John Veneziano v. Bernard J. Saulnier

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 69 Docket: BCD-25-193 Argued: January 6, 2026 Decided: July 23, 2026

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ., and HORTON, A.R.J.

JOHN VENEZIANO

v.

BERNARD J. SAULNIER

STANFILL, C.J.

[¶1] Bernard J. Saulnier appeals from a disclosure order entered in the

Business and Consumer Docket (Duddy, J.) enforcing a money judgment against

him and requiring him to make weekly payments of $1,009 to the judgment

creditor, John Veneziano. Because the underlying judgment was entered in

federal court and has not been domesticated, the disclosure court had no

authority to enforce it, and we vacate the court’s order for lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] On November 17, 2021, Veneziano filed in the District Court

(Biddeford) a disclosure subpoena and a proof of service on Saulnier. See 14

M.R.S. §§ 3122-3123, 3126 (2026). Attached to the subpoena was what appears

to be a copy of a $3,500,000 judgment that Veneziano obtained against Saulnier 2

in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine on March 29,

2021. In February 2022, the court granted Veneziano’s request to transfer the

case to the Business and Consumer Docket. See M.R. Civ. P. 131.

[¶3] Following a series of discovery disputes and other delays, the court

held a disclosure hearing on February 11, 2025. See 14 M.R.S. § 3125(1) (2026).

On April 9, 2025, the court entered an order enforcing Veneziano’s federal

judgment. See 14 M.R.S. §§ 3125(5), 3126-A (2026). The court determined,

based on Saulnier’s earning $350,000 per year, that the maximum payment

authorized by statute was $1,009 per week, see 14 M.R.S. § 3126-A(3), and it

ordered Saulnier to begin making those payments the following week. Saulnier

timely appealed, see M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1), and the court granted his request for

a stay pending appeal, see M.R. Civ. P. 62(e).

[¶4] On appeal, Saulnier initially argued that the court erred by

“imputing” earnings to him in excess of the $40,000 per year that he earns “on

the books.” At oral argument, we advised the parties that the record did not

indicate whether the federal judgment had been filed and domesticated as a

state court judgment, see 14 M.R.S. §§ 8001-8008 (2026); Faith Temple v.

DiPietro, 2015 ME 166, ¶ 15, 130 A.3d 368, and we requested supplemental 3

briefing on whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct

disclosure proceedings on an undomesticated federal judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶5] Saulnier now argues that the disclosure court exceeded its

subject-matter jurisdiction by acting upon Veneziano’s undomesticated federal

judgment. Veneziano does not dispute that the federal judgment was not

domesticated, but he argues that the domestication requirement is merely a

claim-processing rule and that Saulnier waived any arguments as to

domestication by failing to raise them in the disclosure court.

[¶6] Because Saulnier did not raise any issues related to domestication

in the disclosure court, he has not preserved any domestication-based

arguments for appeal. See, e.g., Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor, 2017 ME

128, ¶ 9, 165 A.3d 357. Thus, we must determine whether the domestication

requirement is a claim-processing rule, which is procedural and “may be

waived,” or a true jurisdictional prerequisite, which “cannot be waived and may

be raised at any time.” Monteith v. Monteith, 2021 ME 40, ¶ 22, 255 A.3d 1030.

[¶7] Subject-matter jurisdiction “refers to the power of a particular court

to hear the type of case that is then before it.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Absent subject-matter jurisdiction, a court has “no authority to act.” 4

Guardianship by Stacey M., 2022 ME 1, ¶ 8, 265 A.3d 1004; see also In re Jensen,

145 Me. 1, 4, 70 A.2d 248, 249 (1950) (“The bounds of jurisdiction mark the

limits of the courts’ authority.”). Whether a court acted in excess of its

subject-matter jurisdiction is “a question of law that we review de novo.” Ewing

v. Me. Dist. Ct., 2009 ME 16, ¶ 12, 964 A.2d 644.

[¶8] When a case is transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket,

the court retains the subject-matter jurisdiction of the originating court. Maples

v. Compass Harbor Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 2025 ME 19, ¶ 22, 331 A.3d 435. This case

originated in the District Court, so the disclosure court had the subject-matter

jurisdiction of the District Court. See id.

[¶9] The District Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is statutory. See, e.g.,

Donn-Griffin v. Donn, 615 A.2d 253, 255 (Me. 1992); Doane v. Dep’t of Health &

Hum. Servs., 2017 ME 193, ¶ 12, 170 A.3d 269. Here, the court acted pursuant

to Maine’s disclosure statute, 14 M.R.S. §§ 3120-3138 (2026). Thus, whether

the court exceeded its jurisdiction depends on whether the disclosure statute

authorizes the District Court to act upon undomesticated federal judgments.

We conclude that it does not.

[¶10] The disclosure statute sets out “an efficient procedure for the

enforcement of money judgments.” Id. § 3120. To initiate disclosure 5

proceedings, a judgment creditor must subpoena the judgment debtor and file

with the District Court (1) a copy of the subpoena and a return of service and

(2) a writ of execution on the underlying judgment. Id. §§ 3122-3123, 3126.

The court must then hold a hearing to “determine [the judgment debtor’s]

ability to pay the judgment,” and the debtor must disclose “income, assets and

any other information which will aid the judgment creditor in enforcing the

judgment.” Id. § 3125(1). After the hearing, the court may impose a number of

remedies to enforce the judgment, including requiring payment in regular

installments.1 Id. §§ 3125(1)-3132.

[¶11] The disclosure statute plainly requires, if nothing else, a judgment.

Without a judgment, there is nothing for a court to enforce, and with nothing to

enforce, the court has no basis to exercise the powers conferred by the statute.

Thus, just as a court has jurisdiction to conduct divorce proceedings only when

there is a marriage to be dissolved, see, e.g., Est. of Carter v. Martin, 2026 ME 34,

¶ 5, 354 A.3d 1154, a court has jurisdiction to conduct disclosure proceedings

only when there is a valid judgment to be enforced. And, although the

disclosure statute does not expressly define the “judgments” to which it applies,

1 The statute provides a formula to determine the maximum permissible amount of each installment payment, considering the amount of the debtor’s “disposable earnings” and “exempt income.” See 14 M.R.S. §§ 3121(1)-(2), 3126-A(1)-(3). 6

see 14 M.R.S. § 3121, it necessarily applies only to judgments entered in Maine

state courts and not to those entered in foreign courts.

[¶12] We start with the language of the disclosure statute, which

requires a judgment creditor to obtain and file a writ of execution. Id. § 3126.

A writ of execution may issue on only “a judgment of the Superior Court or the

District Court.” 14 M.R.S. § 4651 (2026); see, e.g., Faith Temple, 2015 ME 166,

¶ 18, 130 A.3d 368 (holding that a trial court erred by ordering that a writ of

execution issue in the absence of “a favorable state court judgment”).

[¶13] We also note that the common-law rule is that Maine courts can

enforce only Maine judgments, 2 see Faith Temple, 2015 ME 166, ¶¶ 11-16,

130 A.3d 368; Maples, 2025 ME 19, ¶ 14, 331 A.3d 435, and there is nothing in

the disclosure statute that suggests an intent to alter or deviate from that rule,

cf. Reed v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 57, ¶ 20, 232 A.3d 202 (“[W]e construe a

statute to alter the common law only to the extent the Legislature makes clear

its intent to do so.” (quotation marks omitted)).

2At common law, a creditor can recover on a foreign-judgment debt in a Maine state court only by bringing a subsequent action on the foreign judgment. See Faith Temple, 2015 ME 166, ¶¶ 11-16, 130 A.3d 368; Maples, 2025 ME 19, ¶ 14, 331 A.3d 435. For examples of cases involving common-law actions on foreign judgments, see Lamberton v. Grant, 94 Me. 508, 509-20, 48 A. 127, 128-32 (1901); Endicott v. Morgan, 66 Me. 456, 457-58 (1876); McVicker v. Beedy, 31 Me. 314, 316-17 (1850); and McKim v. Odom, 12 Me. 94, 95-110 (1835). 7

[¶14] Finally, we note that interpreting the disclosure statute to apply to

foreign judgments that have not been domesticated would be inconsonant with

the broader statutory scheme governing those judgments. Maine’s Uniform

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), 14 M.R.S. §§ 8001-8008, sets

out the procedure for filing a federal or other state court judgment and provides

that any such judgment—once domesticated—shall be treated “as a judgment

of the District Court or Superior Court of this State” and “may be enforced or

satisfied in like manner.” Id. § 8003; see, e.g., Safety Ins. Grp. v. Dawson,

2015 ME 64, ¶¶ 3-4, 116 A.3d 948; Bruesewitz v. Grant, 2007 ME 13, ¶ 2 & n.1,

912 A.2d 1255. Allowing a creditor to use Maine’s disclosure process to enforce

an undomesticated foreign judgment would be inconsistent with the

requirement of domestication and render the UEFJA superfluous in this

context. Cf. Monteith, 2021 ME 40, ¶ 23, 255 A.3d 1030 (“Statutes must be read

together and in light of the entire statutory scheme to produce cohesive

results.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)).

