Jian Hu v. Aria Resort & Casino, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: June 3, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00320
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 JIAN HU, Case No. 2:25-cv-00320-MMD-NJK

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 ARIA RESORT & CASINO, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Jian Hu brings this action against Defendants Aria Resort & Casino, 13 LLC (“Aria”) and MGM Resorts International (“MGMRI”) (collectively, “Defendants”) 14 alleging claims arising from her termination from Aria, where she worked as a poker 15 dealer. (ECF No. 96 (“First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”).) Before the Court is 16 Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. (ECF No. 108 17 (“Motion”).)1 Additionally before the Court are Defendants’ motion for pre-filing order (ECF 18 No. 129)2 and Plaintiff’s other filings: a motion to strike (ECF No. 122)3; a motion for leave 19 to file sur-reply (ECF No. 136)4 in response to Defendants’ Reply; an Objection to 20 Magistrate Judge orders (ECF No. 143 (“Objection”))5; and a motion for temporary stay 21 of proceedings pending petition for Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 147)6. 22

23 1Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 124) and Defendants replied (ECF No. 128 (“Reply”)). 24 2Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 135) and Defendant replied (ECF No. 138.) 25 3Defendant responded (ECF No. 131) and Plaintiff replied (ECF No. 137). 26 4Defendants responded (ECF No. 139) and Plaintiff replied (ECF No. 141). 27 5Defendants responded (ECF No. 144) and Plaintiff filed a reply (ECF No. 145) 28 without leave of the Court. 2 federal claims and overrules Plaintiff’s Objection. The Court further denies all other 3 pending motions as moot. 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 A. Procedural Background 6 On November 7, 2025, the Court issued an order granting Defendants’ motion to 7 dismiss Plaintiff’s initial complaint. (ECF No. 95 (“Order”).) The Court noted that Plaintiff’s 8 64-page complaint contained “thirteen nearly incomprehensible causes of action brought 9 under multiple legal theories and statutes that do not create causes of action, including 10 state and federal criminal statutes and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11” and contained 11 large sections that appeared to have been copy-and-pasted from ChatGPT. (Id. at 2, 4.) 12 The Court denied claims brought under criminal statutes that provided no basis for civil 13 liability with prejudice as amendment would be futile, but granted Plaintiff leave to re- 14 allege her remaining claims. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff timely filed her FAC. (ECF No. 96.) 15 B. Factual Background7 16 Plaintiff worked as a poker dealer at Aria in Las Vegas, Nevada from November 17 18, 2018 to approximately August 24, 2023. (ECF No. 96 at 4.) During 2020 to 2021, 18 Plaintiff “required schedule coordination” from Ryan Kirk, Poker Operations Director. (Id.) 19 Kirk exploited his power by “demanding ‘cash payments’ from Plaintiff” in exchange for 20 “providing this basic managerial function.” (Id.) When she paused these payments, Kirk 21 would interfere with her work schedule, which forced her to go to his office to request a 22 stable schedule, and he would “extort cash” from Plaintiff and “subject her to opportunistic 23 sexual harassment to touch her body.” (Id.) Kirk also “engaged in unwelcome physical 24 proximity and staring,” standing next to her poker table for no apparent reason. (Id.) Kirk 25 was committing illegal acts of extortion and sexual harassment and Defendants 26 “orchestrated a complex conspiracy” to cover up his acts and punish Plaintiff. (Id. at 5.) 27 7The following facts are adapted from the FAC, as best as the Court can discern 28 Plaintiff’s allegations. 2 and Beau, a surveillance staff member, where she was falsely accused of “‘wrong doing 3 for accepting tip from pot’ at table 20 on July 19, 2023.” (Id. at 6.) Kirk and Beau fabricated 4 a story that a casino customer complained about Plaintiff but they didn’t show any videos 5 to her or tell her details about the complaint. (Id.) Kirk and Beau reviewed surveillance 6 footage and said that Plaintiff had taken chips from the pot seven times, totaling about 7 $200. (Id.) Plaintiff admitted that these were all “pre-tips” that she took after customers 8 requested her to take them, and this was a common practice in Aria and in many poker 9 rooms in Las Vegas. (Id.) Later, Plaintiff told HR via a telephone call that she was not 10 working on July 19, 2023, and complained that she was being mistreated by 11 management. (Id.) On or about August 24, 2023, Plaintiff was terminated from 12 employment, causing her physical damage and emotional distress, for which Plaintiff went 13 to the hospital emergency room for about three hours that night. (Id. at 5.) 