Joanne Souelliard, et al. v. Jeffrey Howard, et al.

E.D. Michigan

Joanne Souelliard, et al. v. Jeffrey Howard, et al.

DecidedJanuary 13, 2026

Docket5:25-cv-14198

StatusUnknown

This text of Joanne Souelliard, et al. v. Jeffrey Howard, et al. (Joanne Souelliard, et al. v. Jeffrey Howard, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Joanne Souelliard, et al. v. Jeffrey Howard, et al., (E.D. Mich. 2026).

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Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Joanne Souelliard, et al.

Plaintiffs/Petitioners, Case No. 25-14198

v. Judith E. Levy United States District Judge Jeffrey Howard, et al., Mag. Judge David R. Grand Defendants/Respondents.

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OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING SEVERAL PLAINTIFFS/PETITIONERS, STRIKING THE COMPLAINT AND/OR PETITION [1] FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT’S ORDER, AND DISMISSING THE CASE

On December 31, 2025, this case was initiated with a document titled, “complaint and demand for jury trial on joint petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2265.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiffs “Joanne Souelliard,” “Robin Kraemer,” “Mary (Travis) Shooltz,” “Tina Bommarito,” “Andrea (Bommarito) Walker,” “Carli (Boike) Carpenter,” and Derrick Lee Cardello-Smith, bring suit against a variety of Defendants and also seek habeas relief for Cardello-Smith.1 (Id. at PageID.1.) As set forth in the complaint, Plaintiffs (other than Cardello-

Smith) identify themselves as “false rape victim[s]” who “framed” Cardello-Smith. (Id. at PageID.2, 4–5.) The complaint claims that “Sean

Combs is behind all of this” and “is funding this.” (Id. at PageID.6.) All Plaintiffs request that Cardello-Smith be released from custody and that a jury trial be granted for various matters. (Id. at PageID.6–7.)

For the reasons set forth below, all Plaintiffs except Cardello-Smith are dismissed, the complaint is stricken for failure to follow the Court’s order, and the case is dismissed.

I. Dismissing all Plaintiffs but Cardello-Smith for lack of standing The Court first dismisses all Plaintiffs but Cardello-Smith for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether

subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H

1 The initiating document in this case is described as both a complaint and a petition. For the sake of simplicity, the Court will address the Plaintiff/Petitioners solely as “Plaintiffs,” Defendants/Respondents solely as “Defendants,” and the initiating document as “the complaint.” Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)). The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when a litigant cannot establish constitutional standing.

Glennborough Homeowners Ass’n v. U.S. Postal Serv., 21 F.4th 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2021). To establish constitutional standing, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that they personally experienced an injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and is likely to be addressed by the relief sought. Babcock v. Michigan, 812 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2016); see

also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (stating that the injury “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way” (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))).

Here, the Plaintiffs aside from Cardello-Smith lack standing because they do not plead that they experienced an injury that is likely to be addressed by the relief sought. In their statement of relief sought,

they seek a jury trial “on the standing that we have,” “on our one voice to be heard,” “next-friend status,” and “on this case being assigned to a different judge,” and for Cardello-Smith to be released from state

custody. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) To the extent that a jury trial can be a form of relief in and of itself, these Plaintiffs do not adequately plead an injury that would be remedied by a jury trial on these issues. Additionally, these Plaintiffs do not adequately plead an injury that would be remedied by Cardello-Smith’s release from custody. His release

from custody would benefit Cardello-Smith, not these Plaintiffs. As such, these Plaintiffs lack standing.2

Similarly, to the extent these Plaintiffs filed a habeas petition on behalf of Cardello-Smith, they also lack standing to do so. This is not the first time that a habeas petition regarding Cardello-Smith was

supposedly filed by or with another person. See Carpenter ex rel. Cardello-Smith v. King, No. 2:24-CV-11176, 2024 WL 3974211 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2024) (Grey, J.); Preston v. Wayne Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off.,

No. 25-CV-12447, 2025 WL 2487774, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2025) (White, J.). As set forth in Preston, An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be filed by one person on behalf of another. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (“Application for writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.”). However, “next friend” status will not be granted

2 The complaint also requests that Wayne County Prosecutor Kym Worthy be arrested and “placed in prison.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Assuming that this is another form of relief sought, Plaintiffs do not have standing for this form of relief “because a private citizen ‘lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non- prosecution of another.’” Feiler v. Johnson, No. 223CV11225TGBKGA, 2023 WL 4831424, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 27, 2023) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). automatically. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 [ ] (1990). Two “firmly rooted prerequisites” must be satisfied before “next friend” status will be conferred. Id. First, “a ‘next friend’ must provide an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.” Id. Secondly, “the ‘next friend’ must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate.” Id. Restrictions have been imposed upon whom may act as a “next friend” because “[i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends.” Id. at 164 [ ]. Where a habeas petitioner seeks to proceed as the next friend of a state inmate, the burden is upon the petitioner to establish the propriety of his status to justify the court’s jurisdiction. See Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1998). Preston, 2025 WL 2487774, at *3. Here, these Plaintiffs are not entitled to serve as a “next friend” for Cardello-Smith “because they failed to allege or present evidence that Cardello-Smith is incompetent or incapable of bringing a habeas petition on his own behalf, nor have [they] presented evidence that they are truly dedicated to Cardello-Smith’s interests.” Id. at *4. Further, Cardello-Smith is a Plaintiff in this case; as such, he is clearly capable of bringing a petition on his own behalf. Thus, Plaintiffs aside from Cardello-Smith are dismissed from the suit for lack of standing. II.

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