Wilford E. Thatcher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

533 F.2d 1114, 37 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 76
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 17, 1976
Docket74-2245
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 533 F.2d 1114 (Wilford E. Thatcher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilford E. Thatcher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 533 F.2d 1114, 37 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 76 (9th Cir. 1976).

Opinion

ALFRED T. GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:

Two individual taxpayers and a corporation seek reversal of a Tax Court decision 1 holding taxable as a gain under 26 U.S.C. § 357(c) (1970) 2 the excess of partnership *1116 liabilities assumed by the corporation over the partners’ basis in the assets they transferred to the corporation in a § 351 exchange. 3

From 1956 to 1963, Wilford Thatcher and Karl Teeples engaged in business as partners. The enterprise acquired diversified assets and liabilities. The partners filed tax returns under the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting. In 1963, the partners formed Teeples and Thatcher, Inc., and transferred to that corporation all the partnership’s assets in exchange for all the authorized shares of the corporation.

The assets transferred consisted of $317,-146.96 in unrealized receivables (partially completed construction contracts) and other properties valued at $325,892.33. The corporation concurrently assumed $164,065.54 in accounts payable and $264,194.25 in other obligations. During 1963, the corporation collected the accounts receivable and paid the accounts payable. The corporation reported as income its receipts on accounts receivable and deducted as expenses the payments made upon the accounts payable.

Because the liabilities assumed (including accounts payable) exceeded by some $102,-367.73 the partnership’s adjusted basis in the assets transferred to the corporation, 4 the Commissioner took the position that the excess was taxable under § 357(c) as a gain to the partners in the year that their partnership debts were assumed.

Also because the liabilities assumed by the corporation substantially exceeded the partners’ basis in the assets transferred to the corporation, the Commissioner took the position that the shares of stock received by the taxpayers in the exchange had a basis of zero under 26 U.S.C. § 358 (1970). The zero basis in the stock caused the individual taxpayers to incur further taxes when they sold some of their shares back to the corporation in 1963 and 1964.

Teeples undertook an overseas mission for his church in 1963 and became for most purposes inactive in the business. The corporation paid him, however, $1,250 per month. The Tax Court held that only $250.00 of each payment was deductible as salary paid by the corporation under 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1970).

The Tax Court was not clearly erroneous in its treatment of the salary question. There was substantial evidence to support denial of a deduction to the extent of $1,000. See Klamath Medical Service Bureau v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1958). The other questions are not so easily answered.

The definition of § 357(c) liabilities and their tax treatment have divided the Tax Court and created a conflict between the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. With five judges dissenting, the Tax Court in this case followed its earlier decision in Raich v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 604 (1966). There, as here, a cash-basis taxpayer accomplished a § 351 incorporation and was taxed under § 357(c) when his liabilities (including accounts payable), assumed by the corporation, exceeded his basis in the assets transferred to his corporation.

*1117 After Raich was decided, the question returned in Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972). Bongiovanni, a cash basis taxpayer, completed a § 351 incorporation and the new corporation assumed his liabilities in an amount which, under the Raich rationale, would have exceeded the taxpayer’s basis in the assets transferred to the corporation. The Second Circuit, in a widely noted opinion, 5 defined liabilities in such a manner as to exclude accounts payable from the reach of § 357(c) and thus avoid the tax consequences which would have resulted had the Raich case been followed. 6

While we commend the Bongiovanni result, we cannot accept the method followed in reaching that result. There the court defined liabilities in an ad hoc manner that may have worked equity in that case, but the definition is likely to produce unforeseen results in other cases. In its ordinary meaning, the term “liability” means “that which one is under an obligation to pay; * * * debt * * * [as] opposed to assets.” Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1941). An account payable fits comfortably within that definition.

We believe that the integrity of the standard meaning of liability 7 can be retained while giving vitality to the purposes of both § 351 (tax-free exchange) and § 357 (closing the escape of taxes by borrowing against assets before transferring them to the new corporation, and blocking the creation of a “negative” basis.)

Judge Hall, dissenting in the present case when it was before the Tax Court, did not undertake to redefine “liability”, but advanced a theory that would permit a constructive “wash” narrowly limited to this kind of case. 61 T.C. at 42-44. While the wash, or setoff, solution is not without its own doctrinal difficulty, 8 it is consistent with the spirit of § 351, as it prevents wholly unwarranted tax windfalls in favor of the government. It is equally consistent with § 357(c) so long as its employment is limited as Judge Hall suggests.

Under Judge Hall’s proposal, accounts payable are considered liabilities and § 357(c) gain is recognized when the sum of the liabilities assumed exceeds the basis of the assets transferred. Under the statute, assumption of debt supplants the usual requirement of actual payment for recognition of gain by cash-basis taxpayers. If no trade receivables are surrendered, recognition of the § 357(c) gain completes the income analysis of the incorporation exchange.

However, if receivables are transferred, Judge Hall believes the cash-basis transfer- or has in effect sold those accounts to the transferee-corporation. The consideration to be received is extinguishment of the transferor’s payables. When the transferee-corporation provides that considera *1118 tion, the cash-basis transferor should be able to recognize the now-completed sale of receivables. He can do so through a setoff to the § 357(c) gain.

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Related

Scott v. Commissioner
1997 T.C. Memo. 507 (U.S. Tax Court, 1997)
Christopher v. Commissioner
1984 T.C. Memo. 394 (U.S. Tax Court, 1984)
Focht v. Commissioner
68 T.C. 223 (U.S. Tax Court, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
533 F.2d 1114, 37 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 76, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilford-e-thatcher-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca9-1976.