1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEREMY ANDREW HULES and NO. CV 25-10591-FMO (AGR) 12 STEPHANIE LYNN HULES,
13 Plaintiffs, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE COURT SHOULD NOT 14 v. RECOMMEND DISMISSAL OF 15 COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., AMEND 16 Defendants. 17
18 I. 19 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 20 21 Plaintiffs Jeremy Andrew Hules and Stephanie Lynn Hules filed a complaint 22 on November 4, 2025 and paid the filing fee. (Dkt. No. 1.) The complaint names 23 two categories of defendants: (1) the County of Ventura, County Clerk-Recorder- 24 25 Registrar Michelle Ascencion in her official and individual capacity, and Sr. 26 Deputy Sheriff Sean Eskridge in his official and individual capacity (hereinafter 27 “County Defendants”); and (2) the State of California, Governor Gavin Newsom in 28 1 his official and individual capacity, and Secretary of State Shirley Weber in her 2 official and individual capacity (hereinafter “State Defendants”). 3 For the reasons set forth below, the Court orders Plaintiffs to show cause, 4 5 in writing, on or before February 27, 2026, why it should not recommend 6 dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend. 7 II. 8 LEGAL STANDARDS 9 10 “[C]ourts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject 11 matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” 12 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). “If a court 13 determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 14 15 dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 16 A district court may dismiss a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on 17 its own motion if it gives Plaintiffs notice of its intention to dismiss the complaint 18 and an opportunity to file a written memorandum in opposition. Seismic Reservoir 19 20 2020, Inc. v. Paulsson, 785 F.3d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Belanus v. 21 Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 2015) (“frivolous action clogs the system and 22 drains resources regardless of whether the plaintiff pays the filing fee or proceeds 23 in forma pauperis”). 24 25 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 26 ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 27 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 28 1 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 2 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 3 standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a 4 5 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citations omitted). 6 The “tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained 7 in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the 8 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 9 10 suffice.” Id. at 678; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 11 The court reviews the complaint, materials that are the subject of judicial 12 notice, and materials “submitted as part of the complaint.” See Lee v. City of Los 13 Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 14 15 Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). 16 A pro se complaint is liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 17 94 (2007) (per curiam). Plaintiffs proceeding pro se should be given a statement 18 of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to cure them unless it is clear 19 20 the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 21 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, “district courts are only required to 22 grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not 23 required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. 24 25 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 26 27
28 1 III. 2 ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT 3 Plaintiffs attempted to record a document entitled “The united states of 4 5 America, And In The Republic state of California” “NOTICE OF, CERTIFICATE 6 OF ACCEPTANCE OF DECLARATION OF LAND PATENT.” (Exh. A to Compl.) 7 The Clerk-Recorder-Registrar of the County of Ventura issued a 8 Notification of Unrecordable Document pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 27203- 9 10 27204. (Exh. B to Compl.) The Notification states that the Notice of Certificate of 11 Acceptance of Declaration of Land Patent presented on December 1, 2023 is 12 “unrecordable, [t]here are no provisions to record this type of document.” (Id.; 13 Compl. at 4 ¶ A, at 6 ¶ F.) The Notification states that there is a “right to judicial 14 15 review of the recorder’s refusal to record the document in any court of competent 16 jurisdiction.” (Exh. B to Compl.); Cal. Gov’t Code § 27203(a)(2). 17 Plaintiffs allege that their use of a public recording service has thereby 18 been impaired by California and the County of Ventura. (Compl. at 4 ¶¶ A-C.) 19 20 Plaintiffs apparently submitted to the County of Ventura documents entitled 21 “Removal of Patented Land from Tax Rolls.” (Exh. C to Compl.) Plaintiffs 22 purported to “give notice of removal of patented land from the tax rolls of the 23 County of Ventura.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs also submitted a document entitled “La 24 25 Paz County Recording District Court of Record of the Land Jurisdiction” “Notice of 26 Dispute, Demand and Affidavit of Status” and other attachments. (Exh. D to 27 Compl.) These documents state, among other things, that Plaintiffs’ “land is 28 1 private property and has legal and lawful protections from encumbrance (ie 2 taxation) under settled superior law pertaining to land patents.” (Id. at 2.) 