Johnson v. Regional Supplemental Services

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: July 7, 2026
• Docket: 25-8071
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-8071 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 7, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court WILLIAM DOUGLAS JOHNSON III,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-8071 (D.C. No. 2:25-CV-00035-ABJ) REGIONAL SUPPLEMENTAL (D. Wyo.) SERVICES INC., a/k/a RSS, Inc., a Wyoming corporation,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

MANAGEMENT SPECIALTY SERVICES 109 INC.,

Defendant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before MATHESON, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-8071 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 2

Proceeding pro se, William Douglas Johnson III appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his second amended complaint for failure to state a claim.

Mr. Johnson sued Regional Supplemental Services, Inc. (“RSS”) for

negligence, alleging breach of a duty of care to report true and accurate information

to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”). His claim arose

from RSS’s alleged inaccurate report of a refusal-to-test violation by Mr. Johnson to

the FMCSA regarding his pre-employment drug screening.

In its motion to dismiss, RSS attempted to introduce a reason to find that

Mr. Johnson refused to test that is different from the reason RSS submitted to the

FMCSA as alleged in the complaint. The district court adopted RSS’s new reason,

failing to accept Mr. Johnson’s allegations as true. This was error. And because the

complaint plausibly alleged a negligence claim against RSS, the court should not

have dismissed it.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand for

further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Regulatory Framework

The FMCSA, a U.S. Department of Transportation agency, regulates the

trucking industry. It administers drug and alcohol testing regulations for commercial

truck drivers. The regulations provide that “[p]rior to the first time a driver performs

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safety-sensitive functions for an employer, the driver shall undergo testing for

controlled substances as a condition prior to being used.” 49 C.F.R. § 382.301(a).

The FMCSA Clearinghouse, a secure online database, gives employers real-time

information about commercial drivers’ drug and alcohol program violations,

including test refusals. The regulations describe 11 circumstances that constitute a

refusal to take a drug test. See id. § 40.191(a)(1)-(11). Of those, two are relevant

here: (1) the driver declines to take an additional test, id. § 40.191(a)(6), and (2) the

driver engaged in confrontational behavior at the test, id. § 40.191(a)(8).

The employer has a non-delegable duty to determine whether there has been a

test refusal, see id. § 40.355(i), and within three business days “must report the

following information about a driver to the Clearinghouse”: “A refusal to test

determination made in accordance with 49 CFR 40.191(a)(1) through (4), (a)(6),

(a)(8) through (11), or (d)(1) . . . .” 49 C.F.R. § 382.705(b)(1)(iv).

B. Factual Allegations

The second amended complaint alleged as follows. 1

Mr. Johnson provided a urine sample at an Alabama collection site for his

pre-employment drug screening. The service agent told him the sample was invalid.

Mr. Johnson asked why, but also said he would retest.

1 We recite the facts as alleged in the operative complaint (the second amended complaint) and the documents attached to the complaint. Vasquez-Garcia v. Centurion, LLC, 172 F.4th 1150, 1154 (10th Cir. 2026). We liberally construe Mr. Johnson’s pro se complaint and other filings. Licon v. Ledezma, 638 F.3d 1303, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 2011). 3 Appellate Case: 25-8071 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 4

The service agent informed Mr. Johnson he would “need[] to sign the first test

as invalid before retesting.” Mr. Johnson “disagreed.” R. at 14. “The service agent

repeatedly asked [Mr. Johnson] to sign [the first test], and [he] continued to say no

and the service agent considered [his] behavior irate.” Id. Mr. Johnson “was not

irate,” but he “was frustrated after being repeatedly pushed into signing the first test

as invalid.” Id. “[He] was correct to assert ‘no’ because forcing [him] to sign is

non[-]compliant to the FMCSA[,] . . . as [he] should not be required to sign during

the testing process.” Id.

“Next, the service agent determined [Mr. Johnson’s] test was a refusal for not

signing.” Id. “When the test was deemed a refusal for not signing, the service agent

effectively ended the testing process . . . , and [Mr. Johnson] was asked to leave.” Id.

The Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form (“CCF”) that

documented Mr. Johnson’s test showed the specimen sample temperature was

normal, R. at 18, 20, so an additional test would not have been needed, id. at 14. And

as noted above, Mr. Johnson offered to retest.

RSS reported a refusal-to-test violation to the FMCSA Clearinghouse as a

“‘failed or decline to take an additional test’ under 49 CFR 40.191(a)(6).” Id. at 18;

see id. at 14, 19. RSS’s “written statement indicates that the basis for the violation

report was [Mr. Johnson’s] refusal to sign the CCF and the first specimen being out

of temperature range.” Id. at 18. RSS did not mention “confrontational behavior and

being removed from the lab” as the basis to report a refusal to test. Id. at 14.

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Mr. Johnson requested FMCSA to remove the refusal-to-test violation from the

Clearinghouse, but he was prohibited from operating a commercial motor vehicle

pending the administrative review of this request. During that time, Mr. Johnson was

evicted and had to relocate to a shelter. The FMCSA eventually granted

Mr. Johnson’s request to remove the refusal-to-test violation from the

Clearinghouse. 2

C. Procedural History

Invoking diversity jurisdiction, Mr. Johnson brought a negligence claim

alleging that

• RSS owed a duty of care to report truthful and accurate information regarding his pre-employment drug screening to the FMCSA Clearinghouse.

• RSS “failed to meet the required standard of care” when it “inaccurately reported to the FMCSA Clearinghouse that [Mr. Johnson’s] first urine sample was invalid, due to the temperature being ‘out of range.’” R. at 11.

