1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JESUS SANTIAGO GARCIA, Case No. 1:26-cv-01384-JLT-CDB (HC) 12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 13 v. CORPUS AND DENY RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., (A-Number 206-350-529) 15 Respondents. (Docs. 1, 8) 16 7-Day Objection Period 17 18 Petitioner Jesus Santiago Garcia (“Petitioner”), a federal immigration detainee proceeding 19 pro se, initiated this action on February 17, 2026, with the filing of a petition for writ of habeas 20 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, while in custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 21 at the Golden State Annex Detention Facility, located in McFarland, California, where he remains 22 detained. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1). Respondents are the unnamed Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention 23 Facility, the current or acting San Francisco ICE Field Office Director, the current or acting ICE 24 Director, the current or acting Secretary of Homeland Security, and the current or acting United 25 States Attorney General (collectively, “Respondents”). Id. ¶¶ 13-17. 26 For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s petition for 27 writ of habeas corpus be granted and that Respondents’ motion to dismiss be denied. 28 /// 1 I. Relevant Background 2 The relevant facts are taken from the parties’ respective briefings. See (Docs. 1, 8). 3 Petitioner is a citizen and native of Mexico who unlawfully entered the United States on an 4 unknown date in Arizona before he was arrested by Border Patrol on August 17, 2014, served a 5 Notice to Appear, subsequently released on an Order of Recognizance (“OREC”), and placed on 6 the Alternative to Detention (“ATD”) program Intensive Supervision Appearance Program 7 (“ISAP”) pending his immigration proceedings. See (Doc. 8-1, “Ex. A” at 3-4) (January 10, 2026, 8 Form I-213 Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien). 9 Petitioner’s record indicates that he has a criminal conviction for a hit and run with property 10 damage from September 19, 2006, resulting in a sentence of five months in jail, and a pending DUI 11 charge from November 25, 2022. Id. at 4 (citing CA VC 23152(B)); (Doc. 8 at 1 n. 1, citing Ex. A 12 at 4). 13 On January 10, 2026, Petitioner reported to the Fresno ICE Office as part of his ISAP 14 reporting requirements where he was arrested by immigration officials and taken into custody based 15 on record checks that revealed he had at least nine previous reporting violations that made him 16 amenable to being taken into custody. Ex. A at 3; see id. at 4 (“08/11/2025; 09/08/2025; 17 10/13/2025; 11/24/2025; 12/08/2025; 12/15/2025; 12/22/2025; 12/29/2025; 01/05/2026”). 18 Petitioner alleges that he has lived in the United States for 24 years and that he is a father 19 of four U.S. citizen children. (Doc. 1 ¶ 18). He alleges that he has paid taxes “year after year,” and 20 works in Chowchilla, California, to support his family. Id. ¶ 23. Petitioner alleges that he was 21 detained by ICE because they received his photos “late” although he “always sent them between 22 8am and 10am when requested of them[.]” Id. Petitioner alleges he has complied with all 23 requirements and has attended every scheduled meeting with ICE. Id. 24 The undersigned takes judicial notice that Petitioner’s immigration proceedings are pending 25 with his next master hearing in immigration court set for June 25, 2026.1 26 1 See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Apr. 30, 2026, using 27 Petitioner’s A-Number and nationality); Daniels-Hall v. National Edu. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998- 99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is appropriate to take judicial notice of this information, as it was made 28 publicly available by government entities ... and neither party disputes the authenticity of the web 1 II. Governing Authority 2 A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus 3 Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United 4 States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus 5 shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should 6 not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not 7 entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 8 Relevant here, “in cases that do not involve a final order of removal, federal habeas corpus 9 jurisdiction remains in the district court” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where the petitioner 10 “challenges his confinement on statutory and constitutional grounds.” Nadaraja v. Gonzales, 443 11 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 12 2008) (holding “the district court has jurisdiction over Torres’s habeas petition challenging his 13 detention” in ICE custody). 14 B. Statutory Immigration Framework (8 U.S.C. § 1225 and § 1226) 15 Two statutes govern the detention and removal of inadmissible noncitizens from the United 16 States: 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. Relevant here is the legal background presented by the district 17 court in Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503 (N.D. Cal. 18 Sept 12, 2025), which the undersigned adopts herein: 19 1. Full Removal Proceedings and Discretionary Detention (§ 1226) 20 The “usual removal process” involves an evidentiary hearing before 21 an immigration judge. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8 U.S.C. 22 § 1229(a), also known as “full removal,” by filing a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. 23 Dec. 520, 520 (BIA 2011). Section § 1226 provides that while removal proceedings are pending, a noncitizen “may be arrested and 24 detained” and that the government “may release the alien on ... conditional parole.” § 1226(a)(2); accord Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 25 108 (during removal proceedings, applicant may either be “detained” or “allowed to reside in this country”). When a person is apprehended 26