3 Plaintiffs allege that the County of Ventura Treasurer-Assessor has refused 4 5 to respond to Exhs. C-D despite a “lawful responsibility to respond to such 6 claims.” (Compl. at 5 ¶ E.) 7 Plaintiffs “stopped paying property taxes beginning with the 2024-2025 8 billing cycle.” (Compl. at 6 ¶ I.) The County of Ventura Treasurer-Tax Collector 9 10 issued a “Defaulted Secured Property Tax Bill” indicating that Plaintiffs’ property 11 taxes are in defaulted status for 2024-2025.1 (Exh. F to Compl.) For residential 12 property that is tax defaulted, the Defaulted Secured Property Tax Bill notifies of 13 the “Tax Collector’s power to sell 5 years after the first year of delinquency.” (Id.) 14 15 Plaintiffs contend that Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 3691 conflicts with the Fourth 16 Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects the right of the 17 people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 18 unreasonable searches and seizures. (Compl. at 6-7 ¶ I.) 19 20 Plaintiffs allege that Senior Deputy Sheriff Eskridge refused to investigate 21 or intervene “with a felony act in the process of being committed.” (Id. at 6 ¶ G.) 22 Plaintiffs allege that California, Governor Newsom, and Secretary of State 23 Weber engaged in a “pattern of behavior under the RICO Act.” (Id. at 7 ¶ J.) 24 25
26 1 The complaint also alleges that their property taxes include local public school district bond assessments. (Compl. at 5 ¶ D.) Plaintiffs allege that these 27 assessments are without rational basis because their local school system uses indoctrination instead of teaching critical thinking and problem-solving skills. 28 1 The complaint demands a jury trial and seeks relief in the form of a court 2 order: (1) appointing a trustee to assume control of California; (2) declaring that 3 Plaintiffs’ property is not subject to the jurisdiction of any “commercial forum or 4 5 for-profit corporation” or their statutes without Plaintiff’s express written consent; 6 (3) requiring County of Ventura to record Exh. A to the complaint and any other 7 papers presented by Plaintiffs even “where no provision exists”; (4) prohibiting the 8 County of Ventura from assessing property taxes and local educational bonds; (5) 9 10 declaring Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 3691 unlawful and requiring the County of 11 Ventura to cease any actions that would force a sale of Plaintiffs’ property 12 described in Exh. A to the complaint due to a tax lien; and (5) awarding damages 13 of $11,450,000 to each plaintiff pursuant to 3571 and RICO. (Id. at 11 ¶¶ A-G.) 14 15 IV. 16 DISCUSSION 17 The complaint appears barred by law, and it does not appear that the 18 deficiencies could be cured by amendment. 19 20 A. Tax Injunction Act 21 Under the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, 22 suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law 23 where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such 24 25 State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The purpose of the TIA is “to prevent federal court 26 intrusion into state tax collection, an area which deserves the utmost comity to 27 state law and procedure.” Jerron West, Inc. v. California State Bd. of 28 1 Equalization, 129 F.3d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1997); see Lowe v. Wahoe Cnty., 627 2 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court repeatedly has 3 characterized the Act as a broad jurisdictional barrier, which limits drastically 4 5 federal court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the 6 collection of taxes.” (citations and quotations omitted)). 7 Plaintiffs’ complaint expressly seeks a court order to prevent the County of 8 Ventura from levying and assessing property tax against Plaintiffs’ property, and 9 10 from collecting in the future unpaid property taxes that Plaintiffs concede they do 11 not pay. “If the owner of non-exempt real property in California fails to pay 12 property taxes, a ‘default is declared’ and the property becomes ‘[t]ax-defaulted 13 property.’” Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Westside Delivery, LLC, 888 14 15 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The “tax collector has the 16 power to sell tax-defaulted property that has not been redeemed after the 17 property has been in default for . . . five years for residential real estate.” Tracht 18 Gut, LLC v. L.A. Cnty. Treasurer & Tax Collector, 836 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 19 20 2016) (citing Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 3691(a)(1)(A)). The complaint also seeks 21 millions of dollars in damages under “U.S. Code § 3571.” It is unknown to which 22 chapter of the U.S. Code the complaint refers, but the TIA precludes an action for 23 damages that challenges state or municipal taxation “so long as a ‘plain, speedy 24 25 and efficient’ remedy is available in state court.” Patel v. City of San Bernardino, 26 310 F.3d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. 27 McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) (“taxpayers are barred by the principle of 28 1 comity from asserting [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax 2 systems in federal courts” and must “seek protection of their federal rights by 3 state remedies”). 4 5 The TIA bars these claims and relief in Plaintiffs’ complaint so long as 6 Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy in state court. “The state court remedy need 7 only meet ‘certain minimal procedural criteria.’ Specifically, the party challenging 8 the state tax must have access to ‘a full hearing and judicial determination’ of all 9 10 federal constitutional objections to the tax.” Lowe, 627 F.3d 1155 (quoting 11 Rosewell v. La Salle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 512 (1981)). The state court 12 remedy need not be “the best remedy available or even equal to or better than the 13 remedy which might be available in the federal courts.” Id. at 1155-56. 