THIRD DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., MARKLE and PADGETT, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
February 25, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A1514. BRYANT v. DOLLOFF et al. A25A1515. BRYANT v. DOLLOFF et al.
MARKLE, Judge.
After John Randall Bryant was injured in an auto accident in 2019, he and his
wife, Belinda Bryant (collectively “the plaintiffs”), filed separate suits against the
other driver, Melvin Dolloff. The cases were consolidated for trial, and the jury
awarded the plaintiffs $311,000, which the trial court later reduced based on amounts
the plaintiffs had already received from insurance. The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing
that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motions to amend the
consolidated pre-trial order; (2) the trial court erred by granting motions in limine to
exclude additional witness testimony, and evidence of alcohol use and willful and wanton conduct; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to give their requested jury
charges; and (4) the trial court erred by amending the judgment to allow a deduction
in the award. After a thorough review of the record, and for the reasons given below,
we affirm.
Following a jury’s verdict and a trial court’s subsequent entry of a judgment, this Court must affirm the judgment if there is any evidence to support the verdict, because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the weight and credibility of the evidence. We must construe the evidence with every inference and presumption in favor of upholding the verdict.
Dunwoody Obstetrics & Gynecology v. Franklin, 363 Ga. App. 90, 91 (870 SE2d 592)
(2022) (quotation marks omitted).
So viewed, the evidence shows that John was injured in a head-on collision for
which Dolloff was at fault. The accident shattered John’s left ankle and damaged his
knee. He required surgery and physical therapy, but later started to develop
osteoarthritis in the left knee, and he never fully returned to pre-accident status. John
was self-employed and, as a result of the accident, he lost income and had to hire
someone to assist him.
2 John then filed suit against Dolloff and served his uninsured/underinsured
motorist insurance carrier, State Farm, alleging negligence and seeking punitive
damages. Dolloff was insured with Progressive. John settled his claims against
Progressive and executed a limited release, which included his punitive damages
claim. Two years later, in a separate suit, Belinda sought loss of consortium and
punitive damages. John and Belinda moved to consolidate their cases for trial.
State Farm moved for partial summary judgment as to punitive damages, and
the parties entered into a consent order agreeing that there would be no recovery
against State Farm for punitive damages. This consent order specifically states, “[t]he
parties agree that there shall be no recovery by Plaintiffs of UM/UIM
benefits/payments from State Farm’s available coverage as to Plaintiffs’ claims against
Defendant for (1) punitive damages and (2) attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation[.]” (Emphasis added.)
On September 7, 2023, after the parties completed discovery, the trial court
entered a consolidated pre-trial order (“PTO”), identifying the negligence claims for
trial. The PTO listed a claim for actual damages, but not punitive damages. In the
PTO, the plaintiffs requested a verdict form that specified only whether the jury found
3 in favor of the defendant or the plaintiffs. It further noted that State Farm had already
paid $345,000 in uninsured motorist coverage, and that John received $25,000 from
Progressive, and the plaintiffs requested “the amounts paid [by State Farm] be
deducted from any verdict” in their favor.
Three weeks before trial, the plaintiffs moved to amend the PTO, asserting that
they needed to clarify the admission of certain evidence and witnesses. Specifically,
the plaintiffs sought to add claims of willful and wanton conduct based on allegations
that Dolloff was driving under the influence; present evidence as to the curb weight
of the two vehicles involved in the accident; and to submit evidence of Dolloff’s
toxicology reports to show he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the
accident. They again did not list punitive damages in their request to amend the PTO,
but they did propose a verdict form that set out damages to John and Belinda
individually, and they removed any reference to the deduction for amounts previously
paid. Following a hearing, which was not transcribed, the trial court rejected the
plaintiffs’ arguments and denied the motion. Thereafter, the trial court agreed to stay
the case and re-open discovery for the sole purpose of investigating John’s lost wages
claim.
4 State Farm also filed a motion in limine to exclude any reports of Dolloff’s
alcohol use. State Farm noted that the issue of punitive damages was not for
consideration, as Dolloff had admitted fault and such damages were not listed in the
PTO.1 As such, State Farm asserted that evidence of alcohol use would be unfairly
1 The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant, not compensate for the injury. See OCGA § 51-12-5.1(c). Thus,
[p]unitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.