• RSS’s breach caused him harm because RSS “wrongfully reported [his] first sample as invalid and filed the violation against [him] in the clearinghouse as

2 It did so because the primary basis for RSS’s violation report—that “the specimen was out of temperature range and was therefore ‘invalid’”—was “unsupported by the record.” R. at 18.

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refusal to take an additional test[,] which would not have been required by FMCSA since the first test was valid.” Id.

• He suffered damages as a result of RSS’s breach because he was prohibited from operating a motor vehicle for 47 weeks, which led to significant financial hardship.

RSS moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion. Mr. Johnson

now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal order de novo, applying

the same standards as the district court should apply. Vasquez-Garcia v. Centurion,

LLC, 172 F.4th 1150, 1157 (10th Cir. 2026). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We thus must

accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them, and all reasonable

inferences, in Mr. Johnson’s favor. Vasquez-Garcia, 172 F.4th at 1157.

B. Negligence

In diversity cases, federal courts apply state substantive law. Racher v.

Westlake Nursing Home Ltd. P’ship, 871 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2017). To

establish a negligence claim in Wyoming, the plaintiff must show: “(l) the defendant

owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care; (2) the defendant

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breached the duty of care; (3) the breach proximately caused injury to the plaintiff;

and (4) the injury is compensable by money damages.” Moses Inc. v. Moses,

509 P.3d 345, 350 (Wyo. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

C. District Court’s Reasoning

The district court noted that RSS did not dispute it had a duty of care to report

accurate information to the FMCSA Clearinghouse. But the court concluded there

was no breach because “RSS ultimately determined Johnson’s behavior was

confrontational and thus had a duty to report this information to the FMCSA as a

refusal to test pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(8).” R. at 51. 3 The court concluded

that, “even taking as true all the allegations in the second amended complaint,

Johnson still fails to allege RSS breached its duty by reporting his confrontational

behavior to the FMCSA as a refusal-to-test.” Id. at 52.

D. Analysis

On appeal, Mr. Johnson argues the district court erred because it relied on a

different basis for his refusal to test than RSS reported to the FMCSA. Aplt. Br. at 9.

He asserts, “The District court claims RSS reported confrontational as the refusal [to]

test,” but “RSS never reported that . . . as [the] determination for the refusal.” Id. at

3. He further asserts, “The only primary basis they reported was that [he] ‘failed or

declined to take the test,’ and the court must rely on that.” Id. He argues the district

3 This regulation states that it is a refusal to test if an employee fails to cooperate with the testing process by, for example, “behav[ing] in a confrontational way that disrupts the collection process.” 49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(8).

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court stated incorrect facts, citing the documents which “prove that RSS never

identified confrontational behavior as the refusal reason. Instead, [RSS] reported

only ‘failed or declined to take the test.’ That was RSS’s final determination.” Id. at

6. He contends “[RSS] made their determination, they reported it, and they must be

held to what they reported—not to a story they are now altering to avoid liability.”

Id. at 7. Based on these facts alleged in the complaint, we agree with Mr. Johnson.

The district court erred in granting RSS’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In the

complaint, Mr. Johnson alleged that “RSS reported that [he] failed or declined an

additional test.” R. at 14. Two documents attached to the complaint support this

allegation: (1) a screen shot of the FMCSA Clearinghouse website for Mr. Johnson’s

“Driver Information” that lists the “Type of Test Refusal” as “Failed or decline to

take an additional test,” id. at 19; and (2) the FMCSA administrative review letter,

which states: “The refusal to test violation that your employer[, RSS,] reported to the

Clearinghouse was ‘failed or decline to take an additional test’ under 49 CFR

40.191(a)(6),” id. at 18. Mr. Johnson further alleged that RSS inaccurately reported

to the FMCSA that his first urine sample was invalid, which means he would not

have been required to take an additional test because the first test was valid.

Instead of accepting Mr. Johnson’s allegation that the reason RSS gave for his

refusal to test was inaccurate, the district court relied on the factual contention in

RSS’s motion to dismiss that “RSS considered Johnson’s confrontational behavior a

refusal to test pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(8),” and “RSS reported this

information” to the FMCSA. R. at 47 (citing “ECF No. 29,” which is the

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memorandum in support of motion to dismiss, see Suppl. R.). These statements are

contrary to the factual allegations in the complaint. The court erred by assuming

facts in RSS’s favor and failing to accept as true the well-pled facts in Mr. Johnson’s

complaint. See Vasquez-Garcia, 172 F.4th at 1157.

RSS attempts to defend the district court’s decision by arguing that

confrontational behavior was an independent reason to report a refusal to test. It thus

contends the court correctly held that Mr. Johnson’s conduct was a refusal to test

under 49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(8). But when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we

consider only the complaint’s allegations. RSS’s argument does not explain why the

allegations do not plausibly state a claim for relief.

The regulatory framework underscores the error. As noted, an employer has a

non-delegable duty to make the refusal-to-test determination and report a violation

within three business days. See id. § 40.355(i); id. § 382.705(b)(1)(iv). RSS made

the determination and reported the violation to the FMCSA as “failed or decline to

take an additional test under 49 CFR 40.191(a)(6).” R. at 18; see id. at 19.

Mr. Johnson relies on that report to claim that RSS breached its duty of care by

providing inaccurate information to the FMCSA Clearinghouse. Neither RSS nor the

district court can substitute a different reason—confrontational behavior—to support

a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.

Viewing the factual allegations in Mr. Johnson’s favor, we conclude he has

plausibly alleged that RSS breached its duty of care by reporting inaccurate

information to the FMCSA. The CCF form shows his urine temperature was in the

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normal range, and his refusal to sign the CCF does not constitute a refusal to test.

The breach caused harm by preventing him from working.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court erred in granting RSS’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. We

reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge