Jones v. Acker

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 6, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-07904
StatusUnknown

This text of Jones v. Acker (Jones v. Acker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones v. Acker, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK WARREN JONES; SHELLY JONES, Plaintiffs, 24-CV-7904 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL JUDGE CHRISTI J. ACKER, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiffs, who are proceeding pro se, filed this pleading entitled “Writ of Quo Warrento,” asserting violations of their constitutional rights. By order dated December 11, 2024, the Court granted their requests to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses this action, but grants Plaintiffs 30 days’ leave to replead the claims in an amended complaint, as specified below. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Warren Jones and Shelly Jones, who reside in Poughkeepsie, New York, filed

this action against Justice Christi J. Acker, of the New York Supreme Court, Dutchess County. Their pleading is difficult to understand, because it is comprised mostly of legal jargon and contains no facts about the events giving rise to this action. The Court assumes that Plaintiffs are suing Justice Acker because she is or was presiding over a state-court matter in which they were involved. (ECF 1 at 6.) Plaintiffs allege that Justice Acker acted without jurisdiction, violated their rights to due process, and committed an unspecified “tort” against them. (ECF 1 at 7.) By way of example, Plaintiffs allege:1 Whereas i claim my status by parentage, birthright, and as a direct blood descendant ab initio A.O. 1730 aforestated, the prosperity of the people who formed the American Union of the several states of the United States of America and who are recognized internationally by King Christian Ill of England as sovereign in the Paris Peace Treaty, A.O. 1783. Those people create and scribed upon the written Declaration of Independence, A.O. 1776; the Articles of Confederation, A.O. 1776 (The Constitution For the Commonwealth of Virginia) , A.O. 1776 (The Written Constitution For the United States of America), as amended A.O. 1791 (and, also created the Union of the several states and land of The United States of America and grant limited powers of their sovereignty of those Nations-States formed[.] (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs seek “a writ of quo warranto against [Justice] Acker to challenge their authority to hold office”; “damages for the tort claim, including compensatory and punitive damage”; and any “such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.” (Id. at 6.) DISCUSSION A. Federal pleading rules The complaint does not comply with Rule 8’s requirement that it provide a short and plain statement explaining what happened and showing that Plaintiffs are entitled to relief. The complaint contains only legal terminology and general allegations that Plaintiffs’ rights were violated, which are essentially just legal conclusions. Plaintiffs do not provide the factual detail necessary for the Court to understand exactly what occurred or whether Justice Acker, or anyone else, may be held legally responsible for violating their rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (a complaint must “allow[] the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged”).

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All capitalization, punctuation, omissions, and grammar are in the original. The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint to provide more information about the events giving rise to this action. B. Judicial immunity Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts

arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation . . . .” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). Judicial immunity does not apply when a judge takes action “outside” her judicial capacity, or when a judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).

Moreover, 42 U.S.C.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Stump v. Sparkman
435 U.S. 349 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Mireles v. Waco
502 U.S. 9 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Mills v. Fischer
645 F.3d 176 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Bliven v. Hunt
579 F.3d 204 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Jones v. Acker, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-v-acker-nysd-2025.