OPINION
GOLDBERG, Justice.
This case came before the Court on the appeal of the plaintiff, Paul D. Jewell (Paul), from an order of the Newport County Family Court entered on October 2, 1997, and a final judgment entered on December 9, 1997. The order was in the nature of a contempt order. The judgment called for the issuance of a body attachment against Paul pursuant to the contempt order, and declared void a divorce obtained by Paul in the Dominican Republic, holding that the divorce was not entitled to comity, and therefore a nullity under the law of the State of Rhode Island.
Facts and Travel
This is a tale of two wives and a long' and tortuous voyage through two divorce forums. On December 8, 1995, Paul, an active-duty member of the United States Coast Guard, filed a complaint for divorce in Newport County Family Court from his wife of sixteen years, Margaret W. Jewell (Margaret), on the ground that irreconcilable differences had led to the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. In so doing, he swore that he and Margaret were domiciled inhabitants of the State of Rhode Island, that they had resided in Rhode Island for more than one year, and that he was, at the time, a domiciled inhabitant of the state. However, in May 1997, Paul filed another petition for divorce in the Dominican Republic. A hearing was thereafter held in the Dominican Republic pursuant to Paul’s petition, at which Paul appeared alone. As a result of that hearing, a divorce decree was entered on June 2, 1997, pronouncing a divorce between Paul and Margaret on the grounds of “incompatibility of characters.” The decree certified, however, that the divorce would not become final until August 7,1997.
[737]*737In the meantime, Paul unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw his complaint for divorce in the Newport County Family Court, asserting that he was not a domiciled inhabitant of Rhode Island, and therefore his complaint for divorce should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Paul alleged that although he and his wife were residents of Rhode Island for a number of years, Illinois was his state of domicile, Paul having elected to retain Illinois as his state of domicile as an active-duty member of the armed services. In turn, Margaret motioned to file out of time a counterclaim for divorce that was subsequently granted on July 7, 1997. The counterclaim requested, among other things, that the Family Court enter a judgment divorcing Margaret from the bond of marriage.
Upon learning of Paul’s maneuvers in the Dominican Republic, Margaret sought a restraining order against Paul, on the ground that the marital domicile was Rhode Island and that a complaint for divorce was pending in Family Court at the time Paul went to the Dominican Republic. Margaret requested that Paul be restrained and enjoined from proceeding with a divorce petition in any state other than Rhode Island. Following a hearing, a justice of the Family Court ordered that a restraining order be issued against Paul. However, Paul objected to the entry of the order. A subsequent hearing was held on July 24, 1997, at which a master of the Family Court entered the order that restrained Paul from proceeding with the divorce in the Dominican Republic. However, on August 7, 1997, the final decree of divorce entered in the Dominican Republic, and Paul remarried in Puerto Rico on August 22, 1997. Six days later, a child was born to Paul and his reputed new wife.
Before Paul entered into the second marital union, an additional hearing was held on August 12, 1997, before another justice of the Family Court, to determine whether Paul could withdraw his complaint for divorce in Rhode Island for lack of jurisdiction. That request was denied on August 21, 1997. However, Paul remarried the next day. On September 4, 1997, Margaret filed a motion to adjudge Paul in contempt for violating the restraining order by proceeding with the entry of the final decree in the Dominican Republic. In turn, Paul sought to vacate the restraining order on the ground that it barred him from proceeding in any other state, and that because the Dominican Republic is not a state, he was not in contempt. Both motions were heard on September 22, 1997, at which time the Family Court justice was informed that Paul had not only obtained a final decree of divorce issued in the Dominican Republic after the restraining order had been entered and his motion to withdraw his complaint had been denied, but that he had also remarried. The trial justice thereafter denied Paul’s motion to vacate the restraining order and found Paul to be in willful contempt. As a result, Paul was sentenced to the Adult Correctional Institutions with a directive that he could purge himself of contempt by correcting the Dominican Republic judgment within thirty days. Further, the court declared that the Dominican Republic divorce was void and that, as a result, Paul had entered into a bigamous relationship. Paul filed a timely appeal of the order.
Thereafter, in October of 1997, Margaret filed two motions. The first requested that the Family Court declare that the Dominican Republic divorce was not entitled to comity, and the second motion requested that Paul be found in contempt for his failure to correct the Dominican Republic divorce decree. Both motions were heard on November 20, 1997, and a judgment was entered on December 9, 1997, finding that: (1) Paul had not purged himself with respect to the September contempt order, and (2) the Dominican Republic divorce was void because of the lack of notice to Margaret and because that country lacked jurisdiction. A second body attachment was issued, and remains [738]*738outstanding. Paul filed a timely appeal of this judgment.
Discussion
The first issue for our determination is whether the Family Court was vested with jurisdiction over this divorce. We hold that having filed a complaint for divorce in this state and availing himself of this state’s judicial resources, and by swearing that he was a domiciled resident of this state, Paul is estopped from now claiming that his true state of residency is Illinois, his state of domicile at the time he entered the Coast Guard. Paul may not now assert that the Family Court is deprived of jurisdiction over this divorce simply because it may be easier and more expeditious to seek a divorce in another jurisdiction. Further, we are satisfied that at all times relevant to his case, the Family Court retained in personam jurisdiction over Paul, as well as subject-matter jurisdiction over this pending case. We also note that throughout this proceeding, until he attempted to procure a quickie divorce in the Dominican Republic, Paul was vigorously pursuing the dissolution of his marriage in the Family Court, and had filed numerous motions and memoranda to support his claim. Accordingly, as a matter of public policy, this Court will not permit a complainant who, after having availed himself of the jurisdiction of the courts of this state and our judicial resources, seeks to evade the court’s jurisdiction by filing an identical claim in another jurisdiction and attempting to retract his sworn statement that his place of residence was Rhode Island.
Notwithstanding these various maneuvers, made while the petition was pending in the Family Court and intended to avoid his responsibilities to his wife and family in this state, which can be described only as conduct unbecoming a husband and father, the policy interests of the judiciary of this state defeat any interest the appellant may have in the convenience of a particular jurisdiction, particularly one that permits the entry of an
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OPINION
GOLDBERG, Justice.
This case came before the Court on the appeal of the plaintiff, Paul D. Jewell (Paul), from an order of the Newport County Family Court entered on October 2, 1997, and a final judgment entered on December 9, 1997. The order was in the nature of a contempt order. The judgment called for the issuance of a body attachment against Paul pursuant to the contempt order, and declared void a divorce obtained by Paul in the Dominican Republic, holding that the divorce was not entitled to comity, and therefore a nullity under the law of the State of Rhode Island.
Facts and Travel
This is a tale of two wives and a long' and tortuous voyage through two divorce forums. On December 8, 1995, Paul, an active-duty member of the United States Coast Guard, filed a complaint for divorce in Newport County Family Court from his wife of sixteen years, Margaret W. Jewell (Margaret), on the ground that irreconcilable differences had led to the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. In so doing, he swore that he and Margaret were domiciled inhabitants of the State of Rhode Island, that they had resided in Rhode Island for more than one year, and that he was, at the time, a domiciled inhabitant of the state. However, in May 1997, Paul filed another petition for divorce in the Dominican Republic. A hearing was thereafter held in the Dominican Republic pursuant to Paul’s petition, at which Paul appeared alone. As a result of that hearing, a divorce decree was entered on June 2, 1997, pronouncing a divorce between Paul and Margaret on the grounds of “incompatibility of characters.” The decree certified, however, that the divorce would not become final until August 7,1997.
[737]*737In the meantime, Paul unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw his complaint for divorce in the Newport County Family Court, asserting that he was not a domiciled inhabitant of Rhode Island, and therefore his complaint for divorce should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Paul alleged that although he and his wife were residents of Rhode Island for a number of years, Illinois was his state of domicile, Paul having elected to retain Illinois as his state of domicile as an active-duty member of the armed services. In turn, Margaret motioned to file out of time a counterclaim for divorce that was subsequently granted on July 7, 1997. The counterclaim requested, among other things, that the Family Court enter a judgment divorcing Margaret from the bond of marriage.
Upon learning of Paul’s maneuvers in the Dominican Republic, Margaret sought a restraining order against Paul, on the ground that the marital domicile was Rhode Island and that a complaint for divorce was pending in Family Court at the time Paul went to the Dominican Republic. Margaret requested that Paul be restrained and enjoined from proceeding with a divorce petition in any state other than Rhode Island. Following a hearing, a justice of the Family Court ordered that a restraining order be issued against Paul. However, Paul objected to the entry of the order. A subsequent hearing was held on July 24, 1997, at which a master of the Family Court entered the order that restrained Paul from proceeding with the divorce in the Dominican Republic. However, on August 7, 1997, the final decree of divorce entered in the Dominican Republic, and Paul remarried in Puerto Rico on August 22, 1997. Six days later, a child was born to Paul and his reputed new wife.
Before Paul entered into the second marital union, an additional hearing was held on August 12, 1997, before another justice of the Family Court, to determine whether Paul could withdraw his complaint for divorce in Rhode Island for lack of jurisdiction. That request was denied on August 21, 1997. However, Paul remarried the next day. On September 4, 1997, Margaret filed a motion to adjudge Paul in contempt for violating the restraining order by proceeding with the entry of the final decree in the Dominican Republic. In turn, Paul sought to vacate the restraining order on the ground that it barred him from proceeding in any other state, and that because the Dominican Republic is not a state, he was not in contempt. Both motions were heard on September 22, 1997, at which time the Family Court justice was informed that Paul had not only obtained a final decree of divorce issued in the Dominican Republic after the restraining order had been entered and his motion to withdraw his complaint had been denied, but that he had also remarried. The trial justice thereafter denied Paul’s motion to vacate the restraining order and found Paul to be in willful contempt. As a result, Paul was sentenced to the Adult Correctional Institutions with a directive that he could purge himself of contempt by correcting the Dominican Republic judgment within thirty days. Further, the court declared that the Dominican Republic divorce was void and that, as a result, Paul had entered into a bigamous relationship. Paul filed a timely appeal of the order.
Thereafter, in October of 1997, Margaret filed two motions. The first requested that the Family Court declare that the Dominican Republic divorce was not entitled to comity, and the second motion requested that Paul be found in contempt for his failure to correct the Dominican Republic divorce decree. Both motions were heard on November 20, 1997, and a judgment was entered on December 9, 1997, finding that: (1) Paul had not purged himself with respect to the September contempt order, and (2) the Dominican Republic divorce was void because of the lack of notice to Margaret and because that country lacked jurisdiction. A second body attachment was issued, and remains [738]*738outstanding. Paul filed a timely appeal of this judgment.
Discussion
The first issue for our determination is whether the Family Court was vested with jurisdiction over this divorce. We hold that having filed a complaint for divorce in this state and availing himself of this state’s judicial resources, and by swearing that he was a domiciled resident of this state, Paul is estopped from now claiming that his true state of residency is Illinois, his state of domicile at the time he entered the Coast Guard. Paul may not now assert that the Family Court is deprived of jurisdiction over this divorce simply because it may be easier and more expeditious to seek a divorce in another jurisdiction. Further, we are satisfied that at all times relevant to his case, the Family Court retained in personam jurisdiction over Paul, as well as subject-matter jurisdiction over this pending case. We also note that throughout this proceeding, until he attempted to procure a quickie divorce in the Dominican Republic, Paul was vigorously pursuing the dissolution of his marriage in the Family Court, and had filed numerous motions and memoranda to support his claim. Accordingly, as a matter of public policy, this Court will not permit a complainant who, after having availed himself of the jurisdiction of the courts of this state and our judicial resources, seeks to evade the court’s jurisdiction by filing an identical claim in another jurisdiction and attempting to retract his sworn statement that his place of residence was Rhode Island.
Notwithstanding these various maneuvers, made while the petition was pending in the Family Court and intended to avoid his responsibilities to his wife and family in this state, which can be described only as conduct unbecoming a husband and father, the policy interests of the judiciary of this state defeat any interest the appellant may have in the convenience of a particular jurisdiction, particularly one that permits the entry of an ex parte decree of divorce. Because we are satisfied that the Family Court additionally maintained, at all relevant times, in personam jurisdiction over Paul, the Family Court justice acted well within her authority in issuing a restraining order when it came to her attention that Paul was pursuing the same relief in a foreign tribunal. Accordingly, we hold that Paul is estopped from now challenging the jurisdiction of the Family Court of Rhode Island over his person and over the subject matter of this controversy.
Next, Paul argued that it was error for the hearing justice to find him in contempt because, according to Paul, the divorce already had been granted and, as he argued before us, that after the issuance of the restraining order, he took no affirmative steps to procure the divorce in the Dominican Republic. However, the record is silent and his appellate counsel was unable to assure us that no one acting on Paul’s behalf took any steps to secure the entry of the final decree. Further, the fact that Paul purported to marry an obviously pregnant woman so soon after the entry of the Dominican Republic decree and days before the birth of their child, while the Family Court continued to retain in personam jurisdiction over him, is indicative of contumacious conduct and raises questions about the ethical behavior of any member of the bar of this state who may have so advised him. Moreover, Paul’s motion to dismiss the divorce on the ground that he was not a resident of Rhode Island had been denied before he entered into this second union. Inasmuch as no appeal was taken from that order, it remains the law of this case and is not the subject of this appeal. Further, Margaret’s counterclaim for divorce was viable beginning on July 7, 1997, the date the counterclaim was allowed. Therefore, having retained both in personam jurisdiction over Paul and subject-matter jurisdiction over the pending divorce action, it was appropriate for the hearing justice to issue [739]*739a body attachment upon Paul, determining that he not only had violated the restraining order, but also had purported to remarry on the heels of the entry of a final decree in the Dominican Republic. Further, we note that the body attachment remains outstanding and that Paul is now a fugitive from the Family Court. We therefore hold, that Paul is precluded from challenging in this Court the order of contempt lawfully issued by the hearing justice.
However, Paul is not without recourse. Should he wish to purge himself of contempt, he may return to Rhode Island, surrender to the Family Court, and demonstrate to the Family Court justice that neither he nor anyone acting on his behalf affirmatively pursued, in violation of the restraining order, the entry of a final decree in the Dominican Republic. We are not satisfied that nothing was done affirmatively to procure the Dominican Republic decree in violation of the restraining order, counsel having been unable to assure us otherwise.1 Nevertheless, this is an issue for the Family Court to determine should Paul choose to appear in order to purge himself of contempt.
Further, we unequivocally refuse to recognize the Dominican Republic divorce, or to accord it any comity whatsoever. The ex parte divorce issued by the Dominican Republic, purportedly dissolving the marriage of two people, neither of whom had any connection to that forum, is void as a matter of law as repugnant to the public policy of this state, and we decline to accord it comity. This fly-by-day divorce that was pronounced on May 26, 1997, after Paul flew into the country in the morning, made a brief appearance with counsel, and departed the same day, is a sham, particularly where neither party was a resident of the Dominican Republic nor maintained any other legitimate connection to that forum. We are satisfied that the Dominican Republic divorce and Paul’s subsequent remarriage are void as repugnant to the law and policy of this state, and we decline to accord any comity to those proceedings. We hold that, inasmuch as it is completely lacking any indicia of reliability, including notice and no adequate opportunity for Margaret to appear, and was obtained solely to avoid and frustrate the lawful jurisdiction of the courts of this state, the trial justice was correct in finding that Paul was engaged in a bigamous relationship.
We affirm the decision of the hearing justice refusing to give full faith and credit to the Dominican Republic divorce decree. Although Article 4, section 1, of the United States Constitution mandates that full faith and credit be “given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state,” a decision to recognize a foreign decree rests solely with the courts of this state, and we decline to confer that privilege to the plaintiff in this case. Accordingly, we are satisfied that because she was not required to give full faith and credit to the Dominican Republic divorce decree, the hearing justice did not err in refusing to recognize a decree that was repugnant to this state’s public policy. Therefore, Paul remains both a fugitive from the lawful jurisdiction of the Family Court and a bigamist whose child, born on August 28, 1997, is illegitimate.
Finally, Paul notified the Coast Guard of his divorce and subsequent remarriage almost immediately. This notification had [740]*740the intended effect of depriving Margaret of health insurance and commissary privileges to which she is entitled by virtue of her status as a military wife. This amendment to his military dependents list, accomplished by Paul during the pendency of this divorce, was unlawful and contemptuous. Those benefits should be reinstated forthwith.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we deny the plaintiffs appeal and affirm the judgment of the Family Court, to which the papers of this case may be remanded.