14 15 The California Constitution provides that a taxpayer may seek a refund of a 16 disputed tax amount after the tax has been paid. Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 32 (“No 17 legal or equitable process shall issue in any proceeding in any court against this 18 State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax. After 19 20 payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be maintained to recover the 21 tax paid, with interest, in such manner as may be provided by the Legislature.”); 22 Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 4807 (“No injunction or writ of mandate or other legal or 23 equitable process shall issue in any suit, action, or proceeding in any court 24 25 against any county, municipality, or district, or any officer thereof, to prevent or 26 enjoin the collection of property taxes sought to be collected.”). 27 28 1 The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have held that California’s refund 2 procedures provide an adequately “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” for 3 purposes of the TIA. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 4 5 331, 338 (1990) (“To the extent they are available, California’s refund procedures 6 constitute a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.”); Jerron, 129 F.3d at 1339-40 7 (same); Capitol Indus. EMI, Inc. v. Bennett, 681 F.2d 1107, 1118 (9th Cir. 1982) 8 (California “has a ‘plain, speedy, and efficient remedy’ within the meaning of 9 10 Section 1341”); see Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 505 (“remedy which requires property 11 owners contesting their property taxes to pay under protest and if successful 12 obtain a refund . . . is ‘a plain, speedy and efficient remedy”) (citation omitted)). 13 Plaintiffs do not allege that they are unable to pay the assessed property taxes. 14 15 Even if they did so allege, a “demonstrated inability to pay a tax does not remove 16 the jurisdictional bar of the Tax Injunction Act.” Air Polynesia v. Freitas, 742 F.2d 17 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1984). California courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 18 actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 523 19 20 (1975). 21 Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims 22 challenging the levy, assessment, and collection of property taxes under 42 23 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the United States Constitution.2 Marvin F. Poer & 24
25 2 A party has no cause of action directly under the United States Constitution and must bring such claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Azul-Pacifico, 26 Inc. v. Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992); see Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (“§ 1983 merely provides a mechanism for 27 enforcing individual rights secured elsewhere, i.e., rights independently secured by the Constitution”). 28 1 Co. v. Counties of Alameda, 725 F.2d 1234, 1235 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming 2 dismissal of claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages). This 3 defect cannot be cured by amendment. Silver v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2024 U.S. 4 5 Dist. LEXIS 243205, *20 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2024) (dismissing claims barred by 6 TIA without leave to amend). 7 Plaintiffs’ citations to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 do not save these claims. 8 Sections 241 and 242 are criminal statutes that “do not give rise to civil liability.” 9 10 Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming 11 dismissal of claims); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). This 12 defect cannot be cured by amendment. See Romine v. Big O Tires Corp. Hdqtrs., 13 685 Fed. Appx. 516, 517 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of claims under 18 14 15 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 without leave to amend because amendment would be futile). 16 B. Failure to Respond 17 Plaintiffs appear to allege a claim based on the County’s failure to respond 18 to documents entitled “Removal of Patented Land from Tax Rolls” (Exh. C to 19 20 Compl.) and “La Paz County Recording District Court of Record of the Land 21 Jurisdiction” “Notice of Dispute, Demand and Affidavit of Status” and other 22 attachments (Exh. D to Compl.) Plaintiffs allege that the County of Ventura 23 Treasurer-Assessor has refused to respond to Exhs. C-D despite a “lawful 24 25 responsibility to respond to such claims.” (Compl. at 5 ¶ E.) 26 The complaint fails to allege any federal basis for a legal duty to respond to 27 Exhs. C-D. As discussed above, the California Constitution and laws provide 28 1 procedures through which a taxpayer may seek a refund of a disputed tax amount 2 after the tax has been paid. The complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs have 3 availed themselves of such procedures. Although Plaintiffs may communicate 4 5 with the government outside established legal procedures, “the First Amendment 6 does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to 7 respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargain with it.” 8 Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979); see 9 10 also Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) 11 (same); L.F. v. Lake Washington Sch. Dist. #414, 947 F.3d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 12 2020) (“First Amendment does not compel the government to respond to speech 13 directed toward it”). 