John R. Siegel, V Dawn M. Siegel

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: June 1, 2026
• Docket: 88018-7
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 88018-7-I JOHN R. SIEGEL DIVISION ONE Appellant, UNPUBLISHED OPINION and

DAWN M. SIEGEL,

Respondent.

HAZELRIGG, C.J. — John Siegel challenges the trial court’s division of

property in the dissolution of his marriage to Dawn Siegel. Because he fails to

demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in its valuation and distribution

of the parties’ assets or when it denied his motion for reconsideration, we affirm

the dissolution order.

FACTS

John and Dawn 1 were married on November 14, 2009 and separated on

August 1, 2022. John petitioned for dissolution on July 18, 2023. Prior to trial, the

parties entered a CR 2A agreement regarding parenting issues and child support,

which left only a few matters to be resolved by the court, including the issue of

property distribution.

1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their respective first

names for clarity. No disrespect is intended. No. 88018-7-I/2

The trial in this matter was conducted on October 8 and 9, 2024. Both

parties testified, as did real estate appraiser Mark Hall. John requested that the

property be divided equally between the parties, whereas Dawn requested a 60-

40 distribution in her favor. The trial court rejected both positions and awarded a

55-45 division in Dawn’s favor. Only a limited number of assets are in dispute in

this appeal. The facts concerning each of these assets are outlined below.

Stock Options

The parties agree that John owned stock options in a company known as

Ziply Fiber. John presented no testimony about the stock options in his case in

chief, and the only mention of the stock options in his trial brief was contained in

the proposed distribution spreadsheet, where he asked the court to divide the

proceeds equally once the shares were liquidated.

At trial, Dawn testified that John had valued the Ziply stock options at five

dollars per share in his responses to her interrogatories. She also testified that

she wanted the shares to be awarded to John at that value because she did not

want to have further prolonged financial contact with him and it was unknown at

the time when the stock options would be liquidated. John did not object to any of

this testimony, nor did he cross-examine Dawn with respect to this asset. On

rebuttal, John testified that the stock options would monetize at the same time as

the private equity investment administered by WaveDivision Capital and there was

“absolutely no estimate of date or value.”

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The trial court accepted Dawn’s proposal; it valued the Ziply stock options

at five dollars per share and awarded that value entirely to John. The court did not

enter any additional findings with respect to this asset.

In his motion for reconsideration, John argued that the trial court’s valuation

of this asset at five dollars per share was not supported by the evidence. John

also claimed that after the court entered the dissolution order, Ziply was sold to a

company in Canada, and he expected to receive one dollar and sixty cents per

share for his stock options. John did not submit an affidavit or declaration in

support of this claim. The trial court reviewed the motion for reconsideration and

determined the following:

As stated in the [c]ourt’s Additional Findings of Facts, the [c]ourt did not [find] the [p]etitioner, Mr. Siegel, credible or persuasive during trial. Hence, why the [c]ourt did not adopt most of his suggestions for the value of various items. As mentioned in the [c]ourt’s ruling, he failed to provide reliable and credible testimony, e.g. experts, in support [of] his assertions. The same holds true for the assertions in his Motion for Reconsideration. . . . Similarly, Mr. Siegel’s current Motion fails to provide factually persuasive information to support how this information meets the legal test for reconsideration of the [c]ourt’s prior decision.

Accordingly, the trial court denied reconsideration as to this asset.

Home Furnishings

John testified at trial that he estimated the value of the furniture and

personal property items in the marital home to be worth $50,000. John explained

that he based this estimate on the fact that the parties “were spending quite a bit

of money to refurnish the house” after the home was remodeled in 2019. Dawn,

on the other hand, testified that she estimated the value of the furniture to be worth

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$1,600. The trial court did not find either party’s testimony credible on this issue.

Given the lack of credible evidence, the court assigned no value to the furnishings

and awarded them to Dawn.

Hockey Season Tickets

During the marriage, John signed a seven-year agreement with Seattle

Hockey Partners LLC for season tickets to the Seattle Kraken hockey games.

Under the terms of the agreement, season tickets cost $54,560 for the first year

with a three percent escalation annually until the termination date. John testified

that for the three seasons prior to trial, he attempted to resell the tickets, but

demand was low and the resale value was only “about 50 percent of the actual

price to purchase them.” He requested that the court consider the tickets to be a

debt of $153,654.

The trial court rejected John’s characterization of the tickets as a debt. The

court expressly found that “in the absence [of] additional credible testimony the

[c]ourt does not find sale of the tickets has produced an absolute and unavoidable

loss.” The court therefore classified them as an asset and awarded them to John.

John moved for reconsideration with respect to this item and argued that

the trial court abused its discretion by classifying the tickets as an asset instead of

a debt and ignored evidence of the ongoing financial obligation on the contract.

The trial court agreed in part and noted that it had failed to take the contract

obligation into account. However, the court found that the tickets had intrinsic

value equal to their face value and were not merely a debt. Accordingly, the trial

court assigned a value of zero dollars to the tickets and contract.

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Private Equity Investments

On rebuttal during the trial, John testified that he held a private equity

investment in a fund administered by WaveDivision Capital. He asserted that this

investment was not liquid, could not be divided, and could only be held by an

investor accredited with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

The trial court valued the WaveDivision investment at $275,501 and divided

the value between the parties, awarding $110,200 to John and $165,301 to Dawn.

The court did not enter any additional findings with respect to this asset. In his

motion for reconsideration, John reiterated his argument that the WaveDivision

investment could be held only by someone accredited by the SEC and, as Dawn

was not accredited, no portion of it could be awarded to her. The only additional

evidence John presented in support of this argument was an unauthenticated

document from the SEC explaining generally how to become an accredited

investor. The trial court denied reconsideration and found that John lacked

credible evidence to support his argument on this issue.

John timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

In a dissolution action, the trial court is required by statute to divide the

property and liabilities of divorcing parties “as shall appear just and equitable after

considering all relevant factors” but “without regard for misconduct.” RCW

26.09.080. A property division entered in a dissolution action will be reversed only

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if there is a manifest abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App.

235, 242-43, 170 P.3d 572 (2007). Similarly, “[m]otions for reconsideration are

addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and a reviewing court will not

reverse a trial court’s ruling absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion.”

Wilcox v. Lexington Eye Inst., 130 Wn. App. 234, 241, 122 P.3d 729 (2005).

The court abuses its discretion when the decision is manifestly

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. In re Marriage of

Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d 795, 803, 108 P.3d 779 (2005). “A court’s decision is

manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the

facts and the applicable legal standard.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d

39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). A decision is based on untenable grounds or

reasons if it is based on unsupported facts or an incorrect legal standard. Id.

II. Valuation and Distribution of Certain Assets

John asserts that the trial court erred when it overvalued certain marital

assets and incorrectly distributed property between the parties. We consider each

of his specific challenges in turn.

A. Stock Options

John first contends that the trial court erred when it valued his stock options

in Ziply at five dollars per share. Specifically, he argues that the five-dollar value

was not supported by any evidence and the trial court’s decision to impose a

present valuation rather than awarding a percentage to be divided upon sale of the

company was manifestly unreasonable. We disagree.

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In dissolution proceedings, trial courts have generally employed three

different approaches to valuing stock options: present value, retained jurisdiction,

and deferred distribution. In re Marriage of Farmer, 172 Wn.2d 616, 627, 259 P.3d

256 (2011). Under the present-value method, the trial court determines the current

value of the stock options and awards the non-holder spouse a lump-sum cash

award at the time of dissolution. Id. at 628. Under the retained-jurisdiction

approach, the trial court retains jurisdiction of property dissolution until the holder

cashes in the stock options. Id. And under the deferred-distribution approach, the

trial court awards a percentage of the stock options, which will be distributed only

when the holder cashes in the stock options. Id. Our Supreme Court has declined

to mandate a specific approach to dividing stock options in any given scenario.

See id. at 627.

John avers that if a trial court chooses to employ a present-value approach,

its findings must include an explanation of the methodology it used to calculate the

value of the stock options. However, John did not make this argument at trial, nor

did he present it in his motion for reconsideration. Absent satisfaction of certain

specific requirements, we do not consider matters presented for the first time on

appeal. See RAP 2.5(a). Because John fails to present any argument as to why

RAP 2.5(a) is satisfied such that we could reach this issue, we decline to do so.

John also argues that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s

valuation because Dawn produced none to support her testimony that the stock

options were worth five dollars per share. A trial court does not abuse its discretion

where its valuation of property is within the scope of the admitted evidence. See

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In re Marriage of Mathews, 70 Wn. App. 116, 122, 853 P.2d 462 (1993), abrogated

on other grounds by In re Marriage of Wilcox, 3 Wn.3d 507, 553 P.3d 614 (2024).

John likens this case to In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wn.2d 236, 692 P.2d

175 (1984). In that case, the husband’s experts testified that he held no goodwill

in his practice as a physician, whereas the wife testified that the husband held

goodwill at a minimum of $100,000. Hall, 103 Wn.2d at 246. The court did not

adopt either of these figures and instead valued the husband’s goodwill in his

practice at $70,000. Id. As the trial court did not explain how it reached that figure,

the Supreme Court held that at the very least, additional factual findings were

required for the valuation to stand. Id. at 247.

Here, however, the trial court’s valuation of the stock options is consistent

with the evidence in the record. At trial, Dawn testified that John had valued his

Ziply stock options at five dollars per share in his answers to interrogatories. 2 John

did not object to Dawn’s testimony, cross-examine Dawn on this issue, or offer any

competing testimony. 3 As Dawn’s testimony was the only admitted evidence

concerning the value of the Ziply stock options, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it adopted that value.

Next, John argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it utilized a

present-value approach for the Ziply stock options, rather than the retained-

jurisdiction or deferred-distribution approach. Specifically, John contends that the

2 In a dissolution proceeding, the owner of property can testify to its value.Worthington v. Worthington, 73 Wn.2d 759, 763, 440 P.2d 478 (1968). 3 To the extent John argues that Dawn’s testimony was not credible, we are unable to

review this claim of error. See In re Marriage of Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 868, 56 P.3d 993 (2002) (trial court’s credibility determinations are not subject to review). To the extent John argues that Dawn was required to produce expert testimony or documentary evidence in addition to her own testimony, he cites no authority articulating such a requirement.

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trial court’s decision to use the present value of the stock options could result in a

patent disparity in the respective assets of the parties and therefore was untenable.

But this court will not reverse an award of marital property based on hypotheticals.

As we have previously recognized, “[i]t is a simple matter to conjure up hypothetical

situations which may or may not develop, any one of which would result in a gross

injustice to either party when [the present-value] method of distributing” is applied

to an asset of fluctuating value, such as stock options. DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5

Wn. App. 741, 746-47, 491 P.2d 249 (1971).

Here, Dawn objected to the retained-jurisdiction and deferred-distribution

approaches, as she wished to have no further financial ties to John. John did not

argue that a present-value approach would result in a disparate division of assets,

nor did he produce any evidence that a disparate division was likely to result. The

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it chose to use a present-value

approach to value the Ziply stock options and award them to John.

John further argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for

reconsideration in light of new evidence that a company in Canada purchased Ziply

and, as a result of that sale, he expected to receive one dollar and sixty cents per

share for his Ziply stock options. In support of his motion for reconsideration, John

submitted a document concerning Bell Canada’s agreement to acquire Ziply. Not

only was this document improperly submitted, as it was not attached to an affidavit

or declaration, see KING COUNTY LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7(b)(5)(B)(iv) (“[D]ocumentary

evidence relied upon must be quoted verbatim or a photocopy of relevant pages

must be attached to a declaration identifying the documents.”); State v. Hobbs, 13

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Wn. App. 866, 869, 538 P.2d 838 (1975) (“An affidavit of newly discovered

evidence made by counsel is not sufficient.”), the one dollar and sixty cent figure

does not appear anywhere in it.

As John presented no evidence to support his assertion that the Ziply stock

options were scheduled to sell for one dollar and sixty cents per share, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied John’s motion for reconsideration.

B. Home Furnishings

John next contends that the trial court erred when it assessed the value of

the home furnishings at zero dollars. Dawn responds that there was no error but,

even if there was, the de minimus value of the furnishings does not warrant

reversal. We agree with Dawn.

The ultimate obligation of the trial court in dividing property between

spouses is to “arrive at a fair, just and equitable distribution of assets and liabilities

regardless of their characterization as separate or community.” In re Marriage of

Brady, 50 Wn. App. 728, 731, 750 P.2d 654 (1988). In accordance with this aim,

“mischaracterization of property is not necessarily a reversible error, if the

distribution is, on the whole, fair and equitable.” In re Marriage of Pilant, 42 Wn.

App. 173, 181, 709 P.2d 1241 (1985).

Here, John testified that he believed the home furnishings to be worth

approximately $50,000, whereas Dawn testified to her belief that the home

furnishings were worth only $1,600. As Dawn correctly points out, even under

John’s valuation, the home furnishings would represent only one percent of the

total value of the marital estate. John does not argue that the allegedly errant

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valuation of the home furnishings by itself renders the property division unjust and

inequitable, only that it is unjust and inequitable when combined with the alleged

error concerning the Ziply stock options and season tickets. As we have decided

that the trial court did not err in the division of the stock options, we agree that if

any error exists regarding the valuation of the home furnishings, such error would

be de minimus. Accordingly, even if we were to assume error on this matter,

without so deciding, it would not warrant reversal. In light of the particular posture

of this assignment of error, John has failed to demonstrate entitlement to the

requested relief on this issue.

C. Hockey Season Tickets

John also asserts that the trial court erred when it assigned a value of zero

dollars to the Kraken season tickets instead of assessing them solely as a debt.

Specifically, John argues that the trial court should have accepted his “unrebutted

testimony about [his] inability to personally use the tickets and his difficulty

recouping the costs” and assessed no positive value to the tickets.

“We will not disturb a property valuation having reasonable support in the

trial record.” Pilant, 42 Wn. App. at 178. Here, the trial court admitted as an exhibit

the contract John entered in order to purchase the Kraken tickets. While John

testified that he believed the tickets had no value and he was unable to resell them,

the trial court “did not [find] the [p]etitioner, Mr. Siegel, credible or persuasive

during trial.” The trial court’s credibility determination is not reviewable by this

court. Burrill, 113 Wn. App. at 868. As such, John fails to demonstrate any error

in the trial court’s valuation of the Kraken tickets.

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D. WaveDivision Investment

Finally, John argues that the trial court erred when it awarded Dawn a

portion of the WaveDivision investment because that particular asset can be held

only by an individual accredited by the SEC. As noted in Section II.C., supra, the

trial court expressly found John’s testimony not credible and that his submissions

on reconsideration did not support his position. With no credible evidence

demonstrating that the WaveDivision investment must be held by an accredited

individual, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded a portion of

this asset to Dawn or when it denied John’s motion for reconsideration.

III. Attorney Fees on Appeal

Dawn requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP

18.1(a) and RCW 26.09.140. Under RCW 26.09.140, this court may, after

considering the financial resources of the parties, “order a party to pay for the cost

to the other party of maintaining the appeal.” See also In re Marriage of Kaufman,

17 Wn. App. 2d 497, 521, 485 P.3d 991 (2021). The trial court declined to award

fees to Dawn and ordered that both parties be responsible for their own attorney

fees. We similarly decline to award fees on appeal.

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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