Johnston v. United States

157 Ct. Cl. 474, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 212, 1962 WL 9299
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 9, 1962
DocketNo. 29-58
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 157 Ct. Cl. 474 (Johnston v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnston v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 474, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 212, 1962 WL 9299 (cc 1962).

Opinion

Dureee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff in this action seeks disability retired pay computed at 75 percent of the pay of a lieutenant colonel with over thirteen years service from June 7,1955, to the present, to which he claims to be entitled pursuant to Section 402 of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, 10 U.S.C. 1201 (1958).

Plaintiff, after having served as an enlisted man on active duty in the Army from September 9, 1918, through July 15, 1919, applied for a commission in the Army of the United States on June 18,1942. He was appointed a first lieutenant, with waiver for obesity, and served on active duty continuously from July 1, 1942 until June 6, 1955, when he was released from active duty, not by reason of physical disability, but rather because of the expiration of his category. Plaintiff contends that at the time of his release from active duty he was unfit to perform the duties of his rank and office, and that therefore his release not for reason of physical disability was arbitrary, capricious, and thus contrary to law.

This court has often stated that our function in this type of proceeding is to determine not whether the claimant was unfit for service at the time of his release, but rather whether [476]*476the firiding; of the Secretary of the Army that the serviceman, was fit was so arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by evidence as to be contrary to the applicable principles of law. O'Brien v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 655; Holliday v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 647; Prichard v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 212; Towell v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 422; Robert L. Thompson v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 158.

Plaintiff’s contention that his release without disability retirement benefits was arbitrary and capricious is predicated on his affliction with certain maladies that under some circumstances, if present to certain degrees, could be deemed disqualifying. For example plaintiff had been found, prior to retirement, to be suffering a moderate osteoarthritic affliction which was not disqualifying. This is perfectly consistent with the evidence and the applicable regulation1 which sets moderate osteoarthritis as the minimum degree of the disease prerequisite to a finding of disqualification due to the disease. This regulation definitely does not require disqualification upon discovery of the presence of moderate osteoarthritis.

Similarly, the presence of a mild heart condition is not of itself disqualifying under the applicable regulations.2

In dealing with cases of this type it must be remembered that the Career Compensation Act commits the determination of the serviceman’s fitness to perform the duties of his office, grade, rating, or rank, to the discretion of the Secretary. Sections 413 and 414 of the Act, in addition to vesting this authority in the service Secretary, authorize him to prescribe regulations to implement the effectuation of this legislative mandate. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Army to effectuate this legislative authority, while enumerating certain medical standards, reasonably provide that each case will be considered on its individual merits, and that the overriding criterion will be general ability to perform the duties commensurate with the serviceman’s age, grade, branch of service, and normal duties. Army Special Regulations No. 40-120-1, dated October 9, [477]*4771953, “Medical Standards of Fitness and Unfitness for Retention on Active Duty,” provide in pertinent part:

1. Purpose of standards. * * *
b. * * * Medical examiners should consider these standards as a guide with discretion and not construe them too strictly or arbitrarily, the object being to aid in the determination of whether or not an individual is qualified for further military service. Every case must be considered on its individual merits and the decision of fitness or unfitness based on a consideration of pertinent directives and accepted medical principles.
2. Evaluation of physical defepts.
a. In evaluating physical disabilities, due regard will be given to the physical standards set forth in AR 40-100, AR 40-105, and AR 40-115. However, these directives will not be as strictly interpreted as for appointment or entrance on active duty (par. 4, SR 600-450-5). Appropriate consideration will be given to a record of satisfactory performance of general service over a reasonable period of time, and the individual’s age, grade, branch of service, and normal duties. A finding of physical fitness is appropriate when any physical disability which may be present will not interfere with satisfactory performance of duty, or is not subject to complications or serious aggravation by reason of continued military duty. No individual will be found fit for service unless he is physically capable of performing duties of his office, rank, grade, or rating.
í Í ‡
5. Application of medical standards.—
* * * An individual who is otherwise scheduled for retirement or separation is not automatically found unfit if it is determined that he has a ratable disability. Such an individual is fou/nd to be Unfit only %ohen it is determined that his disability is of such a nature that if he were not retired or separated, he could not perform the duties commensurate with his age, grade, branch, and normal duties. * * * (Emphasis supplied).

On the basis of the record before us we are unable to conclude that the Secretary’s finding that at the time of plaintiff’s release he was fit to perform his duties in accordance with the standards enumerated above was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the evidence. While plaintiff suffered various maladies, the record does not require a conclu[478]*478sion that these afflictions effected, at the time of plaintiff’s release, any significantly greater degree of debilitation than would pertain in most other fifty-eight-year-old males performing similar duties. See McEaddy v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 311. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff’s condition may have deteriorated subsequent to his release from service is not of itself determinative of the issue before us, inasmuch as such conditions are compensable by the Veterans Administration, and indeed the present plaintiff is receiving such benefits. The issue before us is whether the Secretary’s decision that plaintiff was physically fit to perform duties commensurate with his rank and office at the time of his release from service was so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a violation of Ms legislative mandate. In order to establish that the Secretary’s action was so arbitrary and capricious, plaintiff must discharge a very substantial burden of proof. On the basis of the record presently before us, we conclude that plaintiff has not discharged this burden.

For the reasons stated, judgment will be entered for defendant, and the petition will be dismissed.

It is so ordered.

Laramore, Judge; Whitaker, Judge; and Jones, Chief Judge, concur.

FINDINGS OF FACT

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Bluebook (online)
157 Ct. Cl. 474, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 212, 1962 WL 9299, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnston-v-united-states-cc-1962.