PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7529
JESUS EMMANUEL JEHOVAH, a/k/a Robert Gabriel Love, a/k/a Gabriel Alexander Antonio,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director; A. DAVID ROBINSON, Deputy Director,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; LORETTA K. KELLY, Warden, Sussex I State Prison; ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, in their official, individual, and private capacities, jointly and severally; EDDIE L. PEARSON, Warden; KEISHA FOWLKES, Unit Manager; MS. EVANS, Records Officer; MS. ANSAH, Corporal; ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.; ANTHONY KING, Dr.; MESELE GEBREYES, Dr.; BENJAMIN ULEP, Dr.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (1:12-cv-00087-JCC-IDD)
Argued: May 12, 2015 Decided: July 9, 2015
Amended: August 11, 2015 Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Floyd joined.
ARGUED: Lola Abbas Kingo, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Trevor Stephen Cox, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Steven H. Goldblatt, Director, Clay Greenberg, Student Counsel, Elizabeth Purcell, Student Counsel, Appellate Litigation Program, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Cynthia E. Hudson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Linda L. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General, Public Safety & Enforcement, Richard C. Vorhis, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kate E. Dwyre, Assistant Attorney General, Stuart A. Raphael, Solicitor General of Virginia, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
2 GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Inmate Jesus Emmanuel Jehovah appeals from the district
court’s dismissal of his pro se claims against the Commonwealth
of Virginia and various employees and contractors of the
Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”). Jehovah claims
that Appellees violated his free exercise rights under the First
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) by a) prohibiting him from consuming wine
during communion, b) requiring him to work on Sabbath days, and
c) assigning him non-Christian cellmates. Jehovah also alleges
that Appellees demonstrated deliberate indifference to his
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
district court dismissed sua sponte Jehovah’s Sabbath claims,
cell assignment claims, and deliberate indifference claim, and
granted Appellees summary judgment on the communion wine claim.
We reverse the district court’s judgment in its entirety and
remand for further proceedings.
I.
Jehovah is a VDOC inmate who was incarcerated at Sussex I
Prison (“SIP”) in Waverly, Virginia when he filed this lawsuit.
In his pro se complaint, he alleges four courses of action taken
by VDOC employees that he claims violated his rights under
RLUIPA and the First and Eighth Amendments.
3 First, Jehovah claims that various policies have prevented
him from taking communion in the manner required by his
religious beliefs. Jehovah’s religion 1 mandates that he take
communion by drinking red wine and consuming bread dipped in
honey, olive oil, sugar, cinnamon, and water. While he was
incarcerated at Nottoway Correctional Center (“NCC”) from
September 2009 to March 2010, Jehovah was not permitted to take
communion at all pursuant to a memorandum prohibiting the
practice for inmates in segregation. In April 2010, Jehovah was
transferred to SIP and placed in the general population.
Jehovah requested permission from the warden to take communion
but did not receive a response, so he filed a grievance. In
January 2011, while Jehovah’s grievance was pending, VDOC issued
a new policy prohibiting all inmates from consuming wine during
communion. Jehovah filed another grievance, which VDOC denied.
VDOC revised its policy in January 2012 to allow inmates to
consume bread dipped in wine but not to drink wine. Jehovah
filed a third grievance, which was also denied. In December
1Jehovah appears to adhere to his own particular brand of Christianity, citing to a version of the Bible written by himself. See J.A. 23 (Compl. n.1). Appellees do not challenge the sincerity of his beliefs, and it is not within the courts’ purview to “question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
4 2012, VDOC changed its policy yet again to ban inmates from
consuming communion wine by any method. 2
Second, Jehovah asserts that he has been unable to secure a
job that will allow him to observe his Sabbaths. Jehovah’s
faith prohibits him from working during the “Old Jewish Sabbath”
(Friday sundown to Saturday sundown) or the “New Christic
Sabbath” (Saturday at sunset to Monday at sunrise). 3 VDOC
requires inmates to participate in programming –- including work
and educational activities -- for a certain number of hours per
week in order to be eligible for good conduct allowances and
earned sentence credits. See Va. Code § 53.1-32.1. In February
2011 Jehovah was assigned to a cleaning position, and his
supervisor required him to work seven days a week. Jehovah
requested that VDOC accommodate his observance of the Sabbaths,
but VDOC refused, informing him that his failure to work could
lead to sanctions. He filed a grievance, which VDOC denied.
VDOC staff has not approved him for any job for which he has
applied since December 2011, including jobs for which they had
2 This policy, like the January 2011 policy, allows clergy to consume wine during services but permits inmates to drink only wine substitutes such as grape juice. 3 Jehovah is required to devote these days to religious observance and instruction.
5 previously approved him. 4 According to Jehovah, “there are few
prison jobs available to him at SIP and other prisons which he
can work and keep observing the Sabbaths.” J.A. 27 (Compl.
¶ 32).
Third, Jehovah states that VDOC has housed him with “people
who are anti-Christian and unbelievers,” contrary to his
religious beliefs. J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 34). Jehovah “is directed
by God not to be yoked to unbelievers.” J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 34).
At one point Jehovah was housed with a “self-proclaimed Satanist
and anti-Christian,” even though VDOC knew of Jehovah’s
religious views. J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 35). This inmate harassed
Jehovah and subjected him to “anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, anti-
God . . . rhetoric.” J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 35). After several
requests to be reassigned, Jehovah filed a grievance to which
VDOC never responded. Since July 2011, Jehovah has been
assigned to live with “an atheist, an agnostic, a worldly
Muslim, a false/non-practicing insincere Christian, a racist
black anti-Christian atheist, a self-proclaimed ‘Hell’s Angel’
biker, and a black anti-Christian from an anti-white gang.”
J.A. 29 (Compl. n.18). Other VDOC prisons had been able to
4 Jehovah lost his cleaning job on May 17, 2011 after being placed in segregation.
6 accommodate Jehovah’s requests to be housed only with
Christians.
Finally, Jehovah alleges that he has suffered various
medical ailments that VDOC medical staff have deliberately
ignored. In 2009 while incarcerated at NCC, Jehovah
experienced, among other things, tongue lesions, chest and
throat pain, difficulty swallowing, coughing, nausea, lethargy,
and unexplained weight loss. After medical staff at NCC
“detected and acknowledged” Jehovah’s symptoms but before they
could diagnose them, Jehovah was transferred to SIP on March 26,
2010. J.A. 30 (Compl. ¶ 43). Jehovah developed further
symptoms after arriving at SIP, and after testing negative for
strep throat he was referred to Dr. King. On April 15, 2010,
Dr. King examined Jehovah for the first time. He found holes in
Jehovah’s tonsils but “did not acknowledge” any of Jehovah’s
other symptoms; he ordered a test for HIV, which was negative,
and then did not provide any further care. J.A. 30 (Compl.
¶ 45). Jehovah’s symptoms worsened, and he sought additional
treatment from Dr. King on June 17, 2010. Dr. King ignored all
of Jehovah’s symptoms except his coughing, neck lesion, and
nasal drip. 5 Dr. King ordered a chest x-ray and urine and blood
5At this point in time, Jehovah’s alleged symptoms included: “coughing with unusual whitish phlegm, [a] patch of hair loss and neck lesion on His neck, fatigue, dizziness, night (Continued) 7 tests: the x-ray appeared normal but the urine and blood tests
revealed abnormalities consistent with infection. Jehovah
maintains Dr. King ignored these results and provided no further
treatment. Jehovah saw Dr. King again on July 30, 2010, and
Dr. King referred him to mental health staff, who ultimately
determined that he had no psychological problems. Jehovah’s
condition continued to deteriorate. 6 When Jehovah next saw
Dr. King on August 30, 2010, Dr. King “disregarded most” of his
symptoms and treated him for gastroesophageal reflux disease
with Prilosec, which made many of Jehovah’s symptoms worse.
J.A. 31 (Compl. ¶ 48). Dr. King also referred Jehovah to mental
health staff again to be evaluated for bipolar disorder, of
which staff found no symptoms. This pattern continued into
sweats, nasal drip, weight loss, a lump under [h]is left ear, chest pains, chest burning sensations, involuntary muscle spasms throughout [h]is body, headaches, difficulty sleeping, swollen lymph nodes, and other symptoms.” J.A. 30 (Compl. ¶ 46). 6 Additional symptoms included “tinnitus/ringing sensations in [h]is hearing/ears, popping and bubbling sounds and sensations and pains in [h]is ears and ear canals; episodic problems concentrating, slowed cognitive functioning, malaise, and dizziness; abdominal pains, abnormal stools, and rapidly passing consumed meals; more difficulty swallowing and persistent sensations of something being caught in [h]is throat, neck pain, and sore and tender swollen nodes and tissues in his neck; more chest pains and of greater intensity, and bones in [h]is sternum area slightly, audibly, and painfully popping and moving out of place; worsening muscle spasms, and spontaneous irregular and painful heartbeats.” J.A. 31 (Compl. ¶ 47).
8 2012, with Dr. King and other VDOC doctors allegedly
acknowledging only some of Jehovah’s symptoms, ignoring test
results indicating infection, and failing to improve Jehovah’s
condition. 7
Jehovah filed this lawsuit on July 11, 2012, seeking
compensatory and injunctive relief for these alleged violations
of RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. On
September 27, 2012, the district court sua sponte dismissed all
of Jehovah’s claims except his communion claim pursuant to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Appellees moved to dismiss the remaining claim on December 21,
2012. In support of their motion they submitted a declaration
from VDOC Chief of Corrections Operations A. David Robinson
discussing the purposes of the wine ban. Jehovah responded with
numerous discovery requests to which Appellees responded in part
and otherwise objected. He then filed a motion to compel
discovery and to hold an evidentiary hearing, which the district
court denied on May 17, 2013. On August 20, 2013, the court
granted Appellees’ summary judgment motion and dismissed
Jehovah’s RLUIPA and First Amendment claims regarding the
7 In 2013, Jehovah filed a notice with the district court stating that an ultrasound electrocardiogram had revealed that for two years he had been suffering from pulmonary hypertension with right ventricle hypertrophy, an irreversible and often fatal condition.
9 communion wine ban. Jehovah timely appealed the dismissal of
all his claims.
II.
On appeal, Jehovah argues that the district court erred in
1) dismissing his Sabbath, cell assignment, and deliberate
indifference claims under § 1915A, and 2) granting Appellees
summary judgment on his communion wine claim.
We review de novo a § 1915A dismissal for failure to state
a claim. Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248
(4th Cir. 2005). Dismissal is proper only if the plaintiff has
failed to “present factual allegations that ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Jackson v. Lightsey,
775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014). Similarly, we review de novo
a grant of summary judgment. Seabulk Offshore, Ltd. v. Am. Home
Assur. Co., 377 F.3d 408, 418 (4th Cir. 2004). We must “view[]
the facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. Summary judgment is
inappropriate if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
We must construe pro se complaints liberally, Jackson, 775
F.3d at 178, and “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is
particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se
10 complaint raising civil rights issues,” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d
736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original).
III.
The First Amendment’s protection of the right to exercise
religious beliefs extends to all citizens, including inmates.
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). In
Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court held that “when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The Turner
Court laid out a four-factor test for determining whether a
prison regulation that infringes on an inmate’s First Amendment
rights is nonetheless reasonable and therefore constitutionally
valid. First, is there “a ‘valid, rational connection’ between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest
put forward to justify it[?]” Id. Second, are there
“alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to
prison inmates[?]” Id. at 90. Third, what is “the impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally[?]” Id. And finally, do there exist
“obvious, easy alternatives” suggesting that the regulation is
“an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns[?]” Id. Under
11 this framework, “[t]he burden . . . is not on the State to prove
the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to
disprove it.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
RLUIPA provides more stringent protection of prisoners’
free exercise rights than does the First Amendment, applying
“strict scrutiny instead of reasonableness.” Lovelace v. Lee,
472 F.3d 174, 186 (4th Cir. 2006). It prohibits any government
entity from imposing a “substantial burden” on an inmate’s
religious exercise unless the burden “is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive
means of furthering that . . . interest.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-1(a). The inmate bears the initial burden of showing a
substantial burden on her religious exercise, but the government
must establish that the burden is the least restrictive way to
further a compelling governmental interest. Id. § 2000cc-2(b).
“The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally
demanding, and it requires the government to show that it lacks
other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting
party.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 864 (2015) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).
A.
Jehovah and Appellees agree that summary judgment of
Jehovah’s RLUIPA claim regarding VDOC’s wine ban was improper
12 for two reasons. First, Jehovah did not have the opportunity to
brief the issue of whether the wine ban substantially burdened
his religious exercise. The district court held that Jehovah
had not demonstrated a substantial burden. But the court had
previously found, during the motion-to-dismiss stage, that
“[p]rohibiting plaintiff from taking wine with communion burdens
the exercise of his religion.” J.A. 55. Because of this, the
parties did not address the substantial burden prong of RLUIPA
in their summary judgment briefing. A district court may
resolve a motion for summary judgment on grounds not raised by a
party, but it must first provide notice and a reasonable time to
respond. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f); see also Coward v. Jabe, 532 F.
App’x 328, 329 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (“After giving
notice and a reasonable time to respond, the district court may
grant a motion for summary judgment on grounds not raised by a
party.”). Jehovah was not afforded the requisite opportunity to
demonstrate an issue of material fact regarding the burden
imposed by the wine ban.
Second, the parties agree that the record is insufficient
to support the conclusion that the wine ban is the least
restrictive means to address the government’s purported security
13 interest. 8 The Robinson Affidavit, which Appellees proffered in
support of their summary judgment motion, does not even attempt
to explain why an absolute ban is the least restrictive measure
available. At the very least, the government must “acknowledge
and give some consideration to less restrictive alternatives.”
Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2012). 9 Both Jehovah
and Appellees agree that this burden has not yet been satisfied,
and we agree. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s
summary dismissal of Jehovah’s RLUIPA wine ban claim and remand
for further proceedings.
Although we must subject Jehovah’s First Amendment claim to
a standard more deferential to VDOC, we find that a reasonable
jury could rule in Jehovah’s favor. Under Turner, Jehovah bears
the burden of showing not only that his religious exercise was
substantially burdened, but also that the wine ban is not
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482
U.S. at 89; see also Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. The district
8Jehovah also argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the government’s security interest is compelling. Appellant’s Br. 38-40. 9 Jehovah has put forth a number of less restrictive alternatives, including: 1) to apply the same security measures used for medication to wine, 2) to allow Jehovah an accommodation to drink wine, and 3) to exclude inmates who have been convicted of infractions involving stealing or alcohol and inmates with a history of alcoholism.
14 court based its First Amendment holding on its finding that
Jehovah failed to demonstrate a substantial burden on his
religious exercise. As with the RLUIPA claim, the court failed
to provide notice that it would be considering this alternative
ground for summary judgment. However, we may affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on any ground in the
record. Bryant v. Bell Atlantic Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132
(4th Cir. 2002). Therefore, we must determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists regarding whether the wine ban is
unreasonable under Turner.
Turner’s first prong asks whether there is a rational
connection between a legitimate penological interest and the
policy infringing on an inmate’s free exercise. 482 U.S. at 89.
The Robinson Affidavit attests that the communion wine policy is
motivated by “safety and security concerns,” specifically
intended to avoid the mishandling of alcohol and to prevent
inmates who have struggled with alcoholism from engaging in
unhealthy behavior. J.A. 81-82. Promoting the inmates’ safety
and health is a legitimate concern. See McRae v. Johnson, 261
F. App’x 554, 558 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (finding that
“in the prison setting, suppression of contraband . . . [and]
maintaining the health and safety of inmates and
staff . . . constitute compelling governmental interests.”
(emphasis added) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722
15 (2005)). It also seems clear that the communion wine ban is, in
the most general sense, logically connected to its asserted
goal: restricting inmate wine consumption is a rational
approach to preventing alcohol misuse and abuse. What is
unclear, however, is whether the other Turner prongs – the
availability of alternative means of exercising the right, the
impact of accommodation, and the existence of alternatives --
support the conclusion that the wine ban is reasonable.
In the First Amendment context, “the availability of
alternative means of practicing religion is a relevant
consideration.” Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862; see also O’Lone, 482
U.S. at 351-52 (analyzing an absolute ban on attending Jumu’ah
and addressing whether inmates “retain the ability to
participate in other Muslim ceremonies” (emphasis added)).
Although the ban at issue prohibits drinking wine at communion,
it does not prevent inmates from engaging in other aspects of
communion, nor does it affect other religious practices. It is
noteworthy, however, that a previous version of the ban
permitted inmates to consume wafers dipped in wine. That
version, like the current one, allowed clergy to bring one fluid
ounce of wine into the prison. Neither version categorically
prohibits alcohol on the premises. The only difference between
the two policies is that inmates used to have an alternative
means of consuming communion wine in a controlled environment,
16 whereas now they are completely barred from participating in
that practice.
Regarding the impact of an accommodation on other inmates,
guards, and prison resources, the record is largely silent.
Drawing reasonable inferences in Jehovah’s favor, however, a
reasonable jury could find that exempting Jehovah from the ban
would have a minimal impact on prison resources. Wine is
already permitted on the premises, and religious services take
place in a controlled environment in which Jehovah would be
supervised. Furthermore, a jury could find that the prison
population would not be endangered by a single inmate with no
history of alcohol abuse consuming a small amount of wine in
this setting.
Finally, Jehovah has proposed several alternatives to the
ban, including: 1) to apply the same security measures used for
medication to wine, 2) to allow Jehovah an accommodation to
drink wine, and 3) to apply the ban only to inmates who have
been convicted of infractions involving stealing or alcohol and
inmates with a history of alcoholism. A reasonable jury could
find that at least one of these alternatives is so “obvious” and
“easy” as to suggest that the ban is “an exaggerated response.”
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Therefore, we reverse the district
court’s summary dismissal of Jehovah’s First Amendment wine
communion claim.
17 B.
The district court dismissed Jehovah’s Sabbath work claims
because “prisoners have no constitutional right to job
opportunities while incarcerated.” J.A. 56. As Jehovah rightly
points out, however, this is not the correct focus of the RLUIPA
and First Amendment inquiries. The constitutional right in
jeopardy is Jehovah’s right to free exercise of his religious
beliefs; the unavailability of prison jobs accommodating his
Sabbath schedule is the alleged burden on that right.
To state a RLUIPA claim, Jehovah need only plead facts
tending to show a substantial burden on his exercise of
sincerely held religious beliefs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); see
also Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114,
1125 (9th Cir. 2013) (“To survive a motion to dismiss on their
RLUIPA claim, plaintiffs must allege facts plausibly showing
that the challenged policy and the practices it engenders impose
a substantial burden on the exercise of their religious
beliefs.”). “[A] substantial burden on religious exercise
occurs when a state or local government, through act or
omission, puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Here, Jehovah has alleged that his religion requires him to
abstain from working during the “Old Jewish” and “New Christic”
18 Sabbaths. He has pled that his cleaning job would not
accommodate his Sabbath observances, that his requests for job
transfers were denied, and that VDOC staff has not approved him
for any job for which he has applied since December 2011. He
has further alleged that he will face sanctions and lose the
opportunity to accrue good conduct allowances and earned
sentence credits if he fails to work for 30-40 hours per week.
Appellees argue that Jehovah simply wishes more jobs would
accommodate his Sabbath schedule, and that therefore he is not
substantially burdened. They rely on Jehovah’s assertion that
“there are few prison jobs available to him at SIP and other
prisons which he can work and keep observing the Sabbaths.” See
J.A. 27 (Compl. ¶ 32) (emphasis added). However, viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Jehovah, and applying the
requisite liberal construction to his pro se pleadings,
Jehovah’s assertion that there are few jobs available to him is
not inconsistent with his having applied for and been rejected
from all of those jobs. As Jehovah puts it, these other jobs
are available to him “in theory,” but he has “plainly alleged
that these jobs were made unavailable to him.” Appellant’s
Reply Br. 14 (emphasis in original). Jehovah has alleged facts
that support a plausible claim to relief. We therefore reverse
the district court’s dismissal of Jehovah’s RLUIPA claim and
19 The standard for stating a free exercise claim under the
First Amendment is more stringent. Jehovah bears the burden not
only of demonstrating an infringement of his religious beliefs,
but also of showing that VDOC’s refusal to accommodate his
Sabbath work schedule is not rationally related to a legitimate
penological interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Still, Jehovah’s
pro se civil rights complaint meets the low bar of the motion-
to-dismiss stage. It is difficult to see what interest is
served by making it impossible for Jehovah to perform his
required work hours entirely during the week. One reasonably
could determine that granting Jehovah an individual
accommodation is an “obvious, easy alternative[]” that suggests
VDOC’s actions are unreasonable. Drawing all reasonable
inferences in Jehovah’s favor, he has set forth a plausible
claim for relief. See Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178. Therefore, the
district court erred in dismissing Jehovah’s First Amendment
claim.
C.
The district court dismissed Jehovah’s housing claims
because it found that Jehovah “has no right to choose a cellmate
based on that person’s religious preferences or background.”
J.A. 57. As discussed above, however, the proper inquiry is
whether and to what extent VDOC burdened Jehovah’s right to
20 exercise his sincerely held religious beliefs by assigning him
cellmates who did not share his religious views.
Jehovah’s RLUIPA claim must survive the motion-to-dismiss
stage if he has pled facts tending to show that VDOC’s refusal
to accommodate his housing requests “put[] substantial pressure
on [him] to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). Jehovah has alleged that VDOC required
him to “share a cell or anything with persons who are anti-
Christian and unbelievers” in contravention of his religious
beliefs. J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 34). This allegation alone does not
demonstrate that being housed with non-Christians has pressured
him to change his religious conduct. Jehovah takes issue with
the exposure to non-Christians, not with any effect it has on
his religious activities. As Appellees note, the few
jurisdictions to address this question have found that being
housed with an inmate who does not share the plaintiff’s
religious beliefs “does not inhibit or constrain [the
p]laintiff’s religious conduct.” Steele v. Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d
99, 102 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003); see also Rogers v. Hellenbrand,
No. 03-C-230-C, 2004 WL 433976, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 4, 2004)
(“There is no indication in his briefs, evidence or proposed
facts that simply being exposed to the religious views of others
21 hinders [the plaintiff’s] ability to exercise his own religion
in any way . . . .”), aff’d, 118 F. App’x 80 (7th Cir. 2004).
In addition to his general complaints of being assigned
non-Christian cellmates, however, Jehovah asserts that he was
housed with a particular inmate who subjected Jehovah to “anti-
Christian” rhetoric. J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 35). Jehovah states
that he was “burdened, mocked, and harassed on account of [h]is
religious views by being housed in a cell with” this inmate.
J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 37). Construing Jehovah’s pro se complaint
liberally, it is reasonable to infer that Jehovah’s religious
practices were chilled by his cellmate’s religiously motivated
harassment. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, this qualifies as a
sufficient prima facie showing under RLUIPA. 10 We therefore
reverse the district court’s dismissal of Jehovah’s RLUIPA cell
assignment claim.
For his First Amendment cell assignment claim to survive,
Jehovah must allege sufficient facts showing that VDOC’s refusal
to assign him a different cellmate was not reasonably related to
a legitimate penological interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
10Since Jehovah has sufficiently pled that his housing assignments substantially burdened his religious exercise, the parties agree that remand is appropriate because the record does not establish whether VDOC’s housing assignment policy is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.
22 Giving his complaint its due liberal construction, we find that
he has done so. Jehovah states that his cell assignments were
“deliberately done . . . to harass and cause conflict and
problems for [him].” J.A. 29 (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 41 & n.18).
Furthermore, he asserts that his cell assignments have
contravened a SIP housing policy requiring an equivalence in
cellmates’ criminal and disciplinary records. J.A. 29 (Compl.
¶ 41 n. 18). He filed two grievances regarding his issues with
the inmate who allegedly harassed him but never received a
response. 11 J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 37). Given these allegations
suggesting that VDOC was motivated not by a legitimate
penological concern but by animus, Jehovah has successfully
alleged facts supporting a plausible claim to relief.
Therefore, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of
Jehovah’s First Amendment cell assignment claim.
IV.
A claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the
Eighth Amendment requires two showings, one objective and one
subjective. First, the inmate must prove that “the deprivation
of a basic human need was objectively sufficiently serious.”
11 Jehovah’s residence with this inmate came to an end when Jehovah was placed in disciplinary segregation.
23 De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted, emphasis in
original). Second, she must prove that “subjectively the
officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted, emphasis
in original).
“Only extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the
objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding
conditions of confinement.” Id. Therefore, Jehovah must allege
a serious injury or a substantial risk of such. Id. Taking the
facts in the light most favorable to Jehovah, they are
sufficient to support such a finding. Jehovah’s alleged
ailments fill two pages of his complaint and include constant
chest pain, chronic headaches, and diminished hearing and
eyesight. J.A. 37-38 (Compl. ¶ 69). Furthermore, Jehovah
asserts that he has since been diagnosed with pulmonary
hypertension with right ventricle hypertrophy, a serious and
sometimes fatal condition.
Appellees do not appear to dispute that Jehovah’s
innumerable alleged symptoms constitute serious health issues.
Rather, they focus on the subjective component of Jehovah’s
claim. Jehovah must show that his doctors were deliberately
indifferent, or rather, that they “actually kn[e]w of and
24 disregard[ed] an objectively serious condition, medical need, or
risk of harm.” De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634.
Appellees argue that Jehovah cannot meet this bar because
he received extensive treatment from Dr. King and his other
doctors. But the fact that Jehovah received some treatment is
consistent with the allegation that his doctors ignored and
failed to treat many of his symptoms. See id. at 635 (finding
that the fact that the plaintiff received some treatment did not
mean she received treatment for a particular ailment or that the
treatment was reasonable). Jehovah has alleged that his doctors
acknowledged some symptoms but ignored most, disregarded
abnormal test results, and failed to treat any of his symptoms
effectively. In other words, he has pled facts that, if true,
would establish that his doctors “actually kn[e]w of and
disregard[ed] an objectively serious condition, medical need, or
risk of harm.” Id. at 634. Dismissal of Jehovah’s claim is not
appropriate unless he has failed to present factual allegations
supporting a plausible claim to relief. See Jackson, 775 F.3d
at 178. That is not the case here. Therefore, the district
court erred in dismissing Jehovah’s Eighth Amendment claim.
25 V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 12
12 In light of our opinion, the district court should also reconsider Jehovah’s requests for discovery.