14 Defendants fabricated evidence of theft, tampered with surveillance videos, and 15 manipulated or conspired with officers of the Nevada Gaming Control Board to create a 16 false “Nevada District Attorney document” resulting in Plaintiff losing her gaming license 17 and multiple jobs. (Id. at 5, 13.) Moreover, Defendants submitted fabricated photos and 18 videos to the Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation and the 19 Employment Security Division to wrongfully interfere with Plaintiff’s claim for 20 unemployment benefits. (Id. at 9-10.) 21 In December 2024, Plaintiff went to the poker room at Aria and recorded a white 22 female dealer taking a pre-tip from the pot and Aria employees conspired to intimidate 23 her to delete evidence from her phone. (Id. at 11.) Defendants intimidated her witnesses 24 to prevent them from helping her collect evidence. (Id.) Additionally, Defendants 25 “backdat[ed]” its policies related to “receiving tokes from the pot” and video and photo 26 storage requirements, to “create a pre-textual justification for anticipated litigation” and 27 “cloak Defendants’ prior unlawful act of evidence destruction.” (Id. at 12.) 28 2 per se; fraud/intentional misrepresentation; sexual harassment / hostile work environment 3 under Title VII; wrongful termination; sex discrimination under Title VII; negligent 4 misrepresentation; malicious prosecution; abuse of process; fraudulent concealment; 5 IIED; NIED; civil conspiracy; deprivation of due process; intra-corporate conspiracy; 6 RICO; RICO conspiracy; aiding and abetting fraud; negligent hiring, retention & 7 supervision; breach of the implied covenant of good faith & fair dealing; Title VII retaliation; 8 unlawful retaliation under NRS § 613.340; failure to pay earned wages; conversion; and 9 unjust enrichment. (Id. at 16-34.) 10 III. MOTION TO DISMISS 11 A. Discussion 12 Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).8 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a 14 ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 15 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff 16 cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle them to relief. See 17 Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the 18 Court takes as true all allegations of material fact in the complaint and construes them in 19 the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 20 (9th Cir. 1996). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual 21 allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. See Bell Atl. 22 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held 23 24

25 8Defendants also move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may assert lack of 26 subject-matter jurisdiction by motion. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). The United States Supreme Court notes a distinction between jurisdictional requirements and 27 nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules. See Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 548-51 (holding that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional). 28 Accordingly, the Court rejects dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) as it would be improper. 2 Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). 3 As an initial matter, Defendants argue in their Motion that Plaintiff was only granted 4 limited leave to amend her remaining causes of action and claims that exceed the scope 5 of the Court’s Order should be dismissed. (ECF No. 108 at 7-8.) The Court agrees with 6 Defendants that claims exceeding the scope of the Order should be dismissed, but the 7 Court disagrees with Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff is only entitled to amend five 8 causes of action. As the Court noted in its Order and has reiterated here, Plaintiff’s initial 9 complaint set forth muddled claims9 and here too, Defendants note the claims before the 10 Court now are “unclear based on the convoluted nature of Plaintiff’s FAC.” (Id. at 8.) 11 Liberally construing Plaintiff’s claims as alleged in the initial complaint10 and her 12 amended claims in the FAC, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims related to defamation, 13 sexual harassment, disparate treatment, and retaliation under Title VII, retaliation under 14 state law, fraud and misrepresentation, wrongful termination, abuse of process and 15 malicious prosecution fall within the scope of the Court’s Order granting Plaintiff leave to 16 amend. Because Plaintiff brings this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and invokes 17 supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over her remaining state law claims 18 (ECF No. 96 at 1), the Court first considers her federal claims. 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22