27 sites or the accuracy of the information displayed [ ] therein.”); Argueta v. Walgreens Co., 760 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1034 (E.D. Cal. 2024) (taking judicial notice of information on federal government 28 agency’s website). 1 under § 1226(a), an ICE officer makes the initial custody determination. Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022) 2 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). A noncitizen will be released if he or she “demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the officer that such release 3 would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. 4 § 236.1(c)(8)).
5 “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings v. 6 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (citing 8 CFR §§ 236.1(d)(1)). If, at this hearing, the detainee demonstrates by the preponderance of 7 the evidence that he or she is not “a threat to national security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a 8 poor bail risk,” the IJ will order his or his release. Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1197 (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006)). 9 Once released, the noncitizen’s bond is subject to revocation. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b), “the DHS has authority to revoke a noncitizen’s 10 bond or parole ‘at any time,’ even if that individual has previously been released.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 968 (N.D. 11 Cal. 2019). However, if an immigration judge has determined the noncitizen should be released, the DHS may not re-arrest that 12 noncitizen absent a change in circumstance. See Panosyan v. Mayorkas, 854 F. App’x 787, 788 (9th Cir. 2021). Where the release 13 decision was made by a DHS officer, not an immigration judge, the Government’s practice has been to require a showing of changed 14 circumstances before re-arrest. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 15 2. Expedited Removal and Mandatory Detention (§ 1225) 16 While “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States,” 17 U.S. immigration law also “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under 18 §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” a process that provides for expedited removal. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 (2018). Under § 1225, a 19 noncitizen “who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States” is considered “an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1225(a)(1). For certain applicants for admission, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 authorizes “expedited removal.” § 1225(b)(1). § 1225(b)(1) provides 21 that:
22 “If an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) 23 who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 24 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7)], the officer shall order the alien 25 removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an 26 intention to apply for asylum under section 208 [8 USCS § 1158] or a fear of persecution.” 27 Sections 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) and 1182(a)(7) respectively refer 28 to noncitizens who are inadmissible due to misrepresentation or 1 failure to meet document requirements. Clause (iii) of § 1225(b)(1) allows the Attorney General (who has since delegated the 2 responsibility to the Department of Homeland Security Secretary) to designate for expedited removal noncitizens “who ha[ve] not been 3 admitted or paroled into the United States, and who ha[ve] not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, 4 that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of 5 the determination of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.” § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). 6 To summarize, under § 1225(b)(1), two groups of noncitizens are 7 subject to expedited removal. First, there are “arriving” noncitizens who are inadmissible due to misrepresentation or failure to meet 8 document requirements. The implementing agency regulations define “arriving alien” as applicants for admission “coming or 9 attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry.” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. The second group –designated noncitizens –includes 10 noncitizens who meet all of the following criteria: (1) they are inadmissible due to lack of a valid entry document or 11 misrepresentation; (2) they have not “been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior 12 to the date of the determination of inadmissibility”; and (3) they are among those whom the Secretary of Homeland Security has 13 designated for expedited removal. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 109; § 1225(b)(1). 14 “Initially, DHS’s predecessor agency did not make any designation 15 [under (3)], thereby limiting expedited removal only to ‘arriving aliens,’” that is, noncitizens encountered at ports of entry. Make the 16 Rd. N.Y. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-190 (JMC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169432, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025). In the following years, DHS 17 extended by designation expedited removal to noncitizens who arrive by sea and who have been present for fewer than two years, and to 18 noncitizens apprehended within 100 air miles of any U.S. international land border who entered within the last 14 days. Id. This 19 was the status quo until January 2025, when the Department of Homeland Security revised its § 1225 designation to “apply 20 expedited removal to the fullest extent authorized by statute.” Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 21 24, 2025). Under this designation, expedited removal applies to noncitizens encountered anywhere within the United States, who 22 have been in the United States for less than two years and are inadmissible for lack of valid documentation or misrepresentation. In 23 short, expedited removal was expanded to apply for the first time to vast numbers of noncitizens present in the interior of the United 24 States.
