Slip Op. 26-30
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
JINKO SOLAR IMPORT AND EXPORT CO. LTD., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
and
JA SOLAR TECHNOLOGY YANGZHOU CO., LTD., ET AL.,
Plaintiff-Intervenors, Before: Claire R. Kelly, Judge
v. Consol. Court No. 22-00219
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
AMERICAN ALLIANCE FOR SOLAR MANUFACTURING,
Defendant-Intervenor.
OPINION AND ORDER
[Sustaining in part and remanding in part Commerce’s redetermination.]
Dated: March 30, 2026
Ned H. Marshak, Dharmendra N. Choudhary, Jordan C. Kahn, Brandon M. Petelin, and Elaine F. Wang, Grunfeld Desiderio Lebowitz Silverman & Klestadt LLP, of New York, NY and Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs Jinko Solar Import and Export Co. Ltd., Jinko Solar Co., Ltd., Jinkosolar Technology (Haining) Co., Ltd., Yuhuan Jinko Solar Co., Ltd., Zhejiang Jinko Solar Co., Ltd., Jiangsu Jinko Tiansheng Solar Co., Ltd., Jinkosolar (Chuzhou) Co., Ltd., Jinkosolar (Yiwu) Co., Ltd., and Jinkosolar (Shangrao) Co., Ltd. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 2
Jonathan M. Freed, Robert G. Gosselink, and Kenneth N. Hammer, Trade Pacific PLLC, of Washington D.C., for consolidated plaintiffs Trina Solar Co., Ltd., Trina Solar (Changzhou) Science & Technology Co., Ltd., Changzhou Trina Solar Yabang Energy Co., Ltd., Turpan Trina Solar Energy Co., Ltd., Trina Solar (Hefei) Science & Technology Co., Ltd., Changzhou Trina Hezhong Photoelectric Co., Ltd.
Jeffrey S. Grimson, Sarah M. Wyss, Bryan P. Cenko, Jill A. Cramer, Kristin H. Mowry, Savannah Rose Maxwell, and Yixin (Cleo) Li, Mowry & Grimson, PLLC, of Washington D.C., for consolidated plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors JA Solar Technology Yangzhou Co., Ltd., and Shanghai JA Solar Technology Co., Ltd.
Craig A. Lewis, Lindsay K. Brown, and Nicholas W. Laneville, I, Hogan Lovells US LLP, of Washington D.C., for consolidated plaintiff BYD (Shangluo) Industrial Co., Ltd.
Gregory S. Menegaz, Alexandra H. Salzman, and Vivien J. Wang, The Inter-Global Trade Law Group PLLC, of Washington D.C., for consolidated plaintiff and plaintiff- intervenor Risen Energy Co., Ltd.
An Hoang and Kara M. Westercamp, Commercial Litigation Branch – Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, D.C., for defendant United States. Of counsel were Fee Pauwels, Jack Dunkelman, and William M. Purdy, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, D.C.
Timothy C. Brightbill, Laura El-Sabaawi, Stephanie M. Bell, and Paul A. Devamithran, Wiley Rein, LLP, of Washington D.C., for defendant-intervenor American Alliance for Solar Manufacturing.
Kelly, Judge: Before the Court is the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
(“Commerce”) Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, Sept. 26,
2025, ECF No. 147 (“Second Remand Results”) pursuant to this Court’s remand order
in the 2019–20 administrative review of the antidumping duty (“AD”) order covering
crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not assembled into modules, from the
People’s Republic of China (“China”). See Jinko Solar Imp. & Exp. Co. v. United
States, 789 F. Supp. 3d 1275 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2025) (“Jinko II”); see also 87 Fed. Reg. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 3
38,379 (Dep’t Commerce June 28, 2022), as amended by Crystalline Silicon
Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into Modules, From the People’s
Republic of China, 87 Fed. Reg. 48,621 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 10, 2022) (amended
final results) (“Final Results”) and accompanying Issues and Decision Memo., Oct. 5,
2022, ECF No. 24-5 (“Final Decision Memo.”).
BACKGROUND
The Court presumes familiarity with the facts set forth in Jinko Solar Import
and Export Co. v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 3d 1367 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2024) (“Jinko
I”) and Jinko II, and recounts only those pertinent to the instant matter. See
generally Jinko I, 701 F. Supp. 3d 1367; Jinko II, 789 F. Supp. 3d 1275. On December
7, 2012, Commerce published the AD order on solar cells from China. See generally
Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into Modules from
the People’s Republic of China, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,018 (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 7, 2012)
(amended final determination). On February 4, 2021, Commerce initiated the eighth
administrative review of the AD order. See generally Initiation of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,166, 8,168–69 (Dep’t
Commerce Feb. 4, 2021). Commerce selected Plaintiff Jinko Solar Import and Export
Co., Ltd. (“Jinko” or “Plaintiff”) and Consolidated Plaintiff and Plaintiff-Intervenor,
Risen Energy Co., Ltd. (“Risen”), as mandatory respondents. Respond. Select. Memo.
at 1–5, PD 53, CD 5, bar code 4092031-01 (Feb. 25, 2021). Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 4
On December 23, 2021, Commerce published its preliminary results. See
generally Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into
Modules, from the People’s Republic of China; 2019–20, 86 Fed. Reg. 72,923 (Dep’t
Commerce Dec. 23, 2021) (preliminary results and partial rescission) (“Preliminary
Results”) and accompanying preliminary issues and decision memo. (“Prelim.
Decision Memo.”). On August 10, 2022, Commerce issued its final results. See
generally Final Results; Final Decision Memo.
Because Commerce treats China as a nonmarket economy (“NME”) when
calculating the dumping margins for the mandatory respondents, Commerce
determined the surrogate value (“SV”) of the respondents’ entries of subject
merchandise by using data from a surrogate market economy country (“surrogate
country”) to value the factors of production (“FOP”). See Section 773(c)(4) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). 1 Commerce chose Malaysia as the
primary surrogate country for valuing all of respondents’ FOPs to construct normal
value for purposes of calculating dumping margins. Prelim. Decision Memo. at 16–
19, 23–28; Final Decision Memo. at 18.
Commerce preliminarily valued respondents’ anti-reflective-coated (“AR-
coated”) solar glass using Romanian HTS 7007.19.80 import data, rather than
Malaysia’s HTS 7007.19.90 data, finding that the Romanian data was more specific,
1 Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2018 edition. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 5
reliable, and accurate to the input. [Commerce] Prelim. [SV] Memo. at 3, PD 403, bar
code 4194750-01 (Apr. 16, 2021) (“Commerce Prelim. SV Memo.”); Final Decision
Memo. at 15. Commerce applied partial facts available with an adverse inference to
value Risen’s missing data after finding that Risen failed to provide all requested
data and, by continuing to use suppliers that did not cooperate with Commerce’s
requests, failed to cooperate to the best of its ability. Prelim. Decision Memo. at 15–
16; Final Decision Memo. at 8–13. Commerce calculated a rate using facts otherwise
available with an adverse inference, which it determined to be “sufficiently adverse”
to incentivize cooperation. Prelim. Decision Memo. at 15–16; Final Decision Memo.
at 8–13.
Plaintiffs, Consolidated Plaintiffs, and Plaintiff-Intervenor challenged various
aspects of the Final Decision Memo. before this Court, and on May 1, 2024, the Court
issued Jinko I.2 See ECF Nos. 35–41; Jinko I, 701 F. Supp. 3d 1367.
2 In Jinko I, the Court sustained Commerce’s determinations regarding: (1) Consolidated Plaintiffs Trina Solar Co., Ltd., Trina Solar (Changzhou) Science & Technology Co., Ltd., Changzhou Trina Solar Yabang Energy Co., Ltd., Turpan Trina Solar Energy Co., Ltd., Trina Solar (Hefei) Science & Technology Co., Ltd., and Changzhou Trina Hezhong Photoelectric Co., Ltd.’s separate rate status; (2) the valuation of Plaintiff’s electricity, ocean freight, backsheet, and ethylene vinyl acetate (“EVA”); (3) the use of JA Solar Malaysia’s financial statements to calculate surrogate financial ratios; (4) the deduction of Section 301 duties; and (5) the application of facts available with an adverse inference in calculating Risen’s rate. Jinko I, 701 F. Supp. 3d at 1397. The Court remanded Commerce’s determinations regarding (1) the use of Romanian HTS 7007.19.80 to value solar glass; (2) the valuation of air freight; (3) the methodology for constructing Risen’s adverse inference rate and its consistency with 19 U.S.C. § 1677e; and (4) the separate rates for Plaintiff-Intervenors BYD and JA Solar in view of any changes to Jinko’s or Risen’s margins. Id. at 1397. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 6
Commerce filed its first remand results on August 29, 2024. See Final Results
of Remand Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, Aug. 29, 2024, ECF Nos.
89–90 (“Remand Results”). Plaintiff, Consolidated Plaintiffs, and Plaintiff-
Intervenor submitted comments in opposition to Commerce’s remand determination
on October 30, 2024. See ECF Nos. 97–101. On May 30, 2025, the Court issued Jinko
II. 3 See generally Jinko II, 789 F. Supp. 3d 1275.
On August 18, 2025, Commerce filed its Draft Second Remand Results. Draft
Results of Remand Determination, PD 2RCR 1, CD 2RPR 1, bar code 4812049-01
(Aug. 18, 2025) (“Draft Second Remand Results”). On September 26, 2025, Commerce
filed its Second Remand Results. See generally Second Remand Results. On January
5, 2026, Risen, Jinko, BYD (Shangluo) Industrial Co., Ltd. (“BYD”), JA Solar
Technology Yangzhou Co., Ltd., and Shanghai JA Solar Technology Co., Ltd. (“JA
Solar”) submitted comments in opposition to Commerce’s determinations in the
Second Remand Results. See generally Pl. Int./Consol. Pl. Cmts.; Pl. Cmts.; BYD
Cmts.; JA Solar Cmts., Jan. 5, 2026, ECF Nos. 159–165. On January 6, 2026,
Defendant-Intervenor American Alliance for Solar Manufacturing submitted
comments in support of the Second Remand Results. See Def. Int. American Alliance
3 In Jinko II, the Court again remanded, finding Commerce (1) failed to substantiate Romanian data specificity and (2) did not adequately explain why it could not convert respondents’ glass consumption data to match Malaysia’s square meter-reported import values. Jinko II, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 1283–84. The Court sustained Commerce’s air freight valuation, but remanded Commerce’s application of facts available with an adverse inference and selection of the surrogate Romanian HTS data to value solar glass. Id. at 1285–86. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 7
for Solar Manufacturing’s Cmts. Supp’n. [Second Remand Results], Jan. 6, 2026, ECF
Nos. 166–167 (“Def. Int. Cmts.”). On February 25, 2026, Plaintiff, Defendant-
Intervenor, and Defendant replied to comments on the Second Remand Results. See
Jinko Reply to Cmts. on Remand Results, Feb. 25, 2026, ECF Nos. 172–173; American
Alliance Reply to Cmts. on Remand Results, Feb. 25, 2026, ECF Nos. 174, 177 (“Def.
Int. Reply”); Def. Reply to Cmts. on Remand Results, Feb. 25, 2026, ECF Nos. 175–
176 (“Def. Reply”).
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court has jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(c), which authorize judicial review of Commerce’s final determination in an
administrative review of an AD order. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(c). The Court will sustain Commerce’s determination unless it is
“unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. (30) v. United States, 322 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Commerce
must “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,’”
so that a reviewing court can discern whether Commerce reasonably connected the
record evidence to its decision. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 8
43 (1983); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
The Court reviews a remand determination for compliance with its remand order.
Xinjiamei Furniture (Zhangzhou) Co. v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1259
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2014).
DISCUSSION
On second remand, Commerce continues to value respondents’ solar glass
using Romanian HTS 7007.19.80 rather than data from the primary surrogate
country, Malaysia, under HTS 7007.19.90. See generally Second Remand Results.
Commerce also continues to calculate Risen’s rate using partial facts available with
an adverse inference. See generally id. For the following reasons, Commerce’s use of
Romanian HTS data is remanded for further consideration, Commerce’s calculation
of Risen’s rate using facts available with an adverse inference is sustained, and
Commerce’s determination of separate rates is remanded for reconsideration.
I. Solar Glass Valuation
Jinko and Risen argue that Commerce’s decision to value solar glass using
Romanian HTS 7007.19.80, rather than Malaysian HTS 7007.19.90, is unsupported
by substantial evidence. See Jinko Cmts. at 6–9, 23; Risen Cmts. at 5–8. Jinko and
Risen argue: (1) Commerce’s interpretation of the exclusions in Romanian HTS
7007.19.80 is not supported by substantial evidence, and AR-coated solar glass is
excluded from Romanian HTS 7007.19.80; and (2) Commerce fails to provide a
reasonable explanation for why it cannot convert respondents’ record data from per- Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 9
piece to square meters. See Jinko Cmts. at 6–9, 23; Risen Cmts. at 5–8. Commerce’s
determination is remanded for further consideration.
A. Romanian Data
Commerce determines antidumping duties by calculating the amount by which
the normal value of subject merchandise exceeds the export price or constructed
export price. 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Normal value generally is the price at which the
producer or exporter sells the subject merchandise in the ordinary course of trade in
its home market, or, in certain circumstances, in a third-country market. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(a)(1). When the merchandise is exported from an NME country, however,
Commerce does not base normal value on sales. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1). Instead,
Commerce determines normal value using “the value of the factors of production
utilized in producing the merchandise,” plus “an amount for general expenses and
profit,” and including “the cost of containers, coverings, and other expenses.” Id.
To value a respondent’s factors of production, Commerce relies on surrogate
values from market economy countries that are both economically comparable to the
NME country and significant producers of comparable merchandise. 4 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(c)(4). Commerce’s regulations, consistent with the statutory scheme, express
4 In selecting a primary surrogate country, Commerce considers: (1) economic comparability to the NME country; (2) production of comparable merchandise; (3) whether such countries are significant producers of that merchandise; and (4) the quality and availability of FOP data. See Import Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Non-Market Economy Surrogate Country Selection Process, Pol’y Bulletin 04.1 at 1 (Mar. 1, 2004) (“Pol’y Bulletin 04.1”). Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 10
a preference to value all factors, to the extent possible, using a single surrogate
country. 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(2). In selecting surrogate values, Commerce must
use “the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a market
economy country or countries considered to be appropriate.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1).
Commerce evaluates whether proposed surrogate data constitute the best available
information by considering specificity to the input, tax and duty exclusivity,
contemporaneity with the period of review (“POR”), whether the data reflect a broad
market average, and public availability. Pol’y Bulletin 04.1 at 1.
In Jinko I, the Court remanded Commerce’s decision to use Romanian HTS
data to value Jinko’s and Risen’s solar glass. Jinko I, 701 F. Supp. 3d at 1367, 1381–
82. The Court held that Commerce did not support its determination with record
evidence. Id. at 1397. In particular, the Court noted that Romanian HTS 7007.19.80
specifically excludes glass with an absorbent layer:
Enamelled, Coloured Throughout The Mass, pacified, Flashed Or With An Absorbent Or Reflecting Layer, Glass Of Size And Shape Suitable For Incorporation In Motor Vehicles, Aircraft, Spacecraft, Vessels And Other Vehicles.
Id. at 1383; see also Am. Alliance for Solar Mfr. Pre-Prelim. Cmts. & Subm. [SV] at
Ex. 9, PD 334, CD 433, bar code 4149598-03 (Aug. 3, 2021) (“Pet. Pre-Prelim. SV
Cmts. at Ex. 9 (Romanian HTS)”) (containing the Romanian HTS subheading); see
also Final Decision Memo. at 13 n.42). Commerce defines absorbent as “something
that takes in without releasing” light. Jinko I, 701 F. Supp. 3d at 1383 (citing Final
Decision Memo. at 17). Record evidence indicates Jinko’s solar glass, because of the Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 11
AR-coating, “captures and retains light.”5 Id. at 1383 (citing Jinko’s Sect. A & App’x
XI Questionnaire Resps. (“Jinko AQR”) at Ex. A-8C, A-12, PD 120–26, CD 77–106,
bar code 4108310-01 (Apr. 8, 2021) (Jinko’s polycrystalline module “feature[es] new
glass technology [that] improves light absorption and retention”)). Thus, the Court
reasoned Jinko’s AR-coated glass falls within “both Commerce’s definition of
‘absorbent’ and also the Romanian HTS exclusion.” 6 Jinko I, 701 F. Supp. 3d at 1383.
The Court held that Commerce’s method for valuing solar glass was unsupported and
remanded its decision for reconsideration or further explanation. Id.
In its first determination on remand, Commerce continued to use the
Romanian HTS for its solar glass valuation. See Remand Results. In Jinko II, the
Court explained that on remand, Commerce claimed that the excluded exemplars
under Romanian HTS 7007.19.80 all share “light-limiting characteristics.” See Jinko
II, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 1281–82 (citing Remand Results). Commerce found that Jinko’s
solar glass lacks “light-limiting characteristics” and therefore, it concluded that the
5 Jinko explains that the anti-reflective coating “pull[s] in light photons instead of reflecting them back.” Jinko Cmts. at 10 (citing Jinko First Remand Comments (Oct. 30, 2024), ECF Nos. 98–99 (citing Jinko First Supplemental Questionnaire Response, PD 277-88, CD 365-91, Ex. SA-2D barcode 4146749-02, (Jul. 27, 2021)). The coating “triggers greater absorption of light photons and consequently, a higher transmission, as more photons pass through the glass and strike the underlying cells, thereby improving the performance of the solar panels.” Jinko Cmts. at 10. Jinko follows Commerce’s definition of absorption as relating to a sponge. Id. at 11. Like a sponge with water, the subject solar glass absorbs light and then releases it. Id. 6 In Jinko I, the Court identified that Commerce argued common characteristics
among the exemplars but altogether failed to address “the remainder of the exclusionary language contained in Romanian HTS 7007.18.80.” Jinko I, 701 F. Supp. 3d at 1383 n.15. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 12
glass is not excluded from the Romanian HTS. See id. (citing Remand Results). The
Court concluded that Commerce had failed to address record evidence that detracts
from its determination because Commerce’s conclusion that all exemplars had “light
limiting characteristics” ignored the included exemplars of “glass suitable for
incorporation in motor vehicles, aircraft, spacecraft, vessels and other vehicles” from
the HTS. Id. at 1282 (citing Remand Results); see also Pets. Pre-Prelim. SV Cmts. at
Ex. 9 (Romanian HTS).
On second remand, Commerce fails to explain why the Romanian data is
specific to solar glass and does not address evidence undermining its conclusion. The
Romanian HTS exclusion covers glass with an absorbent layer, and record evidence
indicates that the subject glass’s AR coating, “captures and retains light.” Jinko I,
701 F. Supp. 3d at 1383 (citing Jinko AQR at App’x XI, PD 148–52, CD 186–68, bar
code 4108310-01, (Apr. 8, 2021)). Indeed, a “key feature” of Jinko’s solar glass is that
it “improves light absorption and retention.” See Jinko AQR at App’x XI, PD 148–52,
CD 186–68, bar code 4108310-01, (Apr. 8, 2021); [Risen’s] Sect. D Questionnaire Resp.
at App’x XIII:7, PD 147, CD 122, bar code 4116609-01 (Apr. 30, 2021) (“Risen Sect. D
Resp.”).
Commerce’s attempt to construe “absorbent” contrary to its plain meaning by
arguing that all, or some subset, of the exemplars are “light-limiting” lacks merit. In
both the Final Decision Memo. and the Remand Results, Commerce explains that, Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 13
although the phrase “absorbent or reflecting layer” is not itself defined, it appears
within a broader exclusion, specifically:
Enamelled, Coloured Throughout The Mass, Opacified, Flashed Or With An Absorbent Or Reflecting Layer.
Final Decision Memo. at 17–18. Commerce continues, stating “Enameled, colored,
opacified (made opaque), and flashed (colored) are all treatments to the glass that
limit the amount of light that passes through the glass.” Id. Although Commerce
stated that it quoted the exclusion in full, it omitted part of the exclusion language.
The Romanian HTS subheading, in its entirety, reads:
Toughened [Tempered] Safety Glass (Excl. Enamelled, Coloured Throughout The Mass, Opacified, Flashed Or With An Absorbent Or Reflecting Layer, Glass Of Size And Shape Suitable For Incorporation In Motor Vehicles, Aircraft, Spacecraft, Vessels And Other Vessels.
Pets. Pre-Prelim. SV Cmts. at Ex. 9 (Romanian HTS). In the Final Decision Memo.,
Commerce interpreted “absorbent” in the Romanian HTS to mean “light-limiting,”
and on that basis concluded that “glass with an absorbent layer” takes in light
without allowing it to pass through the glass. Final Decision Memo. at 9. Commerce
therefore determined that the subject solar glass was not excluded. Id. Jinko I
questioned Commerce’s conclusion that the plain meaning of “absorbent” did not
encompass the glass at issue and how Commerce could maintain that all the
exemplars supported its interpretation of “absorbent,” given that Commerce failed to
address all of them. Jinko I, 701 F. Supp. 3d at 1383 n.15 (noting Commerce omitted Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 14
from its analysis of the language “Glass Of Size And Shape Suitable For Incorporation
In Motor Vehicles, Aircraft, Spacecraft, Vessels And Other Vessels”).
Again, in the first Remand Results, Commerce argued that the Romanian HTS
exclusions were “light-limiting” exclusions, and, on that basis, that “absorbent”
means light-limiting. Remand Results at 9. Jinko II directed Commerce on remand
to explain how its view that the exemplars all share “light-limiting characteristics”
could be reconciled with “the remaining exemplars in HTS 7007.19.80, i.e., glass
suitable for incorporation in motor vehicles, aircraft, spacecraft, vessels and other
vehicles.” Jinko II, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 1282.
In the Second Remand Results, Commerce adheres to the same interpretive
syllogism. See Second Remand Results at 22–24. It invokes the principle that, in a
list of examples, all the examples share common qualities. See id.; see also Remand
Results at 36–37. 7 Commerce asserts that all the listed exemplars share light-
limiting characteristics and then applies that premise to conclude that every
exclusion, including “absorbent,” is “light-limiting.” See Final Decision Memo. at 17;
Remand Results at 34–35; Second Remand Results at 23. Twice, the Court has
explained to Commerce that not all exemplars are “light-limiting.” See Jinko I 701
F. Supp. 3d at 1383; Jinko II 789 F. Supp. 3d at 1282. Arguably, “absorbent” is not
light-limiting, but light-capturing. “Glass suitable for incorporation in motor
7 One formulation of that principle is “noscitur a sociis,” meaning that “a word is known by the company it keeps.” Noscitur a sociis, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 15
vehicles, aircraft, spacecraft, vessels and other vehicles” does not appear to be light
limiting. See Pets. Pre-Prelim. SV Cmts. at Ex. 9 (Romanian HTS). Commerce’s
latest effort to preserve its flawed syllogism is to divide the exclusion’s list of
exemplars into groups, which abandons its major premise that all the exemplars
share a single common characteristic. See Second Remand Results at 23. The
exemplars are not all light-limiting. Commerce’s division of the Romanian HTS
exclusions into two general categories of glass is illogical. See id. (explaining that
some exemplars are defined by purpose, where others are defined by “treatments that
limit the amount of light that is transmitted through the glass”). Commerce’s
approach is an unreasonable interpretation of the exclusions and cannot overcome
the plain meaning of the term “absorbent.”
Commerce has not provided an explanation, substantiated by record evidence,
that would permit the Court to find its use of the Romanian HTS reasonable.
Although the Court has twice remanded this issue for further explanation, Commerce
still does not reasonably explain why the plain meaning of “absorbent layer” in the
Romanian HTS exclusions does not encompass the solar glass at issue, where record
evidence indicates that the glass has a coating that absorbs light. 8 See Risen Sect. D
8 In its reply to comments on the Second Remand Results, Defendant-Intervenor argues that Commerce’s use of Romanian HTS 7007.19.80 is reasonable because it “covers tempered glass used in solar panels; the specific type of glass used by solar panel producers.” Def. Int. Reply to Comments on Second Remand Results at 8, Feb.
(footnote continued) Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 16
Resp. at App’x XIII:7. Because the record contains evidence that the Romanian HTS
classification excludes anti-reflective solar glass, Commerce cannot reasonably rely
on the Romanian HTS to calculate the normal value of Jinko’s solar glass. On
remand, if necessary, Commerce may reopen the administrative record to obtain
additional information needed to select a surrogate value for solar glass.
B. Reliability of Malaysian Data
Even if the Romanian kilogram-based HTS data did not exclude solar glass,
Commerce still has not explained why the Malaysian HTS 7007.19.90 square meter
data is unreliable. In Jinko I, the Court held that Commerce failed explain why data
from the primary surrogate country, Malaysia, is unreliable. Jinko I, 701 F. Supp.
3d at 1382 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(2)). The Court remanded for Commerce to
reconsider or further explain why it could not convert respondents’ solar glass
consumption from pieces to square meters, despite record evidence indicating that
conversion was possible. Id. (citing Risen Sect. D Resp. Ex. D-34; Jinko AQR Ex. AD-
25, 2026, ECF No. 174 (“Def. Int. Reply”). However, Defendant-Intervenor relies on record evidence from a prior administrative review covering the 2017–18 POR. See id. at 8 (citing Issues & Decision Memo. accompanying Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into Modules, From the People’s Republic of China, 85 Fed. Reg. 62,275 (Dep’t Commerce Oct. 2, 2020) (final results of antidumping duty admin. rev. and final deter. of no shipments; 2017-2018) at 26 n.119). As the Court noted in Jinko I, “‘each administrative review is a separate segment of proceedings with its own unique facts,’ and thus stands on its own record.” Jinko I, 701 F. Supp. 3d at 1382–83 n.14 (quoting Peer Bearing Co.-Changshan v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1325 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008)). On this record, no evidence shows that the Romanian HTS subheading Commerce used is specific to the type of glass used by solar panel producers. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 17
9). In Jinko II, the Court again directed Commerce to explain why it could not use
record glass dimensions to convert Jinko’s and Risen’s per-piece glass consumption
into square meters and use the Malaysian HTS 7007.19.90 surrogate values, which
are reported in square meters. Jinko II, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 1283–84; Second Remand
Results at 3.
In the Draft Second Remand Results, Commerce applies an average conversion
ratio to convert respondents’ glass consumption data into square meters for
comparison with the Malaysian HTS values, but it does not perform the conversion
on a CONNUM-specific basis using the actual record dimensions rather than an
average ratio. Draft Second Remand Results at 3–4. At the same time, Commerce
acknowledges that the record contains respondents’ glass consumption data in square
meters, states that the Malaysian values could be used, and demonstrates the
conversion needed to align respondents’ reported data with the Malaysian square
meter values. See id. Commerce explained:
Upon further review, the record contains the necessary information to determine Jinko and Risen’s solar glass consumption in square meters, which is the unit of measure used to report import values under Malaysian HS number 7007.19.90. Specifically, the record contains inventory records for Jinko and Risen that show the number of pieces of each type of glass withdrawn from inventory for production during the POR and the length and width of each piece of glass, in millimeters. Using this information, we were able to calculate the total square meters of glass consumed in production by each respondent during the POR. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 18
Id. at 3. Despite having respondents’ glass dimensions, Commerce chose to do an
average conversion ratio. 9
Because each respondent already converted their total glass consumption in pieces to total glass consumption in kilograms for reporting to Commerce in the underlying review, we used the ratio of the total glass consumption in square meters to the total glass consumption in kilograms to calculate the number of square meters of glass used for each kilogram of glass consumed in production. We multiplied this square-meter per kilogram conversion ratio by the number of kilograms of glass consumed per watt of finished product, which was reported to Commerce on a control number (CONNUM)- specific basis, to calculate the square meters of glass consumed per watt of finished product for each CONNUM reported in the FOP database. Given that we now have glass consumption in square meters for both respondents, we can use import values under Malaysian HS number 7007.19.90, which are reported in Malaysian Ringgits (RM) per square meter, to value the respondents’ consumption of solar glass. Therefore, consistent with the CIT’s opinion, Commerce’s selection of Malaysia and the primary surrogate country, and Commerce’s preference to value all FOPs using SVs from a single surrogate country, we have recalculated the value of Jinko and Risen’s solar glass consumption using the value of imports during the POR under Malaysian HS number 7007.19.90 in this redetermination.
Id. at 3–4 (footnotes omitted). 10 In its final Second Remand Results, Commerce
explains that, upon further review, it determined the conversion method used in the
9 Commerce explained its choice in the final Second Remand Results, stating that “[g]iven the complexities of determining CONNUM-specific conversion rates, in the Jinko II Draft Redetermination, we determined that it was reasonable to use an average conversion rate.” Second Remand Results at 21. 10 Commerce’s Draft Second Remand Results answers the Court’s question whether
respondents’ data can convert consumption to square meters. See Draft Second Remand Results at 3–4; see also Jinko II, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 1283–84 (directing Commerce to explain why it could not convert to square meters). Commerce
(footnote continued) Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 19
Draft Second Remand did not account for the fact that the respondents’ solar glass
varies in thickness and therefore, conversion to Malaysian square meters produced
“distorted consumption quantities.” Second Remand Results at 4–5, 19–21 (“. . . we
find that the factor used in the Jinko II Draft Redetermination to convert the
respondents’ solar glass consumption quantities into a unit of measure that was
compatible with the Malaysian import prices for solar glass did not take into account
the varying thicknesses of the respondents’ solar glass, and thus, results in distorted
consumption quantities for solar glass”). Commerce also explains that nothing on the
record reveals the thickness of Malaysian glass. Id. at 19. Therefore, even if one
could construct the thickness of the respondents’ glass from the data’s dimensions on
the record, it is possible that using the Malaysian FOP data to value the glass might
result in value distortions. See id.
acknowledges that respondents reported consumption in pieces, and that the record contains the length and width needed to calculate area per piece and total square meters consumed. See Second Remand Results at 4 (citing Risen Case Br., PD 421, CD 481 bar code 4206747-01 (Jan. 28, 2022); Jinko Case Br., PD 494, CD 446, bar code 4246241-01 (May 27, 2022)); Risen Cmts. at 24, Ex. 1. Commerce also acknowledges that the record captures thickness variations through respondents’ conversions to weight in kilograms. Second Remand Results at 6. As Commerce explained, Jinko and Risen calculated glass weight by multiplying glass density (kg/m3) by the cubic meters of glass consumed (m3), using each piece’s length, width, and thickness. Id. Commerce further states that the record contains inventory data showing the number of pieces withdrawn for production during the POR, along with each piece’s length and width, which Commerce used to calculate total square meters (m2) consumed. Second Remand Results at 4. Commerce then used the ratio of total square meters consumed to total kilograms consumed to determine the number of square meters per kilogram (m2/kg) of glass consumed in production. Id. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 20
The weights in kilograms of respondents’ glass are on the record, and therefore,
as Commerce demonstrated in the Draft Second Remand Results, an average
conversion factor method is feasible. Commerce chose to use an average conversion
factor in its calculation because it concluded that a CONNUM-specific conversion
would be unreasonable on this record due to its “complexity,” but then rejects its own
methodology as inaccurate. See id. at 21 (stating that Commerce used an average
conversion factor “given the complexities” of using CONNUM-specific conversion
rates). At no point does Commerce identify or explain the complexities that prevented
it from calculating CONNUM-specific rates on this record. See generally Second
Remand Results. Thus, it is unclear to the Court why CONNUM-specific rates are
too complex to be reasonable, and the matter is remanded for further consideration
or explanation on this point.
Commerce’s rejection of the methodology used in the Draft Second Remand
Results as distortive also requires further consideration or explanation. Commerce’s
concern that it lacks thickness data overlooks the CONNUM-specific weight, length,
and width data already on the record, which is sufficient to account for thickness
when converting respondents’ glass data into square meters. See Second Remand
Results at 19–21. In the Draft Second Remand Results, Commerce derives an overall
conversion factor in square meters per kilogram (m²/kg) from respondents’ total glass
consumption, applies that factor to each CONNUM’s reported glass usage in
kilograms per watt (kg/watt) to obtain CONNUM-specific quantities in square meters Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 21
per watt (m²/watt), and then multiplies those quantities by Malaysia’s surrogate
values in Malaysian ringgits per square meter (RM/m²) to value the glass input for
each CONNUM in RM/watt. See Draft Second Remand Results at 3–4. Because that
conversion factor is based on both area and weight, it necessarily captures differences
in glass thickness. See id. Commerce therefore does not reasonably explain its
conclusion in the Second Remand Results that converting respondents’ data to square
meters is distortive because glass thicknesses vary by CONNUM. See Second
Remand Results at 19. 11
To be fair, Commerce’s second remand analysis also turns on its view that
Malaysia’s surrogate values, expressed in square meters, are not a reasonable proxy
for respondents’ solar glass because there is no way of knowing the thickness of the
glass associated reported in square meters. Id. at 19–21.
Moreover, there is nothing on the record demonstrating that the overall average value of glass per square meter calculated from the Malaysian import data is accurate for Risen or Jinko since there is no information on the record showing that the glass imported into Malaysia during the POR had the same thicknesses (and the same quantities of glass for each
11 In its comments on the Second Remand Results, Risen proposes a two-step methodology linking “job orders” in “Step 8.1” to thickness and weight data in “Step 8.2” to derive CONNUM-specific thickness and conversion ratios. Risen Cmts. at 5– 8. In its reply, Defendant argues that Risen’s proposed methodology is flawed because some CONNUMs reported for sales of subject merchandise during the POR do not appear in Step 8.2 of Risen’s cost reconciliation. Risen Cmts. Ex. 1. (Step 8.2).” Def. Resp. at 13. However, Commerce’s draft methodology already suggests that respondents’ own data could yield a reliable overall m²/kg factor and, from that, a square meters per watt conversion for Malaysian inputs. Draft Second Remand Results at 3–4. Commerce did so without relying on Step 8.2 and without identifying missing CONNUM-level square meter data as necessary to perform the conversion. Id. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 22
thickness) as the glass used by Risen and Jinko. Therefore, even on an overall average basis, and not a CONNUM-specific basis, we have no reason to conclude that including a glass value in normal value based on Malaysia import data is accurate.
Id. at 19. Although the Draft Second Remand Results methodology accounts for
variation in respondents’ glass thickness, it cannot eliminate distortion arising from
variation in Malaysian glass thickness because the record lacks the necessary
Malaysian thickness and weight data. Even so, Jinko points to record evidence
supporting the comparability of Malaysian glass thickness to respondents’ glass. See
Jinko Reply at 3. Jinko notes that “all three glass’ conversion factors available on the
record . . . corroborate each other.” Jinko Cmts. at 22–23. According to Jinko, this
corroboration constitutes substantial evidence that glass imported under Malaysian
HTS 7007.19.80, as part of the same pool of internationally traded glass, shares
physical characteristics similar to Jinko’s glass, including average thickness. Id. at
23. Commerce has not addressed this evidence, which detracts from the support for
its determination.
II. Calculation of Risen’s Rate Using Facts Available with an Adverse Inference
On remand, Commerce modifies and further explains its methodology for
calculating Risen’s rate using facts available with an adverse inference. Second
Remand Results at 25–33. Risen argues that Commerce’s revised methodology is
inaccurate and based on punishment not cooperation. Risen Cmts. at 16–17.
Commerce’s revised methodology, however, is in accordance with law, and its
resulting rate determination is supported by substantial evidence. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 23
Section § 1677e of Title 19 governs Commerce’s use of facts otherwise available.
19 U.S.C. § 1677e. Under § 1677e(a), Commerce shall apply facts otherwise available
where necessary information is not available on the record, subject to the
requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d). 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677e(a); 1677m(d). If Commerce
further finds that a party failed to cooperate “to the best of its ability,” it may apply
an adverse inference in selecting from among the facts otherwise available. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677e(b)(1)(A). When applying an adverse inference, Commerce is limited to relying
on information “derived from” the record. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(2). In Jinko I and
Jinko II, the Court explained that the “derived from” requirement demands a
traceable, logical link between the selected inference and the underlying source
material. Jinko I, 701 F. Supp. 3d at 1395–96 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(2)); Jinko
II, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 1287–88 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(2)).
Commerce must exercise its methodological discretion reasonably, and it must
explain how its selection furthers the statutory purpose of encouraging cooperation.
See Vicentin S.A.I.C. v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 1342–43 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2019), aff’d, 42 F.4th 1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (holding Commerce must explain on
the record how it effectuates a statute’s remedial purpose where the same market
distortion appears to be addressed in a concurrent CVD proceeding). Commerce must
also explain why its imposition of an adverse inference is nonpunitive and grounded
in the record. F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216 Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 24
F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Gallant Ocean (Thai.) Co. v. United States, 602 F.3d
1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
In Jinko II, the Court remanded Commerce’s first remand determination
regarding its application of facts available with an adverse inference to calculate
Risen’s rate as contrary to law and unsupported by substantial evidence. Jinko II,
789 F. Supp. 3d at 1286–87. In the prior remand, Commerce described its
methodology as follows:
For each reported input with missing data, Commerce calculated a ratio for each monocrystalline solar module CONNUM by dividing the per- unit consumption quantity of the input reported for the CONNUM by the highest per-unit consumption quantity reported for that input for any monocrystalline solar module. Commerce then averaged all the CONNUM-specific ratios that it calculated for that input to derive one single ratio for the input (the input ratio). Commerce than calculated: (1) a simple average of all the input ratios for all the inputs (i.e., which include direct materials, direct and indirect labor, electricity, gas, and water) that were used to produce solar modules (including, where applicable, input ratios for inputs, other than solar cells, that were used to produce components in the solar module); (2) another simple average of all the input ratios for all the inputs (i.e., which include direct materials, direct and indirect labor, electricity, gas, and water) that were used to produce solar cells; and (3) a third simple average of all the input ratios for all the material inputs that were used in packing solar modules. Commerce then multiplied each reported per-unit consumption quantity by the multiplicative inverse of the applicable simple average input ratio (i.e., 1 divided by the applicable simple average input ratio) to increase all the reported consumption quantities as an adverse inference.
Remand Results at 22 (footnotes omitted). Thus, Commerce calculated the ratio by
dividing each consumption ratio by the highest consumption ratio. Id. It then took a
simple average of those ratios within each of three input categories and multiplied Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 25
each category’s average by the inverse of the first ratio. Id. The Court faulted
Commerce’s explanation because it suggested that the resulting rate increase flowed
from the multiplicative inverse itself, rather than from record-based information.
Jinko II, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 1286–87. Commerce did not explain the purpose of the
multiplicative inverse beyond stating that it was used to “increase all the reported
consumption quantities as an adverse inference.” Remand Results at 22. The Court
therefore directed Commerce to explain how the inverse is grounded in record
evidence, rather than an arbitrary figure, why Commerce could not rely on actual
record data, and why its grouping methodology was reasonable. Jinko II, 789 F.
Supp. 3d at 1286–87.
Here, on remand, Commerce makes a slight methodological adjustment, and,
more importantly, provides the previously missing explanation for a key component
of its formula. Commerce explains that its formula seeks to identify:
. . . by what number do we need to multiply CONNUM-specific per-unit consumption quantities for inputs that are an average . . . of the highest reported CONNUM-specific per-unit consumption quantities of the inputs to adjust them, on average, to the highest reported CONNUM- specific per-unit consumption quantities for those inputs . . . .
Second Remand Results at 8. In other words, Commerce explains that the purpose
of its formula is to measure the spread between the average consumption quantity
and the highest reported consumption quantity, express that spread as a percentage,
and apply that percentage as an adverse inference when filling missing information Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 26
with facts available. Commerce lists the steps it uses to construct this inference as
follows:
We first isolated the highest reported consumption quantity for a given input in any CONNUM. Then, we averaged the reported consumption quantities for the remaining CONNUMs. From there, we calculated the percentage difference between the highest reported consumption quantity and the average of the other reported consumption quantities for each input.
Id. at 13–14. Commerce explains that it calculates the “percentage difference
between the highest reported consumption quantity and the average of the other
reported consumption quantities,” and then adds that percentage difference to the
input ratios used for missing data. Id. Commerce further explains that this
percentage difference measure estimates the increase needed to replicate the missing
data by using “the variation in Risen’s CONNUM-specific per-unit consumption
quantities to calculate the amount by which the uncooperative supplier’s
consumption quantities could exceed those of Risen.” 12 Id. Commerce has now
provided the explanation the Court requested, showing that the rate is derived from
12 Although Commerce now uses a formula that does not rely on a multiplicative inverse, its explanation here confirms that its prior remand’s use of the multiplicative inverse was reasonable. Commerce asks, what is the percentage relationship between the highest consumption rate and all the other rates? See Second Remand Results at 9–10. That percentage is determined by dividing the average consumption rates of all the other rates by the highest rate. Id. For example, the average rate might be 0.75 (75%) of the highest rate. Commerce then asks what multiplier one would use to bring that average rate up to the highest rate. The highest rate’s relationship to itself is necessarily 1 (100%). Converting a fraction or percentage to 1 requires taking its multiplicative inverse. Commerce’s explanation that it is identifying the multiplier needed to move each consumption rate up to the highest consumption rate therefore makes clear that its methodology is reasonable. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 27
record evidence reflecting variation in reported consumption quantities, rather than
from an arbitrary figure.
Commerce has also adequately explained why it declined to use Risen’s highest
reported consumption quantities as facts available with an adverse inference to
induce cooperation. Commerce found that relying on the highest record value alone
was inadequate because, across multiple reviews, uncooperative suppliers remained
in the proceeding despite Commerce’s use of the highest consumption rate on the
record. Id. at 31. Commerce further explained that, although it had used Risen’s
highest reported consumption quantities as facts available with an adverse inference
in prior reviews to induce cooperation and had warned that it would examine
continued reliance on uncooperative suppliers, Risen continued using such suppliers
across four consecutive administrative reviews, including the 2019–20 POR at issue.
Id. at 31–32. Commerce therefore reasonably concluded that, if the highest reported
consumption quantities had been sufficient to induce cooperation, Risen would not
have continued using uncooperative suppliers, and that a different adverse inference
methodology with a built-in increase was warranted to deter continued non-
compliance. Id. at 33–34. Commerce also explained that increasing the percentage
as a built-in incentive was reasonable in light of repeated noncompliance across
multiple reviews. Id. at 29. Commerce may apply an adverse inference that includes
a built-in incentive to encourage cooperation, so long as the selected rate remains
anchored to the record and is not merely punitive. See F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 28
S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Contrary to
Risen’s argument, Commerce’s methodology is not “divorced from the concerns of
accuracy” and therefore does not result in improperly punitive margins. See Risen
Cmts. at 16–17. Commerce reasonably concludes that the highest reported
consumption quantity is not sufficient incentive and reasonably made a stronger
adverse inference here because that increase is derived from record evidence rather
than punishment for its own sake.
Finally, Commerce reasonably groups the hundreds of record inputs into three
groups—solar cells, solar modules, and packing—and calculates separate average
input ratios for each category. Second Remand Results at 27. Commerce explained
that its FOP-specific approach is reasonable because it aligns adjustments with
distinct stage-specific inputs and processes and avoids distortions that would result
from applying a single average across both cell and module production. Id. at 33.
Although Risen argues that this grouping is unreasonable because the inputs have
different reported FOPs and surrogate values, see Risen Cmts. at 15, Commerce
explains that cell and module production involve different inputs and processes, and
that variability in cell inputs has no apparent relationship to module production.
Second Remand Results at 33. Grouping inputs by production stage therefore
reasonably promotes accuracy by avoiding skewing across stages while remaining
workable on a record containing hundreds of inputs. In light of the foregoing,
Commerce’s application of facts available with an adverse inference is reasonable. Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 29
III. Separate Rate Assignments for BYD and JA Solar
Jinko II remanded to Commerce to recalculate the separate rates for BYD and
JA Solar. Jinko II, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 1292. Plaintiff-Intervenor JA Solar contends
that Commerce should set its separate rate equal to Jinko’s margin, and BYD
contends that Commerce should adjust BYD’s separate rate to track any changes to
Jinko’s and Risen’s margins. See Pl.-Int./Consol. Pl. Cmts., Jan. 5, 2026, ECF No.
159 at 4; BYD Cmts., Jan. 5, 2026, ECF No. 163 at 2, 6. Because Commerce found
no margin changes on remand, it left both Plaintiff-Intervenors’ separate rates
unchanged. Second Remand Results at 34. Following its redetermination, Commerce
will necessarily reconsider whether it must recalculate the separate rates for JA Solar
and BYD.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Commerce’s redetermination with respect to its
decision to use Romanian glass data to calculate normal value is remanded for
reconsideration consistent with this opinion. Commerce’s redetermination with
respect to its methodology for calculating Risen’s rate using facts available with an
adverse inference is supported by substantial evidence on the record and in
accordance with the law and this Court’s remand order. In light of the foregoing, it
is
ORDERED that Commerce’s methodology for calculating facts available with
an adverse inference is sustained; and it is further Consol. Court No. 22-00219 Page 30
ORDERED that Commerce’s determination with respect to its valuation of
solar glass using Romanian HTS 7007.19.80 is remanded for reconsideration
consistent with this opinion; and it is further
ORDERED that Commerce’s determination of the review-specific rate
applicable to JA Solar and BYD is remanded for reconsideration consistent with this
opinion; and it is further
ORDERED that Commerce shall file its redetermination with the Court
within 90 days of this date; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall have 30 days to file comments on the
redetermination; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall have 30 days to file their replies to the
comments on the redetermination; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall file the joint appendix, including the entire
confidential record, within 14 days after the filing of replies to the comments on the
ORDERED that Commerce shall file the administrative record within 14 days
of the date of filing its redetermination.
/s/ Claire R. Kelly Claire R. Kelly, Judge
Dated: March 30, 2026 New York, New York