John Eric Anderson v. State of Texas
Opinion
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 13, 2026.
In The
Fifteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 15-25-00132-CV
JOHN ERIC ANDERSON, Appellant
V.
STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL., Appellees
On Appeal from the 98th District Court Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-25-001988
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se inmate John Eric Anderson was convicted in 1989 of five felonies including indecency with a child, and sentenced to 35 years’ confinement. He was released on parole in 2004, but returned to prison following a violation about 14 years later (in “August of 2018 or 2019” he says), and remains there today.1 He claims his sentence was “fully executed” as of December 24, 2024 (35 years from 1989), but he was denied credit for his time on parole (“street-time,” in the
1 Anderson recently advised that he has been moved to a transitional center.
vernacular),2 despite several complaints. He argues that by “refusing to address the issue, or enforce the law, Texas through its agents has unlawfully taken and destroyed [his] property through inverse-condemnation.” Because Anderson failed to allege a valid takings claim, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the State’s plea to the jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Anderson sued the State, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and Executive Director Bryan Collier on March 18, 2025, for inverse condemnation, alleging that “Texas has forcibly taken plaintiff’s freedom, ability to earn a living, and made him a ward of the state for purposes of maintaining TDCJ’s population count.”3 He sought damages of $5,000 “for every day he spent on parole,” and moved for summary judgment.
The State answered and filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss under Chapter 14 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. At a hearing on the plea, Anderson clarified that he was seeking compensation, not credit, for the time he was released on parole, since he was being “held illegally.”4 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss under Chapter 14, but granted the State’s jurisdictional plea, did not reach Anderson’s motion for summary judgment, and denied his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Anderson now challenges all three decisions.
2 See Ex parte Noyola, 215 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
3 Anderson also requested declaratory and mandamus relief through several other constitutional claims, including separation of powers and due process, but he either dropped those claims or does not raise them on appeal. 4 Anderson argued, “They said they did it by a government code and okay, that’s fine. They can have that time, but no where in that government code does it say they don’t have to compensate me for my time.”
DISCUSSION
I. Inverse Condemnation
When, as here, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.5 Sovereign immunity is waived under the Texas Constitution’s Takings Clause,6 but only for “a viable allegation of taking.”7 Without “a properly pled takings claim,” immunity is retained.8 “When the government takes private property without first paying for it, the owner may recover damages for inverse condemnation.”9 The owner must plead and prove that the government intentionally took specific private property for public use without just compensation.10 “The ultimate determination of whether the facts are sufficient to constitute a taking is a question of law.”11 For two reasons, we hold that Anderson has not—and on these facts cannot— plead a valid takings claim that could overcome sovereign immunity.
First, he does not plead that any of his property was taken, only his person.
When the trial court questioned how inverse condemnation of a person could occur, he responded:
By the Black’s Law Dictionary, freedom is liberty and it falls under property. That’s where I got that from. As far as inverse condemnation takings claim, they took my freedom, my self-determination, my public
5 Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff while looking to the pleader’s intent. Id. 6 TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
7 City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2014) (emphasis added).
8 Id.
9 Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12, 25 (Tex. 2024).
10 Commons of Lake Houston, Ltd. v. City of Houston, 711 S.W.3d 666, 676 (Tex. 2025).
11 Self, 690 S.W.3d at 26.
property for public benefit and multiple reasons including in order to maintain prison expenditures. It was my right to be free after December 24, ‘24, and they took my freedom.
But persons have not been considered “property” under the U.S. Constitution since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. For purposes of the Takings Clause, property “refers not to a physical thing,” but to “the bundle of rights that describe one’s relationship to a thing.”12 Although certain intangible rights may qualify as property,13 Anderson’s freedom and ability to earn a living are aspects of liberty rather than property.14 This is a claim for liberty, not a takings claim. Jurisdiction to grant release from incarceration lies exclusively with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in post-conviction habeas corpus actions: “Any other proceeding shall be void and of no force.”15 Yet as Anderson judicially conceded, his goal is not freedom but compensation:
By them taking my street time, they added it on to the back of my sentence, extended my sentence from 35 years and turned into 50-year sentence…. They can have that time, but nowhere in that government code does it say they don’t have to compensate me for my time.
12 Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 773 (Tex. 2021); see United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (describing “property” as referring to “the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it”). 13 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004–05 (1984).
14 See Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995) (cleaned up) (a “liberty interest ‘denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of one’s own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.’” (quoting The Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)). 15 Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
We hold that incarcerated persons cannot forego legal remedies for release and stay in prison, but sue the State to collect compensation for doing so.
Second, Anderson has not pleaded a valid takings claim even if “persons”
were included among the “property” subject to inverse condemnation. Section 508.283(b) of the Texas Government Code provides that a person “may be required to serve the remaining portion of the sentence … without credit for the time” on release for offenses “described by Section 508.149(a).”16 Whether this limitation applies depends on the version of § 508.149(a) “in effect on the date of revocation.”17 Conviction for indecency with a child was listed in § 508.149(a) in 2004 when Anderson was released,18 and continues to be listed there today.19 Anderson did not plead a valid takings claim because he is simply mistaken about state law.
Anderson argues that the trial court “verbally convert[ed]” or “reclassified”
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
John Eric Anderson v. State of Texas (John Eric Anderson v. State of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.