Negligence, even if gross, will not alone authorize the recovery of punitive damages; there must be circumstances of aggravation and outrage.
Mastec N. Am., Inc. v. Wilson, 325 Ga. App. 863, 866 (755 SE2d 257) (2014), called into question on other grounds by Quynn v. Hulset, 310 Ga. 473 (850 SE2d 725) (2020). See also OCGA § 51–12–5.1(b). It is well-settled that an insurance company is not liable to its insureds for punitive damages under its uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weathers, 260 Ga. 123 (392 SE2d 1) (1990). 5 prejudicial under OCGA § 24-4-403. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the
motion.2
In February 2024, the plaintiffs filed a second motion to amend the PTO. This
time, they asserted that the PTO should be amended to include testimony of the curb
weight of the vehicles and financial testimony from the employee John hired to handle
tasks he was unable to perform during his recovery; and to reflect Belinda’s claim for
punitive damages against Dolloff, including evidence that Dolloff was driving under
the influence. They further suggested that the trial court could bifurcate the trial and
address Belinda’s punitive damages claim separately.
During a hearing on the motion, the plaintiffs asserted that only John had
waived his claim for punitive damages; Belinda had not. They also explained that the
curb weight evidence was necessary to show the force of the impact. The trial court
denied the motion, noting that punitive damages had not been identified in the initial
PTO. The trial court noted that the original PTO had been negotiated by the parties,
and the plaintiffs had not shown why the revisions could not have been presented
earlier.
2 The record on appeal does not contain any transcript from the hearing. 6 At the subsequent trial,3 the court excluded any evidence of alcohol use, and it
declined to give the plaintiffs’ requested jury instructions regarding willful and wanton
conduct. The jury heard medical evidence regarding John’s injuries and the likelihood
that he would continue to suffer the effects of those injuries; and it heard from Belinda
concerning how the accident had affected her. The jury found in the plaintiffs’ favor
and awarded them a lump sum of $311,000.4
The plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment, asserting that the joint award was
void, and they moved for a new trial. State Farm moved to deduct from the judgment
the amount it had already tendered to John. The trial court denied the motions for
new trial and to amend judgment, and it granted the motion to apply the deduction.
The plaintiffs now appeal.
1. In these appeals, both John and Belinda raise the same enumerations of error.
We thus address both appeals together.
3 By that point, State Farm had elected to defend in Dolloff’s name. OCGA § 33-7-11(d). 4 The plaintiffs renewed their objection to the verdict form, but the trial court declined to alter it because it was the form plaintiffs had agreed to in the PTO. 7 The plaintiffs first argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
their motions to amend the PTO because delay alone is insufficient to support a
denial; Belinda had claimed punitive damages in her complaint, meaning there was no
prejudice to the defendants to amend the PTO to include punitive damages; and
justice required allowing them to amend the PTO. They further argue that the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied their second motion to amend the PTO
because the evidence was relevant to rebut testimony of lost wages and to explain the
relevance of curb weight to the jury. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion in
the denial of either motion.
Under the Civil Practice Act, the pretrial order “controls the subsequent course
of the action unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.” Ga. Dep’t of
Human Res. v. Phillips, 268 Ga. 316, 318(1) (486 SE2d 851) (1997). The purpose of the
PTO is to “limit the claims, contentions, defenses, and evidence” to be presented at
trial. Id.
Once a pretrial order is entered, a party may not amend without leave of court or consent of the opposite party. In passing upon the issue of whether to allow an amendment, the trial court considers if permitting such amendment would prevent manifest injustice and in doing so it is clothed with a broad discretion with which the appellate courts are loath
8 to interfere ... In the absence of a viable claim of surprise or unfairness, a trial court’s refusal to amend a pretrial order is not an abuse of discretion. The Georgia Supreme Court has emphasized the vital role of the pretrial order in ensuring an efficient and expeditious trial, as well as the duty imposed on each party to assist the trial court in preparing a pretrial order that accurately identifies the real issues in the case ... [I]f pretrial orders are to continue to serve their laudable purposes, courts and litigants must take them seriously. A final pretrial order should say what it means, and mean what it says.
