Johnson v. Reese

Opinion

No. 812 August 26, 2026 549

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

MARTIN ALLEN JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Mike REESE,

Director for the Oregon Department of Corrections, Defendant-Respondent.

Marion County Circuit Court 24CV00523; A188786

Courtland Geyer, Judge. Submitted June 30, 2026. Martin Allen Johnson filed the brief pro se. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Egan, Presiding Judge, Jacquot, Judge, and Armstrong, Senior Judge.

EGAN, P. J. Affirmed.

550 Johnson v. Reese

EGAN, P. J. Plaintiff, appearing pro se, appeals a general judgment dismissing with prejudice his amended complaint against defendant, the Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC). Plaintiff raises three assignments of error. First, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his amended complaint because the court mistakenly reviewed a different filing when ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss. Second, he contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his request to submit electronic records on DVD. Third, he contends that the court erred in denying his discovery-related motions as moot. We affirm.

First Assignment of Error. In his first assignment of error, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the amended complaint. Plaintiff contends that the court mistakenly reviewed an 83-page response to defendant ’s motion to dismiss rather than his 69-page amended complaint. Defendant acknowledges that the trial court’s opinion letter appears to have referenced the wrong filing but argues that dismissal nevertheless was proper because the amended complaint failed to state a claim. The parties agree that plaintiff preserved his objection to dismissal of the amended complaint. “Whether the facts alleged are sufficient to state a claim for relief is a question of law.” Huskey v. Dept. of Corrections, 373 Or 270, 276, 564 P3d 142 (2025).

Plaintiff, an adult in custody at Snake River Correctional Institution (SRCI), initially filed a 411-page complaint against various ODOC defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under ORCP 21. The trial court granted that motion, explaining that the complaint improperly combined multiple theories and causes of action and employed a “kitchen sink” approach that failed to set forth ultimate facts in a comprehensible manner.

The court later granted plaintiff leave to amend.

Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint, a memorandum in support, and an affidavit. The amended complaint purported to assert six claims relating generally to failure to protect, denial of medical care, denial of access to courts, mail censorship, exhaustion of remedies, and denial

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of an “on the job injury claim.” Defendant again moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim.

The trial court issued an opinion letter granting the motion. As defendant acknowledges on appeal, portions of that opinion letter appear to describe plaintiff’s later-filed response memorandum rather than the amended complaint itself. Even assuming that the trial court mistakenly referenced the wrong filing in its opinion letter, we may affirm if the amended complaint nevertheless failed to state a claim. See Sherertz v. Brownstein Rask, 314 Or App 331, 341, 498 P3d 850 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 338 (2022) (explaining that, where an alternative argument supporting the ruling was raised below and presents a legal question, this court may resolve it on appeal).

Under ORCP 18 A, a pleading must contain “a plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim for relief without unnecessary repetition.” A complaint must allege facts sufficient to establish a prima facie claim for relief. See Moore v. Willis, 307 Or 254, 257-59, 767 P2d 62 (1988). Although courts liberally construe pleadings and assume the truth of well-pleaded allegations, courts disregard legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. See Tydeman v. Flaherty, 126 Or App 180, 182, 868 P2d 755 (1994); Hevern v. Walter E. Heller Western, Inc., 103 Or App 200, 205, 796 P2d 1229 (1990), rev den, 311 Or 150 (1991).

Here, even liberally construed, the amended complaint did not satisfy ORCP 18 A. Plaintiff identified six generalized “claims,” but the amended complaint did not plainly and concisely allege ultimate facts establishing any cognizable cause of action. Instead, plaintiff repeatedly invoked broad lists of constitutional provisions and legal concepts without connecting specific factual allegations to the elements of identifiable claims.

