1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOE ROBERT COLLIER, Case No.: 25-cv-3487-AJB-MMP
12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING CASE 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND DENYING MOTIONS FOR IFP 14 JAMES HILL, Warden, et al., WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT 15 Respondents. 16 17 On October 20, 2025, Petitioner Joe Robert Collier, a state prisoner proceeding pro 18 se, filed a complaint on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights form in the Northern District of 19 California, which was docketed as a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus filed under 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1651. (Doc. No. 1; see also docket in N.D. Cal. Case No. 3:25-cv-08946-LB.)1 On 21 October 20, 2025, Collier also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 22 (“IFP”). (Doc. No. 2.) After the Clerk provided notice to Collier of both the filing fee for a 23 civil action and that he had not submitted his IFP motion on the proper form (Doc. No. 3), 24 on November 7, 2025, Collier filed a second IFP motion (Doc. No. 6). On November 19, 25
26 1 A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 27 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n. 2 (9th Cir. 28 1 2025, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) submitted a 2 copy of his certified trust account statement. (Doc. No. 8.) 3 On December 8, 2025, the Northern District ordered the instant case transferred, 4 noting Collier “filed this pro se civil rights action seeking parole” and “[w]here an action 5 ‘is directed to the manner in which a sentence is being executed, e.g., if it involves parole 6 or time credit claims, the district of confinement is the preferable forum.’ Brown v. Court 7 of Appeals – Third Dist., 2012 WL 368376, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2012).” (Doc. No. 9 at 8 1) (additional citations omitted). Noting that Collier is currently confined at the Richard J. 9 Donovan Correctional Facility, which “lies within the venue of the Southern District of 10 California,” the Northern District transferred the case to this district.2 (Id. at 1–2.) On 11 December 9, 2025, the case was opened in this district and was again docketed as a Petition 12 for a Writ of Mandamus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1651. (See generally docket.) 13 I. DISCUSSION 14 Upon review and for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that this case must 15 be dismissed because it contains contentions pertaining to both federal habeas and civil 16 rights and appears to primarily seek relief only available in habeas corpus, but Collier 17 cannot maintain both types of contentions in a civil suit and his case does not appear 18 amenable to conversion. 19 A. Basis for Filing 20 Challenges to the fact or duration of confinement brought by state prisoners in 21 federal court are brought by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 22 § 2254; challenges to conditions of confinement are brought pursuant to the Civil Rights 23 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488–500 (1973). “[W]hen 24 a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and 25 26 27 2 In ordering the case transferred, the Northern District also specifically indicated that: “The Court takes no position on whether this action should be maintained as a civil rights lawsuit or as a habeas 28 1 the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier 2 release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 3 500. On the other hand, “a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is 4 making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or 5 length of his custody.” Id. at 499. 6 While Collier has captioned his filing as a complaint under the civil rights act, 7 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and appears to contend he is eligible and should be considered for parole 8 under Proposition 57 (see, e.g. Doc. No. 1 at 5, 9–10), Collier indicates in his “prayer for 9 relief” that he seeks “release” from confinement and notably does not indicate he seeks 10 either a parole hearing or parole consideration. (See id. at 7.) Additionally, Collier appears 11 to separately allege that CDCR improperly calculated and/or failed to apply his pre- 12 sentence credits and that he is also currently eligible for parole due to already having served 13 his base term. (See id. at 14–22.) Collier also appears to contend his current punishment 14 has “become grossly disproportionate” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 15 Amendments and asserts “[c]ourts are to consider whether the punishment is so 16 disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions 17 of human dignity.” (Id. at 9) (citation omitted). 18 To the extent Collier seeks immediate “release” from imprisonment (see id. at 7), 19 Collier’s “sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. 20 However, to the extent Collier instead only seeks injunctive type relief compelling CDCR 21 to either consider or reconsider Collier’s eligibility for parole under Proposition 57, such 22 claims would not fall within the “core of habeas corpus” and must instead be brought under 23 1983, if at all. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[W]e 24 hold that if a state prisoner’s claim does not lie at ‘the core of habeas corpus,’ it may not 25 be brought in habeas corpus but must be brought, ‘if at all,’ under § 1983.”) (quoting first 26 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487; then Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011)); see, e.g. 27 Blanco v. Asuncion, 2019 WL 2144452, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 2019) (Report and 28 Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending dismissal of § 2254 habeas petition seeking in 1 relevant part parole consideration under Proposition 57, reasoning that “Proposition 57 2 does not necessarily make petitioner eligible for an earlier release from prison” because the 3 parole board would still need to determine parole suitability and could deny parole and 4 “[t]herefore, petitioner’s claim falls ‘outside the core of habeas corpus.’”) (quoting and 5 citing Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934); see also Blanco v. Diaz, 2019 WL 3562215 (S.D. Cal. 6 Aug. 6, 2019) (Order adopting R&R, granting motion to dismiss, and denying certificate 7 of appealability). 8 B. Conversion 9 The Court further finds Collier’s complaint is not amenable to conversion to either 10 a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or to a habeas petition pursuant to 28 11 U.S.C. § 2254.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOE ROBERT COLLIER, Case No.: 25-cv-3487-AJB-MMP