23 9Plaintiff’s claims in the initial complaint are as follows: defamation (libel & slander); fraud, falsified evidence, video tampering and intentional misrepresentation; malicious 24 dismissal; hostile work environment, psychological coercion, emotional exploitation and interfering with income; sexual harassment, retaliation and discrimination; civil 25 conspiracy; IIED; witness intimidation and retaliation; evidence tampering and fabrication of false evidence; spoliation of evidence and obstruction of justice; malicious prosecution; 26 abuse of process; obstruction of justice, witness tampering false imprisonment, and violation of gaming laws. (ECF No. 6 at 33-63.) 27 10The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s other claims, including her RICO claims, because 28 Plaintiff did not have leave to amend as to these claims. 2 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 3 2(a)-3(a)11 should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative 4 remedies and she is time barred from doing so now. (ECF No. 108 at 11-15.) Plaintiff 5 counters that she exhausted all administrative remedies. (ECF No. 124 at 7.) She cites 6 to a declaration with accompanying exhibits in which she states that she sent complaints 7 via email to the Nevada Labor Commissioner and U.S. Department of Labor, and in 8 January 2024 she went to the Nevada Equal Rights Commission office to file a formal 9 complaint, but was advised by staff there that her claims were not protected under 10 statutes enforced by the EEOC. (ECF No. 73 at 1-2.)12 11 Before a plaintiff may bring a claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must first exhaust 12 administrative remedies. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972) (“A person 13 claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of Title VII. . . may not maintain a suit for redress 14 in federal district court until he has first unsuccessfully pursued certain avenues of 15 potential administrative relief.”); Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 709 (9th Cir. 16 2001) (“In order to bring a Title VII claim in district court, a plaintiff must first exhaust her 17 administrative remedies.”). Exhaustion requires that the complainant file a timely charge 18 with the EEOC, thereby allowing the agency time to investigate the charge. See 42 U.S.C. 19 § 2000ff-6. A plaintiff timely files a charge with the EEOC if the charge is filed “within 180 20 days from the last act of alleged discrimination” or, in a state like Nevada that has its own 21 local agency, within 300 days of the last discriminatory act. Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel & 22 Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that 23 she did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Plaintiff’s assertion that she 24 11Defendants included Plaintiff’s state law retaliation claim under NRS § 613.340 25 in their exhaustion argument. The Court declines to address this state law claim.

26 12The Court considers this document as part of the pleading, because it forms the basis of certain of Plaintiff’s claims. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th 27 Cir. 2003) (stating that a court may consider “documents incorporated by reference in the complaint”— including where the “document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim”— 28 without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment). 2 the agency. 3 To the extent Plaintiff cites to her efforts to file a charge to argue equitable tolling, 4 the Court finds she has not demonstrated equitable tolling.13 Exhaustion is akin to a 5 statute of limitations and is subject to equitable tolling. Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 6 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling 7 bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights 8 diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. 9 DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 10 89, 96 (1990). Even accepting Plaintiff’s claim that she did not file a charge because of 11 what the Nevada Equal Rights Commission staff told her, such a claim does not rise to 12 the level of extraordinary circumstances. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96 (holding that equitable 13 tolling does not apply to “a garden variety claim of excusable neglect”); see also Ilaw v. 14 Daughters of Charity Health Sys., Inc., 585 F. App’x 572 (9th Cir. 2014) (mem.) (rejecting 15 plaintiff-appellant’s argument that his Title VII claims should be subject to equitable tolling 16 because of his counsel’s failure to bring claims, despite plaintiff-appellant’s stated desire 17 to bring the claims, as neglect). 18 In sum, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust her 19 administrative remedies as to her Title VII claims and is now barred from pursuing these 20 claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion 21 as to Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. Dismissal is with prejudice and without leave to amend as 22 amendment would be futile. 