Opinion of the Court by
Justice MINTON.
The Court of Appeals denied relief to a wife and her husband who petitioned to prohibit the family court from adjudicating the paternity of a man who claimed to be the biological father of a baby born to the wife. On appeal, the principal issue is whether Kentucky’s courts have jurisdiction to decide a man’s claim of paternity of a child born to a woman who, at the time of the child’s birth, was married to another man. We hold that Kentucky’s paternity statutes do not grant subject-matter jurisdiction to our courts to determine paternity claims where, as here, there is no evidence or allegation that the marital relationship ceased ten months before the child’s birth. Therefore, we conclude that the family court was attempting to proceed without jurisdiction and that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to grant the writ of prohibition.
I. FACTS.
J.G.R. filed a Petition for Custody and Support in the family court, alleging that DNA tests confirmed him to be the biological father of J.A.R (Child), a three-month-old baby boy, who lived with his mother, J.N.R. (Wife).
Wife moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that J.G.R. lacked standing to bring it and that the family court had no jurisdiction to determine (1) custody of Child because J.G.R. had not been lawfully adjudicated to be his father and (2) paternity of Child because Child was not born out of wedlock since Wife was married to J.S.R. (Husband) when Child was born and at the time the petition was filed. Wife further asserted the continued vitality of the legal presumption that a child born to a married woman is presumed to be the child of her husband. She argued that the presumption could not be rebutted by “a stranger to the marriage.” The family court refused to dismiss J.G.R.’s petition.
Wife and Husband then sought a writ from the Court of Appeals to prohibit the family court from proceeding on J.G.R.’s claims.1 The Court of Appeals denied the writ, holding that Wife and Husband failed to show irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy by appeal. The Court of Appeals further stated that “the only decision made by the [family] court pertaining to J.G.R.’s petition is that it will go forward on the paternity docket” and noted the family court had not made any rulings adjudicating any claims.
II. ANALYSIS.
A. Court of Appeals Applied Wrong Standard to Writ of Prohibition Issue.
The Court of Appeals denied the writ of prohibition based upon Wife and Husband’s failure to show irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy by appeal. If the Wife and Husband had alleged only that the family court was acting erroneously within its jurisdiction, a showing of irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy by appeal would have been required for the writ to issue.2 But recent case law has made clear that a showing of irreparable injury and lack of adequate [589]*589remedy by appeal is not required for issuance of a writ of prohibition when the trial court is acting outside its jurisdiction.3 A court vested with supervisory control should grant a writ of prohibition when the lower court is acting outside its jurisdiction and “there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court.” Despite Wife and Husband’s arguments that the family court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, the Court of Appeals denied the writ on the erroneous grounds of Wife and Husband’s failure to show irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy by appeal. The Court of Appeals failed to analyze whether the family court had jurisdiction to hear and decide J.G.R.’s petition.
B. Family Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction to Hear Case.
Since personal jurisdiction is not at issue, we focus on whether the family court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. Subject-matter jurisdiction is defined as “[jjurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought[,] the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things.”4 From the outset, Wife and Husband have disputed the family court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to accept a petition in which the alleged biological father of a child, born to a woman who is married to another man, seeks to establish paternity, custody, support, and visitation of the child.
We must look to our statutes to see whether our trial courts have been granted subject-matter jurisdiction over a case like this one. We do not explore whether our statutes conferring subject-matter jurisdiction effectuate sound public policy, reflect the modern realities of DNA testing, or recognize the disappearance of ancient legal disabilities associated with being born out of wedlock. And we do not address the constitutionality of the statutes as written. Although the parties have debated whether an unmarried biological father has due process or equal protection rights to seek the relief J.G.R. seeks here, J.G.R. has not argued the uneonstitutionality of the paternity statutes as written nor served Kentucky’s Attorney General to challenge the constitutionality of any statute.5 So we are left to examine the words of our statutes to see whether the family [590]*590court had jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate J.N.R.’s paternity petition.