14 15 The complaint alleges that the failure to respond to Plaintiffs’ submission of 16 Exhs. C-D violates due process and equal protection. The complaint fails to state 17 a claim for relief under either theory of liability. 18 A procedural due process claim has two elements: (1) a protectible liberty 19 20 or property interest; and (2) denial of adequate procedural protections. Thornton 21 v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005). The complaint does 22 not allege facts to support the second element. As discussed above, California 23 law provides a procedure by which a taxpayer who claims a tax is illegal or 24 25 otherwise disputes the tax bill must pay the tax first and then pursue a refund, 26 including by a lawsuit. The complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs complied with 27 this procedure or were denied the opportunity to do so. Rather, the complaint 28 1 alleges the opposite – Plaintiffs “stopped paying property taxes beginning with the 2 2024-2025 billing cycle.” (Compl. at 6 ¶ I.) 3 Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim fares no better. The Equal Protection 4 5 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is essentially a direction that all persons 6 similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 7 Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim, the complaint 8 must allege facts indicating that Defendants acted with an intent or purpose to 9 10 discriminate against them based on their membership in a protected class. Lee v. 11 City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001). Alternatively, under a 12 “class of one” theory, a complaint may allege that Plaintiffs “ha[ve] been 13 intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no 14 15 rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 16 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). The complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs are a 17 member of a protected class or that they were treated differently from similarly 18 situated persons. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 687 (affirming dismissal of equal 19 20 protection claim when crux of complaint was defendants’ failure to treat plaintiffs 21 differently from others similarly situated). 22 The complaint’s attempt to bring this claim under federal criminal statutes is 23 unavailing. As discussed above, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are criminal statutes 24 25 that “do not give rise to civil liability.” Allen, 464 F.3d at 1048; Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 26 1092. The Ninth Circuit has not recognized a private right of action under 18 27 U.S.C. § 1341. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 533 n.1 (9th 28 1 Cir. 1987); see Holscher v. Hess, 837 Fed. Appx. 560, 560 (9th Cir. 2021) 2 (affirming dismissal of claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1341). The criminal statute, 18 3 U.S.C. § 1001, expressly applies only to the “executive, legislative, or judicial 4 5 branch of the Government of the United States” and not state government. 6 Moreover, section 1001 does not contain a private right of action and cannot be 7 the basis of federal jurisdiction. Stockstill v. Fresno Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 2020 8 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46261, *32 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020); see also Andrews v. 9 10 Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (18 U.S.C. § 1001 “do[es] not 11 provide for a private right of action and [is] thus not enforceable through a civil 12 action”). 13 The complaint cites the Supremacy Clause, which makes the federal 14 15 constitution and laws “the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the 16 Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., 17 art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause “invalidates state laws that ‘interfere with, or 18 are contrary to, federal law.” Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., 19 20 Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (citation omitted). However, the complaint does 21 not identify any state law that interferes with or is contrary to any federal law. Nor 22 is it apparent how the Supremacy Clause would create a legal duty to respond to 23 Exhs. C-D. 24 25 Finally, the complaint’s reliance on the public trust doctrine fares no better. 26 “The public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.” PPL Mont., LLC v. 27 Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 28 1 285 (1997) (Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), “was 2 ‘necessarily a statement of Illinois law’”) (citation omitted)); Alaska Constitutional 3 Legal Def. Conservation Fund, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 198 Fed. Appx. 601, 603 (9th 4 5 Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of federal claim under public trust doctrine, which 6 applies only to states). Thus, the public trust doctrine does not provide a basis for 7 federal jurisdiction.3 8 C. Notification of Unrecordable Document 9 10 A county recorder is required to “accept for recordation any instrument, 11 paper, or notice that is authorized or required by statute, or court order to be 12 recorded.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 27201(a)(1)(A). A county recorder is liable for 13 recording “any instrument, paper, or notice, willfully or negligently, untruly, or in 14 15 any manner other than that prescribed by this chapter.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 16 27203(b); Seeley v. Seymour, 190 Cal. App. 3d 844, 863 (1987). 17 Plaintiffs complain that the Clerk-Recorder-Registrar of the County of 18 Ventura issued a Notification of Unrecordable Document pursuant to Cal. Gov’t 19 20 Code §§ 27203-27204 in response to their attempt to record a document entitled 21 Notice of Certificate of Acceptance of Declaration of Land Patent. To be clear, 22 the complaint does not allege that a Notice of Certificate of Acceptance of 23 Declaration of Land Patent is authorized or required by statute to be recorded. 24