12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING CASE 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND DENYING MOTIONS FOR IFP 14 JAMES HILL, Warden, et al., WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT 15 Respondents. 16 17 On October 20, 2025, Petitioner Joe Robert Collier, a state prisoner proceeding pro 18 se, filed a complaint on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights form in the Northern District of 19 California, which was docketed as a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus filed under 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1651. (Doc. No. 1; see also docket in N.D. Cal. Case No. 3:25-cv-08946-LB.)1 On 21 October 20, 2025, Collier also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 22 (“IFP”). (Doc. No. 2.) After the Clerk provided notice to Collier of both the filing fee for a 23 civil action and that he had not submitted his IFP motion on the proper form (Doc. No. 3), 24 on November 7, 2025, Collier filed a second IFP motion (Doc. No. 6). On November 19, 25
26 1 A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 27 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n. 2 (9th Cir. 28 1 2025, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) submitted a 2 copy of his certified trust account statement. (Doc. No. 8.) 3 On December 8, 2025, the Northern District ordered the instant case transferred, 4 noting Collier “filed this pro se civil rights action seeking parole” and “[w]here an action 5 ‘is directed to the manner in which a sentence is being executed, e.g., if it involves parole 6 or time credit claims, the district of confinement is the preferable forum.’ Brown v. Court 7 of Appeals – Third Dist., 2012 WL 368376, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2012).” (Doc. No. 9 at 8 1) (additional citations omitted). Noting that Collier is currently confined at the Richard J. 9 Donovan Correctional Facility, which “lies within the venue of the Southern District of 10 California,” the Northern District transferred the case to this district.2 (Id. at 1–2.) On 11 December 9, 2025, the case was opened in this district and was again docketed as a Petition 12 for a Writ of Mandamus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1651. (See generally docket.) 13 I. DISCUSSION 14 Upon review and for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that this case must 15 be dismissed because it contains contentions pertaining to both federal habeas and civil 16 rights and appears to primarily seek relief only available in habeas corpus, but Collier 17 cannot maintain both types of contentions in a civil suit and his case does not appear 18 amenable to conversion. 19 A. Basis for Filing 20 Challenges to the fact or duration of confinement brought by state prisoners in 21 federal court are brought by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 22 § 2254; challenges to conditions of confinement are brought pursuant to the Civil Rights 23 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488–500 (1973). “[W]hen 24 a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and 25 26 27 2 In ordering the case transferred, the Northern District also specifically indicated that: “The Court takes no position on whether this action should be maintained as a civil rights lawsuit or as a habeas 28 1 the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier 2 release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 3 500. On the other hand, “a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is 4 making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or 5 length of his custody.” Id. at 499. 6 While Collier has captioned his filing as a complaint under the civil rights act, 7 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and appears to contend he is eligible and should be considered for parole 8 under Proposition 57 (see, e.g. Doc. No. 1 at 5, 9–10), Collier indicates in his “prayer for 9 relief” that he seeks “release” from confinement and notably does not indicate he seeks 10 either a parole hearing or parole consideration. (See id. at 7.) Additionally, Collier appears 11 to separately allege that CDCR improperly calculated and/or failed to apply his pre- 12 sentence credits and that he is also currently eligible for parole due to already having served 13 his base term. (See id. at 14–22.) Collier also appears to contend his current punishment 14 has “become grossly disproportionate” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 15 Amendments and asserts “[c]ourts are to consider whether the punishment is so 16 disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions 17 of human dignity.” (Id. at 9) (citation omitted). 18 To the extent Collier seeks immediate “release” from imprisonment (see id. at 7), 19 Collier’s “sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. 20 However, to the extent Collier instead only seeks injunctive type relief compelling CDCR 21 to either consider or reconsider Collier’s eligibility for parole under Proposition 57, such 22 claims would not fall within the “core of habeas corpus” and must instead be brought under 23 1983, if at all. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[W]e 24 hold that if a state prisoner’s claim does not lie at ‘the core of habeas corpus,’ it may not 25 be brought in habeas corpus but must be brought, ‘if at all,’ under § 1983.”) (quoting first 26 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487; then Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011)); see, e.g. 27 Blanco v. Asuncion, 2019 WL 2144452, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 2019) (Report and 28 Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending dismissal of § 2254 habeas petition seeking in 1 relevant part parole consideration under Proposition 57, reasoning that “Proposition 57 2 does not necessarily make petitioner eligible for an earlier release from prison” because the 3 parole board would still need to determine parole suitability and could deny parole and 4 “[t]herefore, petitioner’s claim falls ‘outside the core of habeas corpus.’”) (quoting and 5 citing Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934); see also Blanco v. Diaz, 2019 WL 3562215 (S.D. Cal. 6 Aug. 6, 2019) (Order adopting R&R, granting motion to dismiss, and denying certificate 7 of appealability). 8 B. Conversion 9 The Court further finds Collier’s complaint is not amenable to conversion to either 10 a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or to a habeas petition pursuant to 28 11 U.S.C. § 2254. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936 (“‘If the complaint is amenable to conversion 12 on its face, meaning that it names the correct defendants and seeks the correct relief, the 13 court may recharacterize the petition so long as it warns the pro se litigant of the 14 consequences of the conversion and provides an opportunity for the litigant to withdraw or 15 amend his or her complaint.’”) (quoting Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 16 2005)). 17 First, it is at a minimum unclear whether Collier may instead simply seek a parole 18 eligibility hearing under Proposition 57 rather than immediate release, and because his 19 contentions do not solely lie in either habeas corpus or solely outside the “core of habeas 20 corpus,” id. at 931, the instant complaint does not appear to readily lend itself to conversion 21 to either type of action. Second, the Court notes that the two actions involve different 22 requisite filing fees. All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district 23 court of the United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a 24 filing fee of $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee 25 of $55, although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 26 IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. 27 Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). Meanwhile, “on application for a writ of habeas 28 corpus the filing fee shall be $5.” Id. While Collier has filed two motions for IFP (see Doc. 1 Nos. 2; 6), because Collier’s complaint does not appear amenable to conversion, it is 2 unclear which filing fee is appropriate and thus unclear how to properly consider Collier’s 3 IFP motions. 4 Third and finally, a federal habeas case and a civil rights action involve different 5 state actors as defendant or respondent. As currently pled, Collier names the Warden and 6 the Secretary of the Department of Corrections (see Doc. No. 1 at 1), either of which are a 7 proper Respondent to a habeas action. See e.g. Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125, 126 8 (9th Cir. 1968) (“The actual person who is [the] custodian [of the petitioner] must be the 9 respondent.”); see also Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he 10 ‘state officer having custody’ may be ‘either the warden of the institution in which the 11 petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions.’”) 12 (quoting R. 2(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (2019), advisory committee’s note). 13 However, were this complaint construed as a civil rights action, Collier not only fails to 14 identify any action or inaction of the Warden or of the Secretary he seeks to challenge, 15 Collier also does not name any individual or individuals he alleges were involved in other 16 actions of which he complains, such as those responsible for his current classification and 17 denial of eligibility for parole and it is unclear whether he seeks to hold other state officials 18 responsible for any such alleged wrongs. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 19 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 20 responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 21 caused a constitutional deprivation.”) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370–71 22 (1976)). For these reasons, the Court finds that judicial economy does not counsel in favor 23 of conversion. 24 II. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 25 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DISMISSES Collier’s case without 26 prejudice to refiling his action. To the extent Collier seeks to challenge the fact or length 27 of his custody, he must file a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which will be 28 given a new case number. If Collier instead wishes to challenge the conditions of his 1 || confinement and not the fact or length of his custody, he must file a new civil rights action 2 || pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which will be given a new case number. The Court DENIES 3 |}as MOOT Collicr’s motions for leave to proceed IFP (Doc. Nos. 2; 6) without prejudice 4 ||to reraising a motion for IFP in a new action. 5 The Clerk of Court is directed to send Petitioner a blank In Forma Pauperis 6 || Application, a blank 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Petition form and a blank 42 U.S.C. 7 || § 1983 Civil Rights Complaint form and in forma pauperis application together with a 8 || copy of this Order. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: December 18, 2025 © ¢ Hon. Anthony J. attaglia 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28