C. No Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over This Case Under KRS Chapter JJJ6.
Subject-matter jurisdiction over paternity proceedings for all of our trial courts is governed by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 406, also known as the Uniform Act on Paternity.6 KRS 406.051(1) provides the district court with subject-matter jurisdiction over “an action brought under this chapter” to establish support for “children born out of wedlock.” KRS 406.051(2) states that the circuit court and district court share concurrent jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues “in cases where paternity is established as set forth in this chapter.” And KRS 23A.100(2)(b) confers the general jurisdiction of the circuit court on a family court division of the circuit court for proceedings under the Uniform Act on Paternity.
Despite the fact that KRS 406.021 states that a paternity complaint may be filed by a “putative father,”7 a term not defined in KRS Chapter 406, the instant case is not an action “under this chapter”; and KRS 406.021 does not allow for paternity to be established because KRS Chapter 406 limits its applicability to cases of children “born out of wedlock” and establishes a definition of “born out of wedlock” that the facts of this case do not satisfy. KRS 406.180
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Opinion of the Court by
Justice MINTON.
The Court of Appeals denied relief to a wife and her husband who petitioned to prohibit the family court from adjudicating the paternity of a man who claimed to be the biological father of a baby born to the wife. On appeal, the principal issue is whether Kentucky’s courts have jurisdiction to decide a man’s claim of paternity of a child born to a woman who, at the time of the child’s birth, was married to another man. We hold that Kentucky’s paternity statutes do not grant subject-matter jurisdiction to our courts to determine paternity claims where, as here, there is no evidence or allegation that the marital relationship ceased ten months before the child’s birth. Therefore, we conclude that the family court was attempting to proceed without jurisdiction and that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to grant the writ of prohibition.
I. FACTS.
J.G.R. filed a Petition for Custody and Support in the family court, alleging that DNA tests confirmed him to be the biological father of J.A.R (Child), a three-month-old baby boy, who lived with his mother, J.N.R. (Wife).
Wife moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that J.G.R. lacked standing to bring it and that the family court had no jurisdiction to determine (1) custody of Child because J.G.R. had not been lawfully adjudicated to be his father and (2) paternity of Child because Child was not born out of wedlock since Wife was married to J.S.R. (Husband) when Child was born and at the time the petition was filed. Wife further asserted the continued vitality of the legal presumption that a child born to a married woman is presumed to be the child of her husband. She argued that the presumption could not be rebutted by “a stranger to the marriage.” The family court refused to dismiss J.G.R.’s petition.
Wife and Husband then sought a writ from the Court of Appeals to prohibit the family court from proceeding on J.G.R.’s claims.1 The Court of Appeals denied the writ, holding that Wife and Husband failed to show irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy by appeal. The Court of Appeals further stated that “the only decision made by the [family] court pertaining to J.G.R.’s petition is that it will go forward on the paternity docket” and noted the family court had not made any rulings adjudicating any claims.
II. ANALYSIS.
A. Court of Appeals Applied Wrong Standard to Writ of Prohibition Issue.
The Court of Appeals denied the writ of prohibition based upon Wife and Husband’s failure to show irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy by appeal. If the Wife and Husband had alleged only that the family court was acting erroneously within its jurisdiction, a showing of irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy by appeal would have been required for the writ to issue.2 But recent case law has made clear that a showing of irreparable injury and lack of adequate [589]*589remedy by appeal is not required for issuance of a writ of prohibition when the trial court is acting outside its jurisdiction.3 A court vested with supervisory control should grant a writ of prohibition when the lower court is acting outside its jurisdiction and “there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court.” Despite Wife and Husband’s arguments that the family court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, the Court of Appeals denied the writ on the erroneous grounds of Wife and Husband’s failure to show irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy by appeal. The Court of Appeals failed to analyze whether the family court had jurisdiction to hear and decide J.G.R.’s petition.
B. Family Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction to Hear Case.
Since personal jurisdiction is not at issue, we focus on whether the family court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. Subject-matter jurisdiction is defined as “[jjurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought[,] the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things.”4 From the outset, Wife and Husband have disputed the family court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to accept a petition in which the alleged biological father of a child, born to a woman who is married to another man, seeks to establish paternity, custody, support, and visitation of the child.
We must look to our statutes to see whether our trial courts have been granted subject-matter jurisdiction over a case like this one. We do not explore whether our statutes conferring subject-matter jurisdiction effectuate sound public policy, reflect the modern realities of DNA testing, or recognize the disappearance of ancient legal disabilities associated with being born out of wedlock. And we do not address the constitutionality of the statutes as written. Although the parties have debated whether an unmarried biological father has due process or equal protection rights to seek the relief J.G.R. seeks here, J.G.R. has not argued the uneonstitutionality of the paternity statutes as written nor served Kentucky’s Attorney General to challenge the constitutionality of any statute.5 So we are left to examine the words of our statutes to see whether the family [590]*590court had jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate J.N.R.’s paternity petition.
C. No Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over This Case Under KRS Chapter JJJ6.
Subject-matter jurisdiction over paternity proceedings for all of our trial courts is governed by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 406, also known as the Uniform Act on Paternity.6 KRS 406.051(1) provides the district court with subject-matter jurisdiction over “an action brought under this chapter” to establish support for “children born out of wedlock.” KRS 406.051(2) states that the circuit court and district court share concurrent jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues “in cases where paternity is established as set forth in this chapter.” And KRS 23A.100(2)(b) confers the general jurisdiction of the circuit court on a family court division of the circuit court for proceedings under the Uniform Act on Paternity.
Despite the fact that KRS 406.021 states that a paternity complaint may be filed by a “putative father,”7 a term not defined in KRS Chapter 406, the instant case is not an action “under this chapter”; and KRS 406.021 does not allow for paternity to be established because KRS Chapter 406 limits its applicability to cases of children “born out of wedlock” and establishes a definition of “born out of wedlock” that the facts of this case do not satisfy. KRS 406.180 (governing applicability of Chapter 406) states, in pertinent part, that “[t]his chapter applies to all cases of birth out of wedlock: (l)[w]here birth occurs within this state[.]” And KRS 406.011 defines who is included and who is not included in the term “born out of wedlock:”
A child born during lawful wedlock, or within ten (10) months thereafter, is presumed to be the child of the husband and wife. However, a child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than her husband where evidence shows that the marital relationship between the husband and wife ceased ten (10) months prior to the birth of the child.
We note that the General Assembly chose to enact a narrow definition of an out-of-wedlock birth that differs distinctively from the proposed definition of an [591]*591out-of-wedlock birth proposed by the drafters in the 1960 Uniform Act on Paternity. Section 1 of the Uniform Act on Paternity (1960) states that: “[a] child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than her husband.”8 The official commentary to this section mentions Kentucky’s variation from the Uniform Act draft.9
By the plain language of Chapter 406, that chapter only applies to births out of wedlock. And it defines births out of wedlock as including births to married women where evidence shows that the husband and wife’s “marital relationship” ceased ten months before the child’s birth.10 In the instant case, we have no allegation that Wife and Husband’s marital relationship had ceased ten months before Child’s birth. So Child does not meet the statutory definition of a child born out of wedlock, and Chapter 406 does not grant the family court subject-matter jurisdiction or give J.G.R. standing to seek a paternity determination under Chapter 406.11
We recognize that the Court of Appeals rejected an argument in Montgomery v. McCracken12 that “a child born to a married woman can be found to have been born out of wedlock only if the spouses’ marital relationship ended at least ten months prior to the child’s birth.”13 But the holding in Montgomery depended in large part upon the effect of a non-appealed judicial finding from an earlier divorce proceeding to the effect that the woman’s husband was not the father of the child:
Here, although the spouses’ marital relationship did not fall into the category of having ceased ten months prior to the child’s birth, it is uncontroverted that the husband was found in an earlier circuit court proceeding to not be the child’s father. That finding is not before us on appeal. That being so, the trial court certainly did not err by concluding that the presumption of legitimacy had been overcome by evidence “so clear, distinct and convincing as to remove the question from the realm of reasonable doubt.”14
The Montgomery court then cited in support of this proposition two cases in which the husband’s paternity was successfully challenged despite the mother having been married at the time of the child’s birth.15 But, in both of the cases cited, some evidence (albeit disputed) was presented that marital relations ceased ten months before the child’s birth — in fact, both cases involved the separation of the spouses.16
[592]*592The Montgomery court then stated that subject-matter jurisdiction to determine paternity upon the mother’s motion was proper because of the overwhelming proof that the husband was not the father of the child:
Since the child therefore by implication was found by the circuit court to have been “born out of wedlock” to “a married woman by a man other than her husband,” the district court was clearly vested with subject matter jurisdiction to determine paternity.17
To the extent that Montgomery v. McCracken and other Kentucky cases find subject-matter jurisdiction to exist in any court of the Commonwealth over paternity actions involving (1) a child born “to a married woman by a man other than her husband” who cannot satisfy (2) the narrow definition embraced by the General Assembly that a child born out wedlock includes one where the husband and wife ceased marital relations ten months before the child’s birth, Montgomery v. McCracken and other authority to the contrary are overruled.
Montgomery v. McCracken is inconsistent with the earlier holding in Department of Economic Security v. Shanklin.
The Uniform Act on Paternity was formulated in 1960. The Kentucky Legislature, by a 1972 amendment, varied the language of the 1960 Uniform Act in two instances: (1) In defining what was meant by the phrase “born out of wedlock” by adopting the language of KRS 406.011, and (b) by substituting for a four-year statute of limitations contained in the 1960 Uniform Act, the language of KRS 406.031. [Omitted portion discusses how legislature tried to remedy uncertainty in 1960 Uniform Act limitations provision through adoption of KRS 406.031.]
We would be less than candid if we did not point out that the language used for the clarification is surely no model of precision. According to KRS 406.011, a child born during lawful wedlock or within ten months thereafter, is presumed to be the child of the husband and wife. This is qualified by the provision that a child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than her husband where evidence shows that the marital relationship between the husband and wife ceased ten months prior to the birth of the child.
Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,[21] the issue of paternity may be raised by the defendant unless it has been previously judicially determined. It is our conclusion that, despite the confusing language, it [593]*593was not the intent of the legislature to bar such action within three years of the date of birth of a child born with the presumption of legitimacy.22
In other words, the Shanklin court found Chapter 406 inapplicable to that case because the child at issue was not a child “born out of wedlock” as defined by KRS 406.011. Since the child was “born with the presumption of legitimacy,” the father was not barred from disputing paternity by the limitations provision in Chapter 406; but the father could still dispute paternity because Chapter 407 (URESA) allowed him to challenge paternity so long as it had not been previously established in court. Likewise, in the instant case, the child was not born out of wedlock, as defined by Chapter 406, so Chapter 406 does not apply and does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the family court or standing on J.G.R. to have paternity determined and custody/visitation matters decided.
We recognize that the General Assembly may have chosen to bar paternity suits where there is no allegation of a cessation of marital relations for the ten-month period in part because of difficulties in accurately determining the biological father of a child at the time these statutes were enacted or amended to their present form. In view of modern DNA testing, the legislature might reasonably choose to amend the statutes again to recognize an alleged biological father’s right to have paternity determined in court of a child born to a mother married to another man even where (as here) there is no evidence or allegation that marital relations ceased ten months before the child’s birth.23 But the choice is a policy decision that belongs to the General Assembly. And since the General Assembly has not yet chosen to amend KRS Chapter 406 in such a manner, we are without authority to amend the law for them.
It is the absence of evidence or even allegations that the marital relationship between Wife and Husband ceased ten months before Child’s birth that bars J.G.R.’s paternity action, not J.G.R.’s status as a “stranger to the marriage.” We do not reach the Wife and Husband’s argument that only parties to the marriage can challenge the presumption of legitimacy under KRS 406.011. We do note that the plain language of KRS 406.011 does not say who may challenge the presumption of legitimacy but only says under what circumstances a child born to a married woman can be considered a child born out of wedlock. In fact, if the required threshold is met, showing that marital relations ceased ten months before the birth of the child, it would seem possible that the alleged biological father may file a paternity complaint because KRS 406.021 specifically states that such a complaint may be filed by the “putative father.” The term “putative father” is not defined by the statute, but it is defined by Black’s Law
[594]*594Dictionary (8th ed.2004) as “[t]he alleged biological father of a child born out of wedlock.”
D. No Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under KRS ⅛03370.
Not relying solely on Chapter 406, J.G.R. also contends that as a biological parent, he has standing to seek custody under KRS 403.270. KRS 403.270(2) provides that a court shall determine custody in the child’s best interests and that “equal consideration shall be given to each parent.” But nowhere in KRS Chapter 403 is the word “parent” defined.24
Furthermore, KRS 403.270 does not govern whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction over custody proceedings in this type of case or whether an alleged biological father has standing to pursue custody or visitation in this situation. KRS Chapter 403 is entitled “Dissolution of Marriage — Child Custody.” The statutes in Chapter 403 generally give courts of general jurisdiction the power to grant dissolutions and annulments of marriages and decrees of legal separation — in general, the power to terminate marriages.25 As part of its jurisdiction to dissolve marriages, the family court may also divide property, order spousal maintenance, and order child support for any children born of the marriage.26 Also, when granting a divorce, the trial court must determine the custody of children born to the marriage in accordance with the standards enunciated in KRS 403.270. But KRS 403.270 does not govern whether .a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine custody of children in cases not involving a dissolution of marriage.
Where paternity has been established under Chapter 406, subject-matter jurisdiction regarding custody and visitation issues is governed by KRS 406.051, which states that:
(1) The District Court has jurisdiction of an action brought under this [595]*595chapter and all remedies for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for children born out of wedlock. An appeal may be had to the Circuit Court if prosecuted within sixty (60) days from the date of judgment. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a judgment for future education. All remedies under the uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act are available for enforcement of duties of support under this chapter.
(2) The District Court may exercise jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the Circuit Court, to determine matters of child custody and visitation in cases where paternity is established as set forth in this chapter. The District Court, in making these determinations, shall utilize the provisions of KRS Chapter 403 relating to child custody and visitation. The District Court may decline jurisdiction if it finds the circumstances of any case require a level of proceedings more appropriate to the Circuit Court.
Although KRS 406.051 states that the same standards provided in Chapter 403 for divorce cases shall govern custody determinations conducted in conjunction with paternity proceedings, KRS 406.051 and Chapter 406 as a whole govern subject-matter jurisdiction in this type of case, not KRS 403.270 or any other provision of Chapter 403. So KRS 406.051(2) grants the district court and circuit court concurrent jurisdiction (and by implication, family court, which combines district and circuit court jurisdiction) over custody and visitation where paternity is determined under Chapter 406. But Chapter 406’s applicability is expressly limited to cases of children “born out of wedlock,” and Child does not meet the General Assembly’s narrow definition of a child born out of wedlock.27
From the plain language of our statutes, we hold that J.G.R. lacks standing and the family court lacks jurisdiction to determine paternity, custody, and visitation under the circumstances presented in this case.
III. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for issuance of a writ of prohibition consistent with this opinion.
All sitting. LAMBERT, C.J., concurs. CUNNINGHAM, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion in which SCOTT, J., joins. SCOTT, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion in which [596]*596CUNNINGHAM, J., joins. ABRAMSON, J., dissents by separate opinion in which SCHRODER, J., joins. NOBLE, J., dissents by separate opinion.
21. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) was then and is now found in KRS Chapter 407.