In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00625-CV ___________________________
JEAN MICHEL SZABUNIEWICZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS FORMER TRUSTEE OF THE OAK LAWN INVESTMENT TRUST; OAK LAWN GENERAL, INC.; OAK LAWN HOLDINGS I, L.P.; TEXAS URBAN PROPERTIES, LTD.; TEXAS URBAN GP, INC.; OAK LAWN MEDICAL PROPERTIES, L.P.; WILLOW PARK CONSTRUCTION, INC.; AND GUARANTY FINANCE COMPANY, Appellants
V.
TODD MAY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BEVERLY TRUST, Appellee
On Appeal from the 415th District Court Parker County, Texas Trial Court No. CV25-0171
Before Birdwell, Womack, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
In this restricted appeal, Appellants Jean Michel Szabuniewicz, individually and
in his capacity as former Trustee of the Oak Lawn1 Investment Trust (Szabuniewicz);
Oak Lawn General, Inc.; Oak Lawn Holdings I, L.P.; Texas Urban Properties, Ltd.;
Texas Urban GP, Inc.; Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P.; Willow Park Construction,
Inc.; and Guaranty Finance Company (collectively, the Appellant entities) complain of
the default judgment taken by Appellee Todd May, in his capacity as Trustee of the
Beverly Trust2 (May) in May’s suit against them. Because the trial court erred in
granting default judgment due to error on the face of the record—defects in the
citations and returns of citation—we will reverse and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND
A. May files suit against Appellants and requests issuance of citations.
In February 2025, May filed suit against Appellants, alleging claims for breach
of contract (against Szabuniewicz), breach of fiduciary duty (against Szabuniewicz),
negligence and gross negligence (against Szabuniewicz), conversion (against all
1 At times in the record, “Oak Lawn” is spelled “Oaklawn.” We will use the spelling in the original petition. 2 In 2023, the name of the “Oak Lawn Investment Trust” was changed to the “Beverly Trust,” Szabuniewicz was removed as trustee, and May was named as successor trustee.
2 Appellants), statutory and common law fraud (against Szabuniewicz), fraud in a real
estate transaction (against Szabuniewicz), money had and received (against all
Appellants), fraud by nondisclosure (against Szabuniewicz), trust accounting (against
Szabuniewicz), breach of duty of loyalty and removal of Szabuniewicz (against all
Appellants), declaratory judgment, and attorneys’ fees. According to the petition, the
case involved “breach of fiduciary duties owed by . . . Szabuniewicz as trustee of a
trust.” Specifically, the petition alleged that Szabuniewicz “abused his position as
trustee” and despite being removed as trustee, Szabuniewicz “continue[d] to exercise
control of the entities owned in large part by the trust, allowing him to continue
harming the trust.”3
The petition named “John Michael Szabuniewicz a/k/a John Szabuniewicz” as
a defendant and reflected that he could be served at “8213 Granbury Highway,
Weatherford, Texas 76087.” The petition stated that each of the defendant entities—
Appellant entities herein—“may be served through its registered agent, Corporate
Registered Agent Services, Inc., at 1951 Fort Worth Highway, Suite 105, Weatherford,
Texas 76086.”
3 According to May’s declaration filed in support of his motion for default judgment, the following Appellant entities “were created or utilized as part of the Trust for estate planning purposes”: Oak Lawn General, Inc.; Oak Lawn Holdings I, L.P.; Texas Urban Properties, Ltd.; Texas Urban GP, Inc.; and Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P. With regard to the remaining Appellant entities—Willow Park Construction, Inc. and Guaranty Finance Company—the record reflects that they are “entities Szabuniewicz owns and/or controls.”
