Johnson v. Plumley

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. West Virginia
DecidedJune 23, 2022
Docket2:17-cv-00006
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Plumley (Johnson v. Plumley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Plumley, (N.D.W. Va. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA Elkins ELWOOD JOHNSON, Petitioner, V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-CV-6 Judge Bailey WEST VIRGINIA BOARD OF PAROLE, Respondent.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION The above-styled matter came before this Court for consideration of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Robert W. Trumble [Doc. 81]. Pursuant to this Court’s Local Rules, this action was referred to Magistrate Judge Trumble for submission of a proposed report and recommendation (“R&R”). Magistrate Judge Trumble filed his R&R on May 19, 2022, wherein he recommends, inter alia, the § 2254 petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, this Court will adopt the R&R. |. BACKGROUND On January 23, 2017, petitioner, then an inmate at Huttonsville Correctional Center in Huttonsville, West Virginia, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. 1]. Petitioner was released on parole in August 2020. Consequently, respondent is now identified as the West Virginia Board of Parole. Pending before this Court is petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 15]; original respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as

Unexhausted or in the Alternative, to Hold the Matter in Abeyance to Permit Exhaustion by the Petitioner [Doc. 21]; petitioner's Motion to Active Case Status [Doc. 64]; the Answer by the West Virginia Parole Board [Doc. 72]; and petitioners Motion for a Directed Verdict [Doc. 80]. ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c), this Court is required to make a de novo review of those portions of the magistrate judge’s findings to which objection is made. However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Noris this Court required to conduct a de novo review when the party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In addition, failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of de novo review and the right to appeal this Court’s Order. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984). se filings must be liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by licensed attorneys, however, courts are not required to create objections where none exist. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1971).

Here, objections to Magistrate Judge Trumble’s R&R were due within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the R&R, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner filed a Response to Report and Recommendation [Doc. 83] on June 13, 2022. Accordingly, this Court will review the portions of the R&R to which objections were filed de novo, and the remainder of the R&R will be reviewed for clear error. ill. DISCUSSION Petitioner's claims stem from his May 19, 1989, convictions of first degree sexual abuse and second degree sexual assault.’ Following unsuccessful challenges to the convictions in appellate and habeas proceedings in state court, petitioner filed the instant federal post-conviction proceeding. In support of his federal petition, petitioner contends (1) his due process rights were violated by the state’s presentation of perjured and unreliable evidence and testimony; and (2) during trial, West Virginia State Police serologist Fred Zain? offered testimony and presented evidence that was perjured and had a material and prejudicial effect on the jury. See [Doc. 1 at 7]. In In the Matter of an Investigation of the West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory, Serology Division, 190 W.Va. 321, 438 S.E.2d 501 (1993) (“Zain I’), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that: ‘A complete and thorough account of the history and posture of petitioner’s case is included in Magistrate Judge Trumble’s forty-five page R&R, which this Court incorporates herein. 7As identified by Magistrate Judge Trumble, Fred Zain’s im proprieties constituted one of the most infamous examples of investigative misconduct in modern policing history and gave rise to an independent body of state law concerning habeas relief based on the use of falsified evidence offered by Zain.

in any habeas corpus hearing involving Zain evidence, the only issue is whether the evidence presented at trial, independent of the forensic evidence presented by Trooper Zain, would have been sufficient to support the verdict. As we have earlier stated, once the use of false evidence is established, as here, such use constitutes a violation of due process. The only inquiry that remains is to analyze the other evidence in the case under the [State v.] Atkins [163 W.Va. 502, 261 S.E.2d 55 (1979)] rule to determine if there is sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction. Zain I, 193 W.Va. at 326, 438 S.E.2d at 506. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia applied the Atkins rule in its review of claims concerning falsification of evidence by Zain, stating: Where improper evidence of a nonconstitutional nature is introduced by the State in a criminal trial, the test to determine if the error is harmless is: (1) the inadmissible evidence must be removed from the State’s case and a determination made as to whether the remaining evidence is sufficient to convince impartial minds of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) if the remaining evidence is found to be insufficient, the error is not harmless; (3) if the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, an analysis must be made to determine whether the error had any prejudicial effect on the jury. Id.

Turning first to petitioner's argument concerning due process violations relating to Grand Jury testimony, the magistrate judge properly concluded that petitioner has not stated a cognizable claim in this federal habeas proceeding as the claim relates to state grand jury proceedings. See Barbe v. McBride, 740 F.Supp.2d 759, 768 (N.D. W.Va. 2010) (Bailey, J.), affd, 477 F.App’x 49 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment's grand jury clause has never been extended to the states[.]”); Hartman v. Lee, 283 F.3d 190

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
United States v. Edward Lester Schronce, Jr.
727 F.2d 91 (Fourth Circuit, 1984)
In Re an Investigation of the West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory
438 S.E.2d 501 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1993)
State v. Atkins
261 S.E.2d 55 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1979)
Barbe v. McBride
740 F. Supp. 2d 759 (N.D. West Virginia, 2010)
Snyder v. Ridenour
889 F.2d 1363 (Fourth Circuit, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Johnson v. Plumley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-plumley-wvnd-2022.