For example, under Claim 1, plaintiff alleged failure to protect arising from an assault and ongoing threats, while simultaneously asserting violations of numerous unrelated constitutional provisions, including Article I, sections 8 through 33, of the Oregon Constitution and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 552 Johnson v. Reese

Amendments to the United States Constitution. The complaint did not explain how the alleged facts implicated each cited provision. Similarly, under Claim 2, plaintiff alleged inadequate medical care and denial of accommodations relating to diabetes, COVID-19, and footwear, while again invoking numerous constitutional provisions without identifying the legal theory or elements supporting relief. Under Claim 3, plaintiff alleged denial of access to courts and referenced numerous other proceedings and grievances but did not identify ultimate facts sufficient to establish a cognizable access-to-courts claim. Under Claim 4, plaintiff alleged censorship of mail and publications and challenged ODOC restrictions on certain materials. But plaintiff alleged no facts addressing whether the challenged restrictions were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78, 89, 107 S Ct 2254, 96 L Ed 2d 64 (1987). Finally, Claims 5 and 6 largely consisted of conclusory references to exhaustion requirements and denial of an “On the Job injury claim,” without factual allegations sufficient to discern the nature of the asserted claims.

In sum, although the amended complaint contained extensive factual assertions and exhibits, it failed to provide the “plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim for relief” required by ORCP 18 A. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the amended complaint under ORCP 21 A(1)(h).

Second Assignment of Error. Plaintiff next assigns error to the denial of his motion seeking permission to submit electronic records on DVD. The parties agree that plaintiff preserved this assignment of error. We review the denial of plaintiff’s request to file materials in a particular format for abuse of discretion. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 300, 4 P3d 1261 (2000); Biegler v. Kirby, 281 Or 423, 427, 574 P2d 1127 (1978). “Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a choice outside the permissible range of choices.” State v. G. B., 335 Or App 289, 290, 558 P3d 412 (2024) (citing Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 359 Or 63, 117, 376 P3d 960 (2016)).

After the trial court issued its opinion letter dismissing the amended complaint, plaintiff filed a motion

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requesting permission to file electronic records “on legal DVD as exhibits.” The trial court denied the motion, explaining that, to the extent plaintiff sought records from the court, there was “no showing or reason to believe” that the court possessed the requested records. The court further explained that, to the extent plaintiff sought to file the contents of a USB drive, the request was denied because the “case never entered an evidentiary phase, and plaintiff says nothing about why the content is relevant and/or what motion it is in support of.”

On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Plaintiff filed the motion after the court had already determined that the amended complaint failed to state a claim. The case therefore had not progressed to an evidentiary phase. Moreover, plaintiff’s motion did not clearly explain the relevance of the proposed DVD materials to any pending matter properly before the court. To the extent plaintiff sought to introduce evidence in opposition to the ORCP 21 motion to dismiss, the trial court correctly declined to consider such materials. “Decisions on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may not be granted on the basis of anything other than the body of the pleadings themselves.” Rogers v. Valley Bronze of Oregon, Inc., 178 Or App 64, 69 n 3, 35 P3d 1102 (2001). Accordingly, the trial court acted within the permissible range of discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion.

Third Assignment of Error. In his third assignment of error, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his discovery-related motions as moot. The parties agree that plaintiff preserved this assignment of error through motions relating to discovery requests. Because the trial court denied plaintiff’s discovery motions on mootness grounds, we review for errors of law. Birchall v. Miller, 314 Or App 521, 522, 497 P3d 1268 (2021).

Plaintiff filed multiple discovery-related pleadings seeking admissions and production of documents from ODOC. After granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the trial court denied plaintiff’s remaining motions as moot. An issue is moot if a decision “will no longer have a practical effect on the rights of the 554 Johnson v. Reese

parties.” Geddry v. Richardson, 296 Or App 134, 141-42, 437 P3d 1163, rev den, 365 Or 369 (2019).

Here, because the amended complaint failed to state a claim and the case was properly dismissed, plaintiff ’s discovery requests no longer had any practical effect on the parties’ rights. Resolving discovery disputes would not have altered the dismissal of the action. See State v. McKenzie, 307 Or 554, 561, 771 P2d 264 (1989) (explaining that a motion becomes moot where resolution is unnecessary because of the disposition of the case). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s discovery motions as moot.

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request to submit materials on DVD or err in denying plaintiff’s discovery -related motions as moot.

Affirmed.