Jobanputra v. Kim

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 28, 2022
Docket1:21-cv-07071
StatusUnknown

This text of Jobanputra v. Kim (Jobanputra v. Kim) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jobanputra v. Kim, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JALAK JOBANPUTRA, Plaintiff, -against - OPINION & ORDER 21 Civ. 7071 (ER) YOON KIM, and MOCHI CAPITAL, LLC, Defendants. RAMOS, D.J.: Jalak Jobanputra brings this action against Yoon Kim and Mochi Capital, LLC, alleging that they are withholding her share of the profits resulting from the parties’ joint cryptocurrency investment venture. Doc. 1. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Doc. 19. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. I. BACKGROUND1 a. The Parties Jobanputra, a financial and blockchain technology (“fintech”) expert with over 20 years of experience in venture capital, ¶ 16, is domiciled in Florida but at all relevant times was a

resident of New York, ¶ 8. Kim, the head of research at a digital asset fund, ¶ 23, is a citizen and resident of New York, ¶ 9. Mochi, which is completely controlled and managed by Kim, is organized under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in New York. ¶¶ 10–11. During all relevant times Mochi was, and remains, the alter-ego of Kim. ¶ 11

1 The following facts are based on the allegations in the complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of the instant motion. Unless otherwise noted, citations to “¶ __” refer to the complaint, Doc. 1. b. The Joint Venture Kim and Jobanputra met in 2005 or 2006 through mutual acquaintances and for years afterwards maintained a cordial friendship. ¶ 3. In August 2017, Kim, whose experience in fintech is considerably less than that of Jobanputra, reached out to Jobanputra to discuss a joint business venture, whereby Jobanputra and Kim would pool their respective expertise and

resources to make cryptocurrency investments. ¶ 3–4. Jobanputra considered Kim’s offer only because the venture fund that she managed at the time—and in which Kim was an investor—did not permit her to invest in crypto assets. ¶ 4. Ultimately, Jobanputra agreed, and the parties orally entered into a joint business venture (the “Agreement”) that month. Id. According to the terms of the Agreement, Jobanputra would contribute her experience, credentials, and business network, including her proprietary investment analysis, to identify viable cryptocurrency investments, and Kim would provide liquid capital for the investments. ¶ 5. Profits would be split, with Jobanputra receiving 20% and Kim receiving the remaining 80%. ¶ 24. Apart from her 20% stake, Jobanputra’s work would be unpaid. Id. Jobanputra further

had the option of converting her share of the cryptocurrency into capital contributions so that she would share in potential investment losses—in addition to the losses suffered from unpaid labor—in exchange for a higher share of profits. ¶ 25. Every investment required Jobanputra and Kim’s joint approval. ¶ 26. Some of the investments made by Jobanputra and Kim were in cryptocurrencies that were in the process of technological development and, thus, were not immediately transferrable. Jobanputra and Kim agreed that the profits would be distributed once the relevant cryptocurrency was transferrable. ¶ 25. Specifically, they could realize profits either by selling the assets or by using the assets on their respective networks (e.g., by “staking”2 rewards). Id. Because Kim would be transferring the capital for the investments, the assets from each investment would be distributed once the tokens became transferable pursuant to the terms of each token sale. Id. c. The First Investment: Polkadot (DOTs and KSMs) Early into their venture, Jobanputra identified an opportunity to invest in Polkadot tokens

(“DOTs”), a cryptocurrency being issued by the Web 3 Foundation (“Web 3”). ¶ 27. Though this opportunity was not available to the crypto community at large, Jobanputra leveraged her considerable network to access the token sale. Id. In September 2017, she secured an allocation of DOTs for the joint venture. ¶¶ 27–28. Kim advised Jobanputra that Mochi would be an appropriate corporate vehicle through which to purchase the DOTs. ¶ 28. Jobanputra, however, was to be the main point of contact with Web 3. Id. Accordingly, Kim appointed Jobanputra as a director of Mochi at the end of that month. Id. To execute the purchase, in October 2017, Kim entered into an agreement with Web 3 (the Simple Agreement for Tokens, or “SAFT”) on behalf of Mochi and paid Web 3 $150,000. ¶

29. Kim also sent Web 3 a cryptocurrency wallet address controlled by Kim, which would receive the DOTs. ¶ 29. On October 29, 2017, Web 3 distributed 5,320.101 DOTs to Kim’s crypto-wallet. ¶ 30. Because the network on which the DOTs could be used, Polkadot, was still under technological development, the DOTs were not transferable at that time. Id. Additionally, the SAFT specified that the DOTs could not be transferred until the “deployment of the Polkadot genesis block” and that Web 3 would use its best efforts to deploy the genesis block within two years. Id.

2 Staking is the process by which the owner of tokens on a particular blockchain network assist with validating transactions in exchange for payment in form of cryptocurrency. Staking can be lucrative, but validators risk losing their tokens if they approve transactions that do not conform to the database’s internal rules. Approximately a year and a half later, in July 2019, Web 3 announced that holders of DOTs were entitled to an equal amount of Kusama (“KSM”) tokens for use on Polkadot’s network. ¶ 33. The partnership thereby became entitled to 5,320.101 KSMs (in addition to their 5,320.101 DOTs), which did not become fully transferable until December 2019. Id. At that point, pursuant to the Agreement, Kim was entitled to her share of KSMs. To date, however,

Kim has not given Jobanputra her 20% stake (1,064 KSMs). As a result, since December 2019, Jobanputra has missed out on the opportunity to sell KSM at a profit or, alternatively, profit from staking KSM. Id. By August 18, 2020, the DOTs became transferable; that day, Jobanputra notified Kim of their transferability via email, but Kim never responded. ¶ 37–38. As of August 21, 2020, the Polkadot changed the denomination of its DOT token. Id. ¶ 37. Accordingly, the original 5,320.101 DOTs issued to Kim’s crypto wallet were redenominated to 532,010.10 DOTs. Id. Kim has not yet transferred to Jobanputra her 20% of the DOTs to which she is entitled to under the SAFT (106,402.02 DOTs after redenomination). Id. As a result, since August 2020,

Jobanputra has missed out on the opportunity to sell DOT at a profit or, alternatively, profit from staking DOT. Id d. The Second Investment: Blockstack (STX Tokens) One month after the initial investment, in November 2017, Jobanputra and Kim invested in token sale of Blockstack, another cryptocurrency database; Kim paid $25,000 for 208,333 STX tokens, a cryptocurrency designed to operate on Blockstack’s Stacks Network. ¶ 31. When the STX were initially transferred to Kim’s cryptocurrency wallet, they were non-transferable because the Stacks Network had not yet been deployed. Id. The STX tokens became transferable in January 2021. ¶ 39. Kim has not yet transferred to Jobanputra her 20% of the STX tokens to which she is entitled to under the Agreement (41,667 STX tokens). Id. As a result, since January 2021, Jobanputra has missed out on the opportunity to sell STX at a profit or, alternatively, profit from staking STX. Id. e. The Investor Presentation In late 2019 and early 2020, approximately two and a half years into the venture,

Jobanputa and Kim considered including other investors in their joint venture. ¶ 39. A presentation that they prepared for prospective investors represented that they jointly invested in both DOT and STX tokens, and that these investments were owned by both of them. Id.

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