John Day Co. v. Douglas County Board of Equalization

497 N.W.2d 65, 243 Neb. 24, 1993 Neb. LEXIS 94
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 19, 1993
DocketS-90-1092, S-90-1093, S-90-1094, S-90-1095, S-90-1096
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 497 N.W.2d 65 (John Day Co. v. Douglas County Board of Equalization) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Day Co. v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, 497 N.W.2d 65, 243 Neb. 24, 1993 Neb. LEXIS 94 (Neb. 1993).

Opinion

White, J.

The five appellants are Nebraska taxpayers which separately own personal property located within Douglas County. In 1990, appellant taxpayers timely filed protests with the Douglas County Board of Equalization (county board), requesting that their locally assessed personal property be valued at zero for tax purposes, based on the Nebraska Constitution, the U.S. Constitution, and recent rulings by this court regarding the valuation of centrally assessed railroad, pipeline, carline company, and agricultural property. The county board denied the protests, based on its opinion that as a county board, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider centrally assessed property valuations when determining the constitutionality of locally assessed personal property valuations.

On July 6,1990, appellant taxpayers filed petitions on appeal in the Douglas County District Court. The county board demurred to the petition based on claims of (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) a defect of party defendants, and (3) the failure of the petition to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The district court sustained the demurrers, based on the county board’s asserted lack of jurisdiction, and dismissed the petitions. Appellant taxpayers now appeal the district court’s dismissal of their petitions, assigning only one error: the court’s ruling that the Douglas County Board of Equalization did not have jurisdiction to consider the valuation of centrally assessed property located within Douglas County in determining the constitutionality of the valuation of their property located in Douglas County.

During the time relevant to when the protests were filed in this action, the authority of Nebraska county boards of equalization was governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1501 et seq. (Reissue 1990). As stated in § 77-1504:

The county board of equalization shall fairly and impartially equalize the valuation of individual tracts, lots, or parcels of real and personal property in the county so that all real and personal property is assessed uniformly *26 and proportionately. The county board of equalization may consider and correct the assessment of any tract, lot, or parcel of real property or the assessment of any or all items of personal property by raising, after due notice has been given to the owner or agent at his or her last-known address, or by lowering the assessment of such property. No action shall be taken by the county board of equalization pursuant to this section before April 1 nor after May 31 of each year.
For purposes of equalization of the valuation of any protested real or personal property, the county board of equalization shall make its adjustment so that the valuation of the protested property compares to the aggregate level of value of all taxable property in the county.

Additionally, § 77-1503.01 stated that “[f]or purposes of sections 77-1504 and 77-1506.02, parcels or items of property or classes of property shall mean locally assessed land, improvements, and personal property. Any property valued by the Tax Commissioner shall not be subject to equalization by the county board of equalization under sections 77-1504 and 77-1506.02.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Examples of property subject to valuation by the Tax Commissioner include railroad personal property, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-601 (Reissue 1990), and public service entities, including pipelines, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-801 et seq. (Reissue 1990).

Also at this time, the authority of the State Board of Equalization and Assessment (State Board) was governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-501 et seq. (Reissue 1990). In particular, § 77-505 required that

[t]he State Board of Equalization and Assessment shall annually review the abstracts of assessments of real and personal property submitted by the county assessors, examine the valuation of all other property which is valued by the state, and equalize such valuations for tax purposes within the state. For this purpose the board shall meet at the State Capitol as soon as the abstracts of assessments have been submitted by the county assessors. *27 The board shall have the power to adjourn from time to time until the equalization process is complete.

Consistent with these statutes and our decision in Olson v. County of Dakota, 224 Neb. 516, 398 N.W.2d 727 (1987), appellant taxpayers argue that when a taxpayer protests the taxation of property located in a particular county, the taxpayer’s exclusive remedy is by protest to a county board of equalization, then an appeal to the district court, and ultimately an appeal to this court. Claiming that the district court erred in determining that § 77-505 vests jurisdiction in the State Board, appellant taxpayers assert that § 77-505 merely specifies the roles of the State Board in dealing with intercounty equalization and with centrally assessed taxpayers. Appellants emphasize that there is nothing in the language of this statutory section which prohibits a county board of equalization from examining or considering the valuation of centrally assessed property located within the county in determining whether the valuations of property located exclusively within the county are uniform, proportionate, and within constitutional limitations. Finally, the appellants maintain that even though § 77-1503.01 prohibits a county board from equalizing centrally assessed property, this statute does not prohibit a county board from considering the State Board’s valuation of centrally assessed property as a basis for comparison of property located exclusively within Douglas County to ensure the constitutional requirements of uniformity and proportionality.

Conversely, the county board argues that the statutory limits on the types of property subject to equalization by the county board in § 77-1503.01 prohibit a county board from equalizing locally assessed property with property assessed by the State. The county board asserts that under § 77-505, the State Board has been granted the sole authority to equalize locally assessed property with property that is valued by the State. Pointing out that the State Board does not meet until after the county boards have completed their duties, the county board emphasizes that it would be hard pressed to equalize locally assessed property with values that have yet to be determined by the State.

In contrast to the appellants’ assertions that they are barred from appearing before the State Board, the county board *28 maintains that appellant taxpayers should have appeared before the State Board to demand equalization under the provisions of § 77-510. Section 77-510 provided that

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
497 N.W.2d 65, 243 Neb. 24, 1993 Neb. LEXIS 94, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-day-co-v-douglas-county-board-of-equalization-neb-1993.