Jesus Perez-Regalado v. Thomas Feeley, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 6, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02409
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 JESUS PEREZ-REGALADO, Case No. 2:25-cv-02409-RFB-EJY

8 Petitioner, ORDER

9 v.

10 THOMAS FEELEY, et al., 11 Respondents. 12

13 14 Before the Court is Petitioner Jesus Perez-Regalado’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 15 Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the lawfulness of his detention at 16 Nevada Southern Detention Center (NSDC) in the custody of the Federal Respondents. For the 17 following reasons, the Court grants the Petition. 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 This case is one of a rapidly growing number before this Court challenging the federal 20 government’s reading of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to authorize mandatory 21 detention of all noncitizens charged with entering the United States without inspection.1 The 22 executive branch now takes the position that the INA, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), 23 requires the detention of all undocumented individuals during the pendency of their removal 24 proceedings, which can take months or years. According to this interpretation, detention without 25 a hearing is mandatory, no matter how long a noncitizen has resided in the country, and without 26

27 1 This Court has already granted petitioners relief—both preliminary and on the merits— 28 in dozens of similar challenges. See Livia Vicharra v. Henkey, No. 2:25-cv-02336-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3564725, at *1 n.1 (D. Nev. Dec. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). 1 any due process to ensure the government has a legitimate, individualized interest in detaining 2 them. 3 According to a leaked internal memo, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in 4 conjunction with the Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted this new legal position on a nationwide 5 basis on July 8, 2025.2 It subjects millions of undocumented U.S. residents to prolonged detention 6 without the opportunity for release on bond, in contravention of decades of agency practice and 7 robust due process protections hitherto afforded to such residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).3 On 8 September 5, 2025, the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a precedential decision 9 adopting this new interpretation of the government’s detention authority under the INA. See Matter 10 of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) (“Hurtado”). After Hurtado, immigration judges 11 no longer have authority to hear bond requests or grant bond to noncitizens present in the U.S. 12 who entered without inspection. Id. 13 The overwhelming majority of district courts across the country, including this Court, that 14 have considered the government’s new statutory interpretation have found it incorrect and 15 unlawful. See Escobar Salgado v. Mattos, No. 2:25-CV-01872-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3205356 (D. 16 Nev. Nov. 17, 2025) (finding “that the plain meaning of the relevant statutory provisions, when 17 interpreted according to fundamental canons of statutory construction,” as well as the legislative 18 history and decades of consistent agency practice establish “that the government's new 19 interpretation and policy under [§ 1225(b)(2)(A)] is unlawful.”); see also Barco Mercado v. 20 Francis, No. 1:25-CV-06852, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting over 350 decisions by 21 over 160 different district judges finding the application of §1225(b)(2)(A) to noncitizens residing 22 in the United States unlawful). A nationwide class has also been certified, become final, and 23 granted declaratory relief to all class members, holding that they are being detained without a bond 24 hearing unlawfully. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---