25 Under the expedited removal statute § 1225(b)(1), if an applicant “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum” or “a fear of 26 persecution,” the immigration officer “shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer.” §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). If the 27 asylum officer determines that the applicant has a “credible fear,” the applicant “receive[s] ‘full consideration’ of his asylum claim in a 28 standard removal hearing.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 110. If the 1 officer determines there is no “credible fear,” the officer “shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or 2 review.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, the officer’s decision may be appealed by the applicant to an immigration judge, who must 3 conduct the review “to the maximum extent practicable within 24 hours, but in no case later than 7 days after the date of the 4 determination.” Id. Detention under § 1225(b)(1) is “mandatory” “pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and if 5 found not to have such a fear, until removed.” Id. (citing § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (“Any alien subject to the procedures under 6 this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until 7 removed.”)
8 [Section] 1225 also contains a provision that applies to applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. 9 This provision, 1225(b)(2), states that, subject to statutory exceptions, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, 10 if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, 11 the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a [full removal proceedings] of this title.” § 1225(b)(2). In other words, 12 noncitizens subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited removal but are subject to mandatory detention while their full 13 removal proceedings are pending. This is in contrast to the default detention regime under § 1226(a), which allows for discretionary 14 release and review of detention through a bond hearing.
15 3. The Government’s Recent Change in Position
16 Until this year, the DHS has applied § 1226(a) and its discretionary release and review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens 17 allegedly in this country without valid documentation. This practice was codified by regulation. The regulations implementing the Illegal 18 Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) state that “Despite being applicants for admission, aliens 19 who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible 20 for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). In fact, the government has conceded in other 21 contexts that “DHS’s long-standing interpretation has been that 1226(a) [discretionary detention] applies to those who have crossed 22 the border between ports of entry and are shortly thereafter apprehended.” Dkt. No. 17 (citing Solicitor General, Transcript of 23 Oral Argument at 44:24–45:2, Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785 (2022) (No. 21-954)) . . . 24 In 2025, however, the Government’s policy changed dramatically. 25 The DHS revised its § 1225 designation to “apply expedited removal to the fullest extent authorized by statute.” Designating Aliens for 26 Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025) (emphasis added). The Secretary of Homeland Security memorandum directed 27 federal immigration officers to “consider ... whether to apply expedited removal” to “any alien DHS is aware of who is amenable 28 to expedited removal but to whom expedited removal has not been 1 applied.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 33. Officers are encouraged to “take steps to terminate any ongoing removal proceeding and/or any active 2 parole status.” Id. The memorandum states that DHS shall take the actions contemplated by the memorandum “in a manner that takes 3 account of legitimate reliance interests,” but states that “the expedited removal process includes asylum screening, which is 4 sufficient to protect the reliance interests of any alien who has applied for asylum or planned to do so in a timely manner.” Huffman 5 Memorandum (Jan. 23, 2025).
6 Since mid-May of 2025, the Department of Homeland Security has made a practice of appearing at regular removal proceedings in 7 immigration court, moving to dismiss the proceedings, and then re- arresting the individual in order to place them in expedited removal 8 proceedings. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 35–40. If the immigration judge does not dismiss the full removal proceedings, ICE still makes an arrest, 9 apparently in reliance on § 1225(b)(2)’s detention provision. 10 Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503 at *1-4 (internal footnotes omitted). 11 C. Parole Revocation 12 In Y-Z-H-L v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (D. Or. 2025), the court explained the parole 13 process in immigration cases and noted that before parole may be revoked, the parolee must be 14 given written notice of the impending revocation, which must include a cogent description of the 15 reasons supporting the revocation decision. The court held: Section 1182 . . . has a subsection titled “Temporary admission of 16 nonimmigrants,” which allows noncitizens, even those in required detention, to be “paroled” into the United States. This provision, at 17 issue in this case, states: 18 The Secretary of Homeland Security may, except as provided in subparagraph (B) or in section 1184(f) of this 19 title, in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe 20 only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying 21 for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the 22 alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, 23 have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled 24 and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for 25 admission to the United States. 26 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 27 Id. at 1133 (emphasis added). Y-Z-H-L determined that under the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 1 immigration parolees are entitled to determinations related to their parole revocations that are not 2 arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1146-47. An agency acts arbitrarily and 3 capriciously by failing to make a reasoned determination or where the agency fails to “articulate[] 4 a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and 5 the choice made.” Id. at 1144 (footnote and citation omitted). Parole revocations in the context of 6 the INA must occur on a case-by-case basis and may occur “when the purposes of such parole shall, 7 in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith 8 return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled.” Id. at 1133 (quoting 8 C.F.R. 9 § 212.5(e)). 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e) requires written notice of the termination of parole except where 10 the immigrant has departed or when the specified period of parole has expired. 11 Applying Y-Z-H-L and § 212.5(e), in Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128 12 (W.D.N.Y. 2025), the court found that the INA requires a case-by-case analysis as to the decision 13 to revoke humanitarian parole:
14 This Court agrees that both common sense and the words of the statute require parole revocation to be analyzed on a case-by-case 15 basis and that a decision to revoke parole “must attend to the reasons an individual [noncitizen] received parole.” See id. There is no 16 indication in the record that the government conducted any such analysis here. On the contrary, the letter Mata Velasquez received 17 merely stated summarily that DHS had “revoked [his] parole.” Docket Item 62-1 at 5. Thus, there is no indication that—as required 18 by the statute and regulations—an official with authority made a determination specific to Mata Velasquez that either “the purpose for 19 which [his] parole was authorized” has been “accomplish[ed]” or that “neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants [his] 20 continued presence...in the United States.” See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). As a result, DHS's revocation of Mata Velasquez’s 21 parole violated his rights under the statute and regulations. See Y-Z- L-H, 2025 WL 1898025, at *13. 22 Id. at 146. And in Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025), the court reached 23 a similar conclusion relying on the Due Process Clause: 24 . . . even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release 25 a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in 26 remaining out of custody. See Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-02508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022) (“[T]his Court 27 joins other courts of this district facing facts similar to the present case and finds Petitioner raised serious questions going to the merits 28 1 of his claim that due process requires a hearing before an IJ prior to re-detention.”); Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01434, 2021 2 WL 783561, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021); Ortiz Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785, 2020 WL 5074312, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3 23, 2020); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (“Just as people on preparole, parole, and probation status have a liberty interest, so too 4 does [a noncitizen released from immigration detention] have a liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”). 5 6 Id. (emphasis added). Other courts, including this Court, have held similarly. See Doe v. Becerra, 7 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025); see also Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 8 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The Supreme Court has consistently held that 9 non-punitive detention violates the Constitution unless it is strictly limited, and, typically, 10 accompanied by a prompt individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to ensure that the 11 imprisonment serves the government’s legitimate goals.”). 12 III. Exhaustion 13 A. Governing Authority 14 “Section 2241 … ‘does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before 15 filing petitions for habeas corpus.’” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 16 Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Ninth Circuit, however, requires 17 that, “as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative 18 remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1047 (citing United 19 States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Under the doctrine of exhaustion, ‘no one is 20 entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed ... remedy has been 21 exhausted.’” Laing, 370 F.3d at 997-98 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)). 22 “Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required. If exhaustion is required by statute, it 23 may be mandatory and jurisdictional, but courts have discretion to waive a prudential requirement.” 24 Id. at 998 (citing El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 25 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1991); Stratman v. Watt, 656 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Although 26 courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when it is prudentially required, this 27 discretion is not unfettered…. Lower courts … [must] first determin[e whether] the exhaustion 28 1 requirement has been satisfied or properly waived.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see Murillo v. 2 Mathews, 588 F.2d 759, 762, n.8 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Although the application of the rule requiring 3 exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but calls for the sound exercise of judicial discretion, it is not lightly 4 to be disregarded.”). 5 B. Analysis 6 Neither Petitioner nor Respondents address exhaustion in their filings. See (Docs. 1, 8). 7 The Court finds that the prudential exhaustion requirement should be waived as it would be futile 8 to seek release by administrative means given Respondents’ position that Petitioner is subject to 9 mandatory detention under § 1225(b) and Respondents do not otherwise address exhaustion of 10 administrative remedies in their motion to dismiss the petition. See (Doc. 8 at 1); Jennings v. 11 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 282 (2018) (“§§ 1225(b) … do[e]s not give detained aliens the right to 12 periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention.”); Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F. 13 4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022). Further, the BIA has held that all noncitizens present within the 14 country without admission are seeking admission pursuant to § 1225, rendering any administrative 15 relief futile. See J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013328, at 16 *7 n.9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (“In addition, pursuit of administrative remedies would almost 17 certainly be futile given the BIA’s recent holding that all noncitizens present in the United States 18 without admission are ‘seeking admission’ for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and must be 19 detained.”) (citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)). 20 For these reasons, and because Respondents do not argue Petitioner should be required to 21 exhaust administrative remedies, the undersigned recommends that the prudential exhaustion 22 requirement be waived for Petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus relief. See, e.g, Chavez v. Noem, 23 No. 3:25-cv-02325-CAB-SBC, 2025 WL 2730228, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (waiving 24 prudential exhaustion requirement because the BIA “already applied its expertise in deciding and 25 designating” Hurtado as precedential, pursuant to which detainees are subject to mandatory 26 detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1253 27 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“The Ninth Circuit has recognized ‘the irreparable harms imposed on anyone 28 subject to immigration detention.’”) (citing Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 1 2017)); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *7 n.9. 2 IV. Discussion 3 Petitioner asserts a single cause of action in his petition for violation of procedural due 4 process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See (Doc. 1 at 16-17). 5 A. Procedural Due Process 6 1. Governing Authority 7 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates that ‘[n]o person shall ... be 8 deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” United States v. Quintero, 995 9 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing U.S. Const. amend. V). “The Due Process Clause ‘protects 10 individuals against two types of government action’: violations of substantive due process and 11 procedural due process.” Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). 12 “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive 13 individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 14 Fifth … Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “[F]reedom from 15 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at 16 the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 17 “Procedural due process requires that, even where a deprivation of liberty survives substantive due 18 process scrutiny, the action ‘be implemented in a fair manner.’” Quintero, 995 F.3d at 1051-52 19 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746). “The ‘right to be heard before being condemned to suffer 20 grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal 21 conviction, is a principle basic to our society.’” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 902 (citation omitted). “The 22 fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in 23 a meaningful manner.’” Id. (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). “[D]ue process 24 is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey 25 v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 26 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 27 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 28 U.S. at 693 (citations omitted); see Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 990 (“[I]t is well-established that the 1 Due Process Clause stands as a significant constraint on the manner in which the political branches 2 may exercise their plenary authority.”). “In the context of immigration detention, it is well-settled 3 that ‘due process requires adequate procedural protections to ensure that the government’s asserted 4 justification for physical confinement outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest 5 in avoiding physical restraint.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 990 (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 6 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011)). 7 2. Analysis 8 On Petitioner’s as-applied procedural due process challenge to his continuing detention by 9 immigration authorities, the undersigned considers (1) “whether there exists a protected liberty 10 interest under the Due Process Clause, and … [(2)] the procedures necessary to ensure any 11 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, 12 No. 2:25-cv-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing Kentucky 13 Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). 14 Petitioner has an underlying, continuing liberty interest in being free from re-detention. 15 Specifically, Petitioner was released on his own recognizance by DHS on August 17, 2014, over 16 11 years and four months prior to his re-detention on January 10, 2026. See Ex. A at 3-4; (Doc. 1 17 ¶¶ 18, 23). By releasing Petitioner in their discretion, immigration officials necessarily determined 18 that Petitioner did not present a risk of flight or danger to the community. See 8 C.F.R. § 19 1236.1(c)(8) (“Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, 20 release an alien not described in section 236(c)(1) of the Act, under the conditions at section 21 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the 22 officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely 23 to appear for any future proceeding.”). Accord Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196. Petitioner 24 remained released from immigration detention for a significant amount of time, over 11 years and 25 four months. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 18, 23); see Ex. A. 26 The undersigned agrees with other courts and other judges of this Court that noncitizens 27 released from immigration custody on general orders of supervision or on their own recognizance 28 have a liberty interest in their freedom that implicates protections under principles of procedural 1 due process. See Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“The 2 fact that Petitioner is subject to discretionary conditions of release likewise does not mean he lacks 3 a protectable liberty interest and can be re-detained without process.”); see id. (“[E]ven if 4 immigration detainees must wait months before a periodic re-review of their detention, those 5 already released on immigration bond possess an interest in their continued liberty, which grows 6 over time, and a due process right to a hearing before being re-detained.”); Nak Kim Chhoeun v. 7 Marin, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1245 (C.D. Cal. 2020). Accord Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094 8 (considering in connection with a petitioner’s procedural due process claim that “[t]he lengthy 9 duration of his conditional release as well as the meaningful connections Petitioner seems to have 10 made with his community during that time create a powerful interest for Petitioner in his continued 11 liberty”); Ramazan M. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01356-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3145562, at *5- 12 6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025) (“Even when a statute allows the government to arrest and detain an 13 individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may entitle the individual to 14 procedural protections not found in the statute”). Cf. Daley v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00922-KES- 15 CDB, 2026 WL 101840, at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2026) (finding a petitioner mandatorily 16 detained pursuant to § 1226(c) did not have a protectible liberty interest because he had remained 17 in continuous custody and never released on supervision). 18 Respondents assert that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” and is “subject to 19 mandatory detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” (Doc. 8 at 1; citing, inter alia, Alonzo 20 v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01519 WBS SCR, 2025 WL 3208284 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025)). The 21 petitioners’ circumstances in Alonzo are factually dissimilar from those presented here, as another 22 judge of this Court has explained: Petitioner here was detained by ICE and released, and 23 immigration proceedings have remained pending for a significant period of time. See Garcia v. 24 Chesnut, No. 1:25-cv-01907-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL 3771348, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025) 25 (“However, unlike here, the petitioners in Valencia and Alonzo had never been encountered, let 26 alone processed, by immigration officials, and had not been released on recognizance pending 27 completion of Section 240 removal proceedings.”). 28 Additionally, other judges of this Court, as well as many other courts, have considered and 1 rejected the government’s arguments, finding that Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), 2 provides the appropriate framework for noncitizens released following their initial encounter with 3 immigration authorities and have resided in the United States for a significant period, like Petitioner 4 here. See, e.g., H.J.G.G. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01718-JLT-EPG-HC, 2025 WL 3761803, at *4 5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2025) (citing Castillo v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01586-JLT-HBK, 2025 WL 6 3466064, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025)); accord Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d 919, 7 935-37 (N.D. Cal. 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-7472 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025). Under such 8 circumstances, “the government cannot switch tracks” and subject Petitioner to mandatory 9 detention now under section 1225(b)(2) “after it previously released him on his own recognizance 10 under section 1226(a).” Valencia Zapata, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 936; accord Souza v. Robbins, No. 11 1:25-cv-01597-DJC-JDP, 2025 WL 3263897, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2025). 12 Because Petitioner has shown he has a protected liberty interest to remain free from re- 13 detention based on his discretionary release by immigration authorities in August 2014, the 14 undersigned must determine what process is due before the government may terminate that liberty 15 interest. To determine this, the undersigned considers the following factors articulated in Mathews: 16 “[(1)] the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [(2)] the risk of an erroneous 17 deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 18 additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [(3)] the Government’s interest, including the 19 function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 20 procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 993- 21 94 (applying Mathews test in immigration detention context); id. at 993 (“The appropriateness of 22 the requirement that ICE and IJs consider financial circumstances and alternative conditions of 23 release is confirmed by the balance of factors under Mathews[.]”). 24 As to the first factor, Petitioner has shown he has a significant private interest in remaining 25 on release from re-detention. He had been released from immigration custody for over 11 years 26 and four months prior to his re-detention. Petitioner’s continued liberty interest in remaining on 27 release is undermined by his re-detention without a bond hearing. Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1093- 28 94 (“Freedom from imprisonment is at the core of the Due Process Clause…. The lengthy duration 1 of his conditional release as well as the meaningful connections [he] seems to have made with his 2 community during that time create a powerful interest for [him] in his continued liberty.”). 3 As to the second factor, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest 4 is considerable here where he has not received any bond or custody redetermination. Id. at 1094; 5 A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 6 2025). Because there were no procedural safeguards to determine if Petitioner’s re-detention was 7 justified, the probable value of the additional procedural safeguard of a bond hearing to determine 8 whether Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community is high such that this factor weighs 9 in favor of granting a bond hearing. See Doe, 787 F. Supp. at 1094 (“[G]iven that Petitioner was 10 previously found to not be a danger or risk of flight and the unresolved questions about the timing 11 and reliability of the new information, the risk of erroneous deprivation remains high.”); A.E., 2025 12 WL 1424382 at *5; Ramazan, 2025 WL 3145562, at *6. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of 13 granting a bond hearing. 14 Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without a bond hearing is low. Doe, 15 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094 (citation omitted); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 16 2019)); Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) 17 (“And, like other Courts in this district, the Court concludes that the government’s interest in re- 18 detaining Petitioner-[] without a hearing is ‘low,’ particularly in light of the fact that Petitioner[] 19 has long complied with his reporting requirements.”). “The effort and cost to provide Petitioner 20 with [a bond hearing] is minimal[.]” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. Therefore, any additional 21 burden from requiring the government to seek a bond hearing before it may re-detain Petitioner 22 does not outweigh his liberty interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation. Accordingly, this factor 23 weighs in favor of granting a bond hearing. 24 Respondents assert that after Petitioner was released, he violated the conditions of his 25 release by committing “at least nine consecutive reporting violations.” (Doc. 8 at 1 n.1). Upon 26 review of the record, the undersigned does not find Respondents’ assertions regarding Petitioner’s 27 purported lack of compliance with any conditions of supervised release meritorious. The 28 government does not proffer any particulars, nor do any appear in the record other than the 1 purported dates, regarding the nature of the purported nine violations to justify ICE’s re-arrest and 2 re-detention of Petitioner. Indeed, Respondents do not refute or even address Petitioner’s 3 allegations that he “always sent [photos to ICE]” timely “when requested of them” or explain the 4 circumstances that they “received [Petitioner’s] photos late” in violation of his supervised release. 5 See (Doc. 1 ¶ 23); (Doc. 8). Therefore, Respondents have not shown that Petitioner failed to comply 6 with any conditions of his release nor any changed circumstances sufficient to justify Petitioner’s 7 re-arrest and re-detention. And even if Respondents’ assertions regarding Petitioner’s purported 8 lack of compliance were credited, they are not relevant to the issue of whether Petitioner is entitled 9 to a custody redetermination by an immigration judge given Respondents do not argue, and the 10 record does not show, that Petitioner was ever determined to be a danger to the community or a 11 flight risk to justify his re-detention. See (Doc. 8). 12 In sum, the undersigned finds that, under Mathews, Respondents have violated Petitioner’s 13 procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution through his arrest 14 on January 10, 2026, and continuous and continuing detention thereafter. 15 B. Respondents’ Reference to Ninth Circuit Appeals 16 Separately, Respondents assert that there are matters pending appeal before the Ninth 17 Circuit that bear on the issues presented in this case. (Doc. 8 at 2 n.2; citing, inter alia, Rodriguez 18 v. Bostock, No. 25-6842). Having found that Petitioner’s re-arrest without a bond determination 19 and continuous detention for a considerable length of time violates the U.S. Constitution, the 20 undersigned will not recommend holding the matter in abeyance pending said appeals. See 21 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (reaffirming that “freedom from imprisonment—from government 22 custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due 23 Process] Clause protects.”). 24 C. Relief 25 The undersigned considers whether Petitioner is entitled to a pre-deprivation or post- 26 deprivation bond hearing, and further, addresses what standards should apply at that hearing. 27 Here, although the undersigned finds that Respondents have not convincingly demonstrated 28 that Petitioner, in fact, violated the terms of his supervision on nine occasions, Petitioner tacitly 1 concedes he was informed by ICE that they received his photos late which “is the reason [he is] 2 currently being detained[.]” (Doc. 1 ¶ 23). On this record, the undersigned is unable to evaluate 3 the significance of Petitioner’s purported, repeated non-compliance with the terms of his 4 supervision. See Ex. A at 4. Therefore, the undersigned will recommend that Respondents provide 5 Petitioner with a post-deprivation bond hearing at which Respondents will bear the burden of 6 demonstrating that he is a flight risk or a danger to the community as set forth below. See Patia 7 Garcia v. Cruz, et al., No. 1:26-cv-00922 JLT CDB (HC), 2026 WL 962745, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8 9, 2026) (adopting findings and recommendations in part, ordering that the petitioner be provided 9 a post-deprivation bond hearing, instead of a pre-deprivation hearing, because “the Court is not 10 able to determine the significance of [petitioner’s] apparent instances of non-compliance” with 11 terms of supervision). 12 V. Conclusion and Recommendation 13 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 14 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be GRANTED. 15 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) be DENIED. 16 3. Respondents be ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing within 14 days 17 before an immigration judge wherein the Government must demonstrate by clear and 18 convincing evidence, in accordance with the requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 19 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011), that Petitioner is not a flight risk or a danger to the 20 community, or in the alternative, release Petitioner on appropriate conditions of 21 supervision. 22 4. The Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor for Petitioner and 23 close this case. 24 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 25 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven (7) days 26 after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections 27 with the Court. Although this objection period is shorter than provided by Local Rule, such an 28 adjustment is warranted given the nature of Petitioner’s harm, the finding of a violation of the U.S. 1 | Constitution by Respondents, and the fact that the parties have extensively briefed the issues 2 | involved. See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“The court 3 | may require a response within a shorter period if exigencies of the calendar require.”). Any 4 | objections filed should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 5 | Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave of Court and good cause shown. 6 | The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to 7 | refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document 8 | and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages 9 | filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing 10 | these findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that 11 | failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 12 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 13 | 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 14 | ITIS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: _ April 30, 2026 | nnd bo 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18