3 On the same day that the petition was filed, May’s attorney requested that
citations be issued for all of the Appellants at the same addresses stated in the
petition. The following day, the clerk issued citations.4
B. After service, returns are attached to the motion for default judgment.
Returns of citation were never filed with the clerk. Rather, they were attached
to May’s motion for default judgment, as were certificates of last known mailing
addresses.5 The returns contain no clerk’s file-mark, do not include the clerk’s
citation, and reflect service on all of the Appellant entities as “delivered to the
Authorized Agent by delivering a true copy . . . to: Jean Michel Szabuniewicz aka
John Szabuniewicz at the address of: 1701 Robert Bend, Weatherford, TX 76086 on
4 Consistent with May’s request, the citations for most of the Appellant entities listed “Corporate Registered Agent Services, Inc.” as their registered agent. However, although May requested the same registered agent for Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P., the clerk’s citation listed service on it “[b]y and through its registered agent: Registered Agent Services, Inc.” 5 The certificates of last known mailing addresses contain multiple different addresses for the Appellant entities. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 239a (requiring a party or attorney taking a default judgment to “certify to the clerk in writing the last known email address and mailing address of the party against whom the judgment is taken”). According to those certificates, Oak Lawn General, Inc.’s and Guaranty Finance Company’s last known address was “900 N. Houston St., Granbury, Texas 76048”; Oak Lawn Holdings I, L.P.’s and Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P.’s last known address was “1951 Fort Worth Hwy, Ste. 105, Weatherford, Texas 76086”; Texas Urban Properties, Ltd.’s last known address was “1951 Fort Worth Hwy, Ste. 1951, Weatherford, Texas 76086”; Texas Urban GP, Inc.’s last known address was “900 N. Houston St., Ste. 101, Granbury, Texas 76048”; and Willow Park Construction, Inc.’s last known address was “P.O. Box 2739, Weatherford, Texas 76086.” After taking the default judgment, May listed these same addresses when requesting an abstract of judgment.
4 behalf of” the Appellant entity “by and through Jean Michel Sazabuniewicz [sic].”6
The return on Szabuniewicz states that it was “individually/personally delivered by
delivering a true copy of [certain listed documents] with the date of service endorsed
thereon by me, to: Jean Michel Szabuniewicz a/k/a John Szabuniewicz, Individually
and in [h]is capacity as former trustee of the Oak Lawn Investment Trust.”7
C. After Appellants fail to answer or appear, the trial court has a hearing and enters judgment against Appellants.
Appellants did not answer or otherwise appear. In June 2025, the trial court
had a hearing on May’s motion for default judgment. At the hearing, May’s attorney
stated that the “returns of service for the service on [Appellants] have been on file
since February 28th.” However, no such documents appear in the clerk’s record.
The trial court then proceeded to hear the testimony of May and to admit various
documents into evidence.
On the same day as the hearing, the trial court signed a default judgment
awarding May “from [Appellants] jointly and severally the sum of $7,668,148.24” and
“from [Appellants] jointly and severally reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees in the
sum of $95,189.55” and conditional appellate attorneys’ fees. In addition, the
judgment ordered Szabuniewicz to pay May exemplary damages in the amount of
6 We have removed all emphases that are in the returns. 7 Szabuniewicz’s return reflects service at “1701 Roberts Bend” as opposed to the returns for the Appellant entities at “1701 Robert Bend.”
5 $2,000,000. Finally, it awarded declaratory relief and permanent injunctive relief
against all Appellants. This restricted appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
In six issues,8 Appellants complain about the trial court’s order granting the
default judgment. However, we will address only their first issue—that service failed
to comply with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure—as it is dispositive. See Tex. R.
App. P. 47.1.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A restricted appeal is a direct attack on a trial court’s judgment. Aero at Sp.
Z.O.O. v. Gartman, 469 S.W.3d 314, 315 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.). To
prevail in a restricted appeal, an appellant must establish that (1) it filed its notice of
restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed, (2) it was a party to
8 As phrased by Appellants, the six issues are: (1) Whether the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over [Appellants] because service of process failed to strictly comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 107, rendering the default judgment void; (2) Whether the trial court violated [Appellants’] due-process rights by transferring the case to a different court without notice to [Appellants] before entering a default judgment; (3) Whether the default judgment is unsupported by legally sufficient evidence because the sole witness lacked personal knowledge of key facts and the governing trust agreements expressly authorized the conduct alleged to be wrongful; (4) Whether the trial court erred by awarding $7,668,148.24 in compensatory damages where the record contains no legally sufficient evidence of actual loss, causation, or damages allocation; (5) Whether the trial court erred by imposing joint and several liability against multiple defendants in the absence of evidence establishing a basis for collective liability; and (6) Whether the trial court erred by awarding $2,000,000 in exemplary damages against Szabuniewicz without clear and convincing evidence of fraud, malice, or gross negligence.
6 the underlying lawsuit, (3) it did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the
judgment complained of and did not timely file any post-judgment motions or
requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and (4) error is apparent on the
face of the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c), 30; Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique,
134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004); see also Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 497
(Tex. 2020) (confirming that, unlike the first three restricted appeal requirements, the
error-on-the-face-of-the-record requirement is not jurisdictional).
A default judgment cannot withstand direct attack by a defendant who
complains that he was not served in strict compliance with applicable requirements.
Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990); see World Env’t, L.L.C. v. Wolfpack
Env’t, L.L.C., No. 01-08-00561-CV, 2009 WL 618697, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 12, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A default judgment cannot stand
unless the record shows strict compliance with the rules of civil procedure governing
issuance, service, and return of service.”); see also Huffman Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Colter,
No. 24-0205, 2026 WL 1500963, at *5 (Tex. May 29, 2026) (“The [Texas Supreme]
Court is increasingly skeptical of default judgments, regardless of the precise legal
issue under consideration or the procedural posture in which the case arises.”). There
are no presumptions in favor of valid issuance, service, and return of citation in the
face of a restricted appeal of a default judgment. World Env’t, L.L.C., 2009 WL
618697, at *2. The strict-compliance doctrine considers whether the record shows
that the exact procedural requirements are met and not whether the intended party
7 received notice of the lawsuit. Brookfield Funding, LLC v. Ramey & King Ins. Assocs., Inc.,
No. 02-25-00201-CV, 2025 WL 3558965, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 11,
2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Spanton v. Bellah, 612 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2020)
(stating that because no-answer default judgments are disfavored and because trial
courts lack jurisdiction over defendants who are not properly served with process,
“we have construed ‘strict compliance’ to mean just that”).
When proper service is challenged, it must be proved, not presumed. Shamrock
Enters., LLC v. Top Notch Movers, LLC, 728 S.W.3d 693, 695 (Tex. 2026). No-answer
default judgments are disfavored in Texas and cannot be sustained “absent meticulous
adherence to service requirements.” Id. at 699. “If the record does not affirmatively
demonstrate proper service, a no-answer default judgment cannot stand.” Id. at 696.
“Virtually any deviation from the requisites of statutes and Rules of Civil Procedure
for service of process will destroy a default judgment.” Midstate Env’t Servs., LP v.
Peterson, 435 S.W.3d 287, 289 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, no pet.). It is the
responsibility of the one requesting service to see that service is properly
accomplished. Id. This responsibility extends to assuring that service is properly
reflected in the record. Id.
“The return of service is not a trivial, formulaic document; rather, it is prima
facie evidence of proper service.” Brookfield Funding, LLC, 2025 WL 3558965, at *2.
Defective service is considered error on the face of the record. World Env’t, L.L.C.,
2009 WL 618697, at *2. For purposes of a restricted appeal, the face of the record
8 consists of all the papers on file in the appeal, including the clerk’s record and the
reporter’s record. Norman Commc’ns v. Tex. Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270
(Tex. 1997).
B. Analysis of First Three Restricted Appeal Requirements
Before we consider whether there is error on the face of the record, we must
determine whether Appellants have properly invoked our jurisdiction by satisfying the
first three restricted appeal requirements. See E.H., 602 S.W.3d at 496–97; see also
Mingus v. Claiborne, No. 02-25-00361-CV, 2025 WL 3560109, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Dec. 11, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (analyzing the first three restricted appeal
requirements and concluding that they were met).
Regarding the first requirement, the record reflects that the default judgment
was signed on June 3, 2025, and Appellants filed their notice of restricted appeal on
November 18, 2025. Thus, Appellants filed their notice of restricted appeal before
the six-month deadline. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c).
With regard to the second requirement, May’s petition listed Appellants as
defendants, so they were necessarily parties to the underlying suit. See Reliq Health
Techs., Inc. v. Resurgence Partners, LLC, No. 02-23-00211-CV, 2023 WL 8467376, at *2
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that the
second requirement for a restricted appeal was met because appellant was named as a
defendant in the petition). In addition, the default judgment named all Appellants as
parties. Therefore, the second requirement was met.
9 As to the third requirement, the record reflects that Appellants did not
participate in the trial court proceedings and did not file any post-judgment motions.
Accordingly, Appellants have met the third and final requirement to invoke our
restricted appeal jurisdiction. See Mingus, 2025 WL 3560109, at *2.
C. Analysis of Fourth Requirement: Error on the Face of the Record
In its first issue, Appellants argue that there is error on the face of the record
“because the service of process failed to strictly comply with the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Appellants further contend that there were “numerous defects as to who
was served and as to the name of the case.” We agree.
As to all of the returns, there is no indication on the returns themselves that
they were ever filed with the clerk of the court, let alone that each was on file for ten
days. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 107(g) (“The return and any document to which it is attached
must be filed with the court . . . .”), (h) (“No default judgment shall be granted in any
cause until proof of service as provided by this rule . . . shall have been on file with
the clerk of the court ten days, exclusive of the day of filing and the day of
judgment.”); see also Midstate Env’t Servs., LP, 435 S.W.3d at 290–91 (stating that “there
is no indication on the return itself that it was ever filed with the clerk of the court, let
alone that it was on file for ten days” and that “this is also a defect that would
preclude a default judgment”); Union Pac. Corp. v. Legg, 49 S.W.3d 72, 78 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2001, no pet.) (stating that the clerk’s return of the citation and certified-mail
receipt “do not bear a file mark or other indication that they were in fact filed with the
10 clerk on a particular day, or that they were, indeed, filed at all” and therefore, “they do
not show they were ‘on file’ for the requisite ten days before default judgment was
granted”).
Moreover, the returns for the Appellant entities that were attached to the
motion for default judgment do not reflect proper service on any of the entities. As
we have recently explained, corporations and other legal entities are not persons
capable of accepting service. Nartha Hosp. Grp., L.P. v. Shanks, No. 02-24-00465-CV,
2025 WL 2087933, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 24, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Because they cannot physically accept such service, they must be served through their
authorized agents only, and service to the corporation or entity as a whole or an
individual not listed in the citation is not proper service. Id. “Where service is on a
corporation or entity, Rule 107 requires the return of service to show both the name
of the individual served and that the individual was authorized to receive service on
behalf of the corporation or entity.” Id.; see Hall v. Mansfield Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 02-
24-00201-CV, 2024 WL 5162468, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 19, 2024, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (“When serving an entity’s agent, the citation must affirmatively show
that the individual served is in fact the agent for service.” (emphasis added)); Inlog, Inc.
v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., No. 02-19-00283-CV, 2020 WL 1887846, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Apr. 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]here service is on a corporation,
Rule 107 requires the return to show both the name of the person who received
service and that the person was authorized to do so.”).
11 Texas law provides for personal service of a Texas corporation by requiring the
corporation to designate and continuously maintain a registered agent for service of
process. See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 5.201(a). “A corporation’s registered agent may
be an individual or a corporation, and, in either case the registered agent must
maintain a business office at the corporation’s registered office address.” JD Auto
Corp. v. Bell, 697 S.W.3d 441, 452 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2024, no pet.); see Tex. Bus.
Orgs. Code § 5.201(b)(3). A plaintiff may serve a corporation’s registered agent, its
president, or its vice president to perfect service of process on a defendant
corporation. See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code §§ 5.201(b), .255(1).
“[S]ervice on a limited partnership may be made on its general partner or
registered agent.” WWLC Inv., L.P. v. Miraki, 624 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2021); see
Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code §§ 5.201(b)(1), .255(2). Unlike a corporation, service on a
limited partnership is not authorized to be made through an officer. WWLC Inv.,
L.P., 624 S.W.3d at 800; see Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 5.255(1)–(2) (authorizing service
on a “corporation[’s]” president but omitting a similar authorization for limited
partnerships).
Here, May’s petition alleged that all of the Appellant entities could be served
“through their registered agent, Corporate Registered Agent Services, Inc. at
1951 Fort Worth Highway, Suite 105, Weatherford, Texas 76086.” The clerk then
issued citations accordingly, with the exception of Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P.,
where the citation listed service through its registered agent “Registered Agent
12 Service, Inc.” instead of “Corporate Registered Agent Services, Inc.” However, all of
the returns show service on the Appellant entities as being “delivered to the
Authorized Agent by delivering a true copy . . . to: Jean Michel Szabuniewicz aka
John Szabuniewicz at the address of: 1701 Robert Bend, Weatherford, TX 76086 . . .
by and through Jean Michel Sazabuniewicz [sic].”
Corporate Registered Agent Services, Inc. was the only agent whose authority
was apparent from the face of the record that was authorized to receive service for
any of the Appellant entities. See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 5.201(b) (providing that a
domestic entity may name as its registered agent either an individual residing in the
state or another “organization” that is registered or authorized to do business in the
state). Because the record does not show that the person who was actually served—
Szabuniewicz—was the registered agent or other appropriate person for service,
service of process on each entity was fatally defective. See Bellaire Kingtown, LLC v.
Alegria Dental Care, PLLC, No. 14-24-00192-CV, 2025 WL 3551775, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 11, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The record must
show that the person served was in fact an agent for the business entity authorized to
accept service on its behalf.”); Greystar, LLC v. Adams, 426 S.W.3d 861, 867–68 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (holding that service obtained “by delivering citation to
Greystar LLC ‘by delivering to its’ Office Manager, JAMIE DAITCH’” instead of to
“its registered agent CT Corporation System” as stated on the citation was fatally
defective because “the person who accepted service was not the entity stated on the
13 citation”); see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist.,
180 S.W.3d 903, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (“The record must show
whether the person served was in fact such an agent for the corporation acting as the
registered agent.”); Pharmakinetics Labs., Inc. v. Katz, 717 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1986, no writ) (“[W]hen serving an agent for a corporation or other
entity, the citation must affirmatively show that the individual served is in fact the
agent for service.”).
Moreover, the fact that all of the Appellant entities were served at addresses
that differed from those in the pleadings and the citations raises uncertainty about
whether the appropriate agents of the Appellant entities were indeed served. See Turbo
Rests., LLC v. Reid’s Refrigeration Inc., 657 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022,
no pet.) (concluding that the variation in the addresses raised uncertainty about
whether the corporation’s registered agent was in fact the entity served and noting
that the petition, citation, and certificate of last known mailing address all listed the
registered agent’s address at one place, “yet without explanation, the return of service
shows that service was made at a completely different address in a completely
different zip code”). Other errors on the face of the record include returns that
sometimes spell Appellant’s name “Szabuniewicz” and at other times
“Sazabuniewicz,” thereby creating additional uncertainty about the identity of the
individual who was served. See Hubicki v. Festina, 226 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex. 2007)
(stating that we rigidly enforce rules governing service when a default judgment is
14 rendered because after the defendant fails to respond to the action, “[i]f the defendant
can then show that the person commencing the action was guilty of comparable
nonconformity with procedural rules, under a principle of equality the derelictions
offset each other and the merits of the controversy may be brought forward for
consideration” (quoting Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 837 and Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 3 cmt. d (1982))). Moreover, the returns have an additional defect in that
appellant “Oak Lawn General, Inc.” is identified on each return as “1 Oak Lawn
General, Inc.” While these address and name discrepancies alone may not invalidate
service, service on the wrong person or agent for the Appellant entities does.
Here, the record fails to affirmatively show strict compliance with the rules
governing issuance, service, and return of service. Failure to comply with the strict
rules governing service of citation constitutes error on the face of the record. See Ins.
Co. of St. of Pa. v. Lejeune, 297 S.W.3d 254, 256 (Tex. 2009). Accordingly, we sustain
Appellants’ first issue.
Because these defects alone are sufficient to reverse the default judgment, we
need not address any other complaints that Appellants raise about the returns of
service or the default judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Brookfield Funding, LLC,
2025 WL 3558965, at *2.
15 IV. CONCLUSION
Having sustained Appellants’ first issue and not needing to address the rest, we
reverse the trial court’s default judgment as to all parties9 and remand the case for
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack Justice
Delivered: June 25, 2026
9 See Lytle v. Cunningham, 261 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“When there are co-defendants, and the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over one defendant, the final judgment as to all defendants must be reversed.”); Worldwide Ventures, LP v. 3600 SC I, LLC, No. 03-16-00539-CV, 2018 WL 828965, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (similar).