25 2 See ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for 26 Admission, AILA Doc. No. 25071607 (July 8, 2025), https://perma.cc/5GKM-JYGX. 27 3 See Kyle Cheney & Myah Ward, Trump’s new detention policy targets millions of immigrants. Judges keep saying its illegal., Politico (Sept. 20, 2025 at 4:00 p.m. EDT), 28 https://www.politico.com/news/2025/09/20/ice-detention-immigration-policy-00573850, https://perma.cc/L686-E97L. 1 -, 2025 WL 3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025); Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS- 2 BFM, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025); Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873- 3 SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). 4 Petitioner is currently detained without the opportunity for release on bond in the custody 5 of Federal Respondents at NSDC, pursuant to this new detention “policy.” He asserts that his 6 detention and the application of § 1225(b)(2) to him is unlawful under the INA, that § 1226(a) 7 properly governs his detention—citing to the final judgment and class certification in Bautista— 8 and that his continued detention violates his procedural and substantive due process rights. See 9 2025 WL 3713987. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released unless 10 Respondents provide him with a constitutionally-adequate bond hearing under § 1226(a). 11 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful under 12 the INA and violates his due process rights.4 The Court thus grants the Petition and orders 13 Respondents to provide Petitioner a constitutionally adequate bond hearing by January 13, 2026, 14 or release him. 15 16 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 17 On December 4, 2025, Petitioner filed his Writ of Habeas Corpus, challenging his 18 prolonged detention at NSDC. See ECF No. 1. On December 9, 2025, this case was transferred to 19 the undersigned judge as related to three pending putative class actions pending before the Court. 20 See ECF No. 2. That same day, the Court ordered Petitioner to submit an amended, verified petition 21 by December 11, 2025, stating that it would screen the Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 as 22 soon as possible after the verification was filed. See ECF No. 5. Five days later, on December 16, 23 Petitioner filed an Amended (verified) Petition. See ECF No. 7. The following day, on December 24 17, 2025, this Court ordered Respondents to show cause, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, by 25 December 22, 2025, why the Court should not grant the Petition, and Respondents filed a notice 26 4 Outside of the Court’s own analysis, the Court also recognizes that Petitioner is a member 27 of the class certified in Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---- , 2025 WL 3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), and that the District Court’s Order in Bautista has 28 recently become final, extending declaratory relief to the class. See Bautista, 2025 WL 3713987, at *32; see also ECF No. 10-5. 1 of appearance. See ECF Nos. 9-10. On December 22, 2025, Respondents’ counsel filed a motion 2 for an extension of time, which the Court granted in part, extending Respondents’ deadline to file 3 a Return to December 31, 2025. See ECF Nos. 11-12. Respondents filed their Return to Order to 4 Show Cause on December 31, 2025, and Petitioner filed their Traverse on January 3, 2026. See 5 ECF Nos. 14, 16. Counsel for Defendant John Mattos filed joinder to Federal Respondents’ Return 6 on January 2, 2026. See ECF No. 15. 7 The Court’s Order follows. 8 9 III. BACKGROUND 10 A. Legal Background 11 The Court fully incorporates by reference the legal background regarding the government’s 12 detention authority and removal proceedings under the INA, as well as the government’s new 13 statutory reading and mass detention “policy,” set forth in its ruling in Escobar Salgado. 2025 WL 14 3205356, at *2-6. 15 B. Petitioner Jesus Perez-Regalado 16 The Court makes the following findings as to Petitioner. Mr. Perez-Regalado is a 48-year- 17 old native and citizen of Mexico who has resided in the U.S. for almost twenty years, since his 18 entry without inspection in 2006. See ECF No. 7 at 2. On November 5, 2025, Petitioner was 19 arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada on a battery/domestic violence allegation, which is still pending. 20 See ECF No. 14-2. Upon posting bond on November 6, 2025, Petitioner was transferred to 21 immigration authorities and detained at NSDC, in Pahrump, Nevada, where he remains detained 22 to-date. See ECF No. 7 at 2. Petitioner was concurrently placed into removal proceedings through 23 the issuance of a Notice to Appear (NTA), charging him, inter alia, as being inadmissible under 8 24 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6(A)(i) for entering the United States without inspection. See ECF No. 14-1. 25 Petitioner requested custody redetermination (bond) hearing before an immigration judge 26 (IJ). However, Petitioner was not notified of his bond hearing’s rescheduling and was therefore 27 unable to be appear at the proceeding to fully assist his counsel; further, Petitioner did not 28 1 knowingly or voluntarily waive his appearance, nor authorize his counsel to do so. See ECF No. 7 2 at 3. Petitioner only learned of the rescheduling after the hearing had occurred. See id. 3 Mr. Perez-Regalado is married, has three U.S. citizen children, ages 21, 16, and 14. See id. 4 at 2. His eldest daughter suffers a severe medical condition—pectus excavatum—which has 5 required her to undergo four major surgeries in the last seven years, including a complicated 6 procedure this past July that imposed strict physical restrictions on her until this month (January 7 2026) at minimum and requires continuous follow-up care until 2029. See id. This daughter lives 8 with Petitioner, and because of her condition, she depends entirely on her father for transportation, 9 emotional support, and support for her medical treatment, and has suffered financial and 10 disruptive-treatment hardship in his absence. See id. at 16-17. 11 12 IV. LEGAL STANDARDS 13 The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual 14 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. 15 Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “Its province, shaped to guarantee the most fundamental of all rights, is 16 to provide an effective and speedy instrument by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality 17 of the detention of a person.” Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). “The essence of 18 habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the 19 traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 20 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates 21 that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 22 Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of 23 Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. 24 Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a district court's habeas jurisdiction includes 25 challenges to immigration-related detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); 26 see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003); Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) 27 (describing immigration detainees’ challenge to their confinement and removal as falling “within 28 the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus.”) (per curiam) (citations omitted). “The application for the 1 writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and 2 receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 3 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 4 5 V. DISCUSSION 6 A. Jurisdiction 7 The Court has habeas jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s challenge to the lawfulness of his 8 detention, because the relevant jurisdiction stripping provisions of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 do 9 not apply. See Escobar Salgado, 2025 WL 3205356, at *8-10; Hernandez Duran v. Bernacke, 2:25- 10 cv-2105-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3237451, at *4 (Nov. 19, 2025). In evaluating the jurisdiction 11 stripping provisions of the INA, the Court is guided “by the general rule to resolve any ambiguities 12 in a jurisdiction-stripping statue in favor of the narrower interpretation and by the strong 13 presumption in favor of judicial review.” Arce v. United States, 899 F. F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 14 2018) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 15 B. Statutory Question 16 Petitioner challenges the government’s new interpretation of the INA, and his detention 17 thereunder, as unlawful. Petitioner argues this interpretation of the statutory scheme of §§ 1225 18 and 1226 is flawed, contradicting both the statutory framework and the decades of agency practice 19 applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner. This Court agrees with Petitioner and fully 20 incorporates by reference its holding and findings in Escobar Salgado v. Mattos. 2025 WL 21 3205356, at *10-22. 22 Petitioner entered the United States in 2006 and was arrested and detained by ICE in Las 23 Vegas, decades later, far from any port of entry. Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner is subject 24 to detention under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and that the 25 government’s new interpretation and policy under that provision is unlawful. Escobar Salgado, 26 2025 WL 3205356, at *10-22. 27 C. Due Process 28 Petitioner also challenges his ongoing detention without the opportunity for release on 1 bond under § 1225(b)(2) as unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 2 Amendment. Even if this Court were to accept the government’s new reading of § 1225(b)(2), it 3 would still have to contend with Petitioner’s due process challenge on this basis. This Court 4 incorporates by reference the legal authorities and standards set forth in Escobar Salgado v. Mattos 5 regarding the due process rights of noncitizens. 2025 WL 3205356, at *22-24. For the following 6 reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is currently being detained without the opportunity for 7 release on bond in violation of his procedural and substantive due process rights. 8 1. Procedural Due Process 9 To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply the three- 10 part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 11 53 F.4th 1189, 1203-07 (9th Cir. 2022) (collecting cases and applying the Mathews test in a similar 12 immigration detention context and holding “[u]ltimately, Mathews remains a flexible test that can 13 and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context”). 14 Under Mathews, the courts weigh the following three factors: (1) “the private interest that 15 will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 16 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 17 safeguards”; and (3) “the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 18 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 19 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 20 The first Mathews factor considers the private interest affected by the government's 21 ongoing detention of Petitioner without the opportunity for release on bond. See Mathews, 424 22 U.S. at 335. Here, that is Petitioner’s interest in being free from imprisonment, “the most elemental 23 of liberty interests.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. In this country, liberty is the norm and detention “is 24 the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); see also 25 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th At 1207 (“An individual's private interest in freedom from prolonged 26 detention is unquestionably substantial.”) (citations omitted). Additionally, Petitioner’s liberty 27 interest is not diminished by any final order of removal, or the availability of any existing process 28 to challenge Respondents’ decision to detain him without bond. Cf. id. at 1208 (holding the habeas 1 petitioner's liberty interest was diminished by the fact that he was subject to a final order of 2 removal, had already been afforded an individualized bond hearing, and had additional process 3 available to him through a further bonding hearing before an IJ upon a showing of materially 4 changed circumstances). 5 Second, the Court considers “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [Petitioner’s] interest 6 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedures.” Mathews, 7 424 U.S. at 335. There are no existing procedures whatsoever for Petitioner to challenge his 8 detention pending the conclusion of his removal proceedings without the opportunity for release 9 on bond. The risk of erroneous deprivation is extraordinarily high where ICE and DHS agency 10 officials have sole, unguided, and unreviewable discretion to detain Petitioner without any 11 individualized showing of why his detention is warranted, nor any process for Petitioner to 12 challenge the exercise of that discretion. The likelihood of erroneous deprivation caused by this 13 lack of process is demonstrated by numerous prior cases before this Court where an IJ held a bond 14 hearing for a petitioner prior to Hurtado and found that the government had not established a 15 justification for detention. See, e.g., Escobar Salgado, 2025 WL 3205356; Aparicio v. Noem, No. 16 2:25-CV-01919-RFB-DJA, 2025 WL 2998098 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2025); Berto Mendez v. Noem, 17 No. 2:25-cv-02602-RFB-MDC, 2025 WL 3124285 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2025). Moreover, given that 18 Petitioner has significant ties to the country, specifically as it relates to his family and community 19 in Las Vegas, and because Respondents have not asserted he is dangerous or a flight risk, the Court 20 finds that he is being arbitrarily and unjustifiably deprived of his liberty. 21 The additional procedures afforded under § 1226(a), including an individualized, 22 constitutionally adequate custody redetermination by an immigration judge, i.e., a bond hearing, 23 substantially mitigate the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty, because those 24 procedures require the government to establish that Petitioner presents a flight risk or danger to 25 the community. This would account for the constitutional requirement that “once the flight risk 26 justification evaporates, the only special circumstance [ ] present is the alien's removable status 27 itself, which bears no relation to a detainee's dangerousness.” Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 691-92. An 28 adverse decision by an immigration judge in a bond hearing can further be appealed, and Petitioner 1 could seek additional custody redeterminations based on changed circumstances, such that the 2 outcome of a bond hearing would be subject to “numerous levels of review, each offering 3 [Petitioner] the opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 4 1210 (finding the bond hearing procedures available through the implementing regulations of § 5 1226(a) would render “the risk of erroneous deprivation . . . relatively small.”) (citation omitted). 6 As such, the second Mathews factor also weighs heavily in favor of granting Petitioner the 7 procedural protections under § 1226(a). 8 The third and final Mathews factor considers the “Government's interest, including the 9 function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 10 procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335. The Court acknowledges that the 11 government's interests in enforcing immigration laws, including “protecting the public from 12 dangerous criminal aliens” and “securing an alien's ultimate removal,” are “interests of the highest 13 order.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1188-89. These interests are in fact served by the 14 individualized determination by an immigration judge, based on a review of evidence presented 15 by the government and the noncitizen, as to whether an individual is dangerous or at risk of fleeing 16 removal proceedings, under existing, well-established procedures. In failing to articulate any 17 individualized reason why detaining Petitioner is necessary to enforce immigration law, the 18 question arises “whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of 19 flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532-33 20 (Kennedy, J. concurring). And the government has no interest in the unjustified deprivation of a 21 person's liberty. 22 Further, the Court finds that limiting the use of detention to only those noncitizens who are 23 dangerous or a flight risk through existing bond procedures serves the government and public's 24 interest by reducing the fiscal and administrative burdens attendant to immigration detention. See 25 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 996 (9th Cir. 2017) (Noting in 2017 that “the costs to the 26 public of immigration detention are staggering: $158 each day per detainee, amounting to a total 27 daily cost of $6.5 million. Supervised release programs cost much less by comparison: between 17 28 cents and 17 dollars each day per person.”). 1 In sum, the Court finds the Mathews factors weigh heavily in factor of Petitioner, and 2 therefore, his detention without the opportunity for release on bond violates his procedural due 3 process rights. 4 2. Substantive Due Process 5 Immigration detention violates the Due Process Clause unless it is ordered in a criminal 6 proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or in non-punitive circumstances “where a 7 special justification . . . outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding 8 physical restraint.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 9 Respondents have asserted absolutely no individualized justification—let alone a special 10 or compelling justification—to continue to deprive Petitioner of his physical liberty. Accordingly, 11 in addition to finding that the challenged regulation violates procedural due process, this Court 12 further finds that Petitioner is currently detained in violation of his substantive due process rights. 13 See Escobar Salgado, 2025 WL 3205356, at *25. 14 D. Scope of Relief 15 The federal habeas corpus statute “does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge 16 of the applicant from physical custody.” Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). “Its 17 mandate is broad with respect to the relief that may be granted.” Id. “It provides that ‘[t]he court 18 shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243). 19 Here, Petitioner faces the specific harm of being detained without a constitutionally 20 adequate bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). The Court finds that harm is remedied by ordering a 21 bond hearing be conducted by January 13, 2026. Given the due process rights at stake, if a bond 22 hearing is not provided promptly within that time frame, Petitioner shall be immediately released 23 until it is determined that his detention is warranted under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 24 E. Attorneys’ Fees 25 The Court defers on ruling on the matter of attorneys’ fees and costs. Any fee petition 26 should be filed within the deadlines and consistent with the requirements set by the Equal Access 27 to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 28 1 VI. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Amended Petition (ECF No. 7)is GRANTED. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents must provide Petitioner with a bond 5 | hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) no later than January 13, 2026. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from denying Petitioner 7 | release on bond on the basis that he is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 8 | 1225(b)(2). Thus, in the event that bond is granted, the Court ORDERS that Respondents are 9 | enjoined from invoking the automatic stay to continue Petitioner’s detention, as the Court has 10 | already found the automatic stay unconstitutional and adopts that finding here. See Herrera v. 11 | Knight, No. 2:25-CV-01366-RFB-DJA, 2025 WL 2581792, at *13 (D. Nev. Sept. 5, 2025). 12 In the event that bond is granted, Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release 13 | Petitioner. The Court has received notice of the hardship other petitioners have incurred in their efforts to satisfy bond, and therefore, the Court FURTHER ORDERS that Petitioner be afforded 15 | until February 27, 2026, to satisfy any monetary bond conditions. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the individualized bond hearing is not conducted by 17| January 13,2026, Petitioner shall be immediately released until it is determined that his detention 18 | is warranted under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file a status report on the status of 20 | Petitioner’s bond hearing by January 14, 2026. The status report shall detail if and when the bond 21 hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if denied, the reasons for that denial. 22 23 DATED: January 6, 2026.

26 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28

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