

3 Appellate Case: 25-6016 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/24/2025 Page: 4

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Estate of Burgaz v. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs,

30 F.4th 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 2022). “In reviewing the motion to dismiss, we

accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view the

allegations most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. Because this case involved

a facial attack on Jones’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(1), we “apply a standard

patterned on Rule 12(b)(6) and assume the truthfulness of the facts alleged.” Garling

v. Env’t. Prot. Agency, 849 F.3d 1289, 1293 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Jones is pro se and entitled to liberal construction of his pleadings. See

Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). He

still must comply with the rules that govern all litigants, and we will not act as his

“attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Id.

III. Analysis

a. Jones’s claims against the City fail under the de facto officer doctrine.

On appeal, Jones argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claims

against the City because the de facto officer doctrine cannot apply to McClinsey, who

did not have a proper oath of office. The district court correctly determined that the

4 Appellate Case: 25-6016 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/24/2025 Page: 5

de facto officer doctrine applied to McClinsey, protecting him under both state and

federal law. 2

The federal de facto officer doctrine “confers validity upon acts performed by

a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that

the legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is deficient.” Ryder v.

United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995). This court has previously upheld an

immunity determination under the de facto officer doctrine even where a public

official “did not subscribe an oath of office as required by law.” Horwitz v. State Bd.

of Med. Exam’rs, 822 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th. Cir. 1987).

Under Oklahoma’s de facto officer doctrine, “[w]here the functions of the

office are exercised by one who was in the actual possession of it under color of title,

even if the officer may not be properly qualified in accordance with the law, his or

her acts will be upheld as valid and cannot be collaterally attacked.” State ex rel. Bd.

of Regents v. McCloskey Bros., Inc., 227 P.3d 133, 147 (Okla. 2009). McClinsey was

acting within a law enforcement position even without his signed oath of office. See,

e.g., Greenwood v. State, 299 P. 248, 250 (Okla. 1931) (holding that an appointed

special officer who failed to take an oath of office was still a de facto officer).

Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that the de facto officer doctrine

barred Jones from collaterally attacking McClinsey’s actions.

2 The district court’s de facto officer doctrine analysis utilized both federal and state law. We need not decide whether state or federal law applies because the outcome is the same regardless of which applies. 5 Appellate Case: 25-6016 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/24/2025 Page: 6

b. Jones’s car was subject to state registration requirements.

Jones reasserts his contentions that his car was not subject to state registration

rules because his car was for personal use, which falls outside of the federal

definition of motor vehicle. 3 We are unconvinced. While Jones is correct that he has

a right to travel under federal law, see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758

(1966), this right does not excuse him or any other driver from complying with state

registration laws. States have an interest in ensuring safety, which includes enforcing

“licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements.” Delaware v. Prouse,

440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979); see also United States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1272

(10th Cir. 2009) (finding that Utah’s license plate statutes were not constitutionally

burdensome). This clearly encompasses Oklahoma’s vehicle registration

requirements, which Jones is not exempt from. The district court did not err here.

c. Jones’s claims against OMAG failed because OMAG was immune from suit under Oklahoma law.

We now turn to Jones’s argument relating to his claims against OMAG. He

argues that OMAG was not entitled to any form of immunity from suit, and,

accordingly, those claims should not have been dismissed.

3 Jones provides this interpretation from the use of the phrase “commercial purposes” found in 18 U.S.C § 31(6), which defines a motor vehicle as “every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.” 6 Appellate Case: 25-6016 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/24/2025 Page: 7

Under the OGTCA, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 151-72, the following entities and

individuals are immune from tort liability: “[t]he state, its political subdivisions, and

all of their employees acting within the scope of their employment, whether

performing governmental or proprietary functions.” §152.1(A). OMAG operates

under the OGTCA and, as the district court correctly noted, is “immune from liability

for the tort of bad faith conduct in payment of claims because its employees are not

acting within the scope of their employment if they are acting in bad faith.” R. at 184

(quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Ass’n of Cnty. Comm’rs of Okla. Self-Ins. Grp.,

339 P.3d 866, 870 (Okla. 2014)); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 51 § 152(12) (defining

“scope of employment”). Accordingly, Jones could not bring a bad faith claim

against OMAG for not paying out his claim, and the district court did not err in

dismissing his claims against OMAG.

d. The district court properly evaluated Jones’s complaint and the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Finally, we turn to Jones’s argument that the district court improperly relied on

the defendants’ motions to dismiss when it issued its final order. He argues that their

motions to dismiss should not have been granted because the defendants did not offer

verified factual evidence in support of the motions. At the motion to dismiss stage, a

district court does not evaluate evidence presented by both parties, but instead

determines whether the plaintiff’s complaint provides a legally sufficient claim for

relief. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.

1999). The district court was permitted to evaluate the legal plausibility of Jones’s

7 Appellate Case: 25-6016 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/24/2025 Page: 8

claims, which it did. Neither the motions to dismiss nor the district court’s ultimate

ruling were deficient. We discern no error here.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s final judgment. We grant Jones’s motion to

proceed in forma pauperis. We deny his motion for judicial notice.

Entered for the Court

Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge