John Doe v. Tonya Andrews, Facility Administrator of Golden State Annex Detention Facility

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00333
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN DOE, ) No.: 1:25-cv-00333-JLT-HBK (HC) ) 12 Petitioner, ) ORDER DECLINING TO ADOPT FINDINGS ) AND RECOMMENDATIONS, GRANTING 13 v. ) PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, ) DENYING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO 14 TONYA ANDREWS, Facility ) DISMISS, AND DIRECTING THE CLERK OF Administrator of Golden State Annex ) COURT TO CLOSE THIS CASE 15 Detention Facility, ) ) (Docs. 1, 10, 25) 16 ) Respondents. ) 17 ) 18 John Doe is an immigration detainee in U.S. Immigration Customs and Enforcement 19 custody at the Golden State Annex Detention Facility in McFarland, California, proceeding with 20 counsel on his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 which challenges 21 the constitutionality of his detention without a bond hearing. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed a 22 motion to dismiss the petition.1 (Doc. 10.) This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate 23

24 1 As the Findings and Recommendations note, Respondents move to dismiss all unlawfully named officials under 8 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 25 at 1, n.1.) This Court agrees with the undersigned to dismiss all 25 unlawfully named officials and recognizes the proper Respondent as the Facility Administrator of Petitioner’s detention facility, the Golden State Annex. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) 26 (“the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official”); Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 27 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2024) (explaining that in a habeas petition challenging physical confinement, the proper respondent is the immediate custodian or the warden of the facility where the noncitizen is 28 detained). 1 Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 2 On November 25, 2025, the magistrate judge issued Findings and Recommendations to 3 grant Respondents’ motion to dismiss and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 25.) 4 The Court served the F&Rs on all parties, which notified them that any objections thereto were to 5 be filed within fourteen days after service. (Id. at 23.) In addition, the Court advised the parties 6 that the “failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain 7 rights on appeal.” (Id. at 24 (citing Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014).) 8 After one extension of time, Petitioner filed objections to the F&R on December 19, 2025, (Doc. 9 30), and Respondents filed a response to such objections on December 24, 2025. (Doc. 31.) 10 According to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court performed a de novo review of this 11 case. Having carefully reviewed the matter, along with the objections, response, all other relevant 12 documents, and the governing law, the Court DECLINES to adopt the Findings and 13 Recommendations, GRANTS Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, DENIES Respondent’s motion 14 to dismiss, and ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with a substantive bond hearing 15 where the Government bears the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that 16 Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his continued detention is 17 warranted. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Belize who entered the United States unlawfully on 20 July 1, 2024, and was immediately apprehended by Customs and Border Protection near the 21 border. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 17, 26; Doc. 10-1, ¶ 5, 6.) Petitioner acknowledged that he had no legal 22 documents allowing him to enter or remain in the United States. (Doc. 10-1 at 7–8.) On July 2, 23 2024, CBP issued an expedited order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 24 referred Petitioner to an asylum officer for a credible fear interview after he expressed fear of 25 returning to Belize. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 26, 27; see also Doc. 10-1 at 3, 10–11.) On or around August 7, 26 2024, an asylum officer found that Petitioner had a credible fear of torture if removed to Belize. 27 (Doc. 1, ¶ 27.) According to Petitioner, his positive credible fear determination entitled him to 28 have his asylum case heard in full before an Immigration Judge. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 4.) 1 Soon after Petitioner was taken into custody, “DHS determined there was a Red Notice 2 from his country of origin.” (Doc. 10 at 2.) Respondents allege that Petitioner fled from crimes he 3 committed in his home country. (Id.) Respondents submit an arrest warrant from Belize indicating 4 that sometime in June 2024, Petitioner was charged with aggravated assault with a firearm upon 5 the residence of a commissioner of police. (See Doc. 10-1 at 27–29.) Petitioner claims that he was 6 “never convicted of a crime in Belize” and that the police “fabricated charges” against him 7 partially because he spoke out against the “pervasive corruption in the police department” to a 8 “reporter for a prominent news broadcaster in Belize.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 24, 25.) Petitioner claims that 9 he fled Belize because he “faced constant threats to his freedom, [] his life, and [] the wellbeing 10 of his wife and children” after he refused to stay quiet about the illegal police activity he had 11 witnessed. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 21–25.) 12 On August 14, 2024, at his first immigration hearing, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 13 Services served the Petitioner with a Notice to Appear, which vacated the expedited order of 14 removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 and charged Petitioner as removable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 15 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 27, 39; Doc. 1-1, ¶ 5; Doc. 10-1 at 13–15.) 16 From August 14, 2024, through April 22, 2025, Petitioner was scheduled for a series of master 17 calendar hearings before the IJ. (See Doc. 10-1 at 17–25.) Petitioner claims to have “appeared as 18 required at all hearings.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 5.) Petitioner claims that he did not secure pro bono 19 immigration counsel until January 13, 2025, and was therefore self-represented during the first 20 half of these proceedings. (See Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 1–2.) 21 Respondents claim that during four of these hearings, from August 26, 2024, to January 22 22, 2025, Petitioner requested additional time to prepare and received continuances every time. 23 (Doc. 10 at 2.) Specifically, Respondents claim that Petitioner “requested additional time to find 24 an attorney,” on August 26, 2024, then once he obtained counsel, his “attorney asked for 25 additional time to prepare” on October 16, 2024, and that Petitioner “had not completed his 26 applications for relief” as of December 11, 2024. (Doc. 10-1, ¶¶ 10–12.) However, Petitioner 27 argues that his “pro se appearances at his master calendar hearings” do not constitute delay, (Doc. 28 12 at 17), and that he did not retain counsel until January 13, 2025, (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 2), therefore his 1 attorney could not have possibly asked for an extension on October 16, 2024. (Doc. 12 at 17.) 2 Petitioner argues that he completed his asylum application on September 20, 2024, and he filed it 3 shortly thereafter. (Doc. 12 at 17.) As for any initial delays while Petitioner was pro se, Petitioner 4 implies that these delays were caused, in part, due to an inability to obtain key evidence in 5 support of his asylum case. (See Doc. 1 at 11–12.) Petitioner argues that the guards at Golden 6 State Annex ignored his requests to access his personal property to obtain key documents and 7 evidence for his case. (Id.) He claims that “[o]nly months later, after he retained pro bono counsel 8 who echoed his demands for access to his personal property, did Golden State Annex finally 9 relent.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) Petitioner claims that even assuming some delays are attributable to him, 10 “the fact that Petitioner chose to pursue [an application for relief] and requested continuances to 11 further that application does not deprive him of a constitutional right to due process.” (Doc. 12 at 12 18 (citing Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 13 June 14, 2022).) 14 On August 26, 2024, at a master calendar hearing, Petitioner requested a bond hearing. 15 (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 6.) The IJ denied the request for a bond hearing and stated that she “lacked the 16 statutory authority to hold a bond hearing for him” and instead “advised [him] to submit a request 17 for discretionary parole to ICE.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 6.) On September 20, 2024, Petitioner claims he 18 completed his I-589 Application for Asylum and filed it shortly thereafter. (Doc. 1, ¶ 41; Doc. 1- 19 1, ¶ 7.) Petitioner subsequently mailed his asylum application to the immigration court, which he 20 claims the IJ received on December 11, 2024. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 7.) 21 On November 2024, Petitioner submitted a request for release on parole to the ICE 22 deportation officer assigned to his case. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 8.) Petitioner claims that ICE failed to 23 respond to his parole request for weeks. (Id.) Once Petitioner obtained counsel on January 13, 24 2025, (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 2), his counsel contacted ICE to inquire about the status of Petitioner’s parole 25 request. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 8.) ICE informed counsel that Petitioner’s request had been denied on 26 December 19, 2024, and that Petitioner received notice of such denial. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 8; see also 27 Doc. 10 at 3.) After discovering that Petitioner never received a written decision of such denial, 28 Petitioner’s counsel requested a copy of the written decision from ICE. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 8.) On 1 January 15, 2025, ICE issued an Interim Notice Declining Parole letter which stated: “ICE has 2 decided not to parole you from custody at this time. The decision to authorize parole is 3 discretionary . . . You have not established to ICE’s satisfaction that you are not a flight risk . . . a 4 security risk[,] or danger to the community.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 9.) Then, on March 19, 2025, Petitioner 5 filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his prolonged detention without a 6 bond hearing. (Doc. 1.) 7 According to Petitioner, the “first hearing on the merits of his asylum case” was scheduled 8 for April 22, 2025. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 11.) Although neither party has updated the Court on the status of 9 Petitioner’s asylum determination, publicly available information on EOIR’s website indicates 10 that the IJ ordered Petitioner removed on September 15, 2025.2 See EOIR, Automated Case 11 Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation/ (last visited March 17, 2026). It is 12 unclear what caused the delay between April 22, 2025 and September 15, 2025 for the IJ to 13 render a decision. Furthermore, according to EOIR’s website, Petitioner appealed the IJ’s order of 14 removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals on September 26, 2025. See id. The website 15 indicates that Petitioner submitted his appellate brief on January 27, 2026, that DHS failed to 16 submit an appellate brief, and that the briefing schedule has now expired. Id. Accordingly, it 17 appears that the IJ denied Petitioner’s asylum, ordered the Petitioner removed, and the BIA has 18 not yet issued a decision on appeal. Id. Petitioner has now been in continuous ICE detention for 19 over twenty months. 20 II. JURISDICTION 21 A. Habeas Corpus 22 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Court has the authority to determine a petition for writ of 23 habeas corpus in which the petitioner asserts he is being held in custody “in violation of the 24 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack 25

26 2 Using Petitioner’s A-Number, the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s website provides “basic information about the status of certain cases before an immigration court or the Board of Immigration 27 Appeals” and though not “all information about a case is displayed,” the website provides a general update on Petitioner’s asylum case. EOIR, Automated Case Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (last 28 visited March 18, 2026). 1 by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the 2 writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 3 Petitioner requests this Court issue an order granting a bond hearing and a declaration stating that 4 his prolonged detention without such hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 5 Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 25–26.) Thus, he properly invokes the Court’s habeas jurisdiction. 6 B. Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 7 The INA limits judicial review in many instances. For instance, 8 U.S.C § 1252(g) 8 precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction over the executive’s decision to “commence 9 proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.” 8 U.S.C § 1252(g). 10 However, Petitioner does not challenge the merits of his removal order, rather his prolonged 11 detention under § 1225(b)(1). Thus, this Court has the authority to review Petitioner’s claim. See 12 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (holding that § 1252(g) precludes judicial 13 review only as to the three areas specifically outlined in the subsection). 14 Respondents challenge this Court’s jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claims as barred 15 under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A), 1252(e). (Doc. 18 at 3.) This Court notes that Padilla v. U.S. 16 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1169–70 (W.D. Wash. 2023) dealt 17 with this precise issue and assessed whether these two statutory provisions strip the Court of 18 jurisdiction to review a petitioner’s request for a bond hearing despite section 1225(b)(1)(B)’s 19 mandatory detention provisions. There, the court explained: 20 First, the Court continues to find that § 1252(a)(2)(A) has no application to Plaintiffs’ claims. (citations omitted). This provision 21 only applies to the procedures and policies necessary to implement the removal process. Here, Plaintiffs’ bond hearing claims do not 22 challenge the removal process—just whether they should be afforded a bond hearing after obtaining a positive credible fear finding. As the 23 Court previously explained: “The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is that Defendants have not adopted any formal procedure or policy 24 regarding when . . . the bond hearings of which they complain will be held; hence the issue of impermissible ‘indefinite detention.’” 25 (citations omitted). The Court finds no reason to reconsider this decision. 26 Second, the Court continues to find that § 1252(e)(3), does not strip 27 the Court of jurisdiction. The Court previously explained that § 1252(e)(3) addresses “challenges to the removal process itself, not to 28 detentions attendant upon that process.” (citations omitted). The 1 Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), which rejected application of a 2 similar jurisdiction-stripping provision to claims challenging the detention process for those facing removal. Id. In Jennings, the 3 Supreme Court explained that there is jurisdiction to review the legality of detention under § 1225(b) where petitioners were “not 4 asking for review of an order of removal; . . . not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or seek removal; and . . . not 5 even challenging any part of the process by which their removability will be determined.” Jennings, [583 U.S. at 294]. The same logic 6 applies here because Plaintiffs challenge only the constitutionality of their detention, and the relief they seek does [not] implicate the 7 removal system. The Court rejects Defendants’ argument and continues to find that it has jurisdiction over the claims regarding 8 bond hearings. 9 This Court adopts and applies this reasoning to the instance case and thereby rejects Respondents’ 10 jurisdictional argument.3 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 As the F&Rs correctly note, the applicable statutory detention authority is 8 U.S.C. § 13 1225(b)(1), (Doc. 25 at 6–7), which applies to noncitizen “applicants for admission” initially 14 determined to be inadmissible because of fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid entry 15 documents. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Normally, noncitizens covered 16 by § 1225(b)(1) are subject to an expedited removal process that does not include a hearing 17 before an IJ or review of the removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). However, under this 18 provision, if a noncitizen “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of 19 persecution,” the inspecting immigration officer “shall refer the [noncitizen] for an interview 20 [with] an asylum officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d). If the asylum 21 officer determines that the noncitizen has a credible fear of persecution, the noncitizen “shall be 22 detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) 23 (emphasis added). Under the statute, the only opportunity for a noncitizen to be released pending 24 a decision on the asylum application is temporary parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or 25 significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b), 235.3. 26 3 This precise jurisdictional issue is currently pending review by the Ninth Circuit in an ongoing class 27 action litigation asserting the right to a bond hearing for individuals who enter without inspection and then demonstrate a credible fear of deportation. See Padilla et al. v. U.S. ICE, et al. (9th Cir. 2025) (No. 24- 28 2801). 1 There is no question that these statutes apply here. The record indicates that Petitioner 2 entered the United States at a port of entry without admission or parole and without valid entry 3 documents; was apprehended by CBP near the border; was ordered removed through expedited 4 removal; claimed fear of returning to Belize; received a positive credible fear determination; was 5 issued a Notice to Appear vacating his expedited order of removal and charging him as removable 6 under § 1182(a)(7); and was placed in immigration proceedings pending a determination on his 7 asylum application. (See Doc. 10-1; Doc. 1, ¶¶ 26, 27.) Therefore, Petitioner falls under § 8 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)’s mandatory detention provision. 9 This case raises two main issues. First, whether an applicant for admission under § 10 1225(b)(1) has any due process rights beyond those authorized by statute. Second, whether 11 Petitioner’s prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(1) as applied to him now requires a bond 12 hearing. As the F&R notes, the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have answered this question in a 13 piece-meal fashion, and district courts around the country have taken different approaches. (Doc. 14 25 at 7–12, 13–17); see Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1113–17 (W.D. Wash. 2019) 15 (summarizing the relevant caselaw). 16 The Court concludes that relevant caselaw under the various INA detention provisions— 17 and under § 1225(b)(1) specifically—do not bar Petitioner’s due process claim. The Court further 18 concludes that Petitioner’s now 20-month detention without a bond hearing violates due process. 19 A. Caselaw Regarding the Various INA Detention Statutes Do Not Bar 20 Petitioner’s Due Process Claim. 21 Although only § 1225(b)(1) is at issue here, the Court notes that there are “[f]our statutes 22 which govern immigration detention,” which provide context for the discussion below regarding 23 Petitioner’s due process rights. See Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 529–31 (9th Cir. 2023). As 24 the Ninth Circuit explained: 25 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (“Section 1225(b)”), 1226(a) (“Subsection A”), 1226(c) (“Subsection C”), and 1231(a) (“Section 1231(a)”). . . . 26 Subsection A is the default detention statute for noncitizens in removal proceedings and applies to noncitizens “[e]xcept as 27 provided in [Subsection C].” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Subsection A states that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be 28 arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to 1 be removed from the United States.” Id. (emphasis added). The statute also provides for release on bond or conditional parole. Id. at 2 § 1226(a)(2). Because of Subsection A's permissive language— specifically, the word “may”—detention under Subsection A is 3 discretionary. See Prieto-Romero [v. Clark], 534 F.3d [1053,] 1059 [(9th Cir. 2008)]. 4 Subsection C provides for the detention of “criminal aliens” and 5 states that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who” is deportable or inadmissible based on a qualifying, 6 enumerated offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (emphasis added). Release under Subsection C is limited to certain witness protection 7 purposes. See id. at § 1226(c)(2). Because of its use of the word “shall,” detention under Subsection C is mandatory. See Jennings, 8 [583 U.S. at 303–304]. 9 The differences in the discretionary or mandatory language of Subsections A and C respectively have significant consequences. 10 Under Subsection A—the default detention provision—a noncitizen is entitled to a bond hearing at which the IJ considers whether the 11 noncitizen is a flight risk or a danger to the community. See Jennings, [583 U.S. at 306] (“Federal regulations provide that aliens detained 12 under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1).”); see also Singh v. Holder, 13 638 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). By contrast, under Subsection C, which applies to noncitizens convicted of certain crimes, a 14 noncitizen is not statutorily entitled to a bond hearing. See Jennings, [583 U.S. at 303–304]. 15 Finally, Section 1231(a) applies to detention after the entry of a final 16 order of removal. In contrast to Subsections A and C, Section 1231(a) does not apply to detention during the pendency of administrative or 17 judicial removal proceedings. Section 1231 instead governs detention during a ninety-day “removal period” after the conclusion 18 of removal proceedings.” 19 Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529–31. 20 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that under § 1231(a)(6), the government may detain 21 a removable noncitizen beyond the 90-day statutory removal period, but only for so long as 22 “reasonably necessary to secure the alien’s removal.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 23 (2001). The Court explained that the statute contains an implicit reasonable time limitation, which 24 is presumptively six months, after which the noncitizen bears the burden of proving that there is 25 “no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 682, 701. 26 Relying on Zadvydas, the petitioner in Demore raised a facial challenge to § 1226(c)’s 27 mandatory detention framework arguing that the statute was unconstitutional because it allows for 28 prolonged detention during the removal process. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18, 527–29 1 (2003). The Court disagreed and explained that Zadvydas was materially different because (1) it 2 involved noncitizens with final deportation orders whose removal could not be effectuated and 3 therefore continued detention “no longer [bore] a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the 4 individual was committed” (e.g., to prevent flight); and (2) it involved a period of detention that 5 was indefinite and potentially permanent. Demore, 538 U.S. at 527–31. Whereas under §1226(c), 6 the Court explained, “detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal 7 aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the change that, 8 if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed” and detention is of a much shorter 9 duration with a definite end point. Id. at 528–29 (concluding that detention under § 1226(c) lasts 10 roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases and about five months in the minority 11 cases where the noncitizen chooses to appeal). The concurrence, which created the majority 12 rejecting the facial challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), expressly noted however 13 that “since the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent 14 resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his 15 risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” 16 Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 17 Then, in Jennings, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that §§ 18 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) include an implicit 6-month time limit on the length of mandatory 19 detention and reversed Rodriguez III, holding that these statutes do not provide a right to periodic 20 bond hearings every six months. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 301, 304, 306; see also Rodriguez v. 21 Robbins (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (involving a class action where 22 noncitizens challenged their prolonged detention under §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) 23 without individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention). 24 Notably, however, the Supreme Court in Jennings “chose to answer only the question 25 whether the statutory text itself included a limit on prolonged detention or a requirement of 26 individual bond hearings. . . . [T]he Court concluded that as a matter of statutory construction, the 27 only exceptions to indefinite detention were those expressly set forth in the statutes or related 28 regulations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (humanitarian parole); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) 1 (bond); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (witness protection); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1) (bond 2 hearing).” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 2018); see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288– 3 289, 301, 304–306. Instead, the Supreme Court remanded the constitutional issues to the Ninth 4 Circuit. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312 (“Because the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that 5 periodic bond hearings are required under the immigration provisions at issue here, it had no 6 occasion to consider respondents’ constitutional arguments . . . . [W]e do not reach those 7 arguments. Instead, we remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider them in the first 8 instance.”). In turn, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to consider the 9 constitutional arguments in the first instance, noting it had “grave doubts that any statute that 10 allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that those who 11 founded our democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation of 12 liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez, 909 F.3d at 255–256. 13 Therefore, the Supreme Court did not foreclose the ability to raise as-applied challenges to 14 prolonged detention under these statutes. Rodriguez, 909 F.3d at 255–256; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 15 312. Then, in Nielsen, the Supreme Court expressly noted that as-applied challenges to detention 16 under § 1226(c) are not foreclosed. Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 420 (2019). This suggests that 17 those detained under § 1225(b)(1) have due process rights beyond those authorized by statute, 18 contrary to Respondents’ assertions.4 (Doc. 18 at 2); see also Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1105–06

19 4 The Court notes that during Petitioner’s first five months of detention, he received a custody re- determination wherein ICE denied his request for release on parole because he had failed to establish that 20 he was not a flight risk or danger to the community. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 8, 9; Doc. 10 at 3.) Respondents argue that such procedures constitute “due process protections built into the legislative (statutory) scheme” and 21 that Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing “is unwarranted by law and the statutory foundation.” (Doc. 18 22 at 4, n.1.) However, as explained above, Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit caselaw does not foreclose Petitioner’s due process challenge to his now twenty-month detention under § 1225(b)(1). As Padilla best 23 explained: “The parole process does not afford the noncitizen an in-person adversarial hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where he or she may present witness testimony or evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5. 24 Additionally, the ICE detention officer need not make any factual findings or provide their reasoning, and there is no apparent right to an administrative appeal. This process is not an adequate substitute for a bail 25 hearing to test the legitimate need for continued detention.” Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1174. Additionally, to the extent Respondents argue that under Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1195 26 (9th Cir. 2022), Petitioner’s continued detention under § 1225(b)(1) without a bond hearing is “per se lawful,” such argument is unavailing. (Doc. 18 at 2.) In Rodriguez Diaz, the petitioner was detained under 27 § 1226(a) and had already received a bond hearing before an IJ where the IJ denied release on bond. 53 F.4th at 1193. There, the petitioner challenged his continued detention under § 1226(a) arguing that the 28 due process clause entitled him to a second bond hearing. Id. That is drastically different than the issue 1 (explaining that Jennings did not foreclose due process challenges and that “unreasonably 2 prolonged detention under § 1225(b) without a bond hearing violates due process.”). 3 B. Thuraissigiam Does Not Bar Petitioner’s Due Process Claim. 4 Additionally, contrary to Respondents’ assertions, (Doc. 18 at 3), the Supreme Court’s 5 decision Thuraissigiam also does not foreclose Petitioner’s due process challenge.5 See Dep’t of 6 Homeland Sec., et al. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020). The court in Padilla addressed this 7 precise issue and this Court adopts its reasoning in the present case.6 Padilla explained: 8 The Court stands unconvinced that the Supreme Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam requires dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim. 9 Given the distinct claims presented in Thuraissigiam, the Court finds the decision’s narrow holding presents no bar to Plaintiffs’ claim. 10 In Thuraissigiam, the respondent argued that due process entitled 11 him to an opportunity to reapply for asylum on account of certain alleged defects he identified in the process that led to rejection of his 12 asylum application. [591 U.S. at 138–140]. To understand this claim, the Court first reviews the factual background and procedural posture 13 of the case. Like Plaintiffs in the case before this Court, the respondent in Thuraissigiam was placed into expedited removal 14 proceedings after being detained upon his entry to the United States where he was found inadmissible. Id. at [114]. Like Plaintiffs here, 15 the respondent applied for asylum. Id. But unlike Plaintiffs here, the respondent in Thuraissigiam was unable to convince the immigration 16 officer, a supervising officer, or immigration judge that he faced a credible fear of persecution if returned to his home country. Id. at 17 [114]. Having failed to present a bona fide asylum claim, the respondent was subject to “remov[al] from the United States without 18 further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I); Thuraissigiam, [591 U.S. at 114]. The respondent then filed a habeas 19 before this Court which pertains to prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(1) without an initial bond 20 determination.

21 5 Until July 2019, noncitizens like Petitioner here were entitled to bond hearings before an IJ, as are 22 noncitizens in full removal proceedings. See Matter of X-K-, 23 I.&N. Dec. 731, 731 (BIA 2005). In 2019, the Attorney General overruled Matter of X-K-, and interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) to require 23 mandatory detention without bond hearings for asylum seekers who were initially subject to expedited removal but later transferred to full removal proceedings after establishing credible fear. See Matter of M- 24 S-, 27 I.&N. Dec. 509, 515–17 (2019). Under Matter of M-S-, the only possibility for release available to noncitizens in this category is a discretionary grant of parole by the Department of Homeland Security for 25 “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Id. at 516– 17. 26 6 This precise due process issue is currently pending review by the Ninth Circuit in an ongoing class 27 action litigation asserting the right to a bond hearing for individuals who enter without inspection and then demonstrate a credible fear of deportation. See Padilla et al. v. U.S. ICE, et al. (9th Cir. 2025) (No. 24- 28 2801). 1 petition through which he sought a writ of habeas corpus, an injunction, or writ of mandamus directing the Department of 2 Homeland Security to provide him a “new opportunity to apply for asylum and other applicable forms of relief.” Thuraissigiam, [591 3 U.S. at 114–15]. He argued that he had been deprived of a meaningful opportunity to establish his credible fear claims and that 4 the wrong standards were applied. Id. But the respondent “made no mention of release from custody.” Id. 5 The Supreme Court in Thuraissigiam, rejected respondent’s due 6 process claim. The Court explained that “aliens who arrive at ports of entry . . . are ‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at 7 the border.’” Id. at [139] (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953)). And as to any due process 8 rights concerning their efforts to gain admission, these individuals possess “only those rights regarding admission that Congress has 9 provided by statute.” Id. at [140]. The Court based this conclusion on the proposition that “[t]he power to admit or exclude aliens is a 10 sovereign prerogative” and that “the Constitution gives the political department of the government plenary authority to decide which 11 aliens to admit, and a concomitant of that power is the power to set the procedures to be followed in determining whether an alien should 12 be admitted.” Id. at [139] (citation and quotation omitted). With these principles in mind, the Court held that as to his request for admission 13 into the United States, the respondent had only “a right to a ‘determin[ation]’ whether he had ‘a significant possibility’ of 14 ‘establish[ing] eligibility for asylum.’” Id. at [140] (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (v)). Having been “given that right,” the 15 respondent was entitled to no more process in his efforts to gain admission to the United States. Id. 16 17 Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1171. Similarly to Padilla, the Petitioner here is also an applicant for 18 admission who received a positive credible fear determination and who challenges only his 19 prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(1) not the merits of the asylum decision itself. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 20 27, 80–81.) “Defendants ask the Court to extract from Thuraissigiam a broad rule that any 21 inadmissible noncitizen possesses only those due process rights afforded to them by statute, 22 regardless of the nature of their status or the relief they seek. But such conclusion is untethered to 23 the claim in Thuraissgiam and the Court’s reasoning. Thuraissigiam’s discussion of due process 24 is necessarily constrained to challenges to admissibility to the United States. This was the sole 25 claim presented and the respondent expressly asked for a chance to reapply for asylum and 26 admission. The Court then exclusively analyzed whether a noncitizen applicant for admission has 27 any ‘rights regarding admission’ beyond those set by Congress.” (See Doc. 18 at 3); Padilla, 704 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1171–72 (citations omitted). 1 Accordingly, the Court finds that the holding in Thuraissigiam does not foreclose 2 Petitioner’s due process claim which merely seeks a chance to apply for release on bond pending 3 resolution of his bona fide asylum claim that remains to be resolved in standard removal 4 proceedings. Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1172. 5 C. Petitioner’s Due Process Right to a Bond Hearing. 6 Courts in this circuit have taken various approaches to determine whether procedural due 7 process requires a bond hearing in a case of prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(1). See Padilla, 8 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1166, 1173–74 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (applying the factors enumerated in 9 Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) to assess plaintiffs’ due process claims regarding 10 prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(1)); Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1106–07, 1116–17 (W.D. 11 Wash. 2019) (applying a six-factor test to assess whether petitioner’s prolonged detention under § 12 1225(b)(1) without a bond hearing violated due process); Tigranyan v. Warden of California City 13 Detention, No. 1:25-cv-01554-DJC-SCR, 2026 WL 91765, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026) 14 (applying the Mathews factors to a prolonged detention claim under § 1225(b)(1)); report and 15 recommendation adopted in full, 2026 WL 130843, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026); Bobokulov 16 Akmal v. Warden of California City Detention, No. 1:25-cv-01921-DC-DMC-HC, 2026 WL 17 657606, at *6 (E.D. Cal. March 9, 2026) (applying the three-factor test enumerated in Lopez v. 18 Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870 (2022) to a prolonged detention claim under § 1225(b)(1)); 19 Lebedev v. Warden of Golden State Annex, No. 1:25-cv-01391-KES-SAB-HC, 2026 WL 482733, 20 at *5–8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2026) (applying the three-factor Lopez test to a prolonged detention 21 claim under § 1225(b)(1)); Saribekyan v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-01696-DJC-DMC, 2026 WL 22 776031, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2026) (applying the six-factor Banda test to prolonged 23 detention under § 1225(b)(1)). 24 Though Lopez concerned a due process challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), 25 the factors enumerated there are, in essence, a truncated version of the factors enumerated in 26 Banda, which concerned mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1).7 And on two occasions, this 27 7 The six-factor test enumerated in Banda include: (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely 28 duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused 1 Court has applied the three-factor Lopez test to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1). See 2 Bobokulov Akmal, 2026 WL 657606, at *6; Lebedev, 2026 WL 482733, at *5–8. Accordingly, 3 this Court will do the same. Upon an application of these factors, this Court finds that Petitioner is 4 entitled to a bond hearing where the government bears the burden of proving by clear and 5 convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger.8 6 1. Total Length of Detention to Date 7 First, the length of detention, which is often considered the “most important factor,” see 8 e.g., Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118, weighs in Petitioner’s favor because he has now been 9 detained for over twenty months without a bond hearing. (Doc. 1, ¶ 3.) Courts have found that 10 detention for fifteen, seventeen, twenty-four, and twenty-five months under § 1225(b)(1) without 11 a bond hearing, pending a final determination on an asylum application was unreasonably 12 prolonged. See Saribekyan, 2026 WL 776031, at *2; Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118; Bobokulov 13 Akmal, 2026 WL 657606, *6; Lebedev, 2026 WL 482733, at *5. The length of Petitioner’s 14 detention strongly favors granting him a bond hearing.9 15 by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood 16 that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1117. The three-factor test enumerated in Lopez include: (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely 17 duration of future detention; and (3) the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the government. Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 879. In Lopez, this Court explained why certain factors—such as 18 conditions of detention, or likelihood of obtaining a final order of removal—do not particularly assist the Court in determining whether detention has become unreasonable or whether due process requires a bond 19 hearing. See 631 F. Supp. 3d at 879 (explaining there are other avenues of redress to challenge unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that other factors, such as likelihood of obtaining a final 20 order of removal, is better suited for consideration at a bond hearing by an IJ). This Court agrees and adopts the Lopez factors to assess whether mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) has become 21 unreasonably prolonged as applied to the Petitioner in this case. 22 8 In Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds, 53 F.4th 1189 23 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit held that the government bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen’s detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is justified. As Banda 24 explained, nothing in Singh suggests that the analysis regarding the government’s burden of proof varies depending on the specific detention statute. Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1107. Instead, in Singh, the Ninth 25 Circuit noted “the government ma[de] too much of [a] distinction [regarding § 1231(a)(6) detainees and § 1226(a) detainees] because [r]egardless of the stage of the proceedings, the same important interest is at 26 stake—freedom from prolonged detention.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1205 (citing Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011)). 27 9 Respondents argue that if this Court were to apply a multi-factor balancing test, the Court “must give 28 weight to [Petitioner’s] criminal conduct.” (Doc. 10 at 6–7.) Though Respondents allege that Petitioner 1 2. Likely Duration of Future Detention 2 Second, the likely duration of future detention also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. “The 3 Court considers how long the detention is likely to continue absent judicial intervention; in other 4 words, the anticipated duration of all removal proceedings—including administrative and judicial 5 appeals.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (citations and quotations omitted). “When the 6 [noncitizen’s] removal proceedings are unlikely to end soon, this suggests that continued 7 detention without a bond hearing is unreasonable.” Lebedev, 2026 WL 482733, at *6 (citations 8 omitted). Petitioner initially received a positive credible fear determination and applied for 9 asylum, however, as of September 15, 2025, an IJ ordered the Petitioner removed. See EOIR, 10 Automated Case Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation/ (last visited March 11 21, 2026). On September 26, 2025, Petitioner appealed the IJ’s order of removal to the BIA, and 12 on January 27, 2026, Petitioner filed his appellate brief to the BIA. Id. As of the date of this order, 13 that appeal is still pending. Id. 14 Although future events are difficult to predict, the Court finds that the pending appeal 15 before the BIA and possible judicial review by the Ninth Circuit will be sufficiently lengthy such 16 that this factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. See Lebedev, 2026 WL 482733, at *6 (weighing in 17 favor of petitioner on this factor because his asylum application was pending review by the BIA); 18 Bobokulov Akmal, 2026 WL 657606, at *7 (weighing in favor of petitioner on this factor because 19 his asylum application was pending review by the Ninth Circuit); Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 20 (weighing in favor of petitioner on this factor because his asylum application was pending review 21 by the BIA and noting that this process may take up to two years or longer); Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 22 3d at 1173 (explaining that petitioners with bona fide asylum claims “face a median time of five 23

24 fled from crimes committed in his home country, (Doc. 10 at 2), Petitioner claims that he was “never convicted of a crime in Belize” and that police “fabricated charges” against him because he spoke out 25 against police corruption. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 24, 25; see also Doc. 10-1 at 27–29.) As this Court explained in Lopez, factors such as “the nature of the crime committed”—and here whether such crime was committed 26 altogether—is “more suited for consideration at a bond hearing by the immigration judge . . . than for consideration to determine whether detention has become unreasonable.” Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 879. 27 While the government certainly has a legitimate interest to protect the public from dangerous individuals and to prevent a noncitizens’ flight during removal proceedings, this issue is better suited for an IJ in 28 determining whether to grant release on bond. 1 to six months for adjudication of their claim by an [IJ], nearly a year for cases appealed to the 2 BIA, and still longer for judicial review”). 3 3. Delays in the Removal Proceedings Caused by the Petitioner and the Government 4 Third, delays in removal proceedings caused by Petitioner and Respondents do not weigh 5 significantly in any one direction. Under this factor, “[c]ourts should be sensitive to the 6 possibility that dilatory tactics by the removable [noncitizen] may serve not only to put off the 7 final day of deportation, but also to compel a determination that the [noncitizen] must be released 8 because of the length of his incarceration.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (citations and 9 quotations omitted). Evidence that a noncitizen acted in bad faith or sought to deliberately slow 10 proceedings in hopes of obtaining release would weigh against granting relief. Id. (citations and 11 quotations omitted). 12 Respondents argue that Petitioner caused a series of delays from August 26, 2024, to 13 January 22, 2025, because Petitioner requested additional time and continuances to prepare for his 14 asylum proceedings. (Doc. 10 at 2.) Importantly, however, Petitioner did not obtain an attorney 15 until January 13, 2025, (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 2), and therefore was self-represented during the first few 16 hearings. In fact, Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner “requested additional time to find an 17 attorney.” (Doc. 10-1, ¶ 10.) A pro se litigant asking for additional time to navigate the 18 immigration system and obtain an attorney does not constitute evidence of bad faith. Saribekyan, 19 2026 WL 776031, at *3 (“As there is no allegation or appearance of bad faith, the Court finds that 20 these actions do not significantly weigh against Petitioner.”). Respondents further argue that 21 Petitioner’s attorney caused further delays by requesting a continuance at the January 22, 2025, 22 hearing. (Doc. 10-1, ¶ 13.) However, such request does not demonstrate bad faith considering 23 Petitioner’s attorney did come onto the case until January 13, 2025, and likely needed more time 24 to prepare. 25 Respondents further argue that Petitioner caused delays “in furtherance of his own goal to 26 seek relief from removal.” (Doc. 10 at 6.) However, Petitioner is entitled to raise legitimate 27 defenses to removal, and such challenges do not undermine his claim that detention has become 28 unreasonably prolonged. See Lebedev, 2026 WL 482733, at *7 (citations and quotations omitted). 1 Petitioner, in fact, raised a legitimate defense, namely, fear of torture if returned to Belize, which 2 an asylum officer found to be credible. See id. (“Petitioner raised a legitimate defense to removal, 3 as evidenced by the fact that the IJ granted Petitioner’s application for asylum.”); (Doc. 1, ¶ 27.) 4 The fact that Petitioner chose to pursue an asylum application and requested continuances to 5 further that application does not deprive him of a constitutional right to due process, absent some 6 indicia of bad faith or dilatory tactics, which are absent here. Lebedev, 2026 WL 482733, at *7 7 (citing Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 8 14, 2022). 9 Furthermore, Petitioner filed his appeal to the BIA eleven days after being ordered 10 removed, which is timely and an appropriate remedial avenue. See EOIR, Automated Case 11 Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation/ (last visited March 21, 2026); see 12 Saribekyan, 2026 WL 776031, at *3 (finding that petitioner’s appeal of the IJ’s denial of asylum 13 to the BIA was perfectly legitimate and did not demonstrate bad faith) (citations and quotations 14 omitted). 15 Even still, Respondents also played a part in causing delays. According to Petitioner, 16 guards at Golden State Annex ignored his requests to access his personal property to obtain key 17 documents and evidence needed for his asylum case. (Doc. 1 at 11–12.) He claims that “[o]nly 18 months later, after he retained pro bono counsel who echoed his demands for access to his 19 personal property, did Golden State Annex finally relent.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) Such delay would be 20 attributable to the Government, not Petitioner. See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 (finding that 21 EOIR’s failure to secure an interpreter for petitioner’s immigration proceedings which caused 22 delays in the removal process was attributable to the government and favored granting petitioner 23 a bond hearing). In conclusion, the Court finds that the factors weigh in favor of granting 24 Petitioner a bond hearing. Thus, the Court ORDERS: 25 1. The Court DECLINES to adopt the Findings and Recommendations issued on 26 November 25, 2025, (Doc. 25). 27 2. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. 28 3. Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is DENIED, except the Court grants 1 Respondents’ request to dismiss all unlawfully named officials under 28 U.S.C. § 2 2241. 3 4. Respondents are ORDERED to provide the Petitioner with a bond hearing no 4 later than April 10, 2026, at which the Government SHALL bear the burden of 5 demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the Petitioner is a flight risk 6 or danger to the community if not arrested, and Petitioner SHALL be given 7 adequate notice prior to the hearing and SHALL be allowed to have counsel 8 present. 9 5. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE THE CASE. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 | Dated: _Mareh 22, 2026 Cerin | Tower TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19