23 C. Remaining State Law Claims 24 Because the claims that give the Court federal question jurisdiction will be 25 dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 26 13Plaintiff states in her FAC that she “diligently sought administrative relief by 27 submitting multiple complaints to relevant labor agencies, including the Nevada Labor Commissioner, the Nevada Equal Rights Commission (“NERC”), and the [EEOC].” (ECF 28 No. 96 at 3.) 2 claims without prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing these claims in state court. 3 IV. PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE ORDERS 4 On December 23, 2025, Magistrate Judge Nancy J. Koppe issued an order 5 granting Defendants’ motion to stay discovery (ECF No. 109) and denying Plaintiff’s 6 various discovery-related motions (ECF Nos. 97, 101, 112). (ECF No. 130.) Plaintiff filed 7 a “motion to request limited procedural correction prior to dispositive ruling” on December 8 29, 2025. On January 6, 2026, Judge Koppe issued an order construing the motion as a 9 motion for reconsideration and denying it because Plaintiff did not establish a basis for 10 reconsideration. (ECF No. 140). On January 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed her Objection14 to 11 both orders (ECF Nos. 130, 140 (collectively, “Orders”)). (ECF No. 143.) 12 Magistrate judges are authorized to resolve pretrial matters subject to district court 13 review under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (a “district judge . . . must consider timely objections and modify or 15 set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law”); see also 16 LR IB 3-1(a) (“A district judge may reconsider any pretrial matter referred to a magistrate 17 judge in a civil or criminal case under LB IB 1-3, when it has been shown the magistrate 18 judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”). Here, Plaintiff has not 19 demonstrated that Judge Koppe made clear errors in her rulings. 20 Plaintiff contends that ECF No. 130 was erroneous in light of Plaintiff’s allegations 21 about “evidence integrity, including the alteration of surveillance materials, manipulation 22 of records, and internal date inconsistencies.” (ECF No. 143 at 2.) Plaintiff contends that 23 ECF No. 140 is “erroneous because it perpetuates and refuses to correct the fundamental 24 legal errors contained in [ECF No. 130].” (Id.) The Court disagrees. As to ECF No. 130, 25 Judge Koppe reviewed Defendants’ motion for stay, the related briefing, and relevant 26 14As an initial matter, the Court notes Defendants’ argument that the Court need 27 not address Plaintiff’s Objection to the extent that it relates to ECF No. 130 because her Objection was not timely. (ECF No. 144 at 3.) However, Plaintiff’s Objection as to ECF 28 No. 140 is intertwined with ECF No. 130, so the Court will address the Objection in full. 2 found that a stay of discovery was warranted. (ECF No. 130 at 1.) As to ECF No. 140, 3 Judge Koppe found that Plaintiff had not established a basis for reconsideration as to this 4 decision. (ECF No. 140 at 2.) Judge Koppe noted that Plaintiff essentially sought to 5 engage in discovery prior to the resolution of the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, but 6 Plaintiff was not entitled to discovery given the stage of the case. (Id.) 7 The Court finds that Judge Koppe did not clearly err and will overrule Plaintiff’s 8 Objection. 9 V. CONCLUSION 10 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 11 cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 12 determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 13 motions before the Court. 14 It is therefore ordered that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 108) is granted 15 in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s sexual harassment/hostile work environment, 16 disparate treatment, and retaliation claims brought under Title VII are dismissed with 17 prejudice as amendment would be futile. The Court declines to exercise supplemental 18 jurisdiction as to Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. 19 It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s motion to strike (ECF No. 122), motion for leave 20 to file sur-reply (ECF No. 136), and motion for temporary stay of proceedings pending 21 petition for Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 147) are denied as moot. 22 It is further ordered that Defendants’ motion for pre-filing order (ECF No. 129) is 23 denied as moot. 24 It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s objection to Magistrate Judge orders (ECF No. 25 143) is overruled. 26 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case. No more 27 motions may be filed in this now-closed action. 28 /// 1 DATED THIS 3% Day of June 2026. 2

4 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10