25 3 Even under California law, the “public trust doctrine generally concerns the preservation of certain natural public resources.” Lucas v. Santa Maria Pub. 26 Airport Dist., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1025 (1995); e.g., In re Bay-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th 1143, 1154 (2008) (noting state has affirmative duty to take public trust into 27 account in allocating water resources). It is difficult to discern how California’s public trust doctrine could apply to Plaintiffs’ complaint. 28 1 Instead, the complaint cites Cal. Civ. Code § 22.2, which provides: “The common 2 law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the 3 Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the 4 5 rule of decision in all the courts of this State.” As threshold matter, Plaintiffs do 6 not allege that the common law of England requires recordation of a Notice of 7 Certificate of Acceptance of Declaration of Land Patent. Even assuming Plaintiffs 8 could overcome that hurdle, the express terms of Cal. Civ. Code § 22.2 limit 9 10 application of the common law of England when it is “inconsistent with” the laws 11 of California, namely, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 27201(a)(1)(A) and 27203(b). 12 In any event, the Court addresses this claim separately from the claims 13 covered by the TIA because recordation would not affect the County’s ability to 14 15 levy, assess, and collect property taxes on the property described in Exh. A to the 16 complaint. See Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 468 (1896) (noting property 17 received through federal land patent is subject to state and local regulation); 18 Landi v. Phelps, 740 F.2d 710, 713-14 (9th Cir. 1984) (“United States has no 19 20 continuing interest in the property” acquired through federal land patents); Langan 21 v. Langan, 2023 U.S Dist. LEXIS 28519, *3 (D. Az. Feb. 21, 2023) (“Counties 22 have the authority to initiate foreclosure proceedings on patented land when a 23 landowner fails to pay their property taxes.”); see also Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 24 25 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1986) (self-drafted land patents “are frivolous gestures”); 26 Flores v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40137, *4-*5 (E.D. Wis. 27 Mar. 22, 2013) (noting proponents of land patents believe they can prevent 28 1 foreclosure for delinquent property taxes; courts considering these types of claims 2 “have uniformly rejected them, with most courts deeming the claims frivolous”). 3 The complaint fails to state a federal claim for relief based on the Clerk- 4 5 Recorder-Registrar’s issuance of the Notification of Unrecordable Document. As 6 discussed above, the complaint’s attempt to bring this claim under federal criminal 7 statutes is unavailing. Again, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are criminal statutes that 8 “do not give rise to civil liability.” Allen, 464 F.3d at 1048; Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 9 10 1092. The Ninth Circuit has not recognized a private right of action under 18 11 U.S.C. § 1341. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 533 n.1; see Holscher, 837 Fed. Appx. at 12 560. The criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, expressly applies only to the federal 13 government and does not contain a private right of action. Stockstill, 2020 U.S. 14 15 Dist. LEXIS 46261, at *32; see also Andrews, 483 F.3d at 1076 (18 U.S.C. § 1001 16 “do[es] not provide for a private right of action and [is] thus not enforceable 17 through a civil action”). 18 The complaint’s citation to the Supremacy Clause is unavailing because 19 20 Plaintiffs have not identified any federal law that allegedly preempts Cal. Gov’t 21 Code § 27201(a)(1)(A) and § 27203(b). Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 712. To the 22 extent the complaint alleges that the failure to record the Notice of Certificate of 23 Acceptance of Declaration of Land Patent violates the oath of office to support the 24 25 United States Constitution, any such claim is frivolous. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl.3. 26 The public trust doctrine does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction because 27 28 1 the doctrine is “a matter of state law.” PPL, 565 U.S. at 603; Idaho, 521 U.S. at 2 285. 3 D. Failure to Investigate Felony 4 5 The complaint alleges, in conclusory fashion, that Sr. Deputy Sheriff 6 Eskridge “refused to investigate or intervene with a felony act in the process of 7 being committed.” (Compl. at 6 ¶ G.) The complaint does not identify the alleged 8 felony or provide any other facts. 9 10 Plaintiffs do not have a stand-alone federal constitutional right to an 11 investigation of a felony. Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985) 12 (per curiam) (“We can find no instance where the courts have recognized 13 inadequate investigation as sufficient to state a civil rights claim unless there was 14 15 another recognized constitutional right involved.”); Page v. Stanley, 2013 U.S. 16 Dist. LEXIS 80698 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2013) (“Plaintiff had no constitutional right 17 to any investigation of his citizen’s complaint, much less a ‘thorough’ investigation 18 or a particular outcome.”); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 19 20 (1973) (“private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 21 nonprosecution of another”). For the reasons discussed above, the complaint 22 fails to state a claim for relief under any other recognized constitutional right. 23 Therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief against Eskridge. 24 25 E. Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights 26 The complaint alleges that the County Sheriff’s Department, Recorder’s 27 Office, Assessor’s Office, and Treasurer’s Office have collectively infringed upon 28 1 Plaintiffs’ constitutional and federally protected rights as described above. 2 (Compl. at 6 ¶ H.) 3 The complaint cites 18 U.S.C. § 241, but as discussed above, section 241 is 4 5 a criminal statute that “do[es] not give rise to civil liability.” Allen, 464 F.3d at 6 1048; Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092. 7 “Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983.” Lacey v. 8 Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Absent an 9 10 underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiffs do not state a claim for conspiracy. 11 See Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, “a mere 12 allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. 13 Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs must 14 15 allege facts showing “the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds to 16 violate constitutional rights.” Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th 17 Cir. 2010). The complaint must allege “enough factual matter” to support a 18 reasonable inference of conspiracy. Bell, 550 U.S. at 556. The complaint 19 20 contains no facts raising a reasonable inference of an agreement or meeting of 21 the minds to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 22 F. State Defendants 23 The complaint improperly alleges unrelated claims against unrelated parties 24 25 (the State Defendants) in a single lawsuit. Persons may be joined as defendants 26 if “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the 27 alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 28 1 series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common 2 to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). The claims 3 asserted against the State Defendants do not arise out of the same transaction, 4 5 occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and do not involved 6 common questions of law or fact. 7 The complaint asserts a RICO claim against the State of California, 8 Governor Newsom and Secretary of State Shirley Weber. (Compl. at 7-10 ¶¶ J- 9 10 K.) Plaintiffs cannot maintain a RICO action against California and the individual 11 defendants in their official capacity. Abcarian v. Levine, 972 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th 12 Cir. 2020). 13 To state a civil RICO claim against Governor Newsom and Secretary of 14 15 State Weber in their individual capacity, a complaint must allege “‘(1) conduct (2) 16 of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as 17 ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to the plaintiff’s ‘business or property.’” Id. at 18 1028 (citation omitted). 19 20 The complaint fails to allege any cognizable predicate acts. Although the 21 complaint cites 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242, violations of these statutes are not listed in 22 the definition of “racketeering activity” for purposes of RICO. 18 U.S.C. 1961(1). 23 The complaint generally alleges California’s failed fire and water management, 24 25 failed homeless programs, failed high speed rail projects, failed public safety that 26 permits rioting and looting, failed public education, failed border security and 27 immigration enforcement, and failed election logistics (e.g., failure to require proof 28 1 of citizenship for voting). Plaintiffs’ political differences with the current Governor 2 and Secretary of State, however, do not meet the definition of racketeering 3 activity. 4 5 The complaint also fails to allege a cognizable injury to Plaintiffs’ business 6 or property. “[T]o establish statutory standing pursuant to RICO, a plaintiff must 7 show . . . that his alleged harm qualifies as injury to his business or property.” 8 Shulman v. Kaplan, 58 F.4th 404, 410 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks 9 10 omitted). The complaint must allege “(1) harm to a specific property interest 11 cognizable under state law, and (2) that the injury resulted in concrete financial 12 loss.” Glob. Master Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Esmond Nat., Inc., 76 F.4th 1266, 1274 (9th 13 Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 14 15 G. State Law Claims 16 In the absence of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the 17 complaint does not establish federal diversity jurisdiction because the action is not 18 between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 19 20 “A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related 21 state-law claims once it has ‘dismissed all claims over which it has original 22 jurisdiction.’” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 23 Accordingly, the Court would recommend dismissal without prejudice of any state- 24 25 law claims. 26 27
28 l V. 2 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs show cause, 5 | in writing, on or before February 27, 2026, why the Court should not recommend 6 | dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend. 7 8
DATED: January 27, 2026 10 ALICIA G. ROSENBERG 11 United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 91