Johnson v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co.

141 U.S. 602, 12 S. Ct. 124, 35 L. Ed. 875, 1891 U.S. LEXIS 2551

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: November 16, 1891
• Docket: 60, 71
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice Blatcheord,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is contended by Johnson that the court below had no jurisdiction to grant the injunction prayed for in the bill, because he had been adjudged, in the suit for forcible entry and detainer, to be entitled to the possession of the 18 miles of the road, and a writ of restitution had been ordered to issue to place him in possession thereof; that it is not alleged that anything had arisen since the institution of the forcible entry and detainer suit or the rendition of the judgment in it, which made it inequitable that such judgment should be enforced; that the relations between the parties were entirely contractual,, and Johnson was seeking nothing not provided for by the contract of April 23, 1879; that the bill in this suit does not allege that such contract was obtained by fraud, accident, mistake or surprise; that the plaintiff in this suit is a trespasser in possession, after full defence made by it to the forcible entry and detainer suit, and, without restitution, seeks, through the interposition of a court of equity, to retain the fruits of its trespass and nullify'the judgment at law; and that the bill in this .suit does not seek to settle the rights of the parties under the contract of April 23,'1879, nor does the decree thereon settle such rights, but the order of injunction and the decree nullify such contract by substituting a sum of money as security to Johnson, instead of possession of the road, as provided therein.

But we are of opinion, as contended by the plaintiff, that, on the evidence in the case, the agreement of October 6,1881, was a settlement of the amount due to Johnson, and was and is binding upon him-. The. tender by the plaintiff to Johnson of the $33,825, followed as it was by the payment into the German National Bank of that sum, on August.26, 1887, to^ the credit of the court, as' appears by the> recordj changéd the condition of affairs, and entitled the plaintiff to the relief by injunction asked for, because it showed that the contract of April 23, 1879, had been fully complied with by the plaintiff, as the successor of the Iron Mountain and Helena Railroad Company, and that Johnson had no further right to the possession of ..the road. The $25,000, with interest from October 6,188'1', was substituted for the $29,000; and the contract of April 23, 1879, is to be read as if the sum of $25,000, instead of $29,000, had been- mentioned in it. Johnson was to have possession of the road, and the right to run, use and control it, only as security for the payment of the money, and was to deliver up possession of it to the Iron Mountain and Helena Company, of which the plaintiff is the successor, as soon as the money should be paid. It was paid, by the tender and deposit of the $25,000, with interest, and the right of Johnson further to retain possession of the road, or to interfere with it, ceased.

This case is not like that of Ballance v. Forsyth, 24 How. 183. There this court had, in Ballance v. Forsyth, 13 How. 18, affirmed' a judgment in ejectment against Ballance. After the mandate went down from this court, Ballance filed a bill in equity, setting forth the same titles that were involved in the ejectment suit, and praying relief, on certain special grounds, by enjoining the execution of the judgment. The bill was ■dismissed, and this court affirmed the decree, on the ground that Ballance could not appeal from the judgments of the Circuit Court and of this court to a court of chancery, on the relative merit of the legal titles involved in the controversy, which they had adjudicated. But in the present case the relief in equity does not involve a reexamination of the merits of the. original controversy, but is based on grounds arising subsequently to, and independently of, such, controversy.

The question raised as to the jurisdiction of the court below in this suit is disposed of by the ruling in Parker v. The Judges, 12 Wheat. 561, where, while a writ of error was pending in this court, a bill in equity was filed in the court below, and an injunction issued to stay proceedings on the judgment. After the judgment had been affirmed here, an order was issued by this court to show cause why that court should not issue an execution on the judgment. It was contended that an injunction could not be awarded while the record was before this court on á Writ of error. This point was thus disposed of, Chief Justice Marshall delivering the opinion of the court: “We do not think this a valid objection. The suit in chancery does not draw into question the judgments and proceedings at law, or claim a right to revise them. It sets up an équity independently of the judgment, which admits the validity of that judgment, but suggests reasons why the party who has obtained it ought not to avail himself of it. It proposes to try a question entirely new, which has not been and could not be litigated at law. It may be brought before the commencement of a suit at law, pending such suit, or after its decision by the highest law tribunal.” See also Marshall v. Holmes, ante, 589, and cases there cited.

Although the agreement in regard to the $25,000 was made October 6, 1881, and the judgment in the forcible entry and detainer suit was not rendered until March 14, 1883, such agreement could have constituted no defence to that suit. It was the tender of the money which laid the foundation for the injunction suit, and, although the money might have been tendered at an earlier day, the delay in tendering it deprived the company of no rights and conferred none on Johnson. As was said by this court in the forcible entry and detainer suit, (119 U. S. 608, 612,) the questions there raised by the company in regard to the original contract of April 23, 1879, and to the right of Johnson to hold possession of the road, were immaterial. Equally, the equitable right involved in the present suit could not have been material in the former suit, even if such right had then existed.

The written agreement of October 6, 1881, is full and completeand its terms cannot be varied, qualified or contradicted by showing, as is sought to be done, a contemporaneous verbal understanding that the $25,000 mentioned in the agreement was to be paid in cash in a limited time, or satisfactory securities ..delivered in a limited time, or the written contract was to be void. The agreement of October 6, 1881, is, on its; face, an absolute one, that the amount due to Johnson under the prior contract of April 23, 1879, was the sum' of $25,000 on October 6,1881; and it cannot bé reduced by parol evidence to a mere offer that in a certain contingency Johnson would accept the sum. specified in full for the sum provided in the original contract.

As to the appeal by the plaintiff, which calls in question so much of the decree as imposes upon it the costs of the suit and the payment of the $1000, that appeal must be dismissed, because it does not involve an amount sufficient to give this-court jurisdiction of it.

In No. 60 the decree is affirmed with costs against Johnson / cmd in No: 71 the appeal \s dismissed for wcmt of .jurisdiction.