[¶15] For those reasons, we conclude that the “judgments” referenced

by the disclosure statute are Maine judgments. A federal-judgment creditor

may obtain a Maine judgment by either following the UEFJA’s domestication

procedure, see 14 M.R.S. §§ 8003-8004, or bringing a common-law action on the 8

federal judgment, see supra ¶ 13, n.2, but unless and until the creditor does so,

the District Court simply cannot act pursuant to the disclosure statute.

[¶16] Veneziano does not dispute that a federal judgment must be

domesticated before it may be enforced in the District Court, but citing our

decision in Landmark Realty v. Leasure, 2004 ME 85, 853 A.2d 749, he argues

that the domestication requirement is a claim-processing rule rather than a

true jurisdictional prerequisite. We disagree.

[¶17] Landmark Realty involved the enforcement of a Maine judgment.

The creditor, having obtained a judgment and a writ of execution in the

Superior Court, initiated disclosure proceedings in the District Court, and the

court entered an enforcement order against the debtor. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. On appeal,

the debtor did not dispute that the judgment was valid and enforceable, but he

argued that the writ was invalid because it had issued more than a year after

entry of the judgment. Id. ¶ 6; see 14 M.R.S. § 4652 (2026). However, we did

not reach the merits of the debtor’s claim about the validity of the writ. Instead,

we determined that “[t]he requirement to file a valid writ of execution with a

disclosure subpoena is a claim-processing rule” and, thus, that the debtor had

waived any objections to the writ by failing to raise them in the disclosure court.

Landmark Realty, 2004 ME 85, ¶¶ 9-10, 853 A.2d 749 (citation omitted). 9

[¶18] Veneziano suggests that the lack of domestication in this case is

equivalent to the writ-of-execution issue in Landmark Realty. It is not. A writ

of execution—like an indictment in a criminal case or a complaint in a civil

suit—may be necessary to invoke a court’s authority, but that requirement in

no way suggests that the court’s authority itself depends on the writ. See id.

¶¶ 7-9 & n.1; State v. Shirey, 2020 ME 136, ¶ 9 & n.3, 242 A.3d 1103 (explaining

that an indictment is necessary to “invoke the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction” but that “defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its

power to adjudicate [the] case” (quotation marks omitted)); Cooter & Gell v.

Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990) (noting that a court’s jurisdiction is

invoked by the filing of a complaint); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738,

742 n.5 (1975) (“[S]o long as the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction actually

existed and adequately appeared to exist from the papers filed, any defect in

the manner in which the action was instituted and processed is not itself

jurisdictional . . . .” (citation omitted)). Here, by contrast, the court’s jurisdiction

to enforce a judgment through the disclosure procedure plainly depends on the

existence of an enforceable Maine judgment. See supra ¶¶ 11-15. Unlike the

technical defect alleged in Landmark Realty—which involved only the

procedure by which the creditor invoked the court’s jurisdiction—the lack of 10

domestication in this case left the court without an enforceable judgment upon

which it could act. Thus, the domestication requirement is not a mere

claim-processing rule, and our rationale in Landmark Realty does not apply.

[¶19] In sum, Maine’s disclosure statute authorizes the District Court to

enforce only Maine judgments, and a foreign judgment may be treated as a

Maine judgment only after it has been domesticated here. Because Veneziano’s

federal judgment has not been domesticated, the District Court has no

jurisdiction to enforce it. Accordingly, the court’s order must be vacated and

Veneziano’s action must be dismissed.3

The entry is:

Order vacated. Remanded to the Business and Consumer Docket with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.

3 Because we vacate the court’s order for lack of jurisdiction, we need not address Saulnier’s claim

that the court impermissibly “imputed” earnings to him. Nevertheless, to aid the court in any future proceedings, we clarify that the disclosure statute (1) prohibits courts from imputing earnings to a debtor based on what the debtor “could” or “should” be earning, cf. 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(D) (2026) (providing, for the purposes of calculating child-support obligations, that a party’s gross income “may include the difference between the amount a party is earning and that party’s earning capacity when the party voluntarily becomes or remains unemployed or underemployed, if sufficient evidence is introduced concerning a party’s current earning capacity”), but (2) permits courts to find that a debtor’s actual earnings exceed the debtor’s reported earnings and to calculate the amount of actual earnings from evidence of unreported earnings, see, e.g., Bartel v. Zucktriegel, 47 P.3d 581, 583, 585-86 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 11

Jeffrey Bennett, Esq. (orally), Legal-Ease, LLC, Portland, for appellant Bernard Saulnier

William J. Gallitto, III, Esq., and Jana L. Kenney, Esq. (orally), Bergen & Parkinson, LLC, Saco, for appellee John Veneziano

Business and Consumer Docket docket numbers MNJ-2022-1 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY