John P. And Alice Bongiovanni v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

470 F.2d 921, 31 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 409, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 6346
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedDecember 11, 1972
Docket172, Docket 72-1597
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 470 F.2d 921 (John P. And Alice Bongiovanni v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John P. And Alice Bongiovanni v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 470 F.2d 921, 31 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 409, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 6346 (2d Cir. 1972).

Opinion

HAYS, Circuit Judge:

The only point in contention on this appeal is whether Section 357('e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which imposes a tax on otherwise tax-free Section 351 transfers where the liabilities assumed by the taxpayer’s wholly-owned corporation exceed the adjusted basis of property transferred, applies to a cash basis taxpayer’s “liabilities” consisting of trade accounts payable. 1 The Com *922 missioner determined that the transfer resulted in a taxable gain and the Tax Court affirmed his ruling. We reverse.

I. Factual Background

John P. and Alice Bongiovanni, husband and wife, filed a joint federal income tax return for the year 1965 with the District Director of Internal Revenue at Hartford, Connecticut on or before the due date of April 15, 1966. Since Alice Bongiovanni is a party to this litigation solely because she filed the joint return with her husband, we will refer to John P. Bongiovanni as the “appellant” in this case.

From 1963 to 1965 taxpayer-appellant ran a masonry contracting business known as the Keystone Masonry Company. It was a sole proprietorship and operated on the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting. On or about April 1, 1965, the taxpayer transferred all of the assets and liabilities of his sole «proprietorship to the Keystone Masonry Corporation which had been duly organized under the laws of the State of Connecticut. The transaction was obviously undertaken with an eye to the benefits of the federal income tax laws involving business reorganizations and it met the requirements of Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code. In exchange for the assets of the sole proprietorship, appellant received all of the stock of the corporation consisting of 500 shares of common stock listed on the books and records of the corporation at a value of $26,000, together with the corporation’s promissory note in the amount of $51,253, payable on demand. The assets transferred to the corporation and the liabilities assumed were as follows:

Item

Amount or Value

Appellant’s Basis

Cash............. ... $ 223 $ 223

Trade Receivables .. ... 57,741 -0-

Office Equipment .. 1,160 1,160

Work-in-Process .... . . . 22,762 -0-

Raw Materials..... 8,029 -0-

Tools and Supplies . 4,575 -0-

$94,490 $1,383

Less: Payables . .. . . . 17,237 -0-

$77,253 $1,383

On appellant’s income tax return for 1965 he attempted to adopt the accrual method of accounting to avoid the consequences of the Peter Raich case, 46 T.C. 604 (1966). The Tax Court ruled that the attempt to change accounting methods was unsuccessful, and that decision brought the issue presently on appeal to the fore.

The appellant attached a schedule to his income tax return which indicated that he had included in the gross receipts of the proprietorship work-in-process in the amount of $22,762 and raw materials in the amount of $8,029. He also deducted the trade accounts payable of the proprietorship which amounted to $17,-237. The Commissioner, after examining appellant’s return, reduced the stated gross receipts to exclude the amounts representing the work-in-process and the raw materials. He also disallowed appellant’s deduction of $17,237 for the accounts payable on the grounds that that amount had not yet been paid by the appellant who was a cash basis taxpayer. Finally, the Commissioner determined that the appellant had realized taxable gain in the amount of $51,253 because the promissory note for that sum which *923 appellant had received from the corporation constituted “other property” within the meaning of Section 351(b). These adjustments were accepted by the appellant and a'resulting tax deficiency in the amount of $12,080.44 was duly assessed which is uncontested on this appeal.

A further deficiency of $5,778.49— the subject of this appeal- — was assessed against the taxpayer and was attributable to the Commissioner’s inclusion of an additional $15,854 in appellant’s income. This adjustment was made by the Commissioner in accordance with his reading of Section 357(c) of the Code which requires a taxpayer to recognize gain on a transfer of the assets and liabilities of his business to his wholly-owned corporation to the extent that the liabilities transferred exceed the adjusted basis of the assets transferred. Because the appellant was on the cash basis method of accounting, his accounts receivable, work-in-process, raw materials and tools and supplies, all of which were transferred to the corporation, had an adjusted basis of zero. The Commissioner then determined that the liabilities assumed by the corporation which consisted of the accounts payable for which taxpayer had been denied a deduction because he was a cash basis taxpayer — exceeded the adjusted basis of the assets transferred by $15,854 as follows:

Asset Transferred

Taxpayer’s Basis

Cash $ 223 $ 223

Trade Receivables 57,741 -0-

Office Equipment 1,160 1,160

Work-in-Process 22,762 -0-

Raw Materials 8,029 -0-

Tools and Supplies 4,575 -0-

Total

$94,490 Adjusted basis $ 1,383

Liabilities assumed by the corporation $17,237

Adjusted Basis of Property Transferred 1,383

Liabilities In excess of basis under Section 357(c) $15,854

The excess of $15,854 was determined by the Commissioner to constitute ordinary gain taxable under Section 357(e)(1).

The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner’s determination in an opinion primarily devoted to an explanation of why the taxpayer’s attempt to change his accounting method from the cash to the accrual basis had been futile. It relied on its decision in the Peter Raich case, supra, for its conclusion that the appellant’s accounts payable were to be considered as liabilities of the sole proprietorship for the purposes of Section 357(c) — although appellant was a cash basis taxpayer and the “liabilities” had not been paid — and thus should be reflected in the taxpayer’s taxable gain under Sections 351 and 357(c).

II. Section 357(c) and The Cash Basis Taxpayer

We believe that the Tax Court erred in its interpretation of Section 357(c) when applied to a cash basis taxpayer involved in a tax-free Section 351 transfer of assets to his controlled corporation. Where property is transferred to a corporation solely in exchange for the stock or other securities of that corporation and immediately thereafter the transfer- or is in control of the corporation, Congress mandated through Section 351 that no gain or loss should be recognized for tax purposes. However, Section 357(c) provides that in a Section 351 exchange

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Bluebook (online)
470 F.2d 921, 31 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 409, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 6346, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-p-and-alice-bongiovanni-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca2-1972.