Jeff Mercer, LLC v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation & Development

222 So. 3d 1017, 2017 WL 2457368, 2017 La. App. LEXIS 1069
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 7, 2017
DocketNo. 51,371-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 222 So. 3d 1017 (Jeff Mercer, LLC v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation & Development) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jeff Mercer, LLC v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation & Development, 222 So. 3d 1017, 2017 WL 2457368, 2017 La. App. LEXIS 1069 (La. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

BROWN, C.J.

I Roth parties in this tort action have appealed from the trial court’s judgment entered in accordance with a jury verdict awarding plaintiff $20 million in damages for “destruction of business” and “loss of future profits.” For the reasons set forth [1021]*1021below, we reverse and render judgment in favor of defendants.

BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jeff Mercer is the sole member and manager of Jeff Mercer, LLC.1 Mercer was qualified as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (“DBE”) under a program established and administered by the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”) in accordance with United States Department of Transportation (“USDOT”) and Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”) regulations. In February 2007, Mercer was hired as a subcontractor by Diamond B, the prime contractor on the DOTD Louisville Avenue Project in Monroe, Louisiana. Mercer’s work included the removal of concrete, adjustment of manholes and catch basins, and rebuilding of curbs and any affected sidewalk portions. In a petition filed on September 5, 2007, plaintiff, Jeff Mercer, LLC, named DOTD and several employees as defendants,2 and alleged that a DOTD inspector on the Louisville Avenue project had attempted to solicit bribes from Mercer during the project. According to Mercer, he rebuffed the inspector and reported him to DOTD officials.

| ^Mercer alleged that after the report was made, DOTD and the named defendants retaliated against the LLC as a DBE. According to Mercer, as a result of this retaliation and discrimination, his business was injured, including “its business reputation, business profits and business relationships,” especially with Diamond B, the prime contractor on the project.

In a supplemental petition filed five years after the initial pleading, Mercer added more individual defendants3 and alleged that DOTD’s retaliatory and discriminatory actions against him continued on projects after the Louisville Avenue project. According to plaintiff, on these subsequent jobs, DOTD, through its employees, made the work difficult and costly. Mercer also asserted for the first time claims of fraud and unfair trade practices. In a second supplemental petition, Mercer added claims that defendants conspired together to put him out of business, and noted that on September 28, 2012, Mercer filed an action against prime contractor Austin Bridge & Road, LP, several of its sureties, and DOTD in East Baton Rouge Parish, seeking over $9 million in contractual damages arising out of one of these subsequent projects.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on July 13, 2015, seeking dismissal of.plaintiffs claims, which they argued were contractual, not based in .tort, and unsupported by any relevant evidence from which plaintiff could, establish-a viable tort claim against defendants. This motion was denied by the trial court shortly before the trial began, which was on laNovember 9, 2015. Following the presentation of Mercer’s witnesses, defendants moved for directed verdict, asserting that: (1) plaintiff had failed to establish a cause of action under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”); and (2) plaintiff had failed to establish a cause of action for [1022]*1022intentional interference with a contract because there was no contractual privity between defendants and plaintiff.

Initially, the trial court only granted directed verdict as to plaintiffs LUTPA claim. After closing arguments, however, the trial court reconsidered its ruling and granted directed verdict as to plaintiffs intentional interference with contract claim. Along with this ruling, the trial judge noted that he had reworked the jury instructions and verdict form. Caught off-guard by the late ruling, defense counsel re-urged a previously made objection to the verdict form and noted general objections to the jury instructions. The case was submitted to the jury on December 4, 2015. The jury found that plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it suffered a loss resulting from a conspiracy by the DOTD and its employees to intentionally harm plaintiff, and that defendants Jenkins, Eason, Murphy, and Lacy had “cooperated in, advised or assisted in the destruction of [Mercer’s] business.” The jury then awarded Mercer damages of $7 million for “destruction of business” and $13 million for “loss of future profits.” A judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict was signed by the trial judge.

Defendants filed a motion for new trial/JNOV on February 26, 2016, which was denied by the trial court on July 29, 2016. Defendants filed the instant appeal, and plaintiff answered the appeal.

I,DISCUSSION

Jury Instructions and Verdict Form

In their first two assignments of error, defendants assert that the trial court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law relevant to plaintiffs case and in submitting to the jury a verdict form which failed to correctly address the law, assumed predicate torts which had been dismissed, and was so confusing and legally inaccurate that it led to the jury’s $20 million verdict in favor of plaintiff.

In brief, plaintiff argues that all assignments of error raised by defendants regarding the instructions and verdict form are barred from consideration by this Court because defendants failed to preserve their right to appeal this issue under La. C.C.P. art. 1793(C). Plaintiff also contends that defendants are prohibited from making any arguments regarding the instructions and verdict form that were not asserted before or immediately after the jury retired. Even if the objections were timely made, urges plaintiff, defendants should not be allowed to address this issue because defense counsel failed to adequately or specifically state reasons for their objections on the record at trial.

Defendants vehemently disagree with plaintiffs position, noting that they timely objected to the trial court’s inclusion of intentional interference with contract in the jury verdict form inasmuch as the claim had just been dismissed via directed verdict. Defendants’ main objection was that the Court was allowing this dismissed claim to serve as the predicate tort for conspiracy. Furthermore, the trial court’s revised jury instructions were the result of a surprise ruling that the judge made after the .parties had made their ^closing arguments and right before the case was to be submitted to the jury. This was not a situation where defendants were making specific objections to the instructions and verdict form at a charge conference for which they had adequate time to prepare. Under the circumstances, urge defendants, and keeping in mind the trial court’s obligation under La. C.C.P. art. 1813(B) to inform the parties within a reasonable time prior to the arguments of the general verdict form and instructions (and the • re[1023]*1023quirement that the court give the parties a reasonable opportunity to make their objections), they objected timely and appropriately.

The contemporaneous objection requirement of La. C.C.P. art. 1793(C) is relaxed and appellate review is not prohibited where there is a plain and fundamental error in the jury instructions or interrogatories. Berg v. Zummo, 00-1699 (La. 04/25/01), 786 So.2d 708, 716 n. 5; Nicholas v. Allstate Insurance Co., 99-2522 (La. 08/31/00), 765 So.2d 1017, 1022-24. See also Wegener v. Lafayette Insurance Co., 10-0810 (La.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
222 So. 3d 1017, 2017 WL 2457368, 2017 La. App. LEXIS 1069, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jeff-mercer-llc-v-state-ex-rel-department-of-transportation-lactapp-2017.