Johnson v. Starbucks Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 13, 2025
Docket7:24-cv-06266
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Starbucks Corporation (Johnson v. Starbucks Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Starbucks Corporation, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SUMMER-ANNIE N. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, 24-CV-6266 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND STARBUCKS CORPORATION, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action against Starbucks Corporation regarding a workplace incident that occurred during her employment at a Starbucks location in Goshen, Orange County, New York. Plaintiff invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction as the basis for the Court’s exercising jurisdiction of her claims. Plaintiff states that she resides in New York State and indicates that Starbucks maintains it principal place of business in Washington State. By order dated August 20, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint.1 On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff and Cam, the acting manager at the Starbucks location where Plaintiff worked, were involved in a “verbal

incident.” (ECF 1, at 5.) Cam “spoke[] to . . . [Plaintiff] in a very condescending manner which led me to leave the job I was scheduled to work.” (Id.) Plaintiff informed another manager, by text message, of the incident and asked if she could “make up this day that I left to work another shift.” (Id.) The following day, Plaintiff arrived for her scheduled shift, but “another acting manager . . . stated that someone else would be covering my shift.” (Id.) Plaintiff then reached out to Tate Jacobs, the district manager, who informed Plaintiff that “he had someone cover my shift . . . because of the incident that happened the other day.” (Id.) In response, Plaintiff informed Jacobs “that this is retaliation because he was not here the day of the incident and should have consulted with me about what happened.” (Id.) Following this conversation, Plaintiff “filed a retaliation complaint to www.ethicspoint.com.” (Id.) “During the investigation

Tate Jacobs . . . whom I filed against[] was able to contact me over the phone and terminated me from Starbucks.” (Id.) The ethicspoint.com investigation “ruled in his favor which I felt was unjust and filed with the EEOC which led me here.” (Id.) Plaintiff attaches her Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC. Plaintiff seeks $50,000.00 in damages.

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. DISCUSSION A. Federal Claims Because Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC, the federal administrative agency that investigates violations of federal antidiscrimination laws, and alleges that her employer retaliated against her, the Court construes the complaint as asserting a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII prohibits employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not

actionable under Title VII. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. Plaintiff does not state a claim under Title VII because she does not indicate that her employer mistreated her because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to file an amended complaint to allege facts in support of any Title VII claim she wants to pursue. B. State Claims

Although Plaintiff invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, it is unclear if she intends to assert state law claims. To bring only state law claims, and not claims under Title VII, Plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of the diversity statute. As discussed below, the complaint includes facts demonstrating that the Court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting.2 To establish jurisdiction under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht
524 U.S. 381 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Johnson v. Starbucks Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-starbucks-corporation-nysd-2025.