Whorton v. Boatwright, 233 Ga. App. 369, 371 (504 SE2d 216) (1998) (citation
modified). See also Dep’t of Transp. v. Baxley, 194 Ga. App. 29, 29-30(1) (389 SE2d
519) (1989); OCGA § 9-11-16(b). “If a claim or issue is omitted from the order, it is
waived.” Buckelew v. Womack, 374 Ga. App. 711, 716(2) (913 SE2d 789) (2025).
In evaluating a motion to amend a PTO, “the trial court must balance possible
unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party with the movant’s reasons for delay.” Bolden
v. Ruppenthal, 286 Ga. App. 800, 803(2) (650 SE2d 331) (2007) (quotation marks
omitted).
We have held that a trial court abuses its discretion when it denies leave to
amend a PTO based solely on the trial calendar. See Total Car Franchising Corp. v.
9 Squire, 259 Ga. App. 114, 116(1) (576 SE2d 90) (2003).5 But there is no abuse of
discretion where a party seeks to add issues that are irrelevant to the pending claims
or doing so would prejudice the opposing party. See Whorton, 233 Ga. App. at 371 (no
abuse of discretion where party seeking leave to amend the PTO had already been
denied the evidence in a motion in limine). With these standards in mind, we consider
each motion to amend the PTO.
(a) First motion to amend.
In the first motion to amend the PTO, the plaintiffs sought to add claims of
willful and wanton conduct related to Dolloff’s alleged driving while intoxicated; to
introduce evidence of the vehicles’ curb weigh and Dolloff’s toxicology reports; and
to amend the verdict form.
Importantly, evidence related to willful and wanton conduct, such as the
toxicology reports, was not relevant to the issues at trial because the trial court had
previously entered a consent order granting summary judgment to State Farm on the
issue of punitive damages. See Mastec N. Am., Inc. v. Wilson, 325 Ga. App. 863, 866
5 The plaintiffs rely heavily on Total Car, but we find that case distinguishable as the record reflects that the trial court here did not base its decision solely on the trial calendar. 10 (755 SE2d 257) (2014) (punitive damages are available where there is clear and
convincing evidence of willful and wanton conduct), called into question on other
grounds by Quynn v. Hulsey, 310 Ga. 473 (850 SE2d 725) (2020); OCGA
§ 51–12–5.1(b). In that order, the plaintiffs expressly agreed that there would be no
recovery from State Farm as to their claims for punitive damages. Allowing the
plaintiffs to change their theory of the case from negligence to wanton and willful
conduct, and to pursue a claim that they failed to assert in the initial order, would have
resulted in prejudice to Dolloff and State Farm. Whorton, 233 Ga. App. at 371.
Moreover, the plaintiffs have not shown that the failure to include these claims in the
original PTO was the result of surprise or unfairness; rather, it was an error of their
own making. Phillips, 268 Ga. at 318(1) (noting that the PTO “is an indispensable tool
for the efficient disposition of civil litigation matters. ... The Code imposes a duty on
each party to assist the trial court in formulating the pretrial order by defining the
issues for trial, and deciding such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.”) (citation modified); Buckelew, 374 Ga. App. at 716(2) (claims not raised in
the PTO are waived); Bolden, 286 Ga. App. at 803(2) (court must balance “possible
unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party with the movant’s reasons for delay.”);
11 Whorton, 233 Ga. App. at 371. Cf. Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass’n., 260 Ga. App.
150, 154-55(1)(a) (579 SE2d 37) (2003) (no abuse of discretion where trial court
modified the PTO to conform to stipulation by the parties).
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend to
correct the verdict form because there is nothing improper in the original verdict form.
See Bristol Consulting Group v. D2 Property Group, 366 Ga. App. 843, 852-54(3) (884
SE2d 546) (2023) (no error in verdict form that awarded lump sum to plaintiffs on
their claims). As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
motion to amend.6 Whorton, 233 Ga. App. at 371. Cf. Redfearn, 260 Ga. App. at 154-
55(1)(a).
(b) Second motion to amend.
