Johnson v. Foos Mfg. Co.

141 F. 73, 72 C.C.A. 105, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4003
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedNovember 29, 1905
DocketNo. 1,418
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 141 F. 73 (Johnson v. Foos Mfg. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Foos Mfg. Co., 141 F. 73, 72 C.C.A. 105, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4003 (6th Cir. 1905).

Opinions

LURTON, Circuit Judge.

This is a bill to restrain infringement of two patents granted to W. C. Johnson. The first is for certain “improvements in processes of an apparatus for treating cotton seed and - hulls,” and the second for “improvements in means for separating the fiber from cotton-seed hulls.” The first patent was issued December n, 1894, and bears the serial No. 506,268, the second is-No. 654,550, and was issued October 25, 1898. The cause came on to be heard in the court below upon the pleadings, exhibits, and a voluminous book of evidence, but the trial judge, without passing upon the merits of the ease, dismissed the bill because he thought that the single machine made, sold, and installed by the defendant company had been subsequently licensed by complainant, upon the user agreeing to pay a royalty, and that no further infringement was threatened. The remedy at law he therefore held to be adequate to recover damages for the single infringement averred to have occurred before the bill was filed and no case made requiring an injunction against further infringement. This [75]*75result the learned trial court rested upon .the authority of Woodmanse & Hewitt Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 68 Fed. 489, 492, 15 C. C. A. 520, 524, where this court said:

“The ground upon which a court of equity will take cognizance of a suit for an infringement of a patent is the relief through an injunction. There is nothing so peculiar to a suit for damages and profits for infringement of a patent as will, independently of some recognized ground of equitable jurisdiction, justify a court of chancery in assuming jurisdiction. It must appear that the legal remedy at law is inadequate, and if the case is one in which equitable relief by injunction is inappropriate, as where the patent has expired, or where the circumstances are such as to justify a court in refusing equitable relief, the suit will not be entertained for the mere purpose of an account of past damages and profits. Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 189, 26 L. Ed. 975; McLaughlin v. Railway Co. (C. C.) 21 Fed. 574; Clark v. Wooster, 119 U. S. 325, 7 Sup. Ct. 217, 30 L. Ed. 392.”

The principle there stated is perfectly sound, but, as we think, not applicable to the facts of this case. It is true enough that no injunction can go against the further use of the machine alleged to infringe which was made and set up at Memphis, Tenn., for the Southern Cotton Oil Company in October, 1899, because the buyer of that machine, upon notice from complainants, obtained a license and agreed to pay royalty. But independently of the fact that a patentee may not enjoin his own licensee, an injunction against one charged to have made and sold an infringing device would not operate to enjoin a buyer or user of an infringing device without joining him in the suit or otherwise seeking relief directly against him as an infringer.

We can also agree with the Circuit Court that a single infringement by making and selling a single infringing machine would not justify the interposition of a court of equity for the purpose of restraining further infringement by the making and sale of other infringing inachines, if it appeared clearly that there was- no reason to apprehend any further infringement. But that is not this case. The principal parts of the machinery constituting the machine of the complainant’s patent had been made by the Foos Manufacturing Company, the defendant in this case. Both Mr. Robert H. Foos and Mr. Winchell of that company had visited the complainant’s plant at Memphis, and had been consulted about certain matters connected with the operation of the machinery. It may as well be said here as later that all of the parts composing the apparatus covered by the claims of the two Johnson patents were old. The novelty, if any, consists in the combination and new and useful results thereby accomplished. The arrangement of the different parts was therefore of the essence of the invention, and the Foos Company had a legal right to continue to make and sell attrition mills and other parts of the mechanism which were old, provided only that they did so with no purpose to contribute to the plans of one intending an infringement by combining the parts. Heaton Peninsular Button Co. v. Eureka Mfg. Co., 77 Fed. 288, 25 C. C. A. 267, 35 L. R. A. 728; Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712, 26 C. C. A. 107; German Am. Filter Co. v. Loew Filter Co. (C. C.) 103 Fed. 303; Loew Filter Co. v. German Am. Filter Co., 107 Fed. 949, 47 C. C. A. 94.

The claims of the first Johnson patent cover both a process and an [76]*76apparatus. The Foos Company is charged, not simply with having-made and sold attrition mills and separators to the Southern Cotton Oil Company, but that they made and combined these and other parts according to a plan which was intended to employ the process of the patent and which infringed the mechanical claims of the Johnson patents-as well. For the purpose of this branch of the case we shall assume that the apparatus thus installed, combined, and put in operation was an infringement of the patents owned by complainants. That Mr. Foos and Mr. Winchell of the Foos Company were familiar with the arrangement . and mode of operation in the mill of the complainants is satisfactorily established. Thus under date of March 25, 1895, the defendant wrote-as follows:

“Tennessee Fiber Company, Memphis, Tenn.—Dear Sirs: We note yours-of the 22nd and are pleased to note your faith in both Mr. Winchell and the mills. We are quite sure, now that he has seen you and the machines in operation, that everything will be all right as soon as we get the pulleys. We-will crowd the work to the utmost, and hope to make shipment in a very short time. As they are ordered, it will require some special work, which-necessarily makes more delay than the ordinary run of stock.
• “Yours truly, Foos Manufacturing Co., H. S. B.”

Subsequently complainants heard something of a purpose by defendants to put up similar machinery for others, and therefore wrote about it. To this the defendant replied under date July 8, 1895:

“Tennessee Fiber Company, Memphis, Tenn.—Gentlemen: We note yours-of the 6th, and cannot make any definite answer, as our Mr. Winchell is in Texas at present; but we will communicate with him and advise you just as soon as we can get word. We can assure you, however, that there is-some misunderstanding, as Mr. W. we know appreciates the value of your combination, and would do nothing that would interfere in any way with-your plans, knowing as he does that our interests are just the other way. You appreciate this of course. We hope to be able to write you more definitely upon the subject in a few days.
“Yours truly, Foos Manufacturing Company, H. S. B.”

The admission of appreciation of the value of the “complainant’s-combination” and promise not to interfere with their plans is significant. In June, 1899, complainants wrote to defendant company, in which, among other things, they said:

“We understand that Memphis parties are figuring with you for machines similar to ours, for the purpose of making fiber and bran from cotton seed hulls. We are perfectly willing to give these parties the use of our patents and the benefit of our experience on payment of a fair royalty for the same. We will very promptly prosecute any infringements of our patent rights.

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Bluebook (online)
141 F. 73, 72 C.C.A. 105, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4003, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-foos-mfg-co-ca6-1905.