Jergens v. City of Los Angeles

103 Cal. App. 2d 232
California Court of Appeal·Decided April 2, 1951·No. Civ. No. 17765·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

SHINN, P. J.—

This action involves the disposition of surface water's in a district in the San Fernando Valley section of the city of Los Angeles, lying northerly of the intersection of Van Nuys Boulevard and the coast line of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company. Plaintiff seeks protection against the flooding of its land by water which it alleges will be accumulated at the intersection and diverted to its land by works already established by the city and by the paving of additional sections of the boulevard as planned by the city at the time the action was commenced. It is not the purpose of the action to prevent the contemplated improvement altogether, but only until the city has made provision to carry the expected excessive quantities of water easterly to the Tu junga Wash, a natural and well developed flood control channel.

The area to be considered in the solution of the drainage problem consists of the surface of Van Nuys Boulevard for a distance of about 2% miles north of the intersection, together with certain areas from which drainage would be toward the boulevard. Due to the slope of the boulevard any water which reaches the paved surface flows south to the intersection. Just north of the intersection water flows into catch basins, which the city has installed underneath the pavement, thence through a culvert designated “C” to and along a ditch in the northerly part of the railroad right of way for a distance of 600 feet, thence underneath the right of way through a culvert (“A”) opening to the south toward plaintiff’s adjoining land. Along each side of the right of way is a depression extending easterly and westerly but these have not the capacity to hold any considerable amount of water.

At the time the action was instituted the boulevard was paved for a distance of 2,000 feet northerly from the intersection and it was planned to pave it for an additional 4,000 feet. In this area the boulevard is 100 feet wide. A temporary injunction was issued, the effect of which was to cause discontinuance of the work pending a trial of the action. The judgment granted an injunction which affected only about 45 acres from which surface water would drain onto the boulevard. The city was restrained from approving the opening or improving of any streets in this area unless they are graded to drain away from the boulevard from points not more than 15 feet from the east, or the west edge of the boulevard, as the case might be. There was also a provision that would require water collected in alleys in any new subdivisions in the same eastern area to be drained away from the boulevard. [235] Plaintiff, deeming the relief granted to be inadequate, has appealed from the judgment. The respondents are the city and Panorama Village, a corporation which intervened in the action because of its ownership of a large real estate development east of the boulevard.

The legal principle governing the disposition of surface waters is simple and well established. It was stated in Heier v. Krull, 160 Cal. 441, 444 [117 P. 530], as follows: “Every landowner must bear the burden of receiving upon his land the surface water naturally falling upon land above it and naturally flowing to it therefrom, and he has the corresponding right to have the surface water naturally falling upon his land or naturally coming upon it, flow freely therefrom upon the lower land adjoining, as it would flow under natural conditions. Prom these rights and burdens, the principle follows that he has a lawful right to complain of others, who, by interfering with natural conditions, cause such surface water to be discharged in greater quantity or in a different manner upon his land, than would occur under natural conditions. This is the settled law of this state. (Conniff v. San Francisco, 67 Cal. 45, 49 [7 P. 41]; Ogburn v. Connor, 46 Cal. 346, 351 [13 Am. Rep. 213]; McDaniel v. Cummings, 83 Cal. 515, 519 [23 P. 795, 8 L.R.A. 575]; Gray v. McWilliams, 98 Cal. 157, 162 [32 P. 976, 35 Am.St.Rep. 163, 21 L.R.A. 593]; Stanford v. San Francisco, 111 Cal. 198 [43 P. 605]; Hicks v. Drew, 117 Cal. 305 [49 P. 189]; Rudel v. Los Angeles County, 118 Cal. 281, 288 [50 P. 400]; Cushing v. Pires, 124 Cal. 663, 665 [57 P. 572]; Cloverdale v. Smith, 128 Cal. 230, 233 [60 P. 851]; Larrdbee v. Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 99 [63 P. 143]; Wood v. Moulton, 146 Cal. 317 [80 P. 92].) ” Later cases are Los Angeles Brick & C. Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.App.2d 478 [141 P.2d 46], Dick v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.App. 724 [168 P. 703] and Farrell v. Ontario, 36 Cal.App. 754 [173 P. 392].

Respondents do not contend for any other principle. They cite Womar v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.App.2d 643 [114 P.2d 704], Turner v. Hopper, 83 Cal.App.2d 215 [188 P.2d 257], Le Brun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308 [291 P. 825, 72 A.L.R. 336], contending that these cases have application to the facts of the instant case. But the facts in the cases they rely on are clearly distinguishable. In all of them the problem of surface water had not been created artificially for the complaining landowner, but had existed before the construction of the works in question. Such is not the present case. Even [236] in times of heavy rainfall surface water has not been drained to plaintiff’s land from areas which will drain into the paved boulevard; plaintiff has not in the past had a surface water problem.

Respondents say first that the city has done nothing which would bring the case within the foregoing rule under which plaintiff claims protection; that the grading and paving of the boulevard and the development of a rural community to the north have not “diverted” any storm water so as to cause it to flow in an unnatural manner and, hence, that although storm water, if not controlled, will at some future time be collected in large quantities and discharged upon plaintiff’s land, where none has hitherto found its way, plaintiff is bound to receive this water upon its land unless the city shall see fit to dispose of it in some other manner. In order to sustain this position it was incumbent upon respondents to show that the paving of the boulevard would not result in the discharge of excessive quantities of water upon plaintiff’s land. As we shall see, all the evidence was to the contrary. The city’s own engineers and all the other engineering experts who testified from the charted history of rainfall in the district agreed that storm waters will inevitably be carried to plaintiff’s land in flooding quantities. The second contention of the respondents is that this will not happen in the immediate, or forseeable future, but only when the district is fully “urbanized,” and they argue that the present action is prematurely brought. These contentions will be considered together.

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Jergens v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. App. 2d 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951).

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