6 We note that there is no transcript of the hearing in which the court considered the issue, and we assume the trial court followed the law. Holmes v. Roberson-Holmes, 287 Ga. 358, 361(1) (695 SE2d 586) (2010) (“There is a presumption of regularity that attaches to all official acts, which includes judicial proceedings,” and courts apply that presumption where there is no transcript of the hearing under review). Moreover, at a subsequent hearing, the defendants reminded the trial court that the plaintiffs sought to amend the complaint to raise issues that had already been negotiated between the parties, and the new witnesses named in the proposed amended PTO were cumulative of other named witnesses. 12 As to the second motion to amend, the plaintiffs again attempted to introduce
evidence of the curb weight of the vehicles, along with testimony from the employee
whom John had hired to assist while he recovered. They also argued that Belinda’s
claim for punitive damages against Dolloff was not subject to the agreement
concerning punitive damages sought against State Farm. But, the plaintiffs have not
shown why they were unable to raise these claims at the time of the original PTO or
even in the first motion to amend the PTO. Whorton, 233 Ga. App. at 371. Rather,
plaintiffs’ counsel admitted at the hearing that there was no reason the information
he sought to include in the second motion could not have been raised earlier. Driggers
v. Campbell, 247 Ga. App. 300, 301(1) (543 SE2d 787) (2000) (“The burden is on the
party seeking amendment to show lack of laches or lack of inexcusable delay.”)
(quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, the jury was able to view photographs of the cars involved and could
see for itself the difference in size. Curb weight testimony was unnecessary. Whorton,
233 Ga. App. at 371. The plaintiffs were also able to present evidence of the assistant
John hired, and the testimony confirmed that he was hired to handle the tasks John
was unable to do post-accident. The employee’s testimony would have been
13 cumulative and, therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to
amend the PTO to include this evidence. Nease v. Buelvas, 198 Ga. App. 302 (401
SE2d 320) (1991) (no abuse of discretion given the “chronology of this case and the
redundant nature of the testimony”).
2. The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred by granting the motions to
exclude evidence of Dolloff’s alcohol use at the time of the accident and of his habitual
driving while intoxicated because this evidence was relevant to proximate cause,
punitive damages, and impeachment. We disagree.
“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine for abuse of discretion.
A motion in limine is properly granted when there is no circumstance under which the
evidence under scrutiny is likely to be admissible at trial.” Hankla v. Jackson, 305 Ga.
App. 391(1) (699 SE2d 610) (2010) (citation modified). See also Barefoot v. Denson,
364 Ga. App. 64, 67(4) (873 SE2d 733) (2022). Evidence is admissible if it is relevant,
OCGA § 24-4-402, but it may be excluded where “its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403.
14 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence of alcohol
use.7 As discussed in Division 1, willful and wanton conduct and punitive damages
were not before the jury, so any evidence regarding such conduct or relating to
punitive damages was not relevant.
Pretermitting whether the plaintiffs preserved their argument that the evidence
was relevant for proximate cause, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion
by excluding evidence of Dolloff’s alcohol use. Even if the evidence were relevant to
the issue of proximate cause, because Dolloff admitted fault but did not admit liability,
its admission is still subject to the balancing test in OCGA § 24-4-403. See Schwartz
v. Brancheau, 306 Ga. App. 463, 465-66(1), 467(2) (702 SE2d 737) (2010). In the
absence of a transcript, we presume the trial court properly applied the case law and
the balancing test to determine unfair prejudice. Holmes v. Roberson-Holmes, 287 Ga.
358, 361 (695 SE2d 586) (2010) (in the absence of a transcript, we presume the trial
court followed the law).
7 It does not appear that Dolloff’s deposition was used at trial, and he did not testify or call any witnesses. Thus, there were no prior statements subject to impeachment. See, e.g., McCullough v. State, 330 Ga. App. 716, 726(3) (769 SE2d 138) (2015) (noting, in regard to jury instructions, that impeachment only applies to witnesses who testify at trial, and no impeachment instruction is warranted where the defendant did not testify or call any defense witnesses). 15 The balancing test under OCGA § 24-4-403 is a
quintessentially fact-sensitive enterprise, and the trial judge is in the best position to make such factbound assessments. ... Only rarely—and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances—will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a [trial] court’s on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect.
Rivers v. K-Mart Corp., 329 Ga. App. 495, 497(1) (765 SE2d 671) (2014) (citation
modified).
Given that the issue of Dolloff’s negligence was not before the jury, and the jury
could see evidence regarding the damage to the vehicles and the extent of John’s
injuries, evidence of Dolloff’s alleged alcohol use added little probative value to the
issue of proximate cause, and that value was outweighed by the prejudicial nature of
the evidence. OCGA § 24-4-403; Rivers, 329 Ga. App. at 497(1). Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion in limine.
16 3. The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred by denying their requested
jury instructions on proximate cause and willful and wanton conduct.8 We discern no
error.
“In reviewing a trial court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction, we
must look to the jury charge as a whole, and if the jury charge as a whole accurately
and fully apprised the jury of the law to be applied in its deliberations, then the refusal
to give an additional instruction, even if that additional instruction were accurate, does
not amount to error.” Burdette v. McDowell, 321 Ga. App. 507, 509(2) (739 SE2d 28)
(2013).
Here, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Proximate cause means that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event. When I use the expression “proximate cause,” I mean a cause that, in the natural or ordinary course of events, produced the plaintiff’s injury.
8 They also argue that the trial court erred by refusing to give a requested instruction defining ordinary or simple negligence. The record reflects that the trial court gave that instruction. 17 It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it combines with another cause resulting in the injury.
This instruction mirrors portions of the pattern jury instructions for proximate
causation and was the exact language the plaintiffs requested the trial court give in its
instructions. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) § 60.200 (2024).
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs also requested that the trial court further instruct the jury
that proximate cause
is that cause which immediately precedes and directly produces the injury and without this cause the injury would not have happened. The proximate cause of an event is a cause without which the event would not have occurred. There may be more than one act which constitutes proximate cause.
The plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that the requested charge did not add anything to the
charge the trial court intended to give. The requested instruction on proximate cause
was covered by the instructions given, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by omitting this additional language as cumulative. Burdette, 321 Ga. App. at 509(2).
See also Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 736(5) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (“Because the
trial court fully and correctly instructed the jury on the relevant points of law, it was
18 not error to fail to give the additional explanatory instruction that Wilson
requested.”); Stafford v. State, 312 Ga. 811, 821(4) (865 SE2d 116) (2021) (requested
instruction not warranted where trial court gave pattern instruction that, when
considered as a whole, encompassed instruction party requested).
The remaining requested instructions were relevant only to the issues of willful
and wanton conduct and punitive damages, which, as discussed in Division 1, were not
properly before the jury. Accordingly, we find no error in the jury instructions.
4. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by using an improper
verdict form and deducting the amount insurance paid from the judgment.9
As noted in Division 1, the verdict form was proper. Moreover, the plaintiffs
cannot complain because the form the court submitted to the jury was the same one
they requested in the PTO. Floyd v. Thurman, 242 Ga. 428(2) (249 SE2d 230) (1978).
9 State Farm filed a motion to deduct the amount the plaintiffs had already received, and, although the plaintiffs were served with that motion, it does not appear that they responded to it. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument on appeal, no hearing was required. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3 (“Unless otherwise ordered by the court, all motions in civil actions ... shall be decided by the court without oral hearing[.]”). Thus, there is no merit to the plaintiffs’ claim that State Farm obtained the deduction “surreptitiously.” 19 Turning to the reduction of the award, “[a] trial court’s ruling on a motion to
reduce verdict based on a question of law, as here, is reviewed de novo.” State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 309 Ga. App. 271 (709 SE2d 867) (2011). Because it is a
legal question, we need not defer to the trial court. Suarez v. Halbert, 246 Ga. App.
822, 824(1) (543 SE2d 733) (2000).
In the PTO, the plaintiffs expressly requested that “the amounts paid [by State
Farm] be deducted from any verdict obtained by [them].” As discussed in Division
1, there was no abuse of discretion in precluding the plaintiffs from amending the
PTO. Having received precisely what they requested, they cannot now complain of
error. Video Warehouse v. Newsome, 285 Ga. App. 786, 788 (648 SE2d 124) (2007). Cf.
Phillips, 268 Ga. at 319-20(1) (given the parties’ concessions in the pre-trial order,
Court would not address the issue appellants raised on appeal).
For these reasons, we affirm the verdict and the denial of the motion for new
trial.
